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- a. Executive Order 12958
- b. DoD Directive 5200.1-R, January 1997
- c. AR 380-5, 28 February 1988

2. UP of references 1 a through c, a mandatory declassification review of the following documents by ODCSINT and ODCSOPS personnel:

- a. USAREUR Annual Historical Report for 1954-1955
- b. USAREUR Historical Report for 1956-1957
- c. USAREUR Historical Report for January 1953 - June 1954
- d. Annual USAREUR Historical Report 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958 ✓

3. The joint review determined that the documents are authorized for **declassification**. The documents were declassified. Please ensure that all internal paragraph and page markings are obliterated at the earliest possible moment.

4. ODCSINT point of contact is Mr. B. F. Hiller, 370-7574/7088.

*Robert J. Thayer*  
ROBERT J. THAYER  
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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT  
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY, EUROPE (U)  
1 JULY 1957 - 30 JUNE 1958



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
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## FOREWORD

The preparation of an annual historical report covering the significant activities of Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, is a current Department of the Army requirement. This report was prepared by the staff of the Current History Branch of the Historical Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, based upon research in headquarters files supplemented by interviews with key staff personnel. The draft was reviewed by interested staff agencies of USAREUR headquarters.

This report is a useful reference for the preparation of plans, the development of staff studies, and for briefing and orientation purposes. Information of a higher security classification may be found in the top secret supplement to this report, which is prepared as a separate document with limited distribution.

Recent monographs and special studies published by this division, which are listed on the inside cover, may be obtained upon request from the Historical Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, APO 164.

*Kenneth E. Lay*

KENNETH E. LAY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Chief, Historical Division

March 1959

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## INTRODUCTION

Many of the significant events that occurred in the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), area of responsibility in FY 1958 stemmed from vigorous efforts to implement the policy that all elements of the command should operate daily in the same manner as they would in war.<sup>1</sup>


Essential to achieving full combat readiness was the development of 100 percent operational atomic capabilities. Continued growth of Russian and friendly stockpiles of atomic munitions posed problems of employment and defense in which the U.S. Army had no previous battle-field experience. To assure offensive success it was necessary to prepare flexible plans that could be implemented rapidly and effectively. Defensive capabilities were improved by emphasis on unit training programs and courses. Methods and procedures for quickly handling mass casualties and overcoming the handicaps resulting from area damage had to be developed.

Pending activation of the NATO integrated air defense organization, CINCUSAFE was assigned the mission of air defense for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), effective 15 August 1958. Toward the end of FY 1958 preparations were made to place all U.S. Army surface-to-air missile units and tactical headquarters under the operational control of CINCUSAFE.

The threat of atomic warfare made necessary the repositioning of combat and support elements of Seventh Army in the most effective combat posture. The program for restationing Seventh Army units north of the Danube River--known as Seventh Heaven--was not fully implemented during FY 1958. The essential problem of financing such a large-scale move had not been resolved between USAREUR headquarters and the German Ministry of Defense. However, many of the features of the Seventh Heaven plan were attained through routine stationing actions.

Most urgent was the realignment of supplies and equipment so that in general fast moving items were forward and slow moving items

<sup>1</sup> Cmts by Cinc, Final Rev Comd Obj FY 1958, 9 Jun 58. GS 68-21.  
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to the rear. This principle was amplified by the balanced dispersion of the war reserves stockage, with emphasis on special weapons systems backup. The program of putting the bulk of stocks into ADSEC and the prestocks into the Seventh Army area--thus achieving maximum self-sufficiency of the combat units--was 27 percent completed by the end of FY 1958. At that time there were 3 permanent and 8 provisional general depots.

The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) also emphasized positioning of balanced, dispersed stocks in the forward area. Its logistical command was organized in the same manner in which it would operate in a war. All headquarters were so organized that they could immediately detach themselves from their garrison responsibilities, leaving small detachments for the closing out of these installations.

Several times during FY 1958 USAREUR resorted to expedients to cope with unexpected fluctuations in fund availability. Such improvised action became necessary in August 1957 when expenditure ceilings were imposed. Various measures were therefore taken to improve financial planning for contingencies such as reductions or increases in funds. In general, the adoption of operational planning methods was to permit the command to make the best use of available money and to meet the continuing fund fluctuations in an orderly manner.

Progress was made to achieve the most economical use of personnel consistent with effective operations. USAREUR's personnel were screened carefully to see if they were, in fact, deserving of the privilege of remaining as members of a quality team. This process of elimination took place within the framework of a fairly drastic reduction in force in virtually every personnel category. By releasing personnel selectively, the command attempted to eliminate its least effective elements.

The USAREUR staff divisions were ordered to eliminate all functions that could be performed more effectively by subordinate commands. The operational activities of the USAREUR technical services, for instance, were shifted to USACOMZEUR; the staff divisions, however, retained their policy-making functions.

Fiscal Year 1958 saw major improvements in the integration of German tactical units into the USAREUR/CENTAG emergency command structure. German divisions, however, required additional combat and combat-support elements for sustained operations.

During the year Seventh Army and the German military districts became directly associated. Moreover, the use of German Army units in place of labor service units--paid from U.S. appropriated funds--was one of the command objectives stressed by General Hodes.

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Continuing emphasis was placed on improving community relations in Germany, France, and Italy. The USAREUR program stressed harmonious relations with the press, both U.S. and foreign. Moreover, American personnel--military, civilian, and dependent--were constantly kept informed on the program and encouraged to participate individually and in groups.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Information based on extracts from pertinent chapters of this report. SECRET.

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## CHAPTER 1

### Mission and Organization

#### 1. National and International Command Relationships

There were no major changes in the national or international relationships of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), during Fiscal Year (FY) 1958 (Chart 1). In the unified U.S. command structure USAREUR remained the senior Army command in the European theater, constituting one component of the triservice U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). For purely Army matters General H. I. Hodes, the Commander in Chief, USAREUR (CINCUSAREUR), was responsible to the Department of the Army, and in areas involving two or more services, to the Commander in Chief, USEUCOM (USCINCEUR). Within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CINCUSAREUR was the Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG).<sup>1</sup> The bulk of USAREUR's combat elements were assigned to CENTAG as part of NATO forces.

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<sup>1</sup>USAREUR headquarters' contribution to the CENTAG staff was 9 officers on a full-time and 7 on a part-time basis. Quite frequently other USAREUR staff officers took care of CENTAG problems in addition to their normal duties.

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## 2. USAREUR

a. Missions. The missions of the U.S. Army, Europe, were consolidated and redefined during FY 1958.<sup>2</sup> This was accomplished by differentiating between USAREUR's peacetime missions and the assigned or deduced general war missions of USAREUR (Theater Army). The assignment of missions was based on the assumption that in time of general war the over-all direction of the Allied effort would be through the existing NATO command structure, but that during peacetime and in combat operations short of general war the NATO military structure would not become operational.<sup>3</sup> Most of the former missions were redefined according to these new criteria, and a few new ones were added. With a few significant exceptions, only the new missions are listed below.

(1) Peacetime and Short-of-General-War Missions. USAREUR was to conduct operations short of general war in accordance with USEUCOM plans and directives. In addition, the command was to designate U.S. Army forces to meet requirements set forth in separate USEUCOM plans for employment of USAREUR forces in adjacent areas. In matters pertaining to the tripartite planning for Berlin, exclusive of airlift, USAREUR was to act as agent for USCINCEUR. Because of the integration of the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, USAREUR assumed responsibility for planning and preparations for the rapid phase-out of dependents and other personnel from Italy as well as from Germany and France. Moreover, a new peacetime intelligence responsibility was to process technicians and specialists who made application for employment in the United States in accordance with Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency programs. In the field of civil affairs, USAREUR was to maintain a trained nucleus of provisional civil affairs and military government units from among personnel available within the command and was to activate these units for operations pending the arrival of corresponding units from the United States. USAREUR was also to act as proponent agency for Joint Tables of Allowance for Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in Pakistan, the Netherlands, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark. Finally, on 23 April 1958 the mission of establishing, supervising, and funding dependents' schools in Ethiopia was added to existing requirements.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Although the USAREUR Mission Register was published on 15 August 1958, after the end of the fiscal year, most of its contents applied to the period covered by this report. (Fonecon, Mr. G. E. Blau, Hist Div, with Lt Col N. Harris, G3 Plans & Pley Br, 28 Jul 58. UNCLAS.)

<sup>3</sup> USAREUR ltr, 15 Aug 58, subj: USAREUR Mission Register (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

<sup>4</sup> USAREUR Msn Regis, 15 Aug 58. SECRET.


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Chart 1

International and National Command Relationships



- Legend
- NATO
  - U.S. Unified Command
  - U.S. National Uniservice Command
  - French National Command
  - German National Command

Source: USAREUR Info Buls, Vol. XII, Nr 12, 21 Oct 57, UNCLAS.  
p. 22; and Vol. XIII, Nr 4, 30 Apr 58, p. 9. UNCLAS.

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(2) General War Missions. One of the missions specified solely for wartime conditions was to establish and maintain fixed liaison with regional and local national territorial command units in order to assist in coordination and mutual support. Furthermore, the wartime headquarters would have to determine resources of local areas for logistical support and the effect of levies upon such areas, to provide continuous estimates and reports of refugee movements and concentrations, to report the status of local governments and their capability to continue to govern, and to monitor and report requirements for logistical support of the civilian populace when indigenous resources would be inadequate for the security of Allied forces or the success of their operations. Also, USAREUR (Theater Army) would have to provide a branch prisoner of war information center, prisoner of war and civilian internee facilities, and other administrative and logistical support for personnel interned by U.S. forces.

(3) Combined Peacetime and General War Missions. USAREUR (Theater Army) was to exercise command--excluding that operational command or control exercised by NATO, Allied, or other U.S. commanders--over all U.S. Army forces allocated to USCINCEUR, except those assigned to Military Advisory Assistance Groups and Missions. Since USAREUR was given command over the U.S. ground forces in Italy, many of USAREUR's missions had to be expanded to include USASETAF's responsibilities, and some new statements of missions had to be added.

In the field of advanced weapons, USAREUR was to support, as directed, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and other advanced weapons systems deployed to U.S. and non-U.S. NATO ground forces for support of SACEUR's war plans. Until fired the U.S. Army atomic warheads allocated to the NATO atomic stockpile for delivery by U.S. and non-U.S. forces were to be kept in USAREUR's custody. For this purpose, USAREUR was to plan, program, and budget for three major areas of responsibility; the provision of atomic warheads, in the event of emergency, to non-U.S. NATO delivery units employing U.S. Army ground force advance weapon systems in support of SACEUR defense plans; the furnishing of initial repair parts resupply and heavy maintenance support until non-U.S. NATO countries could assume this responsibility; and the providing of technical assistance and advice for the introduction of U.S. Army ground force weapons into these NATO countries. Dealing through the MAAG's, USAREUR was to provide to NATO recipient countries over-all coordination, support, and consultative service for the introduction of Army surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile equipment.

Both in peace and war, USAREUR was to be responsible for the security of forces and installations, including area damage control, in coordination with other U.S. and Allied forces. The command also had the mission of preparing base development plans to support the strategic concepts and phased force expansions outlined in USCINCEUR plans.

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In the sphere of civilian evacuation, USAREUR had the new mission of exercising movement control over all U.S. surface movements in Central Europe required in the implementation of the U.S. noncombatant evacuation plans and all joint alert plans.

In addition to continuing intelligence missions already assigned, USAREUR was to provide cover and logistical support for certain U.S. intelligence agencies as directed by the Department of the Army.

While he previously had been designated as the Commanding Officer for implementation of Article VII of the NATO status of forces agreement in Belgium and France, CINCUSAREUR was now to assume this responsibility for Germany, Yugoslavia, and Iran also. In addition, he was to monitor and evaluate relations and problems between national territorial commanders and Allied commanders.

According to a USEUCOM directive issued on 4 August 1957, USAREUR was to provide such logistical support in the Paris area as might be agreed upon with the commanders in chief of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM).

In the field of signal communications, USAREUR assumed the new missions of becoming the sole point of contact with appropriate ministries and of processing requirements for leased land line communications circuits for all U.S. military services in Germany, the metropolitan area of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy--less the Naples area.<sup>5</sup>

b. Organization. USAREUR consisted of major commands, subordinate commands, and assigned units. (See Chart 2.) As of 1 January 1958 the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) was designated a major command of USAREUR with no change in current assignments or attachments of units under its commands.<sup>6</sup>

Four months later five additional commands--the Berlin Command; the Northern, Western, and Southern Area Commands; and the U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven--were redesignated as major commands. Simultaneously, 8 other commands were designated subordinate commands, and the number of assigned units was increased from 10 to 32.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>USAREUR Trp Asgt Memo Nr 19, 31 Dec 57. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>7</sup>USAREUR Cir 10-5, 1 May 58, subj: Organization and Functions, Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLAS. Also, see pars 5 & 6.

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
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Chart 2

## Organization of United States Army, Europe, 30 June 1958



\* The 32 assigned units of the United States Army, Europe, are listed in the textual material that defines their mission and organization.

Source: USAREUR Cir 10-5, 1 May 58, subj: Organization and Functions, Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLAS.

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### 3. USAREUR Headquarters

There were several organizational and functional changes within USAREUR headquarters. (See Chart 3.)

a. The Deputy Commander in Chief. The first major organizational change of FY 1958 occurred when Maj. Gen. Halley G. Maddox, then Chief of Staff, was announced as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.<sup>8</sup>

b. Reorganization of the Office of the Commander in Chief. Effective 20 March 1958, the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff was discontinued and the Office of the Commander in Chief was reorganized and redesignated the Office of the Commander in Chief-Secretary of the General Staff, Headquarters USAREUR. This change resulted in a strength reduction of eight spaces.<sup>9</sup>

c. Inactivation of the Air Defense Division. The Air Defense Division was discontinued, effective 15 May 1958, and all of its functions and personnel, except the chief and one U.S. civilian secretary, were transferred to G3 and G4. These two staff agencies performed most of the tasks generated by the command's expanding responsibilities in the field of advanced weapons. Personnel surplus to the receiving divisions' requirements were absorbed elsewhere through natural attrition.<sup>10</sup>

d. Establishment of Two New Deputy Chief of Staff Positions. Coincident with the discontinuance of the Air Defense Division, Maj. Gen. Hobart Hewett was relieved as Air Defense Coordinator and chief of the division and assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Advanced Weapons and Guided Missiles, effective 3 April 1958.<sup>11</sup> In this newly-created position he assisted CINCUSAREUR in discharging the advanced weapons responsibilities that the Department of the Army and USCINCEUR assigned to the command. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Advanced Weapons and Guided Missiles was assisted by two coordinators, one for surface-to-surface missiles, the other for atomic weapons.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>USAREUR GO 178, 6 Jul 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>9</sup>USAREUR GO 61, 11 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>10</sup>(1) USAREUR GO 125, 6 May 58. UNCLAS. (2) DF, SGS to USAREUR stf divs, 29 Apr 58, subj: Transfer of Air Defense Division Functions and Spaces. AEASGS/250. CONF.

<sup>11</sup>USAREUR GO 126, 7 May 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>12</sup>Memo, CofS to Maj Gen H. Hewett, DCS for Adv Wpns & GM, 4 Apr 58, subj: Assignment of Responsibilities for Advanced Weapons and Guided Missiles. UNCLAS. In ofc of Dep CinC.

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Simultaneously, Col. William W. Harris, the incumbent Deputy Chief of Staff, was appointed to the newly created position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and Logistics.<sup>13</sup>

e. Change in Grade Authorization. Upon the departure of Maj. Gen. Derrill M. Daniel, Col. Harold H. Shaller was announced first as Acting Chief,<sup>14</sup> and two months later as Chief, Special Activities Division, USAREUR.<sup>15</sup>

#### 4. Major Commands

a. Seventh Army. There were no major changes in the missions of Seventh Army during FY 1958.<sup>16</sup> The command was charged with implementing existing emergency plans, if necessary, and securing the border separating the Federal Republic of Germany from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Directly subordinate to Seventh Army were the U.S. V and VII Corps--composed of 2 armored and 3 infantry divisions--a support command, an antiaircraft brigade, 3 armored cavalry regiments, and various army troops. As a NATO command, the U.S. Seventh Army had the responsibility of planning for wartime operations of the German II and III Corps.<sup>17</sup>

As a part of the realignment of support elements made necessary by the pentomic reorganization of divisions, the Seventh Army Support Command was activated effective 6 January 1958. This change permitted the exercise of close supervision over administrative and technical service organizations not attached to a corps headquarters by placing them under one commander directly responsible to the army commander. Moreover, it relieved chiefs of Seventh Army staff sections of also being commanders of technical services.<sup>18</sup>

b. U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR). The primary mission of operating a line of communications through France was expanded to include providing logistical support for all USAREUR units, installations, and activities located in Germany, except for the support furnished by the area commands. In addition, USACOMZEUR

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<sup>13</sup>USAREUR GO 126, 7 May 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>14</sup>USAREUR GO 5, 11 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>15</sup>USAREUR GO 69, 14 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>16</sup>Ltr, Hq 12th Mil Hist Det to USAREUR Hist Div, 29 Jun 58, subj: Mission and Organizational Changes of the Seventh United States Army during Fiscal Year 1958. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>17</sup>USAREUR Info Buls, Vol. XII, Nr 12, 21 Oct 57, p. 22; and Vol. XIII, Nr 4, 30 Apr 58, p. 6. UNCLAS.


<sup>18</sup>(1) USAREUR GO 76, 23 Dec 57. (2) Ltr, 12th Mil Hist Det, cited above. (3) Fonecon, Mr. D. A. Lane, Hist Div, with 12th Mil Hist Det, 9 Oct 58. All UNCLAS.

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Chart 3

Organization of Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 30 June 1958



Source: USAREUR Org Chart, 15 Jul 58; USAREUR Stf Memo 10-180-3, 19 Sep 58, subj: Staff Responsibilities and Relationships within Headquarters, USAREUR. Both UNCLAS.

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provided technical guidance and assistance to USASETAF in the execution of supply and maintenance functions and was responsible for supply and stock control for stock assets as well as for procurement in support of that command. USACOMZEUR's other primary missions remained unchanged.<sup>19</sup>

Most of the secondary missions assigned to USACOMZEUR during FY 1958 were transferred with the unit or agency charged with their performance. In an effort to reduce the logistical operating functions of USAREUR headquarters, a variety of tasks--such as procurement; the staff supervision of field maintenance operations; the support of MAAG's, missions, and unified commands; and the over-all responsibility for the supply of materiel to MAP recipients--were transferred to USACOMZEUR.

The command structure of USACOMZEUR underwent no basic change. The Orleans Installation was redesignated Orleans Area Command. Effective 15 June 1958, Advance Section (ADSEC) and Base Section (BASEC) were converted to TOE status and redesignated 4th and 5th Logistical Commands "C", respectively. At the same time these two headquarters, as well as Headquarters, USACOMZEUR, were reorganized along functional lines by the formation of directorate-type staffs. In addition, most USACOMZEUR depots were reorganized under the general depot concept; with the exception of Bussac General Depot,<sup>20</sup> all such reorganizations were provisional, pending receipt of approved tables of distribution from USAREUR.<sup>21</sup>

c. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF). Effective 1 January 1958, USASETAF was transferred from the jurisdiction of USEUCOM to that of USAREUR, with its missions and functions remaining in effect.<sup>22</sup> The task force had come into existence upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Austria in October 1955, when the occupation of that country had ended. With headquarters at Verona, Italy, and its forces deployed in northern Italy, USASETAF was responsible for the tactical operations of all U.S. Army forces allocated to it and not assigned to NATO or Allied operational commands, joint task forces, or unified commands. It also provided administrative and

<sup>19</sup>USAREUR ltr, 17 Apr 58, subj: Logistical Mission and Authority of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (U). AEAGD-MN 250/17 AG (AG-AO). CONF.

<sup>20</sup>USAREUR GO 217, 20 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>21</sup>Incl, to 1st Ind, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR Hist Div, 15 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to USACOMZEUR, 9 May 58, subj: Request for Information. UNCLAS. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (Perm).

<sup>22</sup>Cable EC-9-5432, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Sep 57. CONF.

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logistical support for all U.S. Army forces in the theater as well as for Navy, Air Force, and Allied forces and civilian agencies as directed by the U.S. theater commander.<sup>23</sup> Among a great variety of other missions, USASETAF was to train cadre personnel for Italian Honest John battalions, assume responsibility for electronics and communications--except in the Naples area--and provide and arrange for electronic warfare.<sup>24</sup>

d. Berlin Command. The mission of the Berlin Command remained unchanged.<sup>25</sup> The most important organizational change was the reorganization of the 6th Infantry Regiment into 2 battle groups, supported by 1 separate tank company and augmented by appropriate administrative and logistical elements assigned to the Berlin Command. This change became effective on 1 June 1958.<sup>26</sup> In addition, the horse platoon of the 287th Military Police Company was inactivated effective 1 April 1958, and the 272d Military Police Company, effective 1 June 1958.<sup>27</sup>

e. Area Commands. The area commands continued to provide supplies and services to units and individuals, including dependents, located in their respective areas. The number of area commands was reduced from 4 to 3.

(1) Northern Area Command. Effective 1 April 1958, Northern Area Command (NACOM), with 3 subareas, and Headquarters Area Command (HACOM), with 2 subareas, were consolidated; NACOM assumed responsibility for what had been HACOM. The subareas were abolished and the new command was subdivided into 12 posts.<sup>28</sup>

(2) Western Area Command. Effective 1 October 1957, the surgeon and dental offices of Western Area Command (WACOM) were transferred to the U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany. Moreover, on 20 March 1958 the Movement Control Branch, responsible for the control of highway movement

<sup>23</sup>USAREUR TD's 77-7890(M), & 77-7890-01(M), 15 Oct 57. CONFMOD.

<sup>24</sup>Ltr, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Dec 57, subj: Missions and Functions Assigned to SETAF by USCINCEUR (U). AEAGC-PL 250/16 GC. SECRET. For the tactical mission of USASETAF, see the top secret supplement to this report.

<sup>25</sup>For details on the mission of Berlin Command, see USAREUR Hist Div, Annual Hist Rept, Hq USAREUR, 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 57, p. 9. SECRET.

<sup>26</sup>USAREUR GO 131, 14 May 58. OFLUSE.

<sup>27</sup>1st Ind, Berlin Comd to Hist Div, 7 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to Berlin Comd, 9 May 58, subj: Request for Information. OFLUSE. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (Perm).

<sup>28</sup>1st Ind, NACOM to Hist Div, 18 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to NACOM, 9 May 58, subj as above. UNCLAS. In file above.

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of supply and personnel, was transferred to USACOMZEUR. Finally, the Ordnance Division of Headquarters, WACOM, was assigned an additional mission of rebuilding, modifying, and scrapping various types of vehicles for Seventh Army and was allotted an increase of 60 LWR personnel spaces for the purpose.<sup>29</sup>

(3) Southern Area Command. No significant changes took place in the Southern Area Command.<sup>30</sup>

f. U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB). During FY 1958 the mission of USAPEB remained unchanged. Effective 1 July 1957, the 87th Quartermaster Detachment (Supply), located at Farge, Germany, was transferred to USACOMZEUR, with USAPEB still responsible for its logistical support. The functions of the Accommodations Division were redistributed, effective 1 October 1957; the Adjutant General Division assumed staff responsibility for central clearance, while the Headquarters Commandant was charged with supervision of bachelor officer's quarters and dependent housing.<sup>31</sup>

#### 5. Subordinate Commands

a. Special Troops, Headquarters, USAREUR. This command continued to provide internal security, administration, and logistical support to Headquarters, USAREUR.<sup>32</sup> The headquarters and headquarters company were discontinued effective 15 August 1957.<sup>33</sup>

b. 32d Artillery Brigade (Air Defense). The 32d Artillery Brigade had the mission of providing air defense of the rear area situated west of the Rhine and the vital installations therein. During the course of the fiscal year 4 of the antiaircraft battalions equipped with 90-mm guns were converted to Nike missile battalions, while the other 4 battalions and 2 group headquarters were inactivated.<sup>34</sup>

c. 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. The 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group continued to collect information of a

<sup>29</sup> 1st Ind, WACOM to Hist Div, 14 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to WACOM, 9 May 58, subj as above. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>30</sup> 1st Ind, SACOM to Hist Div, 16 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to SACOM, 9 May 58, subj as above. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>31</sup> 1st Ind, USAPEB to Hist Div, 8 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to USAPEB, 9 May 58, subj as above. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>32</sup> USAREUR TD 77-7911, 1 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>33</sup> USAREUR GO 208, 13 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>34</sup> 1st Ind, 32d Arty Bde to Hist Div, 3 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to 32d Arty Bde, 9 May 58, subj: Request for Information (U). SECRET. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (Perm).

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countersubversive and counterespionage nature. It also maintained the USAREUR Central Registry and performed other collection or investigation duties assigned by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. To facilitate command, the group was reorganized from a TOE unit composed of a headquarters and 4 regions--each with a headquarters and subordinate field offices--to a single headquarters supervising 11 regional offices that reported directly to group headquarters. This change permitted more direct control of the group's counterintelligence activities.<sup>35</sup>

d. 513th Military Intelligence Group. The primary mission of collecting intelligence information by overt means remained unchanged. However, on 17 June 1958 five military intelligence platoons and the 5th Strategic Intelligence Detachment were inactivated. On the same day the 532d Military Intelligence Battalion and the 521st and 526th Military Intelligence Companies were redesignated and reassigned to Seventh Army.<sup>36</sup>

e. USAREUR Engineer Intelligence Center. The center conducted topographic mapping activities, which included surveying, compiling and reproducing maps, and operating the theater map depot system. Its engineer intelligence mission was to overtly collect, evaluate, collate, and disseminate engineer area and technical intelligence, to operate the engineer intelligence library, and to prepare special engineer intelligence studies.<sup>37</sup>

The only organizational change occurred on 3 April 1958, when the USAREUR Air Photo Team (UK) was redesignated the Photographic Evaluation Team (Intelligence, Mapping), reorganized as an intelligence mapping team, and reassigned as a cellular unit to Headquarters and Service Company, 656th Engineer Battalion (Topo).<sup>38</sup>

f. 7th Engineer Brigade. In carrying out its peacetime mission the 7th Engineer Brigade continued to provide construction support

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<sup>35</sup> 1st Ind, 66th CIC Gp to Hist Div, 9 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to 66th CIC Gp, 9 May 58, subj as above. CONF. In file above.

<sup>36</sup> 1st Ind, 513th Mil Intel Gp to Hist Div, 16 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to 513th Mil Intel Gp, 9 May 58, subj as above. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>37</sup> Ltr, USAREUR to CO USAREUR Engr Intel Cen, 4 Sep 57, subj: Mission of the USAREUR Engineer Intelligence Center. IM 250/16 EN. UNCLAS.

<sup>38</sup> 1st Ind, Engr Intel Cen to Hist Div, 8 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to Engr Intel Cen, 17 Jun 58, subj: Request for Information (U). UNCLAS. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (Perm).

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for USAREUR, USAFE, USACOMZEUR, and Seventh Army elements in France and Germany.<sup>39</sup>

g. U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany. The U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany, was organized effective 1 July 1957 and became operative on 1 October 1957. Located at Heidelberg and assigned to USAREUR headquarters, it took over from the area commands the operational control of all medical service units and functions supporting the U.S. Army in Germany except for those in Berlin and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation or assigned to USACOMZEUR and Seventh Army.<sup>40</sup> This organizational change was made in order to place all USAREUR hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical facilities and services in Germany, with the exceptions noted, under a centralized, streamlined administration that would not only be more effective in peacetime but easily adjustable to an emergency.<sup>41</sup>

h. U.S. Army Signal Command. Whereas all other technical services commands were discontinued effective 1 July 1957, the U.S. Army Signal Command continued to operate through FY 1958 with an authorized strength of 15 spaces. Located at Heidelberg, its mission was to implement signal communications plans, policies, and procedures, and to provide photographic and signal logistical support as directed.<sup>42</sup>

## 6. USAREUR Assigned Units

a. The U.S. Army, Europe, Staff Units. The USAREUR staff Units, organized effective 15 August 1957, located at Heidelberg, and assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, had an authorized strength of 20 spaces.<sup>43</sup> Their nine subordinate units, located at various points in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, provided NATO commands with information and advice on matters pertaining to the tactical use of atomic weapons.<sup>44</sup>

b. Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin. This office was assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, reported directly to USAREUR, and

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<sup>39</sup>1st Ind, 7th Engr Bde to Hist Div, 1 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to 7th Engr Bde, 17 Jun 58, subj as above. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In file above.

<sup>40</sup>(1) USAREUR GO 149, 14 Jun 57. (2) USAREUR TD 77-7748, 15 May 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>41</sup>DF, Med Div to G4, 7 May 57, subj: Reorganization of Medical Services, U.S. Army, Germany. AEAMED-PL 320 MD. UNCLAS.

<sup>42</sup>(1) USAREUR GO 81, 20 Mar 58. (2) USAREUR TD 77-7891, 20 Feb 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>43</sup>USAREUR GO 202, 5 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>44</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7749, 9 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

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was attached to Berlin Command for administration and logistical support.<sup>45</sup>

c. The U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group, Karlsruhe. This organization continued to provide educational facilities for dependent children of Department of Defense personnel in Germany and France. On 1 January 1958 the 3 elementary and 2 high schools in Italy were added to its operational responsibilities. Funding and space control responsibilities remained with USASETAF until the end of FY 1958 to permit a smooth transition.<sup>46</sup>

d. U.S. Army European Exchange System, Nuernberg. The primary mission of the European Exchange System was to provide merchandise and services of necessity and convenience at low prices consistent with reasonable profit. Its secondary mission was to support the welfare and recreational programs for military personnel.<sup>47</sup>

e. U.S. Army Special Services Depot, Aschaffenburg. This depot was located at Aschaffenburg, Germany, and assigned to USAREUR headquarters. Its mission was to budget for, procure, receive, store, account for, repack for shipment, salvage, and issue all special services equipment. This activity included operating the entertainment costume shop and providing certain items on a reimbursable basis.<sup>48</sup>

f. U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special Weapons School, Europe. The mission of this school was to provide courses of instruction for intelligence, counterintelligence, and military police personnel; to conduct language courses; to provide special weapons instruction for U.S. and Allied personnel; and to conduct such other courses as directed by Headquarters, USAREUR. In an organizational change that took place on 9 April 1958 the school commandant was appointed post commander.<sup>49</sup>

g. U.S. Army Military Police Customs Unit, Heidelberg. Assigned to the Provost Marshal Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, this unit was to insure compliance with existing customs regulations and to provide customs control to guarantee unimpeded movement of official consignments to and from the forces. Its personnel were to act as technical advisers to the German border police in passport control of members of the U.S. forces. They were also to investigate customs-related incidents,

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<sup>45</sup>USAREUR C1r 10-5, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>46</sup>Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, Hist Div, with Mr. S. J. Hergenroeder, USADEG, Dep Dir for Educ, 22 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>47</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7738, 20 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>48</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7731, 15 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>49</sup>1st Ind, USA Intel, MP, & SW Sch, Eur, to Hist Div, 7 Jul 58, to ltr, Hist Div to USA Intel, MP, & SW Sch, Eur, 9 May 58, subj: Request for Information. UNCLAS. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (Perm).

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maintain liaison between the Provost Marshal and German customs authorities, and issue certificates for personal imports and exports.<sup>50</sup>

h. U.S. Army Military Police Crime Laboratory, Frankfurt. This agency was responsible for testing and analyzing evidentiary matter submitted in connection with criminal and other types of investigation. In addition, it furnished scientific investigative assistance to law enforcement agencies of the armed forces in Europe and exercised technical supervision over the lie detector centers in the USAREUR area. Personnel of the laboratory evaluated, analyzed, identified, and reported upon such evidence as was submitted and, when requested by competent authority, testified as expert witnesses before courts of law.<sup>51</sup>

i. U.S. Army Military District, Europe. Effective 15 September 1957, the six existing U.S. Army Reserve military districts were discontinued, and the U.S. Army Military District, Europe, was organized with headquarters at Heidelberg. In the course of the reorganization of the U.S. Army Reserve program, schools and school student detachments were reassigned, and the responsibilities for logistical support were redefined. The Chief, U.S. Army Military District, Europe, was appointed Deputy Area Commander for Reserve Affairs, Europe.<sup>52</sup> As defined toward the end of FY 1958, the mission of the Military District was to activate, coordinate, administer, supervise, train, and inspect U.S. Army Reserve personnel in Europe.<sup>53</sup>

j. U.S. Army Engineer-Ordnance School, Europe. Effective 1 December 1957, the U.S. Army Ordnance School was discontinued, its activities consolidated with those of the U.S. Army Engineer School, and the school redesignated the U.S. Army Engineer-Ordnance School, Europe. Located at Murnau, Germany, it provided engineer and ordnance courses of instruction and conducted studies and tests toward developing the use and capabilities of pertinent equipment and supplies and toward modifying existing doctrines and techniques peculiar to the European theater.<sup>54</sup>

k. U.S. Army Quartermaster-Signal School, Europe. The U.S. Army Signal School was discontinued, effective 15 February 1958, and its functions were consolidated with those of the U.S. Army Quartermaster School. Simultaneously, the latter was reorganized

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<sup>50</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7712, 24 May 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>51</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7882, 20 Oct 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>52</sup>USAREUR GO 210, 15 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>53</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7744, 15 May 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>54</sup>(1) USAREUR TD 77-7710, 20 Nov 57. (2) USAREUR GO 316, 2 Dec 57. Both UNCLAS.

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and redesignated the U.S. Army Quartermaster-Signal School, Europe, with location at Lenggries, Germany. Its mission was to provide for technical instruction and training of selected personnel in such courses as supply, food service, procurement, station property accounting, communications, electronics, etc.<sup>55</sup>

l. U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany. Effective 1 July 1957, the U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, was relieved from assignment to the U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, and placed under the operational control of the USAREUR Engineer Division. Its mission was to execute U.S. Army and Air Force construction in the Federal Republic of Germany in compliance with applicable directives and programs. A major reorganization, effective on 1 January 1958, resulted in the discontinuance of the resident offices at Frankfurt and Heidelberg and a reduction of 36 personnel spaces.<sup>56</sup>

m. U.S. Army Construction Agency, France. The Joint Construction Agency (JCA) was disestablished by USEUCOM headquarters, effective 1 August 1957. The U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, was designated as its successor organization in France.<sup>57</sup> Located in Paris and assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, the agency executed the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force construction mission in France in compliance with applicable directives and programs.<sup>58</sup>

n. U.S. Army Element, Air Passenger Center, Frankfurt. Located at Frankfurt, Germany, this agency was to receive, process, billet, and arrange transportation service for authorized personnel arriving or departing by air. In addition, the center had the missions of operating a hotel at Rhein-Main Airbase and of furnishing personnel for the support of the Paris Air Passenger Center.<sup>59</sup>

o. U.S. Army Central Finance and Accounting Office, Europe.<sup>60</sup> This office was located at Heidelberg and assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR. In addition to providing finance and accounting services, it controlled

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<sup>55</sup>(1) USAREUR TD 77-7717, 15 Jan 58. (2) USAREUR GO 27, 12 Feb 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>56</sup>1st Ind, USA Const Agcy, Ger, to Hist Div, 23 Jun 58, to ltr, Hist Div to USA Const Agcy, Ger, 17 Jun 58, subj: Request for Information. UNCLAS. In Hist Div 250/H 7 (perm).

<sup>57</sup>USAREUR GO 199, 29 Jul 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>58</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7783, 20 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>59</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7708, 10 Mar 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>60</sup>Redesignated by USAREUR GO 163, 19 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

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the issue and monitored the circulation of U.S. and foreign currencies and military payment certificates in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. In addition, the office audited and vouchered carrier invoices for transportation services rendered U.S. forces in European countries and scrutinized the rates and costs applied by the carriers.<sup>61</sup>

p. U.S. Army Expenditure Accounts Office, Europe.<sup>62</sup> This USAREUR unit performed the accounts office functions for USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USACOMZEUR; it also handled residual financial matters pertaining to Trieste. The Finance and Accounting Officer, USAREUR, exercised operational control and technical supervision of this unit.<sup>63</sup>

q. U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, Europe;

r. U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, France;

s. U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, Germany; and

t. U.S. Army Element, Stars and Stripes. Effective 15 February 1958, these four U.S. Army elements assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, were placed under the operational control of the Information Division.<sup>64</sup>

u. U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany;

v. U.S. Army Claims Office, France;

w. U.S. Army Claims Office, Germany;

x. U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute, Heidelberg;

y. U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute Depot, Frankfurt; and

z. U.S. Army Transportation Finance and Accounting Office, Heidelberg.

There was no change in the missions and functions of these six USAREUR assigned units.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7752, 1 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>62</sup>Redesignated by USAREUR GO 163, 19 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>63</sup>USAREUR TD 77-7752 (amended by USAREUR GO 174, 27 Jun 58, to TD 77-7758), 15 Oct 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>64</sup>USAREUR Trp Asgt Memo Nr 6, 15 Apr 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>65</sup>For further details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 12-13. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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- aa. U.S. Army Coal Point, Rheinau;
- bb. 6th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation);
- cc. 44th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation);
- dd. 62d Military Police Company (Highway Patrol);
- ee. 91st Ordnance Detachment (Technical Detachment); and
- ff. 570th Military Police Company (Railway Guard).

These units were also directly assigned to the U.S. Army, Europe, headquarters.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>USAREUR Cir 10-5, cited above. UNCLAS.

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## CHAPTER 2

### Comptroller Activities

#### Section I: Financial Resources

##### 7. The FY 1958 USAREUR Funding Program

a. Dollar Funds. The USAREUR funding program approved by the Department of the Army totaled \$535,407,966, of which \$513,459,590 was obligated by 30 June 1958, as shown below:<sup>1</sup>

	<u>Availability</u>	<u>Obligations</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$535,407,966</u>	<u>\$513,459,590</u>
Operations and Maintenance, Army	489,413,500	489,205,493
Military Construction, Army	40,800,166	19,785,640
Reserve Personnel, Army	134,600	131,962
Research and Development, Army	846,200	699,461
Procurement and Production, Army	2,876,500	2,334,282
Preparations for Sale and Salvage of Military Property, Army	1,337,000	1,302,752

<sup>1</sup>(1) Funding Sked (DA Form 1323), OCA to USAREUR, 25 Feb, 27 Jun 58. (2) Status of Funds Repts, Hq USAREUR, 8 Aug 58; Hq USACOMZEUR, 9 Aug 58; and Hq USASETAF, n.d. [as of 30 Jun 58]. All in Ofc of Compt Bud Br files. (3) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, Hist Div with Capt H. A. Rosenberger, Ofc of Compt Bud Br, 19 Aug 58. All UNCLAS.

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In addition to these sums the Department of the Army allocated approximately \$15 million for the stateside purchase of supplies for USAREUR under the Modern Army Supply System (MASS).<sup>2</sup>

The Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&MA), funds were distributed to eight budget programs--Programs 2000 through 2700, inclusive--in much the same manner as had been done in fiscal year (FY) 1957, albeit with fewer budget programs. Similarly, installation support costs were prorated to the budget programs on a percentage basis, and obligations were made accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

In his opening address to the Comptrollers' Conference in January 1958, General Hodes emphasized the importance of fully utilizing funds so as to avoid losing any unobligated funds at the end of the fiscal year as had happened in the past.<sup>4</sup> In O&MA funds, which constituted the major portion of the budget, less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the budgeted funds remained unobligated (see table above).

b. Deutsche Mark Funds. In addition to the appropriated dollar portion of the funding program, USAREUR also received the equivalent of approximately \$41 million in Deutsche Marks for FY 1958.<sup>5</sup> This sum was composed of so-called defense support funds, which the German Government contributed for use by the U.S. forces in Western Germany, and the funds that were made available to support the stationing of U.S. forces in West Berlin. The latter category of funds were considered separately from the main portion of the USAREUR budget because of Berlin's occupied status.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col G. L. Haymaker, Ofc of Compt Bud Br, 19 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>3</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Haymaker, cited above. For details of the FY 1957 system, see USAREUR Hist Div, Annual Hist Rept, Hq USAREUR, 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 57, pp. 16-17. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>4</sup>Incl 2, "Suggested Addition to Annual Historical Report," 20 Oct 58, to DF, Ofc of Compt to C/Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 58 (U). AEACO 250/54 CO. UNCLAS.

<sup>5</sup>Cable DA-588443, DA from Compt-B-E to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>6</sup>For a detailed discussion of the Berlin situation and budget procedures, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 33-34. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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In April 1957 the Federal Republic of Germany had made available DM 325 million (\$77.4 million) to the U.S. forces as defense support contributions for German Fiscal Year (GFY) 1958--1 April 1957 to 31 March 1958. The Department of Defense had withheld approximately \$8.6 million of this amount for the payment of claims and had divided the remainder between the Departments of the Air Force and Army, with the latter receiving roughly 82 percent. Of the Army portion, \$24.9 million had been authorized for use in FY 1957, which left USAREUR with approximately \$30.3 million for FY 1958.<sup>7</sup>

Since these defense support funds were exhausted during the first quarter of FY 1958, further use of Deutsche Mark funds was interdicted except for the purpose of making adjustments in already existing obligations.<sup>8</sup> At the same time USAREUR urged the Department of the Army to request the reopening of negotiations with the German Government to obtain an additional contribution of DM 325 million.<sup>9</sup> Since the dollar appropriation had been based on the assumption that defense support funds of DM 650 million would be made available, failure to obtain the full amount would have serious consequences and impair USAREUR's combat readiness.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, no further defense support funds were made available by the Federal Republic of Germany for the use of U.S. forces in Western Germany.

The Berlin budget for GFY 1958 amounted to the equivalent of \$10,880,762 and brought the total of USAREUR Deutsche Mark

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<sup>7</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 25-26. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt Rosenberger, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>8</sup>Cable SC-48292, USAREUR to subor comds, 30 Sep 57. UNCLAS. See also par 8, below.

<sup>9</sup>The FY 1957 defense support contributions had totaled DM 650 million; the FY 1958 contribution was only half that amount, and USAREUR held that contributions should be continued at the former level. CONF.

<sup>10</sup>Cable SX-6214, CINCUSAREUR from Hodes to DA for Taylor, 3 Oct 57. CONF.

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obligations for the year to \$41,228,346, distributed among the O&MA budget programs as follows:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USAREUR</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	
<u>Program</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$41,228,346</u>	<u>\$30,347,584</u>	<u>\$10,880,762</u>
2000	23,812,100	16,720,760	7,091,340	
2100	672,447	661,597	10,850	
2200	8,062,634	6,531,534	1,531,100	
2300	1,735,093	1,735,093	-	
2400	2,913,976	2,227,706	686,270	
2500	4,032,096	2,470,894	1,561,202	

Programs 2600 and 2700 received no Deutsche Mark funds.<sup>11</sup>

8. Effects of the Imposition of Obligation and Expenditure Ceilings

A factor complicating USAREUR's funding procedures was that, unlike previous years when the only limitations had been on obligations, the Department of the Army imposed restrictions on expenditures during the first half of FY 1958.

a. Limitations on Obligations. USAREUR had received its first tentative funding program for FY 1958 in the amount of \$506 million on 25 June 1957. Since 30 percent of the total annual funding program would normally be authorized for first quarter obligations, USAREUR established 10 percent of each subordinate command's tentative funding program as the obligational authority for July 1957. On 1 August, however, the Department of the Army imposed a 21 percent obligation ceiling for the first quarter and a 45 percent ceiling for the first half of the fiscal year, explaining that financial plans necessitated the delaying of obligations until the second half of FY 1958. Thus, since FY 1958 would be a year of stringent economies, USAREUR developed a system to insure prompt recording of obligations, which in turn was to permit command-wide optimum utilization of available funds.<sup>12</sup>

The potential difficulties inherent in this situation were noted by The Inspector General team that conducted the annual general inspection of the U.S. Army, Europe. Not only would the obligation limitations seriously affect support and logistical operations, but

<sup>11</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt Rosenberger, cited above.  
(2) Cable DA-599866, DA from Compt-B-E to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Dec 57.  
UNCLAS.

<sup>12</sup>Remarks of Brig Gen A. J. Maroun, USAREUR Compt, at USAREUR Comdrs Conf, 4 Sep 57. CONF. In SGS 337 (1957).

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the disposition of tactical forces might conceivably be altered merely on the basis of dollar availability. Lack of guidance from the Department of the Army and the nonreceipt of a firm funding program seriously hindered good management practices; the team's spokesman promised to bring up the whole question upon his return to Washington.<sup>13</sup>

b. Expenditure Ceilings. USAREUR's troubles, however, were only beginning. On 13 September information was received that dollar expenditure ceilings had been imposed upon the Department of the Army, both for the entire FY 1958 and for the first half, and that the Comptroller of the Army was in the process of developing net expenditure ceilings for each operating agency for the period 1 September through 31 December 1957.<sup>14</sup> These restrictions resulted from an over-all directive instructing all Federal agencies to curtail expenditures so as to stay within the Federal debt limitation and thus avoid undesirable effects upon the national economy.<sup>15</sup>

Based on an official report of USAREUR's actual expenditures over a 4-month period, the Department of the Army established the command's net expenditure ceiling for September-December 1957 at \$196 million--some 14 percent below normal anticipated expenditures. This presented serious problems for a number of reasons. First, on 30 June 1957 USAREUR had some \$103 million in outstanding obligations from prior year funds that would be liquidated and thus become FY 1958 expenditures. Moreover, the liquidation of the July and August 1957 obligations, which had been made under the higher obligational authority, would also have to come within the expenditure ceiling. Furthermore, since Deutsche Mark funds would be exhausted by 30 September, additional dollar expenditures would be required during the following months to meet the payrolls of local wage rate (LWR) and labor service employees. Finally, situations peculiar to USAREUR indicated that expenditures for the period September-December would probably be higher than for a normal 4-month period: Gyroscope activities would give rise to greater-than-normal costs for transportation of the incoming and outgoing units, as would the restationing of forces, and contractual relationships in France precluded effecting any reduction in construction expenditures during the first half of the fiscal year.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Incl 1, to DF, SGS to Hist Div, 17 Sep 57, subj: Remarks of Annual General Inspection Team Exit Interview--13 Sep 57. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>14</sup>Cable DA-568529, DA from Compt-B to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Sep 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>15</sup>Ltr, Gen M. D. Taylor, CofSA, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 57. UNCLAS. Cy in Ofc of Compt Acct Ploy Sec.

<sup>16</sup>(1) Incl, to memo, C/Ofc of Compt Acct Ploy Sec to Compt, 27 Sep 57, subj: Net Expenditure Ceiling. In file above. (2) Cable SC-50063, USAREUR to DA attn Compt, 11 Oct 57. Both UNCLAS.

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Because of the statutory nature of the expenditure ceiling, however, USAREUR immediately implemented plans to effect the required degree of control of expenditures. By the end of September expenditure ceilings had been established for the 44 disbursing facilities in the command on the basis of their previous expenditure rates. Also, a reporting system using cable and, if necessary, telephone communications was introduced to insure prompt reporting of net expenditures.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, since the ceiling was imposed upon net expenditures, the disbursing facilities were directed to make every effort to obtain full and timely reimbursement of all sums due so as to ease the burden on the command's funds.<sup>18</sup> The command also adopted a 2-point policy with regard to the expenditure ceiling: in any case civilian and military personnel would be paid promptly--if necessary all other payments would be deferred--and the expenditure ceiling would not be considered to affect the previously established obligational authority. To implement this policy some payments that should have been made before 31 December had to be deferred until January 1958 in order not to exceed the expenditure ceiling.<sup>19</sup>

During October the Department of the Army requested USAREUR to submit two special reports of anticipated expenditures for the first half and for the entire fiscal year; based on the USAREUR replies, the Department established a ceiling of \$310.6 million for the first half. USAREUR, however, estimated its needs as \$319.6 million, exclusive of the local wage rate and labor service payrolls that used to be paid from defense support funds. Rather than raise the expenditure ceiling to permit these payrolls to be met with dollar funds, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to use the unexpended portion of already obligated Deutsche Mark funds for this purpose. In effect, USAREUR was thus borrowing the spending capacity of money that had already been promised but not yet paid out. This procedure was put into effect over strenuous USAREUR protests. Compounding the difficulty, the Department of the Army then proposed to reduce USAREUR's expenditure ceiling by the amount of the Deutsche Marks thus borrowed. USAREUR immediately countered that the original dollar ceiling had not included funds for the payment of the German civilian payrolls; despite the re-use of the already obligated funds USAREUR's dollar

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<sup>17</sup>Address, Gen Maroun to Army Compt Conf (Washington, D.C.) n.d.  
/Dec 57/, subj: Field Experience Under Expenditure Controls. UNCLAS.  
In file above.

<sup>18</sup>Briefing for Gen Hodes by Ofc of Compt Fin Plcy Sec, 2 Nov 57,  
subj: Net Expenditure Ceiling. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>19</sup>Address, Gen Maroun to Army Compt Conf, cited above. UNCLAS.

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needs remained at \$319.6 million for the first half of FY 1958, and it was requested that the expenditure ceiling be raised accordingly.<sup>20</sup> Following this request and explanation the USAREUR expenditure ceiling was raised to \$319,653,000 early in December. The command's efforts to remain within the ceiling met with commendable results, a total of \$319,461,000 being expended during the first 6 months of FY 1958.<sup>21</sup>

The Deutsche Mark problem was solved during February 1958 when USAREUR worked out procedures for repaying the German Federal Ministry of Finance with dollar funds to reestablish the Deutsche Mark balances that had been "borrowed." The first such payment was transmitted to the German Government on 3 March.<sup>22</sup>

No expenditure ceiling was imposed for the second half of FY 1958. The launching of the Russian satellites had brought home the importance of military preparedness. The Congress raised the Federal debt limitation and appropriated additional funds for defense, thus eliminating the basic problem.<sup>23</sup>

## 9. Nonappropriated Funds

As had been the practice in the past, the Office of the Comptroller provided custodianship and accounting service for the USAREUR-level welfare funds, while the preparation of the welfare fund budgets remained a function of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.<sup>24</sup> In addition to these funds, the Dependents' School Detachment, U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group; the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF); and the Armed Forces Network (AFN) also

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<sup>20</sup>(1) Address, Gen Maroun to Army Compt Conf, cited above.  
(2) Briefing for Gen Hodes, 2 Nov 57, cited above. (3) Cable SC-55350, USAREUR to DA for Compt, 20 Nov 57. All UNCLAS.

<sup>21</sup>Address, Capt B. J. McKiernan, Ofc of Compt Fin Plcy Sec, to USAREUR Compt Conf, 27 Jan 58, subj: Expenditure Ceiling. UNCLAS. In Ofc of Compt Fin Plcy Sec.

<sup>22</sup>(1) Memo, Capt McKiernan to Gen Maroun, 11 Feb 58, no subj. In file above. (2) DF, Compt to CofS, 3 Mar 58, subj: Daily Report of Staff Actions. AEACO. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>23</sup>(1) Address, Capt McKiernan, cited above. (2) Cmts by Gen Maroun at USAREUR Compt Conf, 29 Jan 58, cited in USAREUR Compt Bul, 15 Mar 58. UNCLAS. See also The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), Nov 57-Feb 58, passim.

<sup>24</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt E. A. Pepin, Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br, 18 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

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operated nonappropriated funds, bringing the command-wide welfare budget to a sum of \$21.9 million, distributed as follows:<sup>25</sup>

	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$21,906,972</u>
Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France		7,178,972
USAREUR Command Welfare Fund		12,919,029
European Scouting Fund		140,000
USAREUR Hunting and Fishing Fund		134,800
School Fund, Dependents' School Detachment		573,000
USASETAF Command Welfare Fund		390,171
Armed Forces Network Fund		400,000
Contingency Funds		171,000

Income to support these nonappropriated fund activities came from a number of sources. The regular dividends from the Department of the Army Central Welfare Fund, approximating \$8.6 million, were supplemented by a special dividend that amounted to some \$7 million. The USAREUR Class VI Agency contributed profits of roughly \$1.6 million, and approximately \$4.6 million were carried over on the books of the Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France, from the previous fiscal year. Finally, the Air Force reimbursed USAREUR in the amount of some \$100,000 in support of joint activities--Armed Forces Network, hunting and fishing, and scouting.<sup>26</sup>

a. Welfare Construction. One significant change in welfare construction funding procedures took place in FY 1958. In November 1957 CINCUSAREUR directed that the practice of issuing certificates of fund availability be stopped. In addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, assumed direct responsibility for supervision of the welfare construction program, and the area commands were relieved of their responsibilities for the program.<sup>27</sup> In effect, this change corresponded to General Hodes' desire to simplify accounting procedures. It also served to streamline construction activities by centralizing their control in the same office that had budgetary responsibility.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup>Fin Rept, Army Welf Fund, Germany-Italy-France, n.d. [1-30 Jun 58], pp. 3-4. UNCLAS. Cy in Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>26</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt Pepin, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>27</sup>DF, G1 to DCS, 20 Nov 57, subj: Welfare Construction Program. AEAGA-W 285/12 GA. UNCLAS. For details of earlier procedures, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 29. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>28</sup>Incl 2, to DF, Ofc of Compt to C/Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, cited above. UNCLAS.

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b. Standardization of Accounting Procedures. As a result of the publication of new Department of the Army regulations covering non-appropriated fund accounting procedures, a program to standardize these procedures was introduced throughout the command. Among the instructions prepared for this purpose, USAREUR Circular 230-80, published in November 1957, established a system of feeder reports that provided figures for nonappropriated fund sales and expenditures for the command on a quarterly basis. Circular 230-20, 19 May 1958, established accounting procedures for welfare funds and activities, and Circular 230-65, of the same date, specified similar procedures for open messes and similar activities. These circulars required a general ledger system, thus providing for the first time a uniform accounting system that was expected to greatly increase the effectiveness of internal control and auditing functions. A similar circular pertaining to unit funds was prepared but not issued before 30 June.

Five additional circulars were being prepared at the end of the fiscal year, and it was anticipated that with their publication during the first quarter of FY 1959 all USAREUR nonappropriated fund activities would be operating under a uniform accounting system.<sup>29</sup>

## Section II: Financial Management

### 10. Command-Wide Application of the Army Command Management System

Following up on the preparations made in FY 1957,<sup>30</sup> the Office of the Comptroller supervised the command-wide implementation of the Army Command Management System (ACMS) during the early part of FY 1958. Within the comptroller's office an ACMS team was formed to visit the finance and accounting offices as well as the operating activities at each subordinate command and to assist in the development of standing operating procedures and in the solving of special local problems.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Draft MS, n.d. [Jul 58], subj: Standardization of Accounting Procedures for Nonappropriated Funds. UNCLAS. In Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br Nonappropriated Fund Unit.

<sup>30</sup>For details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 14-21. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>31</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. Bisbing, Ofc of Compt Mgt Svcs Br, 8 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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The four basic reports of ACMS are the budget execution plan, the cost and performance report, financial statements, and status of allotments reports.<sup>32</sup> In order that these reports would be uniform, and thus permit the integration required by ACMS, USAREUR had directed in April 1957 that the Department of the Army interim management structure for FY 1958 be used for all budgeting, manpower reporting, performance analysis, and cost and fiscal accounting purposes. No other account codes were authorized. This interim structure was intended to permit transitional planning that would lead to the adoption of the new Army program system and management structure that would go into effect in FY 1959.<sup>33</sup>

To serve as guidance to the field in the implementation of ACMS--and to simplify the system to the greatest extent possible--the ACMS team prepared the 1-75 series of USAREUR memorandums.<sup>34</sup> The Department of the Army ACMS team that visited USAREUR during the latter half of September 1957 indicated general satisfaction with the progress made up to that time and singled out USAREUR's efforts to simplify the system for particular commendation.<sup>35</sup>

Command-wide operations on a trial basis began on 1 October 1957 with the submission of cost and performance reports by subordinate commands. During the following three months the system was further refined, and on 1 January 1958 the Army Command Management System was officially introduced, with USASETAF scheduled to begin operations on 1 July 1958.

Simultaneously with the commencement of ACMS operations USAREUR issued a revised edition of the Class I Command Management System Manual, incorporating the modifications, refinements, and simplifications that had been developed during the test and trial run. Based on the detailed procedures outlined in this manual--as supplemented by the 1-75 series of memorandums--the subordinate commands submitted cost-based budget execution plans for FY 1959 to USAREUR headquarters during the spring of 1958. With the Army Command Management System thus in

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<sup>32</sup>USAREUR Compt Bul, 15 Mar 58, p. 59. UNCLAS.

<sup>33</sup>DA ltr, 23 Apr 57, subj: Interim Management Structure, FY 1958 O&M Appropriation Area, AGAM-P (M) 300 (18 Apr 57) COMPT-M, w/1st Ind, USAREUR to distr, n.d., same subj, same file. UNCLAS.

<sup>34</sup>Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Bisbing, cited above, and with Mr. C. E. Willows, Ofc of Compt Mgt Data Analysis Sec, 3 Sep 58. See also USAREUR Memos 1-75-1 through 1-75-9, Jul 57-Apr 58. All UNCLAS.

<sup>35</sup>CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 7 Oct 57, Compt Cmts. UNCLAS.

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full operation by 30 June 1958, it was anticipated that the USAREUR budget execution plan for FY 1960 would also be a cost-based budget, as required by the system.<sup>36</sup>

Its mission accomplished, the ACMS team of the comptroller's office was dissolved at the end of FY 1958. Responsibility for the remaining major problems--to eliminate duplication and refine data generating techniques to insure the production of valid information for budget and management purposes--was vested in the Management Services Branch of the Office of the Comptroller. The review of methods and procedures to effect additional improvements and simplifications of the system was expected to be a continuing function of the comptroller.<sup>37</sup>

#### 11. Military Funding Procedures

a. Effects of the French Franc Revaluation. On 10 August 1957 the French Government announced, effective 11 August, a 20 percent premium on the official exchange rate for French francs; in effect, the dollar rose from 350 to 420 francs on the official exchange. After 11 August disbursing officers both bought and sold francs at the new rate. This devaluation of the franc presented problems of how to recoup losses on balances held and advances previously made on construction contracts and of what action would be necessary to reimburse the French Government for goods and services received prior to 11 August for which payment had not been made on or before 10 August. A 1946 agreement between the United States and France provided that all officially procured francs held by the U.S. forces would be repurchased by the French Government at the original purchase rate. The Department of the Army directed that such action be taken.<sup>38</sup> Army, Navy, and Air Force disbursing officers and custodians of nonappropriated funds were directed to tabulate and report to the Staff Finance and Accounting Officer, Hq

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<sup>36</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Bisbing, cited above.  
(2) Memo for rec, unsgd /Lt Col Bisbing/, n. d., no subj. Cy in Hist Div Docu Sec. (3) Draft USAREUR Man, no nr, 1 Jan 58, subj: Class I Command Management System. All UNCLAS.

<sup>37</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Bisbing, cited above.  
(2) Memo for rec, Lt Col Bisbing, cited above.

<sup>38</sup>(1) Memo, Col C. H. Miles, USAREUR Fin & Acct Off, to Dep/CinC, 15 Aug 57, subj: Revaluation of French Franc. (2) Cable DA-558880, DA from Compt to USCINCEUR, 14 Aug 57. Both UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR SGS 100 (1957). (3) Incl 2, to cmt 2, USACOMZEUR Fin & Acct Off to USAREUR Hist Div, 22 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter. AEZCP 255/23. OFLUSE. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

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USACOMZEUR--who had been designated to monitor the collection of this information--their franc holdings as of 2400 hours 10 August 1957.<sup>39</sup> The French Government elected to pay premiums to the U.S. forces rather than buy back and resell francs, and some 1,114 million francs (\$2,653,000 at the new rate) was paid by the Bank of France to the Paris Finance and Accounting Office. Of this amount, 424 million francs represented a 20 percent premium on the balances held by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 690 million francs was a rebate on advances that had been paid by the United States for construction.

Offsetting these gains, pursuant to the 1946 Agreement the United States reimbursed to the French Government 2,862 million francs (\$6,800,000 at the new rate) for goods and services received prior to 11 August 1957 for which the payments were made on or after 11 August.<sup>40</sup>

b. The Discontinuance of Scrip. In September 1955 the Department of Defense had formulated the policy of discontinuing the use of military payment certificates (MPC, or scrip) wherever possible and advantageous. While the Federal Republic of Germany had indicated no objections to the use of dollar currency as early as 1956, other European nations in the MPC area had not agreed to such a change.<sup>41</sup> During FY 1957 detailed plans had been prepared for a conversion from MPC to the use of United States currency. However, the unfavorable situation that had arisen in Europe as a result of the Suez and Hungarian crises had delayed the implementation of existing plans.<sup>42</sup> Even so, planning had advanced so far that relatively little notice would be required to take action.<sup>43</sup>

Discussions concerning the advisability of a conversion to dollars were resumed in November 1957, when a USAREUR representative attended a conference in Washington at which Treasury Department officials and representatives of the Office of the Chief of Finance reached certain

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<sup>39</sup>(1) Memo, Col Miles, cited above. (2) Cables EC-9-4594, 15 Aug, and EC-9-4623, 16 Aug 57, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al. All UNCLAS.

<sup>40</sup>Incl 2, to cmt 2, 22 Oct 58, cited above. OFLUSE.

<sup>41</sup>Cable DA-936822, DA from Compt to USCINCEUR, et al., 10 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>42</sup>Ltr, Mr. W. R. Burgess, Under Sec of Trsy, to Mr. W. L. Hays, Chmn, House of Rep Subcom on Prtg, 9 Jan 57. UNCLAS. Cy in Ofc of Compt Curr & Banking Sec.

<sup>43</sup>DF, Compt to CofS, 1 Feb 57, subj: Changeover from MPC's to Dollars in Germany. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1957).

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tentative conclusions. Since the Treasury Department no longer raised objections, U.S. coins could be introduced into the U.S. area of responsibility in Germany as soon after 1 January 1958 as the needed coins could be collected and transported to Europe. Because of the implications of such action with regard to the public debt ceiling, paper currency could not be introduced before 1 July 1958, however. While the Treasury Department intended to approach the French and Italian Governments on the subject, it was doubted that permission to use dollar currency in those countries would be granted.

At the same time it was decided to use U.S. Treasury checks for all official dollar disbursements in Germany as soon as check forms could be made available.<sup>44</sup>

In December 1957, after the decision had been made to introduce coin by 1 March 1958, the immediate shipment of \$3 million worth of U.S. coin was requested.<sup>45</sup> However, preferring uniform currency policies throughout the command, USAREUR recommended that the use of U.S. currency be delayed until France and Italy joined Germany in accepting the use of U.S. currency. While the Department of the Army conceded the reasonableness of this view, the introduction of U.S. currency into West Germany was to proceed in any case. In the meantime, negotiations with France and Italy were continuing, and it was felt that the execution of the changeover in West Germany might influence those countries to change their positions on the subject. Moreover, since the public debt situation in the United States had eased, the Treasury Department had advised that paper currency would be available after 31 March.<sup>46</sup> On 12 February the Department of the Army directed that the currency conversion was to take place as soon as preparations could be completed. USAREUR was assigned administrative responsibility for the operation, and USCINCEUR was to decide whether coin would be introduced first or in conjunction with paper currency later.<sup>47</sup>

The comptroller's staff prepared three plans for the conversion. An unclassified exchange with a maximum of advance publicity could be made most easily and would permit prefunding of clubs, messes, post

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<sup>44</sup>(1) Cable SC-54754, USAREUR sgd Maroun to DA for Coff, 16 Nov 57. UNCLAS. (2) Rept of Tvl, 21 Nov-5 Dec 57, unsd, [Capt W. B. Andresen], n.d. OFLUSE. Cy in Hist Div Docu Sec. (3) Memo, Gen Maroun to CofS, 18 Dec 57, subj: Currency and Banking (U). ARACO FAF 255/9 CO. CONF.

<sup>45</sup>(1) Cable SC-59351, CINCUSAREUR to adees, 19 Dec 57. OFLUSE. (2) Cable SX-7664, USAREUR from Cen Fin & Acct Ofc to DA for Coff, 16 Dec 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>46</sup>Cable DA-936822, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>47</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Briefing for CINCUSAREUR by Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br, 17 Feb 58. UNCLAS. In Ofc of Compt, Curr & Banking Sec.

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exchanges, and banks. One form of classified conversion would introduce coin on an unclassified basis with advance publicity, giving a period of approximately 1 month to effect a gradual exchange of coins for fractional MPC; some 2 months later dollar notes would be introduced without announcement during a 1-day classified exchange. The third, and least desirable plan would introduce all currency on an unannounced 1-day-only, classified conversion as had been done in the past with MPC conversions. USAREUR recommended the first plan to USEUCOM since it would involve the least problems and there seemed to be no great need for secrecy.<sup>48</sup> USEUCOM concurred and forwarded this recommendation to the Department of the Army.<sup>49</sup>

Early in April the command was advised that France had agreed to the use of dollars in that country and that the conversion would also apply there.<sup>50</sup> At approximately the same time, however, the Department of the Army indicated that the currency conversion in West Germany and France would be part of a worldwide MPC conversion. Since the MPC change in other areas would have to be protected, the conversion in France and Germany would have to remain on the same security classification level as the over-all change.<sup>51</sup> Although the changeover would be on a 1-day, crash basis, an 11-day grace period for the gradual withdrawal of fractional MPC from circulation was authorized following the change day.<sup>52</sup>

During the two weeks preceding the changeover--which took place on 27 May--the needed cash was distributed from the Karlsruhe finance office. Vans accompanied by convoys of armed guards were used to transport the money to the various disbursing offices. Four days before the conversion day Italy agreed to permit the use of dollar currency there, and aircraft had to be employed to ship the cash to USASETAF disbursing offices in time.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Memo for rec, Capt Andresen, 18 Feb 58, subj: USAREUR Comptroller Briefing, OPERATION IRISH, 17 February 1958. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 255/H5, Op Irish.

<sup>49</sup> Memo, Gen Maroun to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Feb 58, subj: Chronological Development of Operation Irish: 18-28 February 1958. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>50</sup> Cable DA-939823, DA from Compt to USCINCEUR, et al., 8 Apr 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>51</sup> Cable DA-940055, DA from Compt to CINCUSAREUR, n.d. [Apr 58]. UNCLAS.

<sup>52</sup> Cable DA-940942, DA from Compt to USCINCEUR, n.d. [29 Apr 58]. UNCLAS.

<sup>53</sup> (1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt A. L. Bradshaw, Ofc of Compt Curr & Banking Sec, 21 Aug 58. (2) Cable DA-942303, DA to USCINCEUR, n.d. [23 May 58]. Both UNCLAS.

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Since security restrictions prevented the announcement of the conversion before 0100 hours on conversion day, and The Stars and Stripes deadline for stories was before midnight of the day before publication, the news had to be released by different means. Members of the command were made aware of the conversion through spot announcements over the Armed Forces Network stations at 15 minute intervals, beginning at 0600 hours of conversion day. In the conversion, only dollar notes of MPC's were exchanged for United States currency; fractional MPC's were removed from circulation by being taken in at retail outlets, and coin was introduced to replace them through the same sources in the routine giving of change over the 11-day period following the conversion.<sup>54</sup>

## 12. The Relocation and Reorganization of Finance Offices

In February 1958 preparations began for converting finance and accounting units organized under tables of distribution (TD) into finance disbursing sections under tables of organization and equipment (TOE) as quickly as possible. In keeping with Department of the Army policy, this action was expected to clarify and simplify finance activities in times of emergency. The basic TOE unit structure was to be that of a military disbursing unit composed of military personnel only; there would be a TD-type augmentation of military and civilian personnel to meet peacetime accounting responsibilities.<sup>55</sup>

Little was accomplished beyond preparations. Toward the end of FY 1958 it was decided to undertake a comprehensive study of USAREUR's financial services for the purpose of reorganizing and redistributing the finance offices and realigning their responsibilities so that they could better service troops.<sup>56</sup>

To effect changes involved a complicated procedure. The Department of the Army and the USAREUR G3 had to approve reorganizations, the USAREUR G1 and G3 had to approve moves and personnel shifts, the USAREUR Comptroller was responsible for the over-all program, and the subordinate commands had to approve and implement the reorganizations and movements of the finance offices. Nevertheless, at the close of

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<sup>54</sup>(1) Ltr, C/Info Div to Compt, et al., n.d. subj: Public Information and Troop Information Program in France and Germany on Conversion of Military Payment Certificates. In Ofc of Compt Curr & Banking Sec files. (2) Cable AETF0, CG Seventh Army to distr, 27 May 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>55</sup>USAREUR ltr, 20 Feb 58, subj: Conversion of TD Finance Units to TO&E. AEACO 265/H5.1 CO (FA). UNCLAS.

<sup>56</sup>Ltr, USAREUR Compt to CG Seventh Army, attn Fin Off, 12 May 58, subj: Survey of Finance Service. AEACO 250/H5.1 CO (FA). UNCLAS.

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FY 1958 the groundwork for the coming changes was well laid. The basic plan to reorganize 26 TD finance offices into TOE disbursing sections had been approved, and subordinate commands had begun revision actions. The move of 1 office had been approved and would take place early in FY 1959, and the reorganization of 3 other offices had been forwarded to the Department of the Army for final approval. Detailed plans for the further conduct of the program had also been prepared so that its completion could be expected in FY 1959.<sup>57</sup>

## Section III: Review and Control Functions

### 13. Internal Control and Review

The Office of the Comptroller remained responsible for the adequacy of USAREUR's accounting and related financial activities as well as for the proper functioning of these operations at the subordinate command level. Early in FY 1958 General Hodes directed the comptroller to take aggressive action to insure that these internal review responsibilities were properly conducted throughout the command.<sup>58</sup> In conformance with this directive USAREUR Circular 35-15 was published. While emphasizing that internal review responsibilities were not to be construed as audit functions--these being the exclusive prerogative to the U.S. Army Audit Agency--the circular pointed up the responsibility of subordinate commanders to insure the adequacy and propriety of accounting records, internal procedures of the finance and accounting offices under their jurisdiction, and internal control systems at depots, procurement centers, supply control agencies, and similar installations; these review actions were to be performed at least annually at each individual activity of the subordinate command. Finally, commanders were to verify the corrective action taken on reports of audit submitted by the U.S. Army Audit Agency and on reports of general inspection submitted by the General Accounting Office concerning activities under their jurisdiction.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>(1) Prog Rept, 7 Jul 58, subj: FY 59 Comptroller Objectives.

(2) Paper, n.d. [Jun 58], subj: Comptroller Objectives--FY 59. Both UNCLAS. Both in Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br Plans & Prog Sec.

<sup>58</sup>Ltr, USAREUR Compt to subor comds, 29 Nov 57, no subj. AEACO FAA 255/70-IR CO. UNCLAS.

<sup>59</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Cir 35-15, 27 Dec 57, subj: Internal Review. UNCLAS.

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In addition, the Office of the Comptroller established a series of training seminars for internal review personnel of the subordinate commands. Conducted by members of the ADSEC comptroller's office, these seminars were well received by the participants and were instrumental in improving the quality of internal review reports from subordinate commands. Because of its demonstrated worth, the training program was to be continued in FY 1959.<sup>60</sup>

At approximately the same time that he indicated his desire for improved internal review actions, General Hodes also advised the Department of the Army that audit coverage in the command had decreased since the U.S. Army Audit Agency had taken over that function from the USAREUR Audit Agency.<sup>61</sup> The Comptroller of the Army replied that since the current procedures were based on legislative requirements no change could be expected. However, an improvement in audit service could be expected during FY 1958, since the European branch of the U.S. Army Audit Agency staff had recently been augmented by a number of experienced auditors. Moreover, the Audit Agency personnel would work closely with the USAREUR comptroller's staff in meeting local problems.<sup>62</sup>

Actually a very close, although unofficial, liaison was established between USAREUR and the U.S. Army Audit Agency during FY 1958. Informal monthly meetings attended by the director of the European Region, U.S. Army Audit Agency, and various members of the USAREUR comptroller's staff contributed to creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding so that virtually all problems were solved.

Another manifestation of these amicable relations was that the Audit Agency agreed to submit tentative findings of its audits to USAREUR. This practice permitted USAREUR to clarify misconceptions or justify seeming deficiencies, so that these points could be dropped from the Audit Agency's final report of audit. In the event that a deficiency was not explained to the Audit Agency's satisfaction USAREUR's position was included in the audit report submitted to the Department of the Army. These arrangements were considered to work out to the mutual advantage.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. H. W. Steinitz, Ofc of Compt Acct Plcy Sec, 8 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>61</sup> This change had actually taken place in FY 1956. The complaint, made in early November 1957, was based on the experience of FY 1957. UNCLAS.

<sup>62</sup> Ltrs, Gen Hodes to Lt Gen W. S. Lawton, COA, 7 Nov 57; and Gen Lawton to Gen Hodes, 21 Nov 57. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1957).

<sup>63</sup> Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Steinitz, cited above.

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## 14. Management Services

a. Operations. During FY 1958 mandatory routine manpower surveys were conducted at six major installations,<sup>64</sup> and at General Hodes' direction a special survey was made of Headquarters, USACOMZEUR. These surveys, plus 10 others of relatively lesser importance, covered a total of some 11,000 personnel spaces, 747 of which were recovered for distribution by G3. In addition, subordinate commands surveyed approximately 17,000 spaces and recovered 2,100.<sup>65</sup>

The Operations Section of the Management Services Branch also was responsible for organizing and conducting the command comptrollers' conference, which was held at USAREUR headquarters from 27 to 29 January 1958. The conference was highlighted by the opening address of the commander in chief, General Hodes, who pointed up the important role of comptrollership in achieving the major goal of USAREUR--maintaining Seventh Army in the highest possible state of combat capability. Work of the conference centered around presentations and discussions of various subjects of comptroller interest, such as reporting, expenditure ceiling, internal review, cost of performance budget, programming, and ACMS. Four workshop groups studied and then rendered reports on uniformity in operations, reimbursables, maximum obligations for top priority requirements, and areas for savings.<sup>66</sup>

b. Management Improvement. The activities in this area of operations remained essentially the same as in previous years. Incentive Awards suggestions received during FY 1958 totaled 7,555, of which 1,992 were adopted for estimated first year benefits of \$2,422,387; awards paid amounted to \$34,106.

In the Work Simplification activity, the 1,972 supervisors who were trained submitted 1,788 work simplification proposals. Awards of \$7,689 were paid for the 1,539 proposals accepted; first year benefits from these were estimated at \$1,287,615.

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<sup>64</sup>In addition to the Frankfurt Air Passenger Center and the U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany, these included the headquarters of Berlin Command, of U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven, of Western Area Command, and of Special Troops. UNCLAS.

<sup>65</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col V. B. Fox, C/Ofc of Compt Mgt Svcs Br Ops Sec, 3 Sep 58. (2) Notes, 4th Qtr Rev & Analysis, presented by Mr. M. D. McDonough, Ofc of Compt Prog Rev & Analysis Br, to Gen Maroun, 1 Aug 58. In Ofc of Compt Prog Rev & Analysis Br Prog Progress Eval Sec Nr 1. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>66</sup>Incl 2, to DF, Ofc of Compt to C/Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, cited above. UNCLAS.

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Finally, 2,528 recommendations for Sustained Superior Performance Awards were received. Of these, 2,275 were approved, and \$123,678 was distributed in individual awards.<sup>67</sup>

c. Developments in Automatic Data Processing. At the close of FY 1957 USAREUR had been awaiting delivery of automatic data processing equipment that had been ordered for use in the Seventh Army Project MASS.<sup>68</sup> The electronic computer was delivered in October 1957 and installed temporarily at Stuttgart, where it used punched cards.<sup>69</sup> According to the original plans, the machine was to have been installed at Zweibruecken, where it would have used magnetic tape, which permits operation at full efficiency. However, a shortage of funds prevented the preparation of the Zweibruecken site before the machine arrived. In December 1957 the Department of the Army approved funds for this purpose, and the actual move was made in February 1958. Operations with magnetic tape began during the final quarter of FY 1958.<sup>70</sup>

Other achievements in the general area of office machine utilization included the conducting of management surveys at 7 machine records units, the integration of 3 transceiver networks--those of the technical service depots, the area commands, and the Seventh Army direct support units--and the preparation of 3 electric accounting machine mechanization studies. The most important activity, however, was participation in the ad hoc committee that examined the question of centralized accountability and stock control in October 1957. As a result of the recommendations of the committee, General Hodes directed USACOMZEUR to implement this system in January 1958. The effect was to relieve technical service depots of both accountability and financial inventory accounting and to transfer these responsibilities, including the initial processing of requisitions, to centralized mechanical accounting facilities under the control of the technical service supply control agencies.

These activities resulted in a saving of 130 electric accounting machines and 863 personnel or some \$2.2 million. In addition to these

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<sup>67</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Miss E. Arends, Ofc of Compt Mgt Svcs Br Mgt Improvement Sec, 8 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>68</sup>For details and background, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 31-32. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>69</sup>An electronic computer can use punched cards, punched paper tape, magnetic tape, or combinations of these as its sources of input and output of data. UNCLAS.

<sup>70</sup>(1) Incl, to DF, Ofc of Compt Auto Data Proc Sys Sec to Prog Rev & Analysis Br, 20 Jan 58, subj: Quarterly Review and Analysis. AEACO 250/22 CO(M). (2) Briefing for Gen Maroun by Mr. J. D. Miller, Ofc of Compt Auto Data Proc Sys Sec, 16 Apr 58, subj: The ADPS-EAM Program. In section files. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Miller, 3 Sep 58. All UNCLAS.

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tangible benefits, the adoption of the centralized accountability and stock control system resulted in greater efficiency in the filling of supply requisitions, since all information of stock availability was concentrated in one place.<sup>71</sup>

The final major development in the field of automatic data processing concerned the type of computer system to be used for stock control functions in the command. During the third quarter of FY 1958 the Operations Research Office (ORO) recommended in a study on USAREUR's logistical organization that one large-scale computer be procured immediately for the use of all supply control agencies. Such a computer would be installed at an underground site--for purposes of protection--in a consolidated theater logistical center; an alternate computer and site would have to be provided to avoid the possibility of a complete breakdown of logistical services should the primary center be destroyed in wartime.

By contrast, USAREUR plans called for the eventual installation of a mobile binary digital computer (MOBIDIC) at the Seventh Army Stock Control Center by mid-1960. The MOBIDIC would be capable of handling the same amount of data as a large-scale computer and would have the added advantage of mobility.

The comptroller viewpoint was that the most practical approach to the supply control problem would be to install separate medium-scale computers at each technical service supply control agency, if such an installation could be justified in terms of economy and systems improvement. The most significant objections against the ORO suggestions were that no consolidated logistical center existed, that procedures, codes, and systems of the different technical services were not uniform, and that the cost of preparing two underground sites would be extremely high. Finally, the immediate adoption of a large-scale computer would result in a double conversion--first from medium-scale computers to a single large-scale computer, and then later to the MOBIDIC system.

This point of view was adopted as USAREUR's official policy. Separate medium-scale computers were to be installed at the supply control agencies of the major technical services--engineer, quartermaster, signal and ordnance--with the remaining supply control agencies sharing the use of these machines. The eventual consolidation under a "computer service

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<sup>71</sup>(1) Briefing for Gen Maroun, cited above. (2) 2d Qtr Rev & Analysis, cited above. (3) Memo, C/Ofc of Compt Auto Data Proc Sys Sec to Mgt Svcs Br Plans Off, 13 Dec 57, subj: Accomplishments During the Past Calendar Year. AEACO-M 413.51 CO. All UNCLAS.

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center" concept was under consideration.<sup>72</sup>

## 15. Program Review and Analysis

While the program review and analysis responsibilities and operations remained essentially the same, a number of noteworthy developments took place within this area of activity during FY 1958.

a. Review and Analysis. During the third quarter of FY 1958 the procedure for the oral presentation of the quarterly review was modified. Formerly the comptroller had presented an integrated summary of progress to the commander in chief approximately 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter. Beginning with the third quarter of FY 1958 this integrated summary was dropped and each program director--the chiefs of the general staff divisions, the comptroller, the inspector general, the judge advocate, and the chief of information--made an oral presentation on the progress of his program to the chief of staff. Three days later the program directors made a similar presentation, covering only highlights, to the commander in chief during a 2-hour session. The purpose was to insure that the officer best informed about each program would make the presentation so that any questions that might arise could be immediately answered. This procedure was followed in both the third and fourth quarterly reviews.<sup>73</sup>

b. The Department of the Army Survey of Headquarters Reports. Aware that its reporting system was inadequate and often burdensome, the Department of the Army began several years ago an active and continuing screening program. As a part of this over-all effort to simplify and improve the Army's reporting structure, a Department of the Army team of experts visited USAREUR in May and June 1958 for the purpose of conducting a field survey of USAREUR reporting methods.<sup>74</sup> The survey was solely a fact-finding operation; the team's recommendations were in no way binding upon USAREUR headquarters, and no corrective action or reply was required or expected.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Miller, cited above. (2) Paper, unsd (prepared by Ofc of Compt Auto Data Proc Sys Sec), 28 Mar 58, subj: Comments on ORO Study of the USAREUR Supply System. In section files. (3) Incl, to memo, C/Ofc of Compt Auto Data Proc Sys Sec to Mgt Svcs Br Plans Off, 17 Jul 58, subj: 4th Quarter Review and Analysis, FY 58, Program 4B. AEACO 250/22 CO(M). All UNCLAS.

<sup>73</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. McDonough, 4 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>74</sup>This was the third such survey, the others having been conducted in the Southern Area Command and the Toul Engineer Depot in previous fiscal years. UNCLAS.

<sup>75</sup>Statements of Mr. W. O. Quade and Mr. W. J. Snoeyenbos, DA Sv Team, at Exit Conf, 12 Jun 58. UNCLAS. Cy in USAREUR Ofc of Compt Repts Con Sec.

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The survey team reviewed 550 reports--158 of them at USACOMZEUR headquarters--and interviewed over 1,000 operating personnel--300 at USACOMZEUR--in the process of gathering its information. It was estimated that 260,000 man-hours--amounting to a cost of \$650,000, exclusive of accounting machine operating costs--were expended at USAREUR headquarters only on the preparation of reports. For USACOMZEUR headquarters the equivalent figures were 70,000 man-hours and \$155,000. At USAREUR 20 reports were found to account for approximately 80 percent of the total workload; the same was true of USACOMZEUR.

A total of 918 recommendations, varying all the way from rescission to minor changes in reporting procedures, were made--577 of them directed to the Department of the Army, 13 to USEUCOM, 273 to USAREUR, and 55 to USACOMZEUR. Although no action on these recommendations was required, USAREUR agencies began further consideration of the indicated problem areas almost immediately on a voluntary basis, and some tangible benefits were already discernible by the end of the fiscal year. For example, 13 reports that USAREUR required of its subordinate commands and installations were rescinded after the survey, and other rescissions were under consideration. Similarly, although the survey did not cover interstaff reports, the recommendation that attention be given locally to this problem area resulted in 20 such reports being rescinded before the end of the fiscal year.<sup>76</sup>

Among the still-outstanding questions that would require further study at both the departmental and USAREUR levels were the need for the quarterly reviews of the budget and the refinement of Army Command Management System reporting and accounting methods.<sup>77</sup> No final decisions on these problems were expected until they could be thoroughly examined in FY 1959.

c. Forms Control Accomplishments. The responsibilities and procedures of the forms control activity remained virtually unchanged, except that one additional task was assumed during the year: that of performing surveys of the forms used by USAREUR's subordinate commands. Two such surveys were conducted during FY 1958.

(1) Medical Forms. In the fall of 1957 a survey was made of 1,374 medical forms used by USAREUR agencies. It was determined that approximately 600 of these forms duplicated existing higher echelon forms, and their elimination was directed in accordance with the requirements of AR 310-1. An additional 300 forms were eliminated by consolidating their requirements into 25 newly established USAREUR forms, thus leaving in use only 475 medical forms, or slightly over one-third of the original number.

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<sup>76</sup> Statement of Mr. Snoeyenbos, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>77</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Gen Marcun to Gen Lawton, 18 Feb 58.  
(3) Ltrs, Gen Lawton to Gen Maroun, 4 Mar and 16 Apr 58. All UNCLAS.  
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(2) Labor Service Forms. In the third quarter of the fiscal year a similar review of 194 labor service forms resulted in the elimination of 66 that were either rescinded or replaced by higher echelon forms that they duplicated. Another 33 forms were consolidated into 5 newly created USAREUR forms, for a net decrease of 94.<sup>78</sup>

(3) Routine Accomplishments. At the beginning of FY 1958 the total number of forms in use throughout the command was 15,038. Two major developments during the year had a significant effect on this total: the elimination of the USAREUR technical service commands during the first quarter, with a consequent drop of 934 forms that had been used by these commands, and the integration of USASETAF, which resulted in the establishment of 720 new forms.

In addition, as a result of continuing review action, not only at the USAREUR headquarters level, but also in the various subordinate commands and installations,<sup>79</sup> the number of forms in use dropped to 13,384 by the end of the fiscal year. Of the 1,654 net reduction, 1,168 forms were eliminated as a result of the review of 8,883 forms used both by USAREUR headquarters and by subordinate commands. In the performance of this task some 323 forms were designed or redesigned.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with CWO W. L. Dixon, Ofc of Compt Forms Mgt Sec, 16 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>79</sup>Forms control responsibility follows command channels; thus USAREUR headquarters is responsible for the review of its own headquarters forms and for the supervision of the forms control activity at subordinate command levels. UNCLAS.

<sup>80</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with CWO Dixon, 21 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

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## CHAPTER 3

### Personnel

#### 16. Manpower Trends

a. General. The first half of FY 1958 was a period of drastic reductions-in-force affecting all categories of administrative and operating personnel except teachers in the dependents' schools, and reflecting manpower and budgetary limitations imposed by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. During that half year the number of persons under the jurisdiction of CINCUSAREUR decreased by about 12,000 from 514,782 to 502,954 (see Table 1). The assignment of the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) to USAREUR on 1 January 1958 increased the command's responsibilities without restoring the lost military strength, although approximately 15,700 persons were added.<sup>1</sup>

After reaching a peak of 526,434 in February, the total of military and civilian personnel decreased gradually, and by the end of the fiscal year dropped to 517,294, which was still an increase of 2,512 over the corresponding figure for 30 June 1957. There were decreases in Germany and the United Kingdom, but a slight increase in France (see Table 2). Similarly, there were decreases in military personnel, German and French LWR employees, labor service personnel, and U.S. civilian employees other than teachers, but increases in the number of dependents and teachers. Italian LWR employees also had been added.

A mounting dependent population intensified the command's problems of welfare, education, and logistical support. The number of sponsored

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<sup>1</sup>The exact USASETAF increment was 15,723: military personnel, 5,818; dependents, 5,948; U.S. civilian employees, 273; Italian employees, 3,684. GPO.

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Table 1--USAREUR Command Personnel Before and After Incorporation of USASETAF into the Command

Category	30 Jul 57	31 Dec 57	31 Jan 58 <sup>a</sup>	28 Feb 58	30 Jun 58
<u>Total</u>	<u>514,782</u>	<u>502,954</u>	<u>518,474</u>	<u>526,434</u>	<u>517,294</u>
U.S. Military Personnel <sup>b</sup>	<u>232,686</u>	<u>224,347</u>	<u>226,258</u>	<u>235,071</u>	<u>225,019</u>
Officer	19,546	19,083	20,035	20,343	19,879
Enlisted	213,140	205,264	206,223	214,728	205,140
U.S. Civilian Employees	<u>5,481</u>	<u>6,083</u>	<u>6,315</u>	<u>6,298</u>	<u>5,738</u>
Appropriated Fund Employees	4,260	4,683	4,920	4,908	4,405
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	1,221	1,400	1,395	1,390	1,333
Dependents	<u>144,129</u>	<u>148,900</u>	<u>159,312</u>	<u>157,863</u>	<u>157,824</u>
of Military Personnel	116,788	116,949	128,544	128,026	126,085
of Civilian Employees	2,945	3,462	3,905	3,867	3,468
Not Occupying Government Quarters	24,396	28,489	26,863	25,970	28,271
Continental Wage Scale Personnel	<u>138</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>122</u>
Appropriated Fund Employees	98	89	87	86	85
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	40	40	37	37	37
German Resident Personnel	<u>93,729</u>	<u>86,617</u>	<u>86,606</u>	<u>87,109</u>	<u>88,559</u>
Mutual Aid Fund Employees <sup>c</sup>	66,712	59,449	59,355	59,858	60,766
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	27,017	27,168	27,251	27,251	27,793

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Table 1--USAREUR Command Personnel Before and After Incorporation of USASETAF into the Command--  
Continued

Category	30 Jul 57	31 Dec 57	31 Jan 58 <sup>a</sup>	28 Feb 58	30 Jun 58
Other Foreign Nationals	<u>21,385</u>	<u>20,472</u>	<u>23,459</u>	<u>23,564</u>	<u>24,195</u>
Appropriated Fund Employees	17,535	16,400	19,427	19,468	19,568
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	3,850	4,072	4,032	4,096	4,627
Labor Service Personnel	<u>17,234</u>	<u>16,406</u>	<u>16,400</u>	<u>16,406</u>	<u>15,837</u>

<sup>a</sup>After transfer of USASETAF to USAREUR.

<sup>b</sup>Includes transients, patients, and pipeline out.

<sup>c</sup>Known prior to November 1957 as Defense Support Cost Employees.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-7; 31 Dec 57, 31 Jan, 28 Feb, & 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-7. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 2--USAREUR Command Personnel

Category	30 Jun 57				30 Jun 58			
	Total	Germany <sup>a</sup>	France	Other	Total	Germany	France	Italy
<u>Total</u>	<u>514,782</u>	<u>439,774</u>	<u>69,394</u>	<u>5,614</u>	<u>517,294</u>	<u>429,984</u>	<u>69,714</u>	<u>17,110</u>
U.S. Military Personnel <sup>a</sup>	<u>232,686</u>	<u>202,545</u>	<u>27,828</u>	<u>2,313</u>	<u>225,019</u>	<u>191,694</u>	<u>26,849</u>	<u>6,331</u>
Officer	<u>19,546</u>	<u>16,812</u>	<u>2,580</u>	<u>154</u>	<u>19,879</u>	<u>16,592</u>	<u>2,507</u>	<u>760</u>
Enlisted	<u>213,140</u>	<u>185,733</u>	<u>25,248</u>	<u>2,159</u>	<u>205,140</u>	<u>175,102</u>	<u>24,342</u>	<u>5,571</u>
U.S. Civilian Employees	<u>5,481</u>	<u>4,099</u>	<u>1,317</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>5,738</u>	<u>3,983</u>	<u>1,411</u>	<u>312</u>
Appropriated Fund Employees	<u>4,260</u>	<u>3,093</u>	<u>1,117</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>4,405</u>	<u>2,917</u>	<u>1,200</u>	<u>265</u>
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	<u>1,221</u>	<u>1,006</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>1,333</u>	<u>1,066</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>47</u>
Dependents	<u>144,129</u>	<u>123,975</u>	<u>17,578</u>	<u>2,576</u>	<u>157,824</u>	<u>131,663</u>	<u>19,623</u>	<u>6,460</u>
of Military Personnel	<u>116,788</u>	<u>97,511</u>	<u>16,718</u>	<u>2,559</u>	<u>126,085</u>	<u>101,213</u>	<u>18,652</u>	<u>6,154</u>
of Civilian Employees	<u>2,945</u>	<u>2,068</u>	<u>860</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>3,468</u>	<u>2,179</u>	<u>971</u>	<u>306</u>
Not Occupying Government Quarters	<u>24,396</u>	<u>24,396</u>	-	-	<u>28,271</u>	<u>28,271</u>	-	-
Continental Wage Scale Personnel	<u>138</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>45</u>	-	<u>122</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>1</u>
Appropriated Fund Employees	<u>98</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>43</u>	-	<u>85</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>1</u>
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	<u>40</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>2</u>	-	<u>37</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>2</u>	-

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Table 2--USAREUR Command Personnel--Continued

Category	30 Jun 57					30 Jun 58				
	Total	Germany <sup>a</sup>	France	Other	Total	Germany	France	Italy	Other	
German Resident Personnel	93,729	93,729	-	-	88,559	88,559	-	-	-	
Mutual Aid Fund Employees <sup>b</sup>	66,712	66,712	-	-	60,766	60,766	-	-	-	
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	27,017	27,017	-	-	27,793	27,793	-	-	-	
Other Foreign Nationals	21,385	-	20,725	660	24,195	-	19,958	4,007	230	
Appropriated Fund Employees	17,535	-	17,502	33	19,568	-	16,345	3,156	67	
Nonappropriated Fund Employees	3,850	-	3,223	627	4,627	-	3,613	851	163	
Labor Service Personnel	17,234	15,333	1,901	-	15,837	14,004	1,833	-	-	

<sup>a</sup>Includes transients, patients, and pipeline out.

<sup>b</sup>Known prior to November 1957 as Defense Support Cost Employees.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-7; 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-7.  
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dependents of military and civilian personnel, which had climbed steadily from 56,000 in 1952 to almost 145,000 on 30 June 1957,<sup>2</sup> reached 157,816 in April 1958, dropped slightly in May, and rose again by 30 June to 157,824. This was a new high--30 percent of all command personnel and 70 percent as large as the number of military personnel. (In Italy dependents outnumbered military personnel.) Moreover, while total dependents increased by 9.5 percent, the number of dependents not occupying government housing increased by 16.5 percent.

b. Continued Reduction in USAREUR Headquarters Personnel. On 1 January 1957 the USAREUR headquarters authorization had been reduced from 2,971 spaces to 2,438--a cut of 15.8 percent in military personnel and 20.5 percent in civilian personnel.<sup>3</sup> By the end of FY 1957 further cuts were being planned on the basis of a detailed study that had analyzed the strength of each staff division at General Hodes' direction.

When this study indicated that the headquarters staff authorization could be reduced by 370 spaces to 1,968--1,151 military personnel, 528 Department of Army civilians, and 289 other civilians--without seriously impairing operational efficiency,<sup>4</sup> General Hodes instructed division chiefs to make the recommended cuts, with minor modifications, as rapidly as possible after 1 July 1957. Military strengths were to be reduced by attrition; civilian personnel reductions were to be made "across the board" effective 1 August, and no division was to requisition replacements except to fill vacancies within the lowered authorization.<sup>5</sup>

In a separate action the Department of Defense had previously enjoined upon all services a reduction of 1 percent a month in the headquarters staffs of all major commands, beginning 31 March 1957 and continuing through FY 1958.<sup>6</sup> General Hodes had asked the Department of the Army to apply the USAREUR cuts already made and in process against those ordered by the Department of Defense.<sup>7</sup> The Army reply directed that

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<sup>2</sup>EUCOM/USAREUR Annual Hist Repts, CY 1952 through FY 1957. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>3</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 37-38. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) DF's, Col G. P. Warner, SGS to USAREUR stf div chiefs, 20 Nov 57. CONF. (3) Memo for rec, Lt Col M. D. McDonough, C/Ofc of Compt Prog Rev & Analysis Br, 16 Jul 57. UNCLAS. Both in SGS 320.2 (1957), Personnel Staffing, Hq USAREUR, B/P.

<sup>4</sup>Memo, Maj Gen E. D. Post, DCS, to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jun 57, p. 25. CONF. In file above.

<sup>5</sup>Memo, Gen Hodes to CofS & USAREUR stf div chiefs, 1 Jul 57, subj: Size of the Headquarters. OFLUSE. In file above.

<sup>6</sup>Cable DA-510440, DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 22 Mar 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>7</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 37-38. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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USAREUR and USACOMZEUR headquarters be reduced by 250 and 98 spaces, respectively, during FY 1958.<sup>8</sup> General Hodes pointed out that his reduction plan, already under way, called for a more drastic cut than that directed, and asked permission to take the entire 348 spaces from USAREUR headquarters because so many logistical functions had been transferred to USACOMZEUR headquarters. He also asked permission to make the reduction in a single action, as far as possible, and at the earliest possible date instead of in quarterly cuts as proposed by the Department. Both requests were granted.<sup>9</sup> Thereupon, a revised USAREUR headquarters table of distribution was issued, to be attained not later than 30 September. It authorized a headquarters of 1,929 persons--1,168 military personnel, 496 Department of the Army civilians, and 265 other civilians.<sup>10</sup>

Subsequent budgetary restrictions imposed by the Department of the Army led General Hodes to direct in January 1958 that all headquarters and staff sections be further reduced, by the end of FY 1958 or earlier, to "the minimum consistent with sound operation, based on average requirements."<sup>11</sup> In March 1958 the fiscal-year-end authorized strength of USAREUR headquarters was lowered to 1,705--1,060 military personnel and 645 civilians, to be achieved as far as possible by attrition. On 30 June 1958 actual strength exceeded this authorization by 62 military and 24 civilian personnel.

Since the beginning of FY 1957 the over-all military and civilian strength of Headquarters, USAREUR, had been reduced by approximately 39 percent. During the same 2-year period the strength of Headquarters, USACOMZEUR, increased by 24 percent.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>(1) Cable DA-925792, DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jul 57. (2) DF, w/cmts, G3 to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., subj: Reduction of USAREUR and ComZ Headquarters. In file above. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>9</sup>(1) Cable SX-4474, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for DCSPER for Booth, 10 Jul 57. UNCLAS. (2) Cable DA-926455, DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jul 57. CONF.

<sup>10</sup>(1) DF, CofS to USAREUR stf div chiefs, 20 Jul 57, subj: Strength of USAREUR Headquarters. CONF. In file above. (2) Cable SX-5102, USAREUR to DA for DCSPER, 9 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>11</sup>USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 1, 7 Jan 58, p. 2. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>12</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 2d Qtr, pp. 2, 16; 3d Qtr, pp. 47, 68, 70; 4th Qtr, pp. 30, 47, 49. CONF.

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Section I: Military Personnel

17. Strength

Because of a number of circumstances enlisted strength decreased during FY 1958, while officer strength increased. Moreover, at the end of the year the command had become understrength in enlisted personnel while remaining overstrength in officers.

a. Changes in the Troop Basis. As usual, the troop basis, or ceiling strength, established by the Department of the Army as USAREUR's goal for the end of the fiscal year underwent several changes during the year. On 1 July 1957 it was set at 229,635--16,022 officers, 2,495 warrant officers, and 211,118 enlisted personnel. Reflecting personnel cuts imposed by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was lowered tentatively to 225,000 in September and fixed at 225,112 in October. However, plans to assign USASETAF to USAREUR in January 1958 raised the fiscal-year-end goal to 231,436, where it remained virtually stable for the rest of the year. On 30 June 1958 it was 231,508--16,292 officers, 2,757 warrant officers, and 212,459 enlisted personnel. Though slightly higher than the FY 1957 goal of 229,452, without USASETAF this figure would have represented a net reduction of about 4,500 in the troop basis.<sup>13</sup>

b. Actual Strength. As shown in Table 1, the actual military strength of the command on 30 June 1958 was 225,019. This figure included hospital patients and individuals in the "pipeline out." With these excluded, the "chargeable" actual strength of the command was 224,143--7,457 less than at the beginning of the year. It was 7,355, or 3.2 percent, below the ceiling strength set by the Department of the Army and 5,782, or 2.5 percent, below the strength authorized by Headquarters, USAREUR.<sup>14</sup>

(1) Officers and Warrant Officers. At the beginning of the year the command was overstrength in commissioned officers, principally company-grade, by 864 and in warrant officers by 71.<sup>15</sup> These overstrengths were reduced gradually during the first half year to 233 and 45, respectively, as of 31 December 1957. In January and February, however, overstrength in both categories climbed sharply to double that of

<sup>13</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 38. (2) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-10; 31 Oct 57, p. CO-10; 31 Jan & 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-10. All SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>14</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Compt Summary Data, 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-10. SECRET (info used CONF). The "unit" actual strength of the command--chargeable actual strength minus the "pipeline in" and trainees--was 224,092.

<sup>15</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 39. SECRET (info used CONF).

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December.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, it continued at that level for the remainder of the year. This development resulted partly from the absorption of USA-SETAF, which was itself overstrength in officers, and partly from the inactivation and reorganization of several units.<sup>17</sup> However, the principal cause of the continuing overstrength was the difficulty of reducing to the Department of the Army's officer manning level, which was constantly being lowered, and at the same time meeting the command's needs for officers of certain branches and maintaining the proper balance between grades.<sup>18</sup> Table 3 shows that at the end of the year the command was still overstrength in officers by 744--4.6 percent--and in warrant officers by 116--4.5 percent. Table 4 shows that only USACOMZEUR was understrength in both officers and warrant officers. It was estimated that over-all officer and warrant officer strength would continue to exceed authorization until March 1959.<sup>19</sup>

(2) Enlisted Personnel. Enlisted strength, slightly in excess of authorized strength at the beginning of the year, dropped to understrength during the second quarter and was at 96.8 percent of authorized strength at the end of the year, as shown in the following tabulation:<sup>20</sup>

Date	Unit Strength			/ Over or - Under	
	DA Ceiling <sup>21</sup>	USAREUR Authorization	Actual	Number	Percent
1 Jul 57	211,296	211,854	212,291	/ 437	/ 0.02
30 Sep 57	210,095	208,640	205,862	-2,778	- 1.3
31 Dec 57 <sup>22</sup>	208,160	208,696	204,628	-4,068	- 1.9
31 Jan 58	212,780	213,986	205,340	-8,626	- 4.2
31 Mar 58	213,072	215,996	211,545	-4,451	- 2.1
30 Jun 58	211,361	211,084	204,425	-6,659	- 3.2

<sup>16</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, 31 Dec 57, p. CO-14; 31 Jan & 28 Feb 58, p. CSD-14. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>17</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 29, 30, 46. CONF.

<sup>18</sup>Intvw, Mr. D. A. Lane, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. M. Leonard, C/G1 Mil Pers Br Ofc Sec, 15 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>19</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 30. CONF.

<sup>20</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, pp. CO-10, -13; 30 Sep 57, pp. CO-10, -13; 31 Jan, 31 Mar, & 30 Jun 58, pp. CSD-10, -13. SECRET.

<sup>21</sup>DA Troop Basis minus spaces allotted for contingencies. SECRET.

<sup>22</sup>After transfer of SETAF to USAREUR. SECRET.

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Table 3--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Grade (Chargeable Actual Strength)

	Officers				30 Jun 58			
	30 Jun 57	31 Dec 57	31 Jan 58 <sup>a</sup>		Actual	Ceiling	Authorized	Over or Under
	Actual	Actual	Actual					
<u>Total</u>	<u>16,833</u>	<u>16,536</u>	<u>17,341</u>		<u>16,961</u>	<u>16,237</u>	<u>16,217</u>	<u>744</u>
<u>General Officers</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>55</u>		<u>54</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>54</u>	-
General	1	1	1		1	-	-	-
Lieutenant General	3	3	3		3	-	-	-
Major General	22	22	22		21	-	-	-
Brigadier General	24	30	29		29	-	-	-
<u>Field-Grade Officers</u>	<u>4,167</u>	<u>4,259</u>	<u>4,512</u>		<u>4,415</u>	<u>4,259</u>	<u>4,294</u>	<u>121</u>
Colonel	433	438	463		435	402	399	36
Lieutenant Colonel	1,384	1,403	1,473		1,438	1,354	1,377	61
Major	2,350	2,418	2,576		2,542	2,503	2,518	24
<u>Company-Grade Officers</u>	<u>12,616</u>	<u>12,221</u>	<u>12,774</u>		<u>12,492</u>	<u>11,926</u>	<u>11,869</u>	<u>623</u>
Captain	5,458	5,651	5,901		5,834	5,735	5,715	119
Lieutenant	7,158	6,570	6,873		6,658	6,191	6,154	504
<u>Warrant Officers</u>								
WO-1, CWO-2,								
CWO-3, CWO-4								
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,467</u>	<u>2,492</u>	<u>2,627</u>		<u>2,740</u>	<u>2,643</u>	<u>2,624</u>	<u>116</u>

<sup>a</sup>After transfer of USASETAF to USAREUR.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-16; 31 Dec 57, 31 Jan & 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-16. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 4--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Major Elements, 30 June 1958

	Officers			Warrant Officers		
	Author- ized	Actual <sup>a</sup>	Over or -Under	Author- ized	Actual <sup>a</sup>	Over or -Under
<u>Total</u>	<u>16,217</u>	<u>16,930</u>	<u>✓ 713</u>	<u>2,624</u>	<u>2,737</u>	<u>✓ 113</u>
USAREUR Headquarters & Units	958	934	- 24	102	116	✓ 14
Seventh Army	8,281	8,564	✓ 283	1,394	1,390	- 4
USACOMZEUR	2,989	2,946	- 43	507	486	- 21
SETAF	541	605	✓ 64	96	135	✓ 39
Area Commands	1,557	1,756	✓ 199	164	228	✓ 64
Other Commands	1,891	2,125	✓ 234	361	382	✓ 21

<sup>a</sup> Unit actual strength, not including pipeline in, students, and trainees--31 officers and 3 warrant officers as of 30 June 1958.

Source: USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Compt Summary Data, 30 Jun 58, pp. CSD-10, -14, -15. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Women's Army Corps enlisted strength, which stood at 962 at the beginning of the year, was 820 at the end.

(a) Strength by Major Elements. The following tabulation shows enlisted strength by major elements at the beginning and end of the year:<sup>23</sup>

	1 Jul 57			30 Jun 58		
	Author- ized	Actual <sup>24</sup>	Over -Under	Author- ized	Actual <sup>24</sup>	Over -Under
<u>Total</u>	<u>211,854</u>	<u>212,291</u>	<u>/ 437</u>	<u>211,084</u>	<u>204,425</u>	<u>-6,659</u>
<u>Command</u>						
USAREUR Headquarters and Units	2,508	2,491	- 17	3,430	3,507	/ 77
Seventh Army	148,637	149,856	/1,219	142,295	134,351	-7,944
USACOMZEUR	30,565	30,043	- 522	30,855	30,992	/ 137
USASETAF	-	-	-	5,061	5,497	/ 436
Other Commands	30,144	29,901	- 243	29,443	30,078	/ 635

At the end of the year the combat units of Seventh Army were markedly understrength and were awaiting the arrival of enlisted packets to replace the unusually large numbers of personnel returned to the United States for separation.<sup>25</sup> (See par 20b.)

(b) Strength by Grade. The following tabulation shows the command's chargeable actual enlisted strength by grade at the beginning and end of FY 1958.<sup>26</sup> The changes in grades introduced in June 1958 are indicated in parentheses: (For details, see par 19d.)

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-14; 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-14. CONF.

<sup>24</sup> Unit actual strength. CONF.

<sup>25</sup> Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 29. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>26</sup> USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Compt Summary Data, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-16; 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-16. SECRET (info used CONF).

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	30 Jun 57	30 Jun 58	<u>Increase</u> <u>- Decrease</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>212,299</u>	<u>204,442</u>	<u>- 7,857</u>
<u>Grade</u>			
(E-9) (Sgt Maj) (Sp 9)	-	-	-
(E-8) (1st Sgt or MSgt) (Sp 8)	-	69	+ 69
	-	1	+ 1
E-7 MSgt (Plat Sgt) MSp (Sp 7)	7,876 111	7,720 139	- 156 + 28
E-6 SFC (S/Sgt) Sp 1 (Sp 6)	17,242 487	16,402 576	- 840 + 89
E-5 Sgt (Sgt) Sp 2 (Sp 5)	15,173 14,175	14,344 15,991	- 829 + 1,816
E-4 Cpl (Cpl) Sp 3 (Sp 4)	2,034 49,857	1,345 46,026	- 689 - 3,831
-----			
E-3 PFC (PFC)	73,838	81,612	+ 7,774
E-2 Pvt (Pvt)	29,252	18,426	-10,826
E-1 Pvt (Recruit)	2,254	1,791	- 463

(c) Strength by Components. The decrease in the percentage of Regular Army enlisted personnel that had set in during the second half of FY 1957, continued throughout FY 1958, as shown in the following tabulation:<sup>27</sup>

	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Percent RA</u>
	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	
30 Jun 57	147,092	65,199	69.3
31 Dec 57	129,047	75,581	63.1
30 Jun 58	123,639	80,786	60.5

At the end of the year USASETAF had the highest percentage of RA's--75.2-- and Seventh Army the lowest--55.4 as against 66.4 on 30 June 1957. The marked drop in the Seventh Army reflected the involuntary separation of large numbers of RA's. (See par 20b.)

(d) Ratio of Supporting to Operating Forces. The ratio of operating to supporting forces continued to rise. At the end of the year operating troops constituted 97.7 percent of the command's military strength, but within the operating forces the ratio of combat to combat support

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-26; 31 Dec 57 & 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-26.  
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forces shifted appreciably:<sup>28</sup>

	<u>1 Jul 57</u>		<u>31 Dec 57</u>		<u>30 Jun 58</u>	
<u>Total Forces</u>	<u>231,599</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>223,680</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>224,143</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Category</u>						
Supporting	6,305	2.7	5,616	2.5	5,097	2.3
Operating	<u>225,294</u>	<u>97.3</u>	<u>218,064</u>	<u>97.5</u>	<u>219,046</u>	<u>97.7</u>
Combat	133,003	57.5	121,892	54.6	120,903	53.5
Combat Support	92,291	39.8	96,172	42.9	98,143	44.2

18. Enlistment, Reenlistment, and Replacement

a. Enlistments and Reenlistments. Enlistments and reenlistments totaled 12,110, as compared with 11,152 in FY 1957:<sup>29</sup>

	<u>Total</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>12,110</u>	<u>3,241</u>	<u>3,699</u>	<u>2,576</u>	<u>2,594</u>
1st Term RA, NG and USAR	<u>4,789</u>	1,226	1,534	1,012	1,017
Other RA	<u>6,829</u>	1,914	2,017	1,461	1,437
AUS	<u>492</u>	101	148	103	140

The over-all reenlistment rate was 20.14 percent of potentials during the first quarter, 19.93 percent during the second, 17.58 during the third, and 21.13 during the fourth. Approximately 60 percent of Regular Army potentials reenlisted--from 30 to 40 percent of them after their return to the United States. On the other hand, only 2.4 percent of the Army of the United States potentials "re-upped." However, a concentrated drive achieved a rate of 3.59 percent in this category during the fourth quarter.<sup>30</sup>

Reenlistments were expected to rise in FY 1959 because of the pay raise, the new enlisted grade structure, and the proficiency pay system. On the other hand, the revocation of a regulation permitting air travel to the United States for personnel on reenlistment leave might have an

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-20; 31 Dec 57 & 30 Jun 58, p. CSD-20.  
SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>29</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 38. CONF.

<sup>30</sup>USAREUR Reenlistment News Letter, Sep-Oct 58, p. 1. UNCLAS.

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adverse effect.<sup>31</sup>

b. Alien Enlistment Program. The recruiting of individuals from Iron Curtain countries continued under Congressional authority granted in 1951 and twice extended. With the enlistment of 243 persons during the year, total enlistments since the beginning of the program reached almost 1,600. Methods of screening and examining were improved and accelerated. At the end of the year a request for legislation to extend the act again beyond its expiration date of 30 June 1959 was in preparation.<sup>32</sup>

c. Modification of Gyroscope Rotation System. As a result of recommendations made in FY 1957<sup>33</sup> the gyroscope system of overseas troop replacement through the mass interchange of entire units was significantly modified during FY 1958. Two years of experience had demonstrated the morale value, to gyroscoping personnel, of permanent assignment to one unit, concurrent travel of dependents, and assured housing. On the other hand, the combat efficiency of gyroscoping divisions had been lowered appreciably during the movement and for a number of weeks before and after. Indications were that rotation by smaller units or by smaller increments of divisions would retain all the values of the gyroscope system and eliminate this principal defect.

During the second and third quarters of FY 1958 the 4th Armored Division replaced the 2d Armored Division in Germany, as planned.<sup>34</sup> However, the 3d Armored Division, with headquarters in Frankfurt, was removed from gyroscope status. Other gyroscope movements to and from USAREUR were scheduled to be made by battle groups, separate regiments, battalions, or companies.<sup>35</sup> Department of the Army plans for the future called for the basic rotation unit within a division to be the battle group and for the basic nondivisional rotation unit to be the battalion or a number of smaller units grouped into a provisional battalion to facilitate control and shipment.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>31</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 28. CONF.

<sup>32</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Capt N. B. Eldred, AG Div Mil Pers Proc Sec, 10 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>33</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 47. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Apr 57, subj: Report on Status of Operation Gyroscope. In SGS 322 GYRO (1957). Both SECRET.

<sup>34</sup>Qtrly Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 2d Qtr, p. 2; 3d Qtr, p. 17. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>35</sup>(1) Cable DA-934931, DA to USAREUR, 7 Jan 58. SECRET. (2) DA ltrs, TAG to CINCUSAREUR, et al., various dates, subj: Rotation Instructions. AGAM-P (M) DCSOPS. UNCLAS.

<sup>36</sup>AR 220.20, 27 Aug 58, subj: Operation Gyroscope. UNCLAS.

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## 19. Career Management

a. Regular Army Officer Augmentation. The Department of the Army program for augmenting the Regular Army officer corps through the integration of reserve officers into the corps under the provisions of Public Law 737, July 1956,<sup>37</sup> began to bear fruit in July 1957, when the first appointments were made. By 30 June 1958 the Department had approved the applications of 1,115 USAREUR reserve officers on active duty,<sup>38</sup> as follows:

<u>Total</u>	<u>1,115</u>
July 1957	220
October 1957	91
November 1957	222
December 1957	98
February 1958	276
March 1958	103
June 1958	105

Of this number of successful applicants, 963 had taken the oath of office, 52 had declined appointment, 26 had been found physically disqualified, and 74 were in various stages of processing. Provisions for reapplication and an indefinite extension of the time limit for submitting new applications made it probable that more appointments would follow.<sup>39</sup>

b. Counseling and Assignment of Junior RA Officers. At the same time, the rate at which Regular Army lieutenants were resigning at the end of their mandatory periods of service continued to rise and was 15 percent over the rate for FY 1957.<sup>40</sup> Taking personal note of this development, General Hodges urged all commanders to extend to all Regular Army junior officers the system of counseling that had been set up in late FY 1956 for officers who had submitted resignations.<sup>41</sup> He expressed his belief that a major cause of the resignations was the frequent assignment of young officers to administrative type units, away from troops, and

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<sup>37</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 47. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) PL 737, 84th Cong., Armed Forces Regular Army Augmentation Act of 1956, 20 Jul 56. UNCLAS. (3) DA Cir 601-26, 13 Aug 56, and AR 601-100, 9 Dec 57, subj: Appointment of Commissioned Officers in the Regular Army. UNCLAS.

<sup>38</sup>There were 5,297 approvals throughout the Army. UNCLAS.

<sup>39</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Capt C. J. Schena, AG Div Pers Br, 9 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>40</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 3d Qtr, pp. 47, 69. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>41</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 73. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Cable SX-20894, USAREUR to subor comds, 25 May 56. UNCLAS.

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indicated that all young officers should be assigned to line combat organizations.<sup>42</sup>

c. Pay Increases. Under the provisions of the Military Pay Act of 1958 pay increases approximating 10 percent for all military personnel with more than 2 years of service became effective beginning 1 June.<sup>43</sup> Designed both as a cost-of-living raise and to retain highly qualified individuals by increasing the attractiveness of military service as a career, the Act gave the largest pay increases to the higher officer and enlisted grades and created four new pay levels: E-8's and E-9's for enlisted personnel and special O-9's and O-10's for general officers. It also established two proficiency pay systems for enlisted personnel. Under the first, an enlisted man might rise to any enlisted pay grade by demonstrating special proficiency in a specific skill. Under the second, proficiency ratings P-1, P-2, and P-3 were established. These would be obtainable through examinations and would pay respectively \$50, \$100, and \$150 a month over and above basic pay and other allowances.

d. New Enlisted Grades and Insignia. On 4 June 1958, under the same Act of Congress, the Department of the Army announced changes in enlisted insignia and titles, including additions corresponding to the two new enlisted pay levels mentioned above, aimed specifically to enhance the prestige of noncommissioned officers and make their careers more attractive. One feature was the restoration of the 3-striped "buck" sergeant's chevron, the discontinuance of which after World War II had met with wide disapproval.

Not enough time had elapsed by the end of June 1958 for valid judgment of the new system. There was apparently some disgruntlement because the insignia of NCO's of some grades would have one stripe less although denoting the same grades as before. On the other hand, there was general approval of the opportunity that personnel of long service and outstanding proficiency would have to attain higher grades and better pay.<sup>44</sup>

## 20. Personnel Policies and Problems

In addition to the increasing rate of Regular Army junior officer resignations already pointed out, other critical problems of personnel administration developed during the year. Two of the most far-reaching grew out of the decision of the Secretary of Defense, in July 1957, to reduce the strength of the Army by 50,000 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel by 31 December.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42</sup>USAREUR Memos 1-20-25, 8 Apr 58, subj: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commanders's Conference Notes, p. 4; 1-20-27, 26 Aug 58, same subj, pp. 4-5. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>43</sup>DA Cir 35-22, 20 May 58, subj: Military Pay Act of 1958. UNCLAS

<sup>44</sup>USAREUR Memo 1-20-27, cited above, pp. 7-8. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>45</sup>Cable DA-926599, DA from DCSPER sgd Booth to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 57. UNCLAS.

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a. Forced Separation of Certain Reserve Officers. To implement this decision, the active-duty officer strength of the Army had to be reduced by 5,530. Part of the reduction, Phase I, was to be accomplished through 2,130 involuntary separations of reserve officers--100 colonels, 390 lieutenant colonels, 570 majors, 480 captains, and 580 warrant officers--while such further separations as might become necessary were to be carried out in Phase II during the second half of FY 1958. After screening personnel records in Washington, departmental active duty boards were to designate the officers to be separated, with the over-all objective of improving the quality of the officers corps by releasing officers of least usefulness. The criteria included assignment flexibility as well as the ability to perform normal assigned duties. Each individual affected under Phase I was to be notified by 15 November or earlier, and most separations were to take place in December 1957, with 60 days' notice plus travel time to the officer's home. In a related action, reserve and AUS officers who had been passed over two or more times for promotion to captain, major, or lieutenant colonel, and most officers whose categories were to expire during the last half of FY 1958 and for whom further active duty had been denied, were also to be separated.<sup>46</sup>

On the assumption that between 20 and 25 percent of the Army's manpower was in Europe, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, estimated that through Phase I separations the command would lose from 426 to 534 reserve officers and warrant officers: 20-25 colonels out of 38 in the command; 78-98 lieutenant colonels out of 712; 114-143 majors out of 1,822; 98-123 captains out of 4,430; and 116-145 warrant officers out of 1,463. Except for full colonels, Phase I would therefore have little impact upon the effectiveness of the command. However, the harmful effect upon the morale of reserve officers in general would be marked.<sup>47</sup>

Actually, 423 USAREUR officers and warrant officers received separation notices under Phase I: 5 colonels, 69 lieutenant colonels, 109 majors, 76 captains, 17 lieutenants, and 147 warrant officers. Phase II was not carried out. As had been anticipated, reserve officer morale dropped to a low ebb as the number of separations mounted, but recovery was rapid, and the over-all impact of the policy upon the effectiveness of the command was beneficial.<sup>48</sup>

b. Elimination of Substandard Enlisted Personnel. Another part of the reduction program involved the discharge of enlisted personnel who failed to meet the aptitude standards desirable for the 1958 Army and its

<sup>46</sup>(1) Cable DA-926939, DCSPER sgd Booth to CINCUSAREUR for Hodes, 24 Jul 57. (2) Cable SX-4811, USAREUR to subor comds, 21 Jul 57. Both SECRET.

<sup>47</sup>DF, ACofS G1 to CofS, 26 Jul 57, subj: Reduction in Army Strength. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1957).

<sup>48</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col R. M. Leonard, C/G1 Mil Pers Br, 15 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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modern weapons. As a first step, personnel--commonly known as ACB-Zero's--who failed to make a score of 90 or more in at least 1 of the aptitude areas<sup>49</sup> of the Army Classification Battery (ACB) would be discharged. Later, ACB-1's--those who failed to score 90 in at least 2 of the areas--would be discharged, and there was some indication that the program would eventually be extended to include the discharge of ACB-2's if the necessary congressional approval could be obtained.<sup>50</sup> It was estimated that 25,000 eliminations would be required by December 1957. In anticipation of the program, commanders were directed to administer the Army Classification Battery to all enlisted personnel, without exception, who did not have recorded scores. The program would then apply to both RA and non-RA personnel, without discrimination on account of race, color, or religion. Exempted, however, were highly decorated personnel and those in the highest 3 grades with over 10 years of service. Moreover, since discharges under this program would normally be honorable, it would not apply to personnel being considered for discharge under disciplinary action or for the convenience of the government.

When The Judge Advocate General ruled that separations based solely on low test scores, without a record of unsatisfactory performance, would be of doubtful legality, the Department of the Army directed that all separations must be based upon substandard performance and that such substandard performance might be determined by a company, battalion, or higher commander. In some cases a few days of observation would doubtless suffice to establish an individual's capacity to absorb training; in others a period of up to two weeks might be required. Thenceforward the program was known as the Job Performance Potential Program.<sup>51</sup>

(1) Discharge of ACB-Zero's. USAREUR's original quota of ACB-Zero discharges was 6,000. After a G1 survey of potentials in the command this quota was raised to 7,500, then to 8,050, and finally to 11,050.<sup>52</sup> Actually, 10,808 individuals were returned to the United States for separation, as follows:<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup>Reading Vocabulary, Arithmetic Reading, Pattern Analysis, Mechanical Aptitude, Army Clerical Speed, Army Radio Code, Shop Mechanics, Automotive Information, Electrical Information, and Radio Information. UNCLAS.

<sup>50</sup>Cables DA-926599 & DA-927634, DA from DCSPER sgd Booth to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul, 6 Aug 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>51</sup>Cables DA-926922 & DA-556219, DA from AGPO-XD to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul, 7 Aug 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>52</sup>(1) Ltr, Lt Gen D. P. Booth, Asst DCS, to Gen Hodes, 17 Jul 57. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen H. G. Maddox, Dep CINCUSAREUR, to CG's USACOMZEUR & Seventh Army, 25 Jul 57. (3) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Booth, 10 Aug 57. All in SGS 320.2 (1957). (4) Cable DA-926685, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 57. (5) Cables DA-566904 & DA-577356, DA from AGPO-XD from TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Sep, 10 Oct 57. All UNCLAS.

<sup>53</sup>Info from Lt Col J. L. Rimlinger, G1 Mil Pers Br Enl Pers Sec, 10 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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Potential discharges	16,018
Exemptions	<u>7,331</u>
Balance eligible for separation	8,687
Additions after reevaluation	<u>2,703</u>
Total eligible for separation	11,390
Retained after reevaluation	<u>582</u>
Returned for separation	<u>10,808</u>

(2) Discharge of ACB-1's. When the elimination program was extended to include the discharge of a certain number of ACB-1's, 12,349 potential discharges were found in the command. With 3,131 of these exempted, 9,218 remained separable, and 5,550 were recommended for separation. However, only 1,900, the quota allowed USAREUR, were actually returned to the United States for separation.<sup>54</sup>

c. MOS Shortages in Special Weapons Units. A completely different problem was the continuing shortage, through unreplaced losses, of enlisted personnel with technical MOS's required by special weapons units. Despite continued command attention to personnel procurement in the special weapons field the gradual and continuous augmentation of special weapons delivery and support units kept these units understrength because of the time lag in procuring, training, and shipping personnel from the United States. In October 1957, for example, a Department of the Army training staff group found "a shortage of forward assembly technicians in special weapons delivery units and of ordnance special weapons warhead technicians in special weapons support units." Although the Seventh Army special weapons school at Pirmasens was expected to provide a number of the former until the replacement stream began to bring others, shortages in the second field would apparently remain critical.<sup>55</sup>

With a few exceptions--e.g., MOS 220, guided missile crewman--and although requirements were constantly increasing, by the end of FY 1958 the Department of the Army was providing the command with special weapons technical personnel in numbers commensurate with the known requirements. Moreover, even in the exceptional cases the command was often provided with personnel with closely related and adaptable training--e.g., an MOS 221, surface-to-surface missile mechanical assembler, instead of an MOS 220.<sup>56</sup>

d. Incidents. The rate of civilian-type offenses by military personnel against Germans, commonly known as "incidents," averaged 1.05 per 1,000 troops per month.<sup>57</sup> It was still a source of concern to the command

<sup>54</sup>Ibid. UNCLAS.

<sup>55</sup>Rept of DA Tng Stf Visit to USAREUR and SETAF, 17 Oct 57, pp. 2, 6. CONF. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>56</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col H. W. Pells, C/G1 Mil Pers Br Enl Pers Sec, 10 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>57</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 35. CONF.

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although it was consistently below that of FY 1957 and dropped in the fourth quarter to 0.7, lowest in 2 years and 41 percent lower than during the comparable quarter of FY 1957. The downward trend apparently reflected, in large measure, not only the efforts of commanders and of German and American organizations to improve German-American relations, but also the continuing program of eliminating undesirables and repeated offenders through board action. During the year 5,310 individuals--an average of 442 a month--were discharged under the provisions of AR 635-208, and 711--about 60 a month--under the provisions of AR 635-209.<sup>58</sup>

e. Family Housing. The problem of providing families of eligible military personnel in Germany with government housing was not solved during FY 1958. At the end of the year 41,265 family housing units were available--an increase of 1,532 over June 1957.<sup>59</sup> Most of the additional units, however, were temporarily converted maids' quarters and playrooms in family-type apartments. (See par 100i.) Moreover, long-range estimates were that 6,500 additional permanent units would be needed if arbitrary restrictions on the number of married men in gyroscope units were lifted and if housing were provided for the families of men in grade E-4.<sup>60</sup> In this connection, it was found in October 1957 that shortages in dependent housing and restrictions on the number of married men in gyroscope units were responsible for the fact that these units arrived in USAREUR with less than the authorized numbers of NCO's and specialists of the highest three grades and more than the authorized number of privates and PFC's.<sup>61</sup> It was also found that while an infantry battalion of 1,000 men would normally require 130 sets of family quarters, a field artillery battalion of 650 men, with its large percentage of specialists, required about 175 sets.<sup>62</sup> USAREUR and DA efforts to obtain approval for a surplus commodity and rental guarantee housing program for Germany were not meeting with success, but even if the plans were consummated months would elapse before

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<sup>58</sup>(1) AR 635-208, 21 May 56, subj: Personnel Separations: Discharge, Undesirable Habits and Traits of Character. (2) AR 635-209, 17 Mar 55, subj: Personnel Separations: Discharge, Inaptitude or Unsuitability. (3) G1 Stat Charts, subj: Discipline, Law, and Order. In G1 Mil Pers Br. All UNCLAS. In August 1958, noting that approximately 16 days elapsed between the initiation of board proceedings and the approval of findings, and 10 more days before the actual departure of the dischargee, and that meanwhile some of the individuals became involved in incidents, General Hodes urged the use of all appropriate administrative means to speed action.

<sup>59</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 28. CONF.

<sup>60</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col R. A. Kapp, C/G1 Welfare & Rec Br Const & Hsg Sec, 30 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>61</sup>Rept of DA Tng Stf Visit, cited above, pp. 2, 6. CONF.

<sup>62</sup>Ltr, Gen Hodes to Lt Gen C. D. Eddleman, DCSOPS, 15 Mar 58. CONF. In SGS 250/H5 (Restationing), 1958.

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additional housing units would become available.<sup>63</sup> (See pars. 100j, k.)

As another facet of the housing problem in Germany, more than 17,000 families supported by USAREUR were living, sometimes under very unsatisfactory conditions, in German-owned lodgings leased or rented by their sponsors.<sup>64</sup> In an effort to stem or reverse the increase in the number of families living on the economy, in May 1957 the Department of Defense had withdrawn commissary, PX, and virtually all space-available return trip privileges from all families brought overseas after 6 June 1957 without express military authorization.<sup>65</sup> However, this restriction aroused such widespread protest, both in Germany and in the United States, that it was rescinded three months later, except with respect to return transportation.<sup>66</sup> Thus, during FY 1958 the number of families residing "on the economy" in Germany increased by more than 15 percent (Table 2).

In France the number of government-controlled housing units, adequate units on the economy, and surplus commodity units under construction totaled less than half the family housing requirement. It was expected that strength cuts would reduce the requirement during FY 1959 but not down to the level of housing availability. In Italy available indigenous housing and programmed surplus commodity construction were nearly sufficient for current needs and, it was estimated, would exceed future needs.<sup>67</sup>

f. Concurrent Travel. Except in Italy the command's desire to provide all eligible families of military personnel with concurrent travel to Europe with their sponsors continued to be thwarted by the housing shortage, although the rate of such travel increased appreciably. In Germany it averaged 70 percent of eligible families, with a high of 85.2 percent in June 1958, and in France it averaged 77 percent, with a high of 82 percent during the same month.<sup>68</sup> The waiting period for families not granted concurrent travel averaged six months. Because in many cases priority in housing and concurrent travel for gyroscope personnel meant corresponding and arbitrary restrictions upon housing and concurrent travel for families of nongyroscope personnel, in February 1958 the

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<sup>63</sup> Annex A, Comments of CinC, to USAREUR Memo 1-20-26, 25 Jun 58, subj: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference, pp. 4-5. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>64</sup> Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 28, 41. CONF. Of the 70,250 families being supported by USAREUR on 30 June 1958--57,777 in Germany, 10,014 in France, 2,459 in Italy--27,419 were living on the economy--17,281 in Germany, 7,679 in France, 2,459 in Italy. This was an increase of 1,658 families, almost entirely in Germany, since 30 June 1957.

<sup>65</sup> Cable SC-32531, USAREUR to subor comds, 14 Jun 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>66</sup> Cable SC-47038, USAREUR to subor comds, 20 Sep 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>67</sup> Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 45. CONF.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 4th Qtr, p. 28. CONF.

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command established the practices of terminating special allocations of housing to gyroscope personnel 30 days after their units arrived in the theater and of integrating the names of personnel remaining on gyroscope waiting lists into existing community waiting lists.<sup>69</sup>

At the end of the fiscal year the objective for both Germany and France was 95 percent concurrent travel by 31 December 1958 and 97 percent by 30 June 1959. This was to be achieved through the maximum utilization of government housing, the construction of surplus commodity housing, and the increased use of indigenous housing.<sup>70</sup>

## Section II: Civilian Personnel

### 21. Strength and Trends

As shown in the following tabulation, extracted from Table 1, the number of civilian employees in the command decreased significantly during the first half of FY 1958. Although USASETAF American and Italian employees were added in January, at the end of the fiscal year the civilian force, excluding labor service personnel, was smaller by about 2,100 persons than at the beginning:

	<u>30 Jun 57</u>	<u>30 Dec 57</u>	<u>31 Jan 58</u> <sup>71</sup>	<u>30 Jun 58</u>	<u>Δ Increase - Decrease during FY 1958</u>
Total Appropriated and Nonappropriated Fund Employees, excluding LS	<u>120,733</u>	<u>113,301</u>	<u>116,504</u>	<u>118,614</u>	<u>- 2,119</u>
U.S. Civilian	5,481 <sup>72</sup>	6,083	6,315	5,738 <sup>73</sup>	Δ 257
Continental Wage Scale	138	129	124	122	- 16
German Resident	93,729	86,617	86,606	88,559	- 5,170
Other Foreign Nationals	21,385	20,472	23,459	24,195	Δ 2,810

<sup>69</sup>USAREUR msg, quoted in HACOM Daily Bul, Nr 13, 31 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>70</sup>USAREUR Memorandum 614-20-10, 24 July 1958, subject: Concurrent Travel, established economy housing rental agencies in all billeting offices throughout USAREUR to assist local commanders in locating suitable indigenous housing for concurrently-traveling families of newly assigned personnel. UNCLAS.

<sup>71</sup>After the transfer of USASETAF. CONF.

<sup>72</sup>Approximately 1,200 DAC school teachers are not carried in June 1957 figures. CONF.

<sup>73</sup>Approximately 1,500 DAC school teachers are not carried in June 1958 figures. CONF.

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The greatest decrease was in German resident employees through a sharp reduction in the second quarter necessitated by the discontinuance of Deutsche Mark support.<sup>74</sup>

## 22. Payroll

Of the 118,614 U.S., Allied/Neutral, and indigenous civilians--excluding labor service personnel--employed by the command, 24,058 were paid from Department of the Army appropriated funds, 60,766 from mutual aid funds, and 33,790 from nonappropriated funds (Table 2). Beginning 1 October 1957 all wages and salary payments, except to certain personnel in Berlin, were out of dollar funds; thus, the dollar payroll was \$133,062,483--almost double that of FY 1957, which had been \$68,538,538. By the same token, the Deutsche Mark payroll was DM 122,349,330 (\$29,130,793), about one-fourth the DM 480,258,178 (\$114,347,178) for FY 1957.<sup>75</sup>

## 23. Personnel Policies and Problems

### a. Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) Employees.

(1) The Reduction in Force. Budgetary limitations and employment ceilings established by the Department of the Army for the first quarter of FY 1958 brought about the first general reduction in force since the extension of the civil service competitive system to overseas commands in 1955. Specifically, on 15 July 1957 the Department ordered a USAREUR-wide reduction of 485 Department of the Army Civilian spaces, to be accomplished in such a manner that the number of graded individuals in pay status on 30 September 1957 would not exceed 4,355. The over-all decrease would be about 13 percent, but, since school teachers and nurses were not affected, other civilian spaces had to be reduced by about 20 percent. Positions eliminated were not to be refilled with military personnel or contract employees. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense placed a virtually complete freeze upon civilian hiring until further notice.<sup>76</sup>

A preliminary survey indicated that about 200 of the spaces to be lost were occupied, that they would not be vacated through normal attrition, and that a mandatory reduction in force would therefore be necessary.<sup>77</sup> The actual number of employees affected during the first and

<sup>74</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 18. CONF (info used UNCLAS). Also, see Table 1. CONF.

<sup>75</sup>Info from G3 Org & Eqp Br Civ Mpr Sec, 8 Sep 58. UNCLAS. Also, see Table 2. CONF.

<sup>76</sup>(1) Memo, Col W. W. Harris, DCS, to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 57. (2) Cables DA-556550, 8 Aug, DA-557556, 10 Aug, & DA-572688, 26 Sep 57, DA from DCSPER sgd TAG to CINCUSAREUR, et al. (3) Hq USAREUR, Qtrly Rev & Analysis, Civ Pers Prog (hereafter cited as Qtrly CP Rev), FY 58, 1st Qtr, P. 2. (4) CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 12 Aug 57, Formal Comments by ACofS Gl. All UNCLAS.

<sup>77</sup>Memo, Col Harris to CINCUSAREUR, cited above. UNCLAS.

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second quarters was 364. Of this number, 176 were separated involuntarily--108 in Germany and 68 in France--and 188 resigned or transferred to other agencies.<sup>78</sup>

In February 1958 the freeze on civilian hiring was lifted and normal policies were resumed.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, because limitations upon funds were still stringent, the command continued its effort to reduce civilian employee levels through normal attrition and the elimination of nonessential positions. Mandatory reductions in force were used only as a last resort.

Total involuntary separations during the year were 247, as follows:<sup>80</sup>

	<u>Total</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>33</u>
Germany	<u>146</u>	13	95	23	15
France	<u>101</u>	17	51	15	18

(2) Grievances and Appeals. As might have been expected because of the mandatory reduction in force, appeals from management actions rose to a record high. Most of the appeals were in France, and many took the form of letters to Congressmen from employees who had established community roots, either through the acquisition of property or through marriage, and who could look only to the U.S. forces for employment. Employees so situated might conceivably gain through an appeal, and certainly would have nothing to lose thereby. None of the appeals were successful. However, better face-to-face counseling, written explanations of employees' rights and obligations, complete information about policies and procedures, and more effective handling of complaints were provided at installations in order to reduce the number of unjustifiable appeals to higher authority.<sup>81</sup>

(3) Overseas Interchange Program. What was believed to be the first true exchange of employees under the Army Overseas Interchange Program inaugurated in 1956 was accomplished during the fourth quarter, when arrangements were completed for an Information Specialist, GS-11, in the Berlin Command to exchange jobs with an Information Specialist, GS-11, at Headquarters, Second Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.<sup>82</sup> The command negotiated the stateside placement of eight other individuals before their departure from USAREUR, and an unknown number were placed, after their arrival in the States, upon the basis of negotiations begun, but not completed, in USAREUR. Fourteen employees were received from the United States for reassignment under the program. A general review of interchange problems in April 1958 indicated that there would be greater confidence in

<sup>78</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 2d Qtr, p. 4. UNCLAS.

<sup>79</sup>Cable SC-14222, USAREUR to all area comds, 3 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>80</sup>Info from G1 Civ Pers Br Stds & Pdn Sec. UNCLAS.

<sup>81</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 10; 4th Qtr, p. 6. UNCLAS.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 4th Qtr, p. 5. UNCLAS.

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the program if the Department of the Army would inform the command periodically of the names, instead of merely the number, of returnees actually placed or reinstated. At the end of the year there were 126 applicants for interchange among the approximately 4,200 USAREUR Department of the Army civilians.<sup>83</sup>

(4) Pay Increases. By Congressional enactment, cost-of-living pay increases approximating 10 percent, retroactive to 1 January 1958, became effective in June.<sup>84</sup>

b. Continental Wage Scale (CWS) Employees. Because it was Department of the Army policy that no U.S. civil service career or career-conditional employee should be involuntarily separated while an Allied/Neutral civilian continued to hold a position for which the American employee was qualified, the reduction in force of U.S. civilian employees affected some CWS employees.<sup>85</sup> However, in many cases the employment of Allied/Neutral personnel had been based upon their special qualifications; thus, less than 10 such employees were involved. The decrease in this category from 138 at the beginning of the year to 122 at the end was as much through attrition as through forcible separation.<sup>86</sup>

c. German Local Wage Rate (LWR) Employees.

(1) Reduction in Force. The most drastic of the civilian reductions in force was brought to bear upon German resident employees, chiefly during the second quarter of the year, when the German Government reduced and finally discontinued the Deutsche Mark defense support payments from which LWR wages and salaries had been funded. A total of 5,213 German employees were forcibly separated during this quarter, as compared with 598 during the first.<sup>87</sup> Other separations were postponed to the third quarter because of the notice periods required by German law.<sup>88</sup> When additional dollar funds became available in most areas during the third quarter, the current was reversed and some rehiring began. Nevertheless, 7,042 German workers were dropped from USAREUR employment during the year. Most of them could not be rehired because of the considerable competition for skilled workers in some areas together with the apparent lack of job security with the U.S. forces.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 3rd Qtr, p. 9; 4th Qtr, pp. 5-6. UNCLAS.

<sup>84</sup> DA Civ Pers Cir Nr 19, 13 Jun 58, subj: Federal Employees' Salary Increase Act of 1958. UNCLAS.

<sup>85</sup> Cable SC-44370, USAREUR to area comds, 3 Sep 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>86</sup> Info from G1 Civ Pers Br Stds & Pdn Sec. UNCLAS

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

<sup>89</sup> (1) Ibid., 2d Qtr, p. 4; 3rd Qtr, pp. 10-11; 4th Qtr, p. 6. UNCLAS.  
(2) Charts in G1 Civ Pers Br Stds & Pdn Sec. UNCLAS.

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Action was taken at all levels to ease the impact of the mass discharges so far as possible. Employees separated even as early as 15-30 October were paid the Christmas bonus. Where possible, greatest reductions were made in areas where the labor supply was scarce, so that discharged employees might be absorbed by local industries. When rehiring became possible, paid advertisements were used to publicize it. The following extract from a dispatch from a U.S. Embassy observer to the State Department in Washington is in point:<sup>90</sup>

"The Embassy representative was especially impressed by the unanimous and cordial expressions of gratitude by all the German participants to the United States Forces for the consideration they have shown to their employees and the German agencies in connection with this reduction in force. The representatives of the trade unions were no less appreciative than those of the government agencies present. This is a fresh indication, which may be added to others that have come informally to the attention of the Embassy, of the good relations existing between the United States Forces and the trade unions... responsible for representing the interests of local employees."

## (2) Formal Agreement on Interim Pay Increase of 1 April 1956.

In July 1957 German labor union representatives finally signed the agreement under which pay increases averaging 5½ percent, with no reduction in the 48-hour workweek, had been paid to all major categories of LWR personnel except hotel, mess, restaurant, and retail trade employees since 1 April 1956.<sup>91</sup> Agreement had actually been reached in July 1956. At the last moment, however, the Industrial Metalworkers' Union (Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall), largest in Germany, had made new demands, unacceptable to the forces, that delayed the signing for approximately one year. Since the union's area of primary interest was the Schwaebisch-Gmuend Ordnance Depot, a separate wage agreement for that installation was negotiated later.

This episode demonstrated the dangers inherent in allowing wage increases to become operative before new agreements were actually signed.<sup>92</sup>

(3) New Wage Scale for Retail Trade Personnel. In November 1957 agreement was reached on increases in the wages of LWR retail trade personnel, that is, employees selling "over the counter" in exchanges, commissaries, and quartermaster sales stores. For a while this agreement, too, was delayed by labor union considerations--this time a jurisdictional

<sup>90</sup>Dispatch 595, AMEMB Bonn to State Dept, 3 Oct 57, cited in Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

<sup>91</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 75-77. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>92</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 1st Qtr, pp. 1-2; 3d Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

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dispute between the Salaried Employees' Union (Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft), representing most of the LWR personnel, and the Union of Public Service Workers (Offentliche Dienste, Transport, und Verkehr), representing a considerable number of commissary employees. As finally promulgated, the new wage scale, covering 4,700 employees, called for increases ranging from 4 to 5 percent, retroactive to 1 July 1957.<sup>93</sup> This agreement, unlike that leading to the interim pay increase of 1 April 1956, was not to be implemented until formal signing took place.

(4) New Wage Scale for Hotel and Mess Personnel. Wage negotiations for hotels, mess, and restaurant personnel, affecting approximately 14,350 employees, proved to be the most lengthy and difficult of all and were concluded only after USAREUR representatives, German authorities, and officials of the German hotel and catering workers' union made joint field trips to typical U.S. installations for firsthand observation of their hotel and mess operations. After a study of comparable establishments on the German economy, USAREUR developed a completely new LWR job structure and proposed a new pay scale. The regrading and pay rates finally agreed upon resulted in wage increases averaging 9 percent, effective 1 May 1958. The regrading also eliminated many of the differences between the American and German job structures that had been the underlying cause of several troublesome labor court suits.<sup>94</sup>

(5) Institution of the 45-Hour Workweek. On 1 August 1957 the workweek of most LWR manual workers, administrative and clerical personnel, and salaried foremen, constituting about two-thirds of USAREUR's LWR employees, was reduced from 48 hours to 45, as agreed upon by the U.S. forces, the German Government, and the principal German labor unions in June 1957.<sup>95</sup> This step was taken in general conformity with the growing practice in German industry. Because it was put into effect wherever operationally feasible, some categories of LWR employees were granted the reduction ahead of their counterparts in German establishments. Since weekly take-home pay remained the same, the reduction in working time was, in effect, an increase of 6.67 percent in hourly wage rates. Moreover, most of the employees affected were also granted a 5-day workweek.<sup>96</sup>

The foregoing reduction did not apply to the LWR employees of hotels, restaurants, messes, clubs, sales establishments, hospitals, fire-fighting companies, and other facilities for which an operating week of 5 days or 45 hours was impractical, or to certain other personnel whose counterparts in German industry were working longer hours. An initial USAREUR study of the feasibility of extending it to other groups of employees led the

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<sup>93</sup>(1) Ibid., 2d Qtr, p. 1. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15 Dec 57, p. 1. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>94</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 2d Qtr, pp. 3-4; 3d Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

<sup>95</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 57. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>96</sup>(1) USAREUR Memo 700-310-10, 9 Jul 57, subj: Reduction of Work Hours for LWR Personnel. (2) Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 1. UNCLAS.

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forces to advise the German authorities in November 1957 that there was little prospect of such an extension. By the end of the fiscal year, however, the reduction of the workweek of retail sales personnel was being discussed, since many German retail establishments had instituted the 45-hour week.<sup>97</sup>

(6) Developments in Berlin. In Berlin the Allied Kommandature, the Berlin Senat, and the local labor unions reached agreement for the extension of the 45-hour workweek to the same categories of employees, and under the same conditions, as in the Federal Republic of Germany. Through subsequent agreements across-the-board pay increases approximating 6 2/3 percent were also granted, effective 1 January 1958.<sup>98</sup>

(7) Additional Fringe Benefits. In 1955, when representatives of the Allied forces, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the principal German labor unions had signed an agreement setting up uniform wage scales and prescribing conditions of work for German LWR employees of the forces,<sup>99</sup> the then Allied High Commissioners for Germany had committed the forces to granting their employees four kinds of "fringe" monetary benefits, somewhat like those customarily provided in German industry. The first of these was a onetime gratuity, paid when the agreement became effective. The second was an annual Christmas bonus of 2 percent of gross annual pay to each hourly paid worker and 2.74 percent to each salaried employee. The third was a termination gratuity of 2 percent, to be paid to eligible personnel leaving the employ of the forces after 1 February 1960. The fourth was to be a contribution to additional old age insurance or to some other benefit. It was to consist of 2 and 4 percent of the gross annual payrolls for hourly paid and salaried employees, respectively, and was to be paid according to a plan to be proposed by the West German Government.

In October 1957, after preliminary discussions concerning the fourth benefit, the German Federal Ministry of Finance proposed three different plans for it, without stating a preference, and suggested 1 April 1958 as an effective date for the plan that would be agreed upon. All of the forces, however, set 1 July 1958 as the earliest possible date. Further discussions narrowed the alternative plans to two--additional old age

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<sup>97</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 2d Qtr, p. 1; 3d Qtr, p. 2; 4th Qtr, p. 1. UNCLAS. In August 1958 the workweek of LWR retail sales personnel was reduced from 48 hours to 45, effective 6 October 1958. The impact of the shortened week upon service to customers and the utilization of personnel was to be studied. (Cable SC-41018, USAREUR to 7th Army, et al., 21 Aug 58. UNCLAS).

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 1st Qtr, p. 2; 3d Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

<sup>99</sup>Tariff Agreement, Concerning the Employees Employed with Offices, Agencies, Enterprises, and Other Institutions of the Allied Authorities and the Allied Forces Within the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Jan 55. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Polit Ad and SGS.

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insurance benefits or additional annual leave. The uncertain tenure of employment by the forces, the increase in German old age insurance benefits since 1955, and the trend in German industry away from additional insurance cast some doubt upon the wisdom of adopting additional old age benefits. Polls of opinion at typical installations, moreover, indicated that from 88 to 98 percent of the employees preferred either additional leave or vacation pay. At the end of the fiscal year no decision had been reached in the matter. However, to protect employees from financial loss because of lengthy negotiations, the forces had agreed that the new benefit would be effective from 1 July 1958, irrespective of its form or the date of the final agreement.<sup>100</sup> Estimates were that it would cost \$2,675,000 in appropriated funds and \$1,300,000 in nonappropriated funds.<sup>101</sup>

(8) Request for New Round of Wage Increases. In March 1958 the two unions representing retail trade personnel served notice of the termination of their wage agreements and requested increases approximating 12 percent, allegedly based upon the higher cost of living rather than upon advancing wages in German industry. At the request of the Federal Ministry of Finance negotiations for general increases estimated at 6 percent of payroll were begun, but at the end of June 1958 they were still in progress.<sup>102</sup>

## d. French LWR Employees.

(1) Reduction in Force. In the general lowering of employment ceiling 806 LWR employees in France were discharged during the second quarter--as against 109 during the first--and 1,279 during the year.<sup>103</sup> To an even greater degree than in Germany, recruiting and rehiring when additional funds became available were made difficult by the very high rate of employment in French industry.<sup>104</sup>

(2) Wage Increase of 1 January 1958. In September 1957 the French Government proposed an increase of 13 percent in the wages and salaries of LWR employees in France. The United States' position, based largely upon a survey of French industrial pay scales made by USACOMZEUR,

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<sup>100</sup> Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58; 2d Qtr, p. 1; 3d Qtr, pp. 1-2; 4th Qtr, p. 1. UNCLAS.

<sup>101</sup> USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58, pp. 3-4. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>102</sup> (1) Ibid. (2) Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58; 3d Qtr, pp. 3-4; 4th Qtr, p. 2. (3) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15 Jun 58, p. 1. All UNCLAS.

<sup>103</sup> Info from G1 Civ Pers Br Stds & Pdn Sec. UNCLAS.

<sup>104</sup> Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 1. UNCLAS. At the end of February 1958 the British Treasury Information Service reported that only four-tenths of 1 percent of the labor force in France was unemployed; in West Germany, 7.5 percent.



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was that increases were warranted only for employees in the higher grades. Nevertheless, in October the forces submitted a counterproposal offering a general raise of 5 percent. On 15 January 1958 agreement was reached on across-the-board increases of 8 percent, effective 1 January. In addition, joint American-French surveys of industrial wages in French localities would be made and completed by 15 July, and any additional increases justified by the surveys would be granted.

Notwithstanding this agreement, the French authorities immediately appealed to USEUCOM and to the American Embassy, Paris, on the grounds that the 8 percent raise was inadequate and that a wage increase of 15 percent would be necessary to prevent labor unrest at military bases. The burden of any such discontent, said the communication, would have to be borne by the U.S. forces. After much interservice discussion, exchange of messages, and consideration by the Departments of Defense and State, the French authorities were advised that they were free to reopen negotiations with the military agencies if they desired. However, at the end of FY 1958 the discussions had not been reopened. The agreed-upon joint surveys, believed to be unique in labor-management relationships, were proceeding satisfactorily.<sup>105</sup>

e. Italian LWR Employees. Even before 1 January 1958 USAREUR representatives had frequently been consulted in connection with civilian personnel administration in Italy. For example, USAREUR representatives attended a meeting in Rome in July 1957 at which the Italian Government and the U.S. forces reached agreement on LWR pay scales and employment conditions in Italy. A subsequent survey of industrial wage scales in major Italian areas, made by USASETAF after 1 January and reviewed by USAREUR, indicated that increases in the wages of both hourly and monthly paid employees were warranted in all localities. The increases agreed upon ranged from 3 1/2 to 5 percent and became effective on 1 June 1958.<sup>106</sup>

### Section III: Labor Service Personnel

Labor service units composed of German and displaced non-German civilians continued to provide guard and technical service support in Germany and France under the staff supervision of the Labor Services

<sup>105</sup>(1) Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58; 1st Qtr, p. 2; 2d Qtr, p. 4; 3d Qtr, p. 4; 4th Qtr, p. 4. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58, p. 3. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>106</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58; 1st Qtr, p. 2; 2d Qtr, p. 3. UNCLAS.

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Division, Headquarters, USAREUR.<sup>107</sup>

24. Composition

On 30 June 1958 the national composition of the labor service force as compared with that at the end of FY 1957, was as follows:<sup>108</sup>

Nationality	Total	30 Jun 57	30 Jun 58	Increase - Decrease
		17,185	15,808 <sup>109</sup>	
				- 1,377
German		9,668	8,632	- 1,036
Polish		4,993 <sup>110</sup>	4,244 <sup>111</sup>	- 749
Latvian		1,124	940	- 184
Lithuanian		651	473	- 178
Estonian		241	244	+ 3
Czechoslovakian		158	250	+ 92
Hungarian <sup>112</sup>		-	213	+ 213
Bulgarian		160	152	- 8
Ukranian <sup>112</sup>		-	148	+ 148
Russian		102	63	- 39
Albanian		88	89	+ 1
Yugoslavian <sup>112</sup>		-	326	+ 326
Romanian <sup>112</sup>		-	9	+ 9
Other <sup>113</sup>		-	25	+ 25

25. Strength and Trends

Chiefly because of budgetary limitations, the strength of the labor service force was reduced by about 8 percent, from 17,234 to an alltime low of 15,837 (Table 1)--a decrease of almost 50 percent from the 1952

<sup>107</sup> Beginning 5 May 1957 all units composed of German nationals were redesignated officially as Civilian Labor Groups (Zivile Arbeitsgruppen). However, they continued to be known generally as labor service units. UNCLAS.

<sup>108</sup> (1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 60. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Lab Svc Div, Tab of Lab Svc Str by Nat, 30 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>109</sup> Actual end-of-month strength. The figure 15,837 shown in Table 1 represents persons paid during June. CONF.

<sup>110</sup> 1,903 in France. CONF.

<sup>111</sup> 1,833 in France. UNCLAS.

<sup>112</sup> Not reported separately before August 1957. UNCLAS.

<sup>113</sup> By nation of birth: Arabia, 1; Austria, 1; France, 2; Greece, 2; Holland, 1; Italy, 1; Israel, 2; Spain, 1; Switzerland, 1; Turkey, 3; United States, 1; Undetermined, 9. UNCLAS.

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strength of more than 31,000.<sup>114</sup> The closing of the Landsberg War Crimes Prison resulted in the elimination of about 100 guard spaces. In addition, a survey of all remaining guard units led to the reorganization of a large number of posts--1 jeep patrol sometimes replacing as many as 4 walking units--and the discontinuance of others. Moreover, the Department of the Army lowered the labor service ceiling in France from 1,900 to 1,850.<sup>115</sup>

26. Personnel Policies and Problems

a. Proposed Phase-out of German Technical Units. Under the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany that permitted the maintenance of labor service units composed of German nationals for civilian-type employment after 5 May 1957, a number of units with essentially military duties were also to be continued until their missions could be taken over by the German Army.<sup>116</sup> In January 1958 General Hodes proposed, as a goal for 30 June, the elimination of as many German labor service engineer, signal, and other technical units as possible through the substitution of German Army units, to be under CENTAG's operational control.<sup>117</sup> The accomplishment of this aim depended largely upon the willingness of the German Federal Government to assume additional budgetary responsibility, the availability of appropriate German Army units, and the extent to which qualified labor service technical personnel might be accepted into the German Army.

Labor service personnel had been reluctant to volunteer for the German Army without firm commitments concerning openings, grades, pay, seniority on account of labor service experience, and kindred matters. A great deal of interest was aroused when German recruiting officers stated in a number of orientation talks to labor service units that pay and longevity credit in the Army would be granted for such service. Accepted labor service employees with more than 6 months of service would be considered as former soldiers, even without prior military service, and upon reaching the grade of sergeant and passing required examinations would be eligible for lifetime civil service employment. Former Wehrmacht personnel would be given a military rank equal to or higher than the grade held in the labor service organization, if qualified, and individuals called for testing and interviews would possibly be informed on the same day of their acceptance and grade or their nonacceptance. However, the very favorable reaction to the

<sup>114</sup>(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, 1952, p. 80. SECRET. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 31. CONF.

<sup>115</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col F. T. Berg, C/Lab Svc Div, 13 Jul 58. UNCLAS. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 2. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (3) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 63. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>116</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 60-61. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>117</sup>USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 1, 7 Jan 58, p. 3. SECRET (info used CONF).

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recruiting officers' statements was reversed when the Bundeswehr recruiting center at Wiesbaden informed the Labor Service Division that they were not authorized or valid. The promises later were validated by a letter from General Heusinger, the German Armed Forces Chief of Staff, to General Hodes, but interest in enlisting did not mount again to the peak from which it had fallen.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, as time passed, the Federal Ministry of Finance seemed increasingly reluctant to give budgetary approval to the organization of the required German Army units.

When little progress had been made by 30 June 1958, the maximum use of German Army units to replace labor service units paid from U.S. funds was rescheduled as a major command objective for FY 1959.<sup>119</sup>

b. New Wage Proposals. Early in the year USAREUR began negotiations with German labor unions, through the Federal Ministry of Finance and on behalf of the forces, concerning revision of the labor service wage agreement that had expired on 5 May 1957. The negotiations proved difficult because of differences in the points of view of the unions. However, after much discussion it was agreed in principle that no wage or salary increases, as such, would be given but that work hours would be reduced from 48 to 45, effective 3 months after the final agreement. By virtue of another agreement, previously reached under the Forces Convention, that labor service wages and salaries might include subsistence and billeting,<sup>120</sup> a monetary value of DM 80 per month was placed on subsistence and quarters furnished to employees. This sum was added to their pay rates but withheld from employees to whom subsistence and quarters were furnished. Personnel absent from their duty stations on authorized leave were granted a monetary allowance in lieu of meals.<sup>121</sup> By the end of the fiscal year no formal agreements on other changes had been signed.<sup>122</sup>

c. Plans for Emergency Procurement of Local Labor. Because of diminishing labor service strength, a plan was prepared for procuring local civilian labor in an emergency. This plan was coordinated with the

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<sup>118</sup>(1) DF, Lab Svc Div to DCS, et al., 29 Aug 57, subj: Recruitment of Labor Service Engineer Employees by the Bundeswehr. AEALS 230 LS. (2) Ltr, Gen Lieut A. Heusinger, German Armed Forces CofS, to Gen Hodes, 11 Oct 57. (3) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Heusinger, 29 Oct 57. All UNCLAS. All in USAREUR SGS 231.5 (1957).

<sup>119</sup>(1) Annex A, to USAREUR Stf Memo 11-5-4, 12 Jun 58, subj: Command Objectives FY 1959. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col Berg, cited above. CONF.

<sup>120</sup>Annex A, to USAREUR Memo 600-400-2, 3 Jun 57, subj: Labor Service Organization in Germany Under Article 45 of the Forces Convention, p. 5. UNCLAS.

<sup>121</sup>Qtrly CP Rev, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 2. UNCLAS.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 4th Qtr, p. 1. UNCLAS.

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German Federal Republic's own territorial defense plan, which called for the organization of civilian skilled labor groups that were to be commanded by German officers and were to operate immediately behind forward lines. These groups were to be made available to American commanders, civil affairs officers, and military government officers upon request. Commanders unable to obtain the necessary labor from appropriate German military agencies might approach local city or town officials. As a last resort they might recruit directly.<sup>123</sup>

d. Polish Personnel in France. The clause of the Bruce-Parodi Agreement of 1950<sup>124</sup> stipulating that only Polish labor service personnel would be permitted to work in France continued in effect. These employees were still not eligible for French social security benefits or for German benefits unless they returned to Germany within 6 months. However, they were entitled to free medical care at U.S. Army hospitals and, if injured on the job, were eligible for U.S. Federal Employees' Compensation Act benefits. They were paid in U.S. currency and were authorized, while in France, to use the American Express Company banking services normally available to U.S. military personnel, to register privately owned vehicles under the provisions applicable to U.S. military personnel, to buy at European Exchange System (EES) stores and USAREUR Quartermaster retail gasoline outlets, and to avail themselves of all Army-Air Force post office privileges except the purchase of postal money orders.<sup>125</sup>

Every labor service employee transferring from Germany to France was furnished with documents attesting to his right to reenter Germany. Possession of these documents, however, did not constitute permission to enter France. Instead, and by special agreement, the employee's entry was technically on the basis of U.S. Army travel orders solely, and it was the responsibility of the Army to return him to Germany at the end of his service.<sup>126</sup> Because of these special conditions, employees desiring to cross the French border into countries other than Germany, even for short visits, were unable to obtain visas in France. In each case the employee had to return to Germany to apply for a visa.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>DF, ACofS G1 to USAREUR stf divs, 7 Apr 58, subj: Procurement of Local Labor in an Emergency (U). CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>124</sup>Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment of Line of Communications Across France, 5 Nov 50. SECRET. In Lab Svc Div.

<sup>125</sup>Cmt 2, Lab Svc Div to Hist Div, 6 Nov 58, to DF, Hist Div to Lab Svc Div, 29 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1958 (U). AEAHI 250/54 HI. SECRET.

<sup>126</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Repts, FY 55, pp. 114-115; FY 56, p. 86. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>127</sup>Cmt 2, 6 Nov 58, cited above. SECRET.

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Section IV: Morale, Personnel Services, and Discipline

27. General State of Morale

While the recurrence of periods during which mandatory reductions in force were either imminent or in process was an unusually constant source of concern to personnel in the categories involved, the pay raises to military personnel and to almost every category of civilian employee, together with the assurance of additional fringe benefits to German employees tended to be balancing factors. Department of the Army training staff inspectors visiting USAREUR in October 1957 found that "without exception, all units visited evidenced a high state of morale, combat readiness, discipline, and esprit de corps, as well as a complete confidence in their ability to accomplish operational missions."<sup>128</sup> Lt. Col. Margaret A. Kimpton, USAREUR WAC Staff Advisor, reported in August 1957 that during staff visits she had talked to every enlisted woman in Europe and had found them to be generally well integrated and happy to be a part of the command.<sup>129</sup> At the end of the year there was general agreement that the morale of military organizations had not only continued to be high but had been significantly improved through the separation of least effective personnel from the service. Absences without leave continued to be few. The number of complaints received by the USAREUR Inspector General Division remained at about the level of FY 1957 and were of normal scope. A marked increase in complaints concerning promotion and job assignment, during the last quarter, was probably an unavoidable concomitant of the introduction of the new enlisted grade structure.<sup>130</sup>

a. Other Factors Contributing to Improved Morale.

(1) Red Cross and Army Emergency Relief Activities. The American National Red Cross continued to render financial aid and assistance of other kinds in the solution of the personal and family problems of individuals who desired welfare reports, emergency leaves, compassionate discharges or reassignments, and the like. Loans and grants to Army personnel in 9,850 cases totaled \$578,300, including \$25,500 in outright grants. A monthly average of 1,240 volunteer and 200 professional workers, including Grey Ladies, staff and nurses' aides, social welfare aides, and other assistants, rendered needed services in hospitals. Training courses in first aid, water safety and swimming, home nursing, and volunteer work were offered.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Rept of DA Tng Stf Visit, 17 Oct 57, cited above. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>129</sup> USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 13, 20 Aug 57, p. 3. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>130</sup> Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 13-14. CONF.

<sup>131</sup> Incl 1, to ltr, Mr. L. F. Trace, USAREUR Red Cross Fld Dir, to Mr. Lane, 17 Sep 58. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

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As a special project, and because it was found that in a very large number of car-owning families only the sponsor had a driver's license, classes in driver education were organized in several communities, on a voluntary basis, to aid dependents to obtain USAREUR licenses for emergency NEO use.

Army Emergency Relief made 7,161 loans totaling \$952,300 and 139 outright grants totaling \$19,445.<sup>132</sup>

(2) Extension of American Forces Network to France. After years of negotiation, a step of great importance to the morale of troops in France was taken on 23 May 1958 when the American Forces Network (AFN) extended programmed radio broadcasting service to that country. Five transmitters were placed in operation, and 25 more were planned.<sup>133</sup>

b. Factors Adversely Affecting Morale. The uncertainties growing out of personnel reduction programs, shortages in government housing, and the length of the waiting periods for married personnel whose families did not come overseas concurrently were the principal factors adverse to the high morale of those affected.

## 28. USAREUR Savings Program

The command continued to promote the USAREUR Savings Program for the purchase of U.S. savings bonds by military and U.S. civilian personnel and the use of the soldiers' deposits system by enlisted personnel. Climaxing a year of consistent increase, 46.6 percent of USAREUR personnel participated in one or both aspects of the program during the fourth quarter, as against 38.2 percent during the fourth quarter of FY 1957.<sup>134</sup>

a. Savings Bond Program. U.S. savings bonds purchased totaled \$14,137,385, an increase of more than 25 percent over FY 1957, when they totaled \$11,285,955. Reflecting person-to-person canvassing and retroactive pay increases, fourth-quarter purchases alone amounted to \$4,096,544.

b. Soldiers' Deposits Program. Soldiers' deposits, totaling \$11,061,026, kept pace with the FY 1957 figure of \$11,097,002. Deposits during the fourth quarter were almost three million dollars (\$2,903,753), a new record.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>132</sup>Info from AG Div AER Ofc, 15 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>133</sup>DF, SGS to Info Div, 18 Apr 58, subj: Opening of AFN in France. UNCLAS. In SGS 260/N5 1958 (1 yr). See par 117.

<sup>134</sup>(1) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 119-20, 126. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 73-74. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>135</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Capt A. C. Bradshaw, Ofc of Compt Fin & Acct Br Curr & Banking Sec, 8 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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## 29. Contributions to National Charities

The three federally sponsored overseas fund-raising campaigns and the Army's annual drive for Army Emergency Relief and the Army Relief Society realized contributions totaling \$763,785, an increase of 15.5 percent over the FY 1957 total of \$652,851.

a. Federal Overseas Fund Campaign. This consolidated appeal was for the same agencies as in FY 1957--the Crusade for Freedom (sponsoring Radio Free Europe), the American Social Hygiene Association, the National Recreation Association, the American Branch of the International Social Service, the United Seamen's Service, the United Service Organizations (USO), and the Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere, Inc. (CARE). It ran from 15 September to 31 October 1957 and raised \$96,846.84, about \$9,500 more than in FY 1957.<sup>136</sup>

b. National Health Agencies Campaign. The beneficiaries of this drive were the American Cancer Society, the American Health Association, the National Tuberculosis Association, United Cerebral Palsy Associations, the Arthritis and Rheumatism Foundation, the National Society for Crippled Children and Adults, the Muscular Dystrophy Association, and the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, as in FY 1957, plus the National Association for Mental Health and the National Society for the Prevention of Blindness. Running from 15 January to 28 February 1958, the campaign was not hampered by the unfortunate timing that had made the response to the previous year's drive unrepresentative. Contributions totaled \$138,925.81, an increase of more than 62 percent over the approximately \$85,000 raised in FY 1957.<sup>137</sup>

c. The Red Cross Drive. Final reports on the American National Red Cross Drive, conducted from 15 March to 30 April 1958, showed contributions totaling \$326,225, an increase of 27 percent over the \$257,151 realized from the FY 1957 drive. The number of contributors increased by 19 percent and memberships by 32 percent. USAREUR military personnel contributed \$197,644, while Air Force, Navy, and civilian personnel contributed \$128,581.<sup>138</sup>

d. The Joint AER/ARS Campaign. The annual joint campaign for the support of Army Emergency Relief and the Army Relief Society, which was conducted from 15 July to 1 September 1957, raised \$201,787.19, about 9.6 percent less than the \$223,200 contributed in FY 1957.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>136</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col E. S. Graham, USAREUR AER Off, 9 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>137</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 86-87. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>138</sup>Final Campaign Bul, 3 Jul 58. UNCLAS. In AG Div Red Cross Ln Ofc.

<sup>139</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col Graham, cited above. UNCLAS.



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## 30. Character Guidance and Religious Activities

a. The Character Guidance Program. The USAREUR Character Guidance program continued to stress the development of self-discipline and maturity in personal conduct, largely through required lecture-discussion hours conducted by chaplains. In December 1957 the USAREUR Character Guidance Council appointed a committee of its members to survey the adequacy of the program from a command standpoint.<sup>140</sup> This committee reported in March 1958, with G3 Training Branch concurrence, that there was no indication of the program's inadequacy but that, on the contrary, it could be assumed that the program had contributed in considerable measure to the steady downward trend in the incident and offense rate.<sup>141</sup>

Continuing its investigation of the standards used for the selection and review of literature offered for sale on The Stars and Stripes newsstands,<sup>142</sup> the council's Literary Standards Committee visited the USAREUR Stars and Stripes office in October 1957. It found that the editor and a staff of four persons read or scanned all books and magazines offered and excluded questionable materials, including those that might be objectionable to other countries. Moreover, The Stars and Stripes staff was very desirous of having USAREUR staff representatives check the newsstands and assist in maintaining high standards. To aid in the process without establishing censorship, the Chaplain Division had obtained guidance materials from the Armed Forces' Chaplains Board and had transmitted them to the council for further dissemination. On the basis of this information, the council found that policies and procedures were adequate.<sup>143</sup>

b. Religious Activities. At the end of the year 277 chaplains were assigned to USAREUR, the increase of 14 having been brought about chiefly by the addition of USASETAF. Representing 28 denominations, 182 of the chaplains were Protestant, 85 were Roman Catholic, and 10 Jewish. Two new chapels were built in Germany and three in France, and several other buildings were adapted for use as chapels. It was considered significant that during calendar year 1957 the church attendance of U.S. personnel in the Headquarters Area Command (HACOM) reached 600,000, as compared with 300,000 in 1956. The principal reason for this increase was apparently the large-scale transfer of families from rented lodgings to government housing areas with their own chapels.<sup>144</sup> At the same time, the USAREUR-wide percentages of military personnel attending at least 1 religious

<sup>140</sup> Min, Mtg of USAREUR Character Guidance Council, 11 Dec 57. UNCLAS. In G1 Pers Svcs Br.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 26 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>142</sup> USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 74. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>143</sup> (1) Min, 11 Dec 57, cited above. (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Col H. H. Schulz, USAREUR Chaplain, 10 Sep 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>144</sup> The [Heidelberg] Rhein Neckar Zeitung, 11 Jan 58, p. 4. UNCLAS.

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service (25%) and of those attending 1 religious education activity (7.2%) weekly during FY 1958 were about the same as in FY 1957. On the other hand, the number of individuals who came into contact with a chaplain for pastoral services other than preaching increased by more than 10 percent. The National Councils of Catholic Men and Women strengthened their activities and the Protestant Men of the Chapel expanded their programs. Seventy-four religious retreats, a record number with a record attendance, were held at the Retreat House in Berchtesgaden.

German-American religious activities were emphasized, chiefly on local chapel levels, but also on the staff level through participation in the Church Congress (Kirchentagskongress) held at the University of Hamburg in January, and in several religious forums, called academies, for the discussion of contemporary problems. One of the two new chapels completed in Germany was an especially fine structure in Berlin. Situated outside the strictly military area, it was expected to become a center of German-American religious life. In France a chapel was redecorated and completely refurnished at Camp des Loges, near Paris. As a special project, USAREUR furnished chapel support to the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.<sup>145</sup>

## 31. Health

Except for an incidence of Asiatic influenza that reached epidemic proportions during the four months beginning in July 1957, the health of the command continued to be excellent. There were 69 cases of influenza in July, more than 500 new cases in August, more than 6,600 in September, and 8,900 in October. A rapid decline to normalcy followed, however, and at no time did the case load exceed the command's capability.<sup>146</sup>

The organization of the U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany, not only made a reduction in the number of medical service personnel possible but improved hospital service in general by providing closer supervision of the smaller units by senior medical officers assigned to major installations.<sup>147</sup>

a. Salk Vaccine Program. As of December 1957 probably less than 37 percent of eligible civilians, including dependents, had submitted themselves to the first Salk antipoliomyelitis immunization dose, and less than 11 percent had received all 3 doses. The program was continued, but, because of its voluntary nature and the constant turnover among dependent personnel, maintaining an accurate record of the number of persons who

<sup>145</sup> Intvws, Mr. Lane with Col Schulz and Lt Col H. K. Cross, Chaplain Div, 10 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>146</sup> (1) USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Prog 10D, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 05. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 6. UNCLAS.

<sup>147</sup> Ltr, USA Hosp Cen, Ger, To Med Reps of area comds, 26 Sep 57, subj: Reorganization of Medical Service in Germany. AEUHC 27017. UNCLAS.

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had completed the series was impossible.<sup>148</sup>

b. Reduction in Costs to Civilian Employees. Two reductions in medical costs to civilian employees were of command-wide impact. Effective in January 1958, the outpatient hospital and clinic fee for Department of the Army civilians and their dependents was reduced from \$1.75 to \$1.00 per visit.<sup>149</sup> In June, under a master contract between USAREUR and the American International Underwriters, the individual premium paid by U.S. and CWS employees for hospitalization insurance was reduced from \$10 to \$7.50 per year and the family rate from \$25.00 to \$18.00 per year.<sup>150</sup>

c. USAREUR Mobile Chest X-Ray Service. In March 1958 a mobile chest x-ray unit was placed in operation. It was first sent on a tour of installations in France to survey LWR personnel required by French law to have chest examinations. Labor service personnel and their dependents were also surveyed. A considerable number of dependents of military personnel likewise took advantage of the service, but domestics, in general, did not. A few cases of active tuberculosis were uncovered. At the end of the year tours of Germany and Italy were being planned.<sup>151</sup>

d. The Medical Care Act. Since USAREUR's medical facilities were generally adequate to its needs, the application of the Dependents' Medical Care Act of 1956, permitting the Government to pay part of the cost of certain medical care for dependents of military personnel, continued to be restricted to emergency cases and to personnel residing in remote areas. No significant administrative difficulties were encountered. During FY 1958 claims filed in USAREUR under the act totaled \$18,253.39, out of the Army-wide cost of approximately \$80 million.<sup>152</sup>

### 32. Recreation and Welfare

Although all the recreation and welfare services suffered personnel cuts, no activities were eliminated.

a. Special Services. The following tabulation shows the types of special service activities that were being operated during FY 1958 and the estimated average monthly attendance at each:<sup>153</sup>

<sup>148</sup>CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 16 Dec 57, p. 2. CONF.

<sup>149</sup>The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 17 Jan 58, p. 1. UNCLAS.

<sup>150</sup>HACOM Heidelberg Br Ofc, Civ Pers Newsltr, Nr 33, Jun 58, p. 1. UNCLAS.

<sup>151</sup>Fonecon, Mr. Lane with Med Div Hist Sec, 21 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>152</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Memo 40-10-1, 3 Dec 56, subj: Medical Care for Dependents. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>153</sup>Info from G1 Pers Svcs Br Welfare & Rec Sec, 30 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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	<u>Number</u>	<u>Average Monthly Attendance</u>
Service Clubs	121	1,200,000
Libraries	254	567,000
Craft Shops	119	88,250
Photo Laboratories	144	121,350
Movie Theaters (paid admission)	208	1,851,350
Movie Theaters (free admission)	112	89,500
Stage Theaters	111	112,600
Bowling Lanes (lines rolled)	954	740,000
Gymnasiums (not including spectators)	146	30,000
Athletic Fields (not including spectators)	1,373	42,750

With the integration of USASETAF, the cost of the program, including its administration, increased from the FY 1957 total of \$8,458,570 to approximately \$9,467,000, as follows:<sup>154</sup>

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Expenditure</u> <sup>155</sup>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$9,467</u>	<u>100.0</u>
Service Clubs	3,942	41.6
Sports	2,358	24.6
Libraries	1,468	15.6
Crafts	1,123	11.9
Music and Entertainment	576	6.3

b. Consolidation of the Army and Air Force Motion Picture Services. Beginning 1 October 1957, the USAREUR-operated European Motion Picture Service (EMPS) was consolidated with the Air Force's USAFE Motion Picture Service (USAFE MPS) to form the Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service (AAFMPs), Europe, as provided for in 1956 by joint Army-Air Force regulations<sup>156</sup> and directed by USEUCOM in May 1957. The new agency, employing 144 persons, about 1/4 of whom were Americans, inherited 451 theaters--291 from EMPS and 160 from USAFE MPS. The Army theaters had shown an attendance of approximately 1,800,000 and a profit of \$90,000 every 4 weeks; the Air Force theaters, an attendance of approximately 800,000 and a profit of \$36,000 every 4 weeks.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>154</sup> Ibid. UNCLAS.

<sup>155</sup> In thousands of dollars. UNCLAS.

<sup>156</sup> AR 28-62 and AFR 24-32, 28 Dec 56, subj: Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service. UNCLAS.

<sup>157</sup> Annex A, Functions of DAD EMPS, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Con, Nr 16, 1 Oct 57, pp. 6-7. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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Following agreement that the commanders in chief of USAREUR and USAFE would alternate biennially as the approving authority for the new agency's activities, a provisional headquarters was established in Wiesbaden, with CINCSAFE as the approving authority for the first two years.<sup>158</sup>

c. The European Exchange System. The European Exchange System (EES), which employed 20,050 persons in FY 1957, released over 1,000 during FY 1958. About 17 percent of these released were U.S. personnel.

Sales, however, totaled \$183,015,000, as against \$182,504,000 in FY 1957, and net profit forwarded to Washington for distribution to recreation and welfare funds was \$13,073,000 (7.09 percent), as compared with \$12,238,500 (6.9 percent) in FY 1957. The rise in sales volume, resulting to a considerable degree from an increase in the variety of goods and services offered, led in turn to improvements in physical facilities.

The system of cross-servicing between the Army and Air Force exchange systems, adopted experimentally instead of consolidation, worked well, and its continuance was approved.<sup>159</sup>

d. The Class VI Agency. The reduction in the Class VI Agency working force reduced operational expenses, an increase in the authorized ration from 4 to 5 bottles monthly per person resulted in greater sales, and a new price markup formula contributed to increased receipts. Sales totaled \$9,439,413 and produced a net profit of \$2,118,541 for distribution by Washington to welfare and recreation funds.<sup>160</sup>

e. Armed Forces Recreation Center. Although there was considerable pressure from German sources for the release of the recreation facility at Chiemsee in return for a resort hotel in the Taunus Mountains, no buildings were released there, in Garmisch, or in Berchtesgaden. During slack seasons, however, some facilities were closed partially or entirely. With year-round space at the 3 locations for 2,475 guests nightly, overnight accommodations were furnished to 656,960 guests during the year, an increase of about 4 percent over FY 1957. Usage was about 87 percent of available capacity. Through advertising more conventions were attracted to the center. Although not all the facilities were self-supporting, a general operating profit of \$39,788 was realized through economies and improved management.<sup>161</sup>

<sup>158</sup>Mins, Mtg of Bd of Dirs, AAFMPS, Eur, 11 Sep 57. UNCLAS. In SGS 002 (1957).

<sup>159</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Maj E. Sherman, G1 Pers Svcs Br Welfare & Rec Sec, 30 Sep 58. UNCLAS. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 28, 39. CONF.

<sup>160</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 28. CONF.

<sup>161</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Maj Sherman, 9 Sep 58. UNCLAS. (2) Summary of Acts Proc thru USAREUR SGS, 28 May & 24 Jun 58. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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f. Welfare Fund Construction. The USAREUR Welfare Fund Construction Program, established in FY 1955 to build from nonappropriated funds certain welfare and recreational facilities deleted from appropriated fund programs,<sup>162</sup> was revised during FY 1958. Early in the year a number of construction projects were cancelled by the Welfare Fund Board because of the planned restationing of military units. All other projects not previously suspended or cancelled remained active.<sup>163</sup> The suspended and cancelled portion of the program was thus increased from 3.5 to 4.1 million dollars and the active portion cut to 10.7 million dollars. At the end of the fiscal year contracts for approximately 75 percent of the active program had been let, and a little more than half of the construction was in place.<sup>164</sup>

g. Off-Duty Education. Although budgetary limitations necessitated generally larger classes, a reduction in the number of education centers, and fewer full-time education advisers and specialists, the program of off-duty, civilian-type education for military personnel was expanded through better utilization of part-time instructors. Enrollments in intermediate, high school, and MOS-related classes were significantly more numerous, the increase being attributed to the current stateside emphasis on education and the Army's increased stress on training to meet specialized requirements. In implementation of the new foreign-language program for officers, which authorized 1 hour of duty-time instruction daily, approximately 200 classes were organized. On the other hand, enrollments on the elementary school level were fewer because of the forced separation of large numbers of low-aptitude enlisted men from the service. Total enrollments, including those in Italy, were more than 50 percent above those of the preceding year.<sup>165</sup>

(1) Intermediate Education. Approximately 15,000 noncommissioned officers and specialists enrolled in intermediate level classes. Of this number, 8,400 earned eighth grade certificates, as against 7,028 during FY 1957.

(2) High School Education. Approximately 19,000 soldiers enrolled in high school level classes. Approximately 14,050, including many who were not enrolled, earned high school certificates or their equivalent by passing the appropriate General Educational Development tests. The corresponding figure for FY 1957 was 12,280.

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<sup>162</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 268-70. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>163</sup>DF, ACoFS G1 to CoFS, 25 Nov 57, subj: Welfare Fund Construction Program. UNCLAS. In SGS 600.1 (1957).

<sup>164</sup>Info from G1 Pers Svcs Br Welfare & Rec Sec, 23 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>165</sup>(1) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58; 1st Qtr, p. 6; 3d Qtr, p. 46. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Stmt Prep by Mr. E. Hunter, G1 Pers Svcs Br Trp Educ Consultant, 15 Jul 58. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

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(3) College Level Courses. The University of Maryland continued to offer courses on the college level in 5 terms of 8 weeks each. A new graduated scale of tuition assistance by the Government granted 50 percent assistance to new enrollees but restricted maximum assistance--75 percent--to personnel who had demonstrated their serious intentions by obtaining at least 12 semester hours of credit.<sup>166</sup> Course completions by Army personnel totaled 10,250, as compared with 10,235 during the preceding year. Of the 123 bachelor's degrees conferred at the commencement exercises held in Heidelberg on 24 May, 59 were conferred upon Army military personnel.<sup>167</sup>

Also on the college level, 1,515 soldiers, as compared with 1,639 in FY 1957, demonstrated first-year college equivalency by passing the college level GED test.

(4) USAFI Courses. Enrollment of Army personnel in United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) self-teaching and correspondence courses remained at the level of approximately 20,000 throughout the year. Completions totaled 3,850, as against 3,892 in FY 1957.

(5) MOS-Related Courses. USAREUR administered 24,100 tests to students who completed special technical, vocational, and language courses designed to most specific needs related to training and to their military occupation specialties. The corresponding figure for FY 1957 was 14,931.

(6) Administration of Tests. Testing services in a multiplicity of subjects were also maintained at all centers, as in previous years, and test scores were transmitted to USAFI, Madison, Wisconsin, for recording. Approximately 150,000 tests were administered, as against 123,500 during FY 1957.<sup>168</sup>

## 33. Dependents' Schools

a. Facilities. The incorporation of USASETAF in January 1958 added 2 high schools, 3 elementary schools, and 3 kindergartens in Italy to the USAREUR dependents' school system.<sup>169</sup> In Germany and France, moreover, the number of elementary schools increased by 2 and the number of kindergartens by 5. By virtue of these 15 additions, at the close of the school year USAREUR was operating 180 schools--96 elementary, 17 secondary, and 67 at the kindergarten level. The six dormitory facilities for high school students residing in communities not large enough to support high schools

<sup>166</sup> USAREUR Memo 621-5-4, 17 Sep 57, subj: Tuition Assistance. UNCLAS.

<sup>167</sup> Intvw, Mr. Lane with Dr. R. C. Larson, Assoc Dir Univ of Md OS Prog, 10 Sep 58. UNCLAS. Other graduates included: Air Force, 47; Navy, 1; DAC, 7; DAFC, 4; dependents, 4; other, 1.

<sup>168</sup> Stmt prep by Mr. Hunter, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>169</sup> During the remainder of FY 1958 the schools in Italy were administered by USAREUR but financed separately. UNCLAS.

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of their own were continued.<sup>170</sup>

b. Enrollment. A significantly larger pupil enrollment reflected not only the incorporation of the American children in Italy but the increasing number of dependent families in Germany and France. In particular, the mounting enrollment forecast the need for additional junior and senior high school facilities. It became apparent, for example, that in 1958-59 senior high schools would have to be provided in Karlsruhe, Germany, and Verdun, France, and a junior high school in Bussac, France.<sup>171</sup>

(1) Grades 1-12. The average monthly enrollment in grades 1-12, excluding Italy, was 40,543, of whom 35,404 were in grades 1-8 and 5,139 in grades 9-12. This was an increase of 5,501, or 15.7 percent, over 1956-57. Actual enrollment at the beginning of the school year in September was 40,582, about 20 percent larger than in September 1956. In normal seasonal fluctuations, accentuated by movements of gyroscope units, enrollment dropped to 40,084 in December, rose to a high of 41,026 in January, and dropped again to a low of 39,474 in June.<sup>172</sup>

In Italy the June 1958 enrollment in grades 1-12 was 1,771.<sup>173</sup>

(2) Kindergartens. Kindergarten enrollment, excluding Italy, averaged 4,791 monthly, an increase of 14.2 percent over 1956-57. From 4,515 in September it rose to a peak 5,050 in February and dropped to 4,854 in May, when kindergartens closed.<sup>174</sup>

In Italy the kindergarten enrollment for May 1958 was 224.<sup>175</sup>

c. Administrative and Teaching Personnel. Although the size of the central administrative and clerical staff at the U.S. Army Dependent Education Group headquarters in Karlsruhe was reduced slightly, increases in the number of teachers more than kept pace with enrollment. The ratio of pupils to teachers, a factor of special importance where the turnover rate for both is high, dropped from 29.8:1 to 28.6:1 in grades 1-8 and from 20.7:1 to 19.1:1 in grades 9-12, against a standard of 30:1.<sup>176</sup> At the close of the school year 1,813 U.S. citizens were employed in the USAREUR

<sup>170</sup>Hq USADEG, USAREUR Sch Enrollment Rept, as of 6 Jun 58, pp. 1, 2. AEUE-ST 268/37. UNCLAS.

<sup>171</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. M. E. Armitage, USADEG Stat Sec, 15 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>172</sup>USAREUR Sch Enrollment Rept, cited above, pp. 1, 3, 19, 22. UNCLAS.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>176</sup>Highest ratios were 32.6:1 in the Crailsheim Elementary School and 32.5:1 in Elementary School Nr 1, Frankfurt. UNCLAS.

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school system--an increase of 295, or 19.5 percent, over the 1,518 employed in June 1957. Of the 1958 number, 1,440 were teachers--including 50 teaching principals--in grades 1-12, and 86 were kindergarten teachers paid out of nonappropriated funds, making a total of 1,526 classroom teachers, as compared with 1,266 in the preceding year. There were 29 American librarians. In addition, 22 German and French nationals were employed as librarians and 160 as language instructors; 130 of the latter taught in the elementary grades and were paid out of nonappropriated funds.<sup>177</sup>

In Italy 87 U.S. citizens were employed. Of this number, 74 were paid from appropriated funds--62 elementary and high school teachers, 5 principals, 6 specialists, and 1 librarian--and 13 were kindergarten teachers and other personnel paid out of nonappropriated funds. These schools also utilized the services of 18 Italian nationals, including 9 language teachers, 1 librarian, and 8 clerical employees. The pupil-teacher ratio in grades 1-12 was 22.7:1.<sup>178</sup>

d. Curriculum Developments. Special stress upon the teaching of science in junior and senior high schools culminated in the First Annual Science Fair, held at the Heidelberg High School on 28-29 March 1958. The fair was designed to give students an opportunity to demonstrate their scientific interest and imagination. Some 250 pupils from 19 schools participated; all the exhibits were student projects. They were in the fields of physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, meteorology, geology, bacteriology, and mathematics and conformed to National Science Fair requirements.

Additional emphasis upon science, a course in international relations, expansion of commercial offerings, and a physical fitness program following the standards of the American Athletic Union (AAU) were planned for school year 1958-59.<sup>179</sup>

e. Policies and Problems. No unusual administrative problems arose during the year. Recruiting of teachers, which had been handicapped by the Hungarian and Suez crises during 1956-57, was accomplished more satisfactorily and with greater ease because of the prospect of relative political stability in Europe. Although the Department of the Army lowered its USAREUR school allotment per pupil--known as the per pupil limitation--from \$242 to \$230, gross availability of funds was greater than during the previous year because of the increased enrollment. Moreover, net availability per pupil was actually larger because some items formerly budgeted against the per pupil limitation were made chargeable to other funds.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup>USAREUR Sch Enrollment Rept, cited above, pp. 2, 4, 12, 14. UNCLAS.

<sup>178</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>179</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. W. Waters, Asst C/USADEG Educ Br, 13 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>180</sup>Intvws, Mr. Lane with Mr. S. J. Hergenroeder, USADEG Dep Dir for Educ, 13 Jun, 23 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

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(1) Supply Economy. At the same time, reductions were achieved in the large quantities of excess supplies--some having been accepted from other agencies as possibly useful to the schools--that had accumulated in the schools and in the Dependents' Education Group warehouse over the years. The system of reporting and requisitioning supplies was revised, and a limit was placed both on the "overages" that schools might retain and on the stock level that the central warehouse might maintain. As a result, approximately \$600,000 was made available for the purchase of supplies and equipment. In addition, considerable quantities of serviceable and salvageable materials were transferred to the technical services.<sup>181</sup>

(2) Plans for Expansion of Administrative Staff. The continuing increase in enrollment, together with the emphasis that stateside school systems were placing on the revitalization of secondary education, led to a thoroughgoing staff review of the USAREUR system's staffing, organization, and educational procedures. A basic finding was that both the policymaking personnel at Dependents' Education Group headquarters and the superintendents in the field were seriously overburdened with routine administration and the pressures of day-to-day operation, at the expense of planning and effective supervision. It was therefore recommended that both groups be strengthened and enlarged to keep USAREUR curriculums and methods abreast of those of leading public school systems in the United States.<sup>182</sup> By the end of the year agreement was reached on a staff reorganization that would add several subject-matter specialists to the curriculum development section of the headquarters and to the supervisory staffs in the field, beginning with the school year 1958-59.<sup>183</sup>

(3) Recommended Legislation. In March 1958, after three years of USAREUR effort looking toward the enactment of legislation to improve certain unfavorable employment conditions under which teachers worked overseas,<sup>184</sup> a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate to permit overseas teachers to be placed in a special civil-service category. Salaries would be geared to a 10-month school year as in most stateside school systems, and beginning salary differentials would be based upon teaching experience and advanced degrees.<sup>185</sup> At the close of the year the bill was still in committee.

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<sup>181</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col E. Ream, USADEG Dep Dir for Log, 23 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>182</sup>USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58, Remarks by Maj Gen G. E. Martin, ACoS Gl, p. 2. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>183</sup>Intvws, Mr. Lane with Mr. Hergenroeder, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>184</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Repts, FY 55, pp. 135, 220; FY 56, pp. 117-18; FY 57, p. 55. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>185</sup>S. 3460, 85th Cong., 2d sess., introduced 12 March 1958 by Sen. O. D. Johnston, S.C. UNCLAS.

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34. Community Activities for Youth

The emphasis of the American Youth Activities program was upon decentralization and concomitant transfer of responsibilities to local communities. In the absence of command-wide projects, most communities expanded their own programs and supported them to a greater degree than previously through local fund-raising campaigns. Typical programs included arts and crafts, social hours, camping, tours, solicitation of part-time employment, baseball for "little league" boys and teen-age girls--culminating in championship series at the area command level--and scouting, under the auspices of the national Boy and Girl Scout organizations. USAREUR monitoring of scouting programs was restricted to budgetary matters.<sup>186</sup>

35. Crimes and Offenses

a. Military Offenses. Throughout the year the number and rate of purely military offenses--such as absence without leave, pass and uniform violations, disrespect to a superior, etc.--were well below FY 1957 and showed a fairly steady decrease from month to month, averaging about 6.1 per thousand troops per month, as compared with 8.6 for the previous year. Absences without leave averaged about 380 a month, as compared with 400 during FY 1957.<sup>187</sup>

b. Offenses Against Persons and Property. Offenses of military personnel against persons and property also showed a decline, with minor fluctuations, from month to month and a definite decrease from the FY 1957 average of 3.7 per thousand troops per month to 2.6 for June 1958 and 3.0 for the year. Crimes of violence--murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, etc.--were also fewer than in FY 1957.<sup>188</sup>

c. Traffic Offenses. On the other hand, the driving privileges of 5,335 persons were either revoked or suspended during the year, chiefly because of repeated involvement in traffic violations. This was an increase of 7.8 percent over FY 1957. It reflected not only the continuing high rate of such violations but the increased authority given to unit commanders to suspend licenses without referral to higher authority.<sup>189</sup>

36. Courts-Martial

a. Pilot Law Officer Program. In November 1957 USAREUR was designated as a pilot area for a program under which a number of experienced

<sup>186</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Lt Col H. H. Moses, G1 Pers Svcs Br, 10 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>187</sup>(1) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 10A, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 27, 36. CONF. (2) Repts of AWOL, Incds, etc. (MRU 449). UNCLAS. In Ofc of Compt Prog Rev & Analysis Br.

<sup>188</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 10A, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 27, 32. CONF.

<sup>189</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 27, 36. CONF.

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senior officers in the Judge Advocate Branch would be assigned to be law officers for general courts-martial as their exclusive duty.<sup>190</sup> Beginning 1 January 1958, six colonels and lieutenant colonels of the USAREUR Judge Advocate Division were made available as law officers for areas centering in Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Munich, and Paris. Judge advocate offices at lower echelons were thereby relieved of the necessity of providing law officers from among their limited personnel. It was hoped, moreover, that the designation of specialized officers would result in higher standards of performance and warrant the extension of the system Army-wide.<sup>191</sup>

b. Decrease in Courts-Martial. The following tabulation shows the marked and steady decrease in courts-martial of all kinds that characterized FY 1958:<sup>192</sup>

	<u>FY 1957</u>	<u>FY 1958</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>31,557</u>	<u>25,796</u>	<u>7,702</u>	<u>6,252</u>	<u>6,096</u>	<u>5,746</u>
General	<u>913</u>	<u>497</u>	182	125	96	94
Special	<u>9,121</u>	<u>6,689</u>	2,140	1,671	1,482	1,396
Summary	<u>21,493</u>	<u>18,610</u>	5,380	4,456	4,518	4,256

Undoubtedly the decrease in the number of courts-martial for serious offenses reflected the two programs under which chronic offenders were discharged through board action and low-aptitude personnel were eliminated. The most striking decrease was in general courts-martial, which dropped to almost half the FY 1957 number. They fell to a low of 94 and a rate of 0.13 per thousand troops per month in the fourth quarter, as compared with 221 and a rate of 0.31 during the fourth quarter of FY 1957. The number of special courts-martial likewise decreased from 2,079--2.96 per thousand troops per month--to 1,396--1.97 per thousand troops per month. Although trials for murder and rape attracted widest public attention, they constituted only one-half of 1 percent of the general courts. About 60 percent were for larceny and assault.<sup>193</sup>

### 37. Imprisonment

Board action and the elimination of low-aptitude personnel were also largely responsible for the fact that there were only 410 prisoners confined in USAREUR--382 of them in local stockades--at the end of the year.

<sup>190</sup> USAREUR ltr, 5 Nov 56, subj: Establishment of Law Officer System. AEAJA 250.4 JA. UNCLAS.

<sup>191</sup> Fonecon, Mr. Lane with Lt Col E. V. Brown, JA Div Mil Justice Br, 12 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>192</sup> USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 10F, FY 58, 1st, 2d, 3d, & 4th Qtrs, pp. 15, 17. CONF.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

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This was a record low.<sup>194</sup>

38. Safety

a. On-Duty Accidents, Injuries, and Fatalities. Accidents during the year were 19 percent fewer than in FY 1957, injuries 15 percent fewer, and deaths 14 percent fewer. Their estimated over-all cost to the Army was 12 percent less.<sup>195</sup> Reported injuries to LWR employees not only continued to be excessive, but increased, although military and U.S. civilian injury rates dropped sharply.<sup>196</sup>

	<u>FY 1957</u>	<u>FY 1958</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>/ Increase</u> <u>- Decrease</u>
<u>Injury Rate</u>			
Military <sup>197</sup>	9.26	7.84	- 15.3
U.S. Civilian <sup>198</sup>	0.41	0.32	- 22.0
Other Civilian, principally LWR <sup>198</sup>	10.82	11.05	/ 2.1
<u>Accident Rate</u>			
Motor Vehicle <sup>199</sup>	2.24	1.74	- 22.3
Army Aircraft <sup>200</sup>	28.50	43.08	/ 51.2
<u>Fatality Rate</u>			
Military <sup>197</sup>	0.23	0.24	/ 4.3
U.S. Civilian <sup>198</sup>	-	-	-
Other Civilian, principally LWR <sup>198</sup>	0.03	0.03	-

(1) Army Aircraft Accidents. The number of Army aircraft accidents jumped from 46 in FY 1957 to 73 in FY 1958--27 of them during the fourth quarter. This increase was considered alarming, even though more craft were in the air, and the figures for 1958 included 19 minor mishaps that would not have been reported in 1957. While the directives

- <sup>194</sup>(1) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 10A, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 26-27. OFLUSE. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, pp. 2, 9-10. CONF.
- <sup>195</sup>Briefing, for G1 Conf by G1 Safety Br, n.d. UNCLAS. In G1 Safety Br.
- <sup>196</sup>Data from G1 Safety Br. UNCLAS.
- <sup>197</sup>Per 100,000 man-days' exposure. UNCLAS.
- <sup>198</sup>Per 1,000,000 man-hours' exposure. UNCLAS.
- <sup>199</sup>Per 100,000 miles driven. UNCLAS.
- <sup>200</sup>Per 100,000 miles flown. UNCLAS.

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issued to assist in accident reduction were considered as sufficient, stronger preventive measures were needed at unit levels. It was felt, in particular, that appropriate corrective and disciplinary action was not brought to bear upon pilots and crew members found to be at fault.<sup>201</sup>

(2) LWR Injuries. The recurrent problem of excessive sickness among and injuries to LWR employees continued. As pointed out above, the rate of reported on-duty injuries increased by about 2 percent, from 10.82 to 11.05 per 1,000,000 man-hours' exposure. The possibility of a solution was indicated in Berlin and Bremerhaven where the LWR injury rates were reduced by 45 and 72 percent, respectively, during the last 6 months of the year, when authorized U.S. military or German civilian medical officials determined whether injuries were or were not disabling. At the end of the year a USAREUR directive designed to make this practice general was in preparation.<sup>202</sup>

b. Accidents Involving Privately Owned Vehicles. During FY 1958 a total of 424 persons lost their lives as the result of accidents involving Army and privately owned motor vehicles:<sup>203</sup>

	<u>Total</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>101</u>
<u>Nationality</u>					
U.S.	<u>142</u>	51	35	19	37
German	<u>231</u>	92	47	39	53
French	<u>46</u>	15	11	11	9
Italian	<u>5</u>	-	-	3	2

Accident involving privately owned vehicles of USAREUR personnel caused 304 of the deaths, including those of 103 U.S. citizens and 201 local nationals. Motor vehicle accidents therefore remained an especially sensitive problem.<sup>204</sup>

In an effort to reduce traffic violations, accidents, and fatalities in Germany, the basic USAREUR directive concerning the operation of privately owned vehicles was revised in January 1958 to expand the authority

<sup>201</sup>(1) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 31. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) USAREUR Memo 1-20-27, 26 Aug 58, subj: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference Notes, p. 23. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>202</sup>(1) Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 31. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. J. M. Hoefer, C/G1 Safety Br, 26 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>203</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 23; 2d Qtr, p. 32; 3d Qtr, p. 76; 4th Qtr, p. 52. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>204</sup>USAREUR Memo 1-20-27, cited above, p. 5. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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of unit commanders.<sup>205</sup> Enlisted personnel below grade E-5 were thereafter required to obtain their commanding officers' approval on applications for operators' licenses. A unit commander might impose a 30-day license suspension upon any member of his command, irrespective of grade, for committing 2 or more minor moving-traffic offenses within a period of 90 consecutive days.<sup>206</sup> When an individual charged with drunken driving was convicted of the offense or accepted nonjudicial punishment in lieu of a court-martial, the commander exercising special court-martial jurisdiction was required to suspend his operator's license forthwith and might do so for as long as 6 months. More broadly, any commander exercising special court-martial jurisdiction was authorized to suspend, for as long as 6 months, the license of any member of his command whose disciplinary record or off-duty conduct indicated a lack of the prudence and good judgement necessary for safe driving. Suspension of a license might be followed by cancelling the registration of the licensee's vehicle and removing the plates.

Three other traffic safety measures of importance were taken. Beginning in August 1957, semiannual instead of annual inspections were required for privately owned vehicles five years or more old.<sup>207</sup> To fix responsibility and liability in accident cases involving American cars, German nationals were no longer permitted to drive vehicles belonging to members of the U.S. forces unless they were their bona-fide dependents.<sup>208</sup> In addition, the USAREUR system of lettering and numbering license plates for private vehicles in Germany was revised, beginning with the 1958 plates, so that the numerals were fewer, larger, and more legible.<sup>209</sup>

Among instructional projects planned for FY 1959 were a mandatory troop information course in traffic safety, new training aids, a directive on winter driving hazards, and a "Highway Follies of 1959" similar to the 1957 production.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>205</sup>Change 1, to USAREUR Cir 643-30, 3 Jan 58, subj: Operation of Privately-Owned Vehicles in Germany. UNCLAS.

<sup>206</sup>Previously he could withdraw a license only during the investigation of an alleged major offense. UNCLAS.

<sup>207</sup>Cable SC-39757, USAREUR to subor comds, 31 Jul 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>208</sup>DF, ACoFS G1 to CofS, 19 Sep 57, subj: Operation of Privately-Owned Vehicles in Germany. AEAGA-P 265/111 GA. UNCLAS.

<sup>209</sup>DF, PM to CofS, 29 Oct 57, subj: License Plates for Privately-Owned Vehicles. AEAPM-O 45 PM. UNCLAS.

<sup>210</sup>Intvw, Mr. Lane with Mr. Hoefer, cited above. UNCLAS.





## CHAPTER 4

### Intelligence Activities

#### Section I: Collection of Positive Intelligence Information

#### 39. Fields of Intelligence Collection Interest and Areas of Responsibility.

Primary responsibility for collecting intelligence information in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Zone of Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and that part of the U.S.S.R. which lies west of the Ural Mountains, the Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R., and the Turkmen S.S.R. remained with CINCUSAREUR. In addition, upon assuming control over USASETAF on 1 January 1958, USAREUR also became responsible for similar coverage of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Within its area of responsibility, USAREUR directed its efforts toward collecting intelligence information pertaining to early warning of the imminence of hostilities, the capabilities and probable courses of action of the military forces of the Soviet Bloc countries, and other matters of military significance.<sup>1</sup>

#### 40. Positive Intelligence Collection Agencies

USAREUR continued to secure intelligence information from various non-USAREUR agencies as well as through its own intelligence organizations. It also obtained items of interest from organizations and committees responsible for coordinating U.S.

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<sup>1</sup>The material in this section is based on a paper prepared by Lt Col F. H. Gregg, G2 Intel Coll Br. SECRET. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

and Allied intelligence activities. There were no significant changes in either the missions or the methods employed by these agencies.

a. USAREUR Agencies. The following agencies collected positive intelligence under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G 2.

(1) Seventh Army. The 532d Military Intelligence Battalion's mission of detecting and reporting any evidence of movement of Soviet Bloc forces that would indicate the imminence of hostilities remained unchanged. In carrying out this mission, the battalion continued to screen overt-type sources entering the U.S. area of responsibility in West Germany, excluding German returnees from the U.S.S.R. The battalion also maintained liaison with 481 West German border police and customs stations and kept visible East German and Czechoslovakian border security installations under surveillance. During FY 1958 the battalion operated 29 installations where border crossers were interviewed and information recorded, screened 30,108 sources, and submitted 5,691 reports. In implementation of the U.S.-German agreement on the operation of joint interrogation centers, Seventh Army provided personnel for staffing the first center, which began operations at Stuttgart on 1 April 1958.

(2) U.S. Army Southern European Task Force. The 508th Military Intelligence Detachment, assigned to USASETAF, remained responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence information pertaining to Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Of special interest was information on order of battle, military supply, transportation, communications, scientific and technical developments, and economic and political trends.

(3) The 513th Military Intelligence Group. The 513th Military Intelligence Group continued to serve as the administrative headquarters for certain U.S. Army intelligence units assigned or attached to USAREUR. The group also provided administrative and logistical support for the USAREUR Interrogation Center located at Camp King, near Frankfurt. The technical intelligence detachments assigned or attached to the group remained under the operational control of the USAREUR Interrogation Center for the purpose of obtaining technical information from refugees and similar persons. Of the more than 27,000 sources screened during the reporting period, 1,829 were interrogated at Camp King and the remainder at the Berlin element of the Interrogation Center; 2,499 reports were prepared. After the conclusion of an agreement on establishing joint interrogation centers with the U.S. Air Force and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the 513th MI Group made plans to staff such installations in the former British Zone of Occupation.

(4) 522d Military Intelligence Battalion. This battalion remained responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence information pertaining to the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the European portion of the U.S.S.R. Of special interest was information on order of battle, military supply,

transportation, communications, scientific and technical developments, and economic and political trends.

(5) The Area Commands. The intelligence officers of the 4--later 3--area commands in West Germany, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the Berlin Command continued to collect weather data, inform the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on current trends within their commands, and perform other intelligence missions through overt methods. During the reporting period the area command intelligence officers participated in bimonthly conferences conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as a means of keeping them informed on current intelligence developments.

(6) U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (USMLM). There was no significant change in the mission, organization, or method of operation of this unit during the fiscal year. In addition to his open liaison mission, the Chief, USMLM, had a primary responsibility under the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for collecting intelligence information on Soviet troops and East German military and paramilitary forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany. As in former years the organization's main element was at Potsdam, and a supporting element was in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

(7) U.S. Army Operations and Research Detachment (ORD). The detachment continued its surveillance of communications in the U.S. areas of responsibility in West Germany and West Berlin. Assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group, this unit operated under the control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintaining 10 base stations located in large cities throughout its areas of responsibility. Its intelligence collection mission was both positive and counterintelligence in nature. During the reporting period the detachment completed 600 monitoring operations involving the U.S.S.R. and its satellite countries. By the end of FY 1958, the detachment was carrying out 1,900 surveillance operations.

b. Non-USAREUR Agencies. Successful conduct of the USAREUR intelligence effort required continuing liaison with other intelligence agencies and organizations and with other military headquarters interested in intelligence activities in Europe. The more important of these contacts were the following.

(1) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army. The office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, continued to furnish guidance through the Department of the Army Intelligence Plan, Intelligence Collection Guides, Intelligence Collection Memoranda, and Specific Requests for Information. The Department of the Army also supported USAREUR's intelligence operation by allocating contingency funds, by providing finished intelligence prepared at the Department of the Army level

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and by other governmental agencies, and by analyzing the finished intelligence produced by USAREUR.

(2) J2, USEUCOM. The policy directives of the USEUCOM Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, delineated the intelligence missions within the USEUCOM area. USAREUR remained responsible for intelligence collection and primary intelligence analysis for both ground and security forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, and for the integration of information concerning the western U.S.S.R. USAREUR also participated in the USEUCOM Indications Committee, the joint agency sponsored by USEUCOM for considering possible indications of the imminence of hostilities.

(3) Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAFE. USAREUR and USAFE headquarters continued to coordinate intelligence activities through the exchange of liaison officers and through the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany. USAREUR field collection agencies assisted USAFE in gathering scientific and technical intelligence as well as air order of battle intelligence to supplement the latter's coverage of air installations in the East Zone of Germany and the satellite countries.

(4) CINCNELM Representative, Germany.<sup>2</sup> USAREUR furnished continuing intelligence collection and logistical support to the CINCNELM Representative, Germany, at Frankfurt, including security checks, courier service, and the use of G2 communications facilities.

(5) U.S. Embassy, West Germany. Routine contacts with the U.S. Embassy continued through the G2 liaison officer accredited to the Office of the Coordinator and Special Adviser, U.S. Embassy, which had offices in both Frankfurt and Bonn. Other intelligence contacts with the U.S. Embassy were maintained through coordinating agencies.

(6) Department of the Army Detachment (DAD). The Department of the Army Detachment carried out its mission independently, except for certain intelligence activities coordinated with USAREUR through staff conferences and a permanently assigned liaison officer. There was appropriate cooperation at the field operating level, and USAREUR continued to provide both administrative and logistical support in accordance with departmental instructions.

(7) Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The official German intelligence service, the former Gehlen Organization, exchanged reports on finished intelligence, but its responsibilities for support of U.S. Army intelligence were not fully clarified. This deficiency was largely attributable to the patterns of liaison to which USAREUR was required to adhere. However, the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintained constant liaison with the BND through the channels prescribed for the exchange of certain intelligence,

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<sup>2</sup> Formerly Intelligence Officer, USNAVGER. SECRET.

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and the German agency cooperated in conducting overt interrogations of refugees and defectors. The groundwork was laid for the establishment of U.S.-German joint interrogation centers in West Germany, and the Stuttgart center began operations.

(8) British and French Armed Forces. The free exchange of intelligence between military intelligence organizations of USAREUR and the British Army of the Rhine continued through full-time intelligence liaison officers and frequent intelligence production conferences. Relationships with the French remained comparatively less close, although one designated French Army intelligence liaison officer visited the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, regularly. Other intelligence contacts with the French took place within the NATO structure.

(9) SHAPE. Intelligence relations with SHAPE were maintained through NATO channels. In addition, a copy of the monthly USEUCOM listing of indications of the imminence of hostilities, to which USAREUR contributed, was distributed to SHAPE headquarters.

(10) Army Attaches. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintained direct intelligence contact with Army attaches in the European area, especially those in Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, and Moscow, who visited Heidelberg frequently. USAREUR also had contact with the attaches in France, the Benelux countries, and the three Scandinavian countries. Through the Army attaches USAREUR exchanged a certain amount of intelligence information with the competent authorities in these countries.

(11) United States Escapee Program (USEP). The USAREUR intelligence effort continued to benefit indirectly from the United States Escapee Program, whose primary mission was to help escapees from Soviet domination reestablish themselves in the Free World. By contributing to the comfort of these refugees, and thereby raising their morale, USEP assisted the intelligence exploitation effort. At the same time, USEP eliminated a most difficult problem by assuming responsibility for resettling the escapees.

(12) Radio Stations. USAREUR continued to furnish Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, and Radio Liberation with information on listeners' reactions to broadcasts. USAREUR also assisted the stations in locating refugees who could be used in the propaganda effort and provided facilities in the field for interviewing persons who were considered potential sources of propaganda material. This support was necessarily consistent with security and with the full exploitation of individuals for intelligence purposes.

(13) Army Security Agency in Europe (ASAE). This Department of the Army organization remained responsible for furnishing both communications intelligence and communications security support to USAREUR. ASAE maintained liaison officers with both the USAREUR Assistant Chief

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of Staff, G-2, and Seventh Army headquarters. USAREUR provided ASAE with raw information derived from its intelligence collection sources. ASAE in turn furnished USAREUR with intelligence concerning the imminence of hostilities and other selected data on Soviet and satellite order of battle, military activities, transportation and communications, and political and economic developments affecting the war potential of the Soviet Zone of Germany and other satellite countries.

c. Interagency Coordination.

(1) Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, Germany. The Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, Germany, continued to coordinate overt intelligence activities on behalf of the Ambassador, who was the senior U.S. representative in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this connection the Coordinator maintained offices in both Frankfurt and Bonn.

(2) Office of the Coordinator and Special Adviser (OCA), Bavaria. This office performed a similar function at lower levels, coordinating relations between the U.S. intelligence and security agencies and the Bavarian civilian authorities. The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, accredited a permanent liaison officer to OCA, Bavaria, at Munich.

(3) Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany (ICCG). As the principal coordinating body for all overt collection activities in Germany, ICCG consisted of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; the USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence; the CINCELM Representative, Germany; and the Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, who served as permanent chairman. The USEUCOM Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, continued to participate as an observer at the regular ICCG meetings. Although the committee itself met only upon call of the chairman, or upon specific request of a member, various subcommittees and working groups convened frequently throughout the year. For example, the Standing Scientific and Technical Subcommittee coordinated all intelligence matters of a technical nature for ICCG, under the chairmanship of a Department of the Army Detachment representative. Another subcommittee met periodically to do preparatory work and to select working groups that studied problems before they were submitted to the main committee.

(4) Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin. There was no change in either the organization or functions of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin, made up of representatives of the principal intelligence agencies in Berlin and of the U.S. Commander, Berlin. The group continued to provide Berlin agencies with an opportunity for consultation and aided in preventing duplication of effort.

(5) Returnee Exploitation Group (REG) This joint interagency group was primarily concerned with the exploitation of German scientists who had returned from the U.S.S.R. and settled in the East Zone of Germany. USAREUR intelligence agencies offered financial and similar awards to induce these scientists to defect to the Federal Republic. The operation

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was highly successful and provided a major source of intelligence information on the extent and scope of Soviet research and development. USAREUR maintained a liaison officer with the group and supported it operationally.

(6) Defector Reception Center (DRC). Also operated on a joint interagency basis, the Defector Reception Center was concerned essentially with non-German sources of special or national interest. Originating from the U.S.S.R. or its satellites, these individuals were brought in from points in Germany and other European and Middle Eastern countries. Their exploitation was based on the participating agencies' primary areas of interest and on the knowledge of the sources themselves.

## Section II: Production, Maintenance, and Dissemination of Intelligence

### 41. Production of Intelligence

The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Strategic Intelligence Detachments (SID) continued to produce positive intelligence.<sup>3</sup> The information collected by field agencies was collated, evaluated, interpreted, and published as intelligence studies, reports, or basic documents. The production of intelligence included order of battle handbooks, surveys and lists of known communist training areas and supply depots, and similar publications as well as intelligence concerning armament, vehicle, petroleum, and iron and steel production. Other information obtained concerned scientific and technical intelligence in the fields of atomic energy, missiles, electronics, and biological and chemical warfare, and intelligence concerning political and governmental activities related to military planning and security, psychological weaknesses of governments, and resistance movements.

### 42. Maintenance of Intelligence

Changes in U.S. and Allied military doctrine and policy, together with the changing situation in USAREUR's area of responsibility, made necessary a continuing review of intelligence requirements during the reporting period. Intelligence was maintained on a current basis through the review and revision of intelligence collection memoranda, which established continuing requirements, and by the development of

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<sup>3</sup>Unless otherwise cited, the material in this section is based on a paper prepared by Maj E. L. Sievers, G2 Intel Pdn Br. SECRET. In file above.

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specific requests for information when intelligence was desired on a onetime basis. Through the new evaluation system established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and put into effect in May 1956, each report was evaluated as to its validity and usability on the basis of information received from USAREUR agencies, and specific guidance was given to collection units. In addition, frequent staff visits were made to field collection agencies to keep them abreast of the changing situation and to insure that they obtained the required information.

#### 43. Dissemination of Intelligence

The intelligence dissemination media included the USAREUR Monthly Intelligence Summary, Items of Intelligence Interest, a daily summary cable, the USAREUR Weekly Intelligence Summary Cable, the Weekly Intelligence Extract Cable, the USAREUR Weekly Situation Report, the quarterly USAREUR/CENTAG Periodic Intelligence Report, and the annual top secret USAREUR/CENTAG Military Estimate. In addition, many commanders, staff officers, and visiting officials were briefed to appraise them of the intelligence situation and assist them in developing emergency and war plans.

#### 44. Mapping Activities

Major emphasis was placed on the production, reproduction, and storage of maps.<sup>4</sup>

a. 1:25,000-Scale Mapping Program, Germany, Series M841. This project had been initiated in mid-1952 as a combined French, British, and United States program to revise the existing 1:25,000-scale map coverage of Western Germany. The purpose of the program was to replace the badly outdated German wartime maps with a common, large-scale series on standard sheet lines. The British assumed responsibility for producing 881 sheets, while the French and U.S. production quotas were 201 and 969 sheets, respectively. The USAREUR sheets covered the former U.S. and northern French occupation zones of Germany. USAREUR's specific technical responsibilities connected with the publication of new sheets included photo revision, field check, photogrammetric compilation of certain sheets, recast of sheet lines, and color separation drafting. The Army Map Service assisted USAREUR in the production of 304 sheets. The progress made in completing the 1:25,000-scale mapping program during FY 1958 was as follows:

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<sup>4</sup>This paragraph is based on a paper prepared by Capt W. M. Hipp, G2 Intel Pdn Br. CONF. In file above.

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<u>Work Phase Completed</u>	<u>Sheets Completed</u>	
	<u>1 Jul 57</u>	<u>30 Jun 58</u>
Photo Revision	968	968
Field Check	968	969
Color Separation	301	301
Recasting to Prussian Sheet Lines	173	173
Cartographic Revision (Drafting)	962	968
Ready for Printing	102	968
Sheets Printed	842	968

b. 1:50,000-Scale Mapping Program, Germany. The purpose of this project, begun in mid-1954 at the request of LANDCENT, was to provide coverage of Western Germany with the minimum number of sheets at a scale acceptable for most combat purposes. Since one 1:50,000-scale sheet could replace four 1:25,000-scale sheets, the advantages in terms of storage and issue of maps were obvious. USAREUR was responsible for producing the 73 sheets that covered the former U.S. zone of occupation. The German State Mapping Agencies (Landesvermessungsamter) accomplished the color separation for all sheets under contract. The addition of Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid and standard marginal information was carried out by U.S. 656th Engineer Battalion personnel. The German Ministry of Defense agreed to produce the remaining sheets of the new 1:50,000-scale coverage of Western Germany, since USAREUR's direct participation in the program was to cease with the completion of the 73 sheets. However, USAREUR maintained close and continuing liaison with the German Ministry of Defense to keep abreast of its progress. As of 30 June 1958 the color separation drafting of 61 sheets had been completed, while 12 were still being processed; 56 sheets had complete grid and marginal information, and work on 5 additional sheets was in progress.

c. Military City Maps, Germany, Series M943. This program was assigned to the Engineer Intelligence Center in 1955 for the purpose of obtaining up-to-date, large-scale topographic sheets of strategically important West German cities. Its implementation required multiplex compilation and color separation drafting of 108 map sheets covering 60 cities. By 30 June 1958 the multiplex compilation of 34 sheets and the color separation drafting of 5 sheets were completed.

d. Military City Maps, France, Series M964. The project, assigned to the Engineer Intelligence Center in 1956, had been requested by the G2 of the U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe, for use in operational planning along the line of communications. Source material in the form of large-scale topographic planetable sheets was being procured for 75--previously 73--cities. Of that total, material for 53 city maps was on hand, and a contract for procuring data on the remaining 22 cities was placed in the last quarter of FY 1958. Twenty-nine sheets covering 25 cities were being compiled by the Engineer Intelligence Center, and 3 sheets were completed in color separation drafting during the fiscal year.

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e. Map Reproduction Activities. USAREUR's topographic units concentrated their map reproduction effort on standard topographic sheets needed for current operational and training requirements and on fulfilling reserve requirements in accordance with the USAREUR Map Stockage Plan. During FY 1958, 1,763 map sheets and 5,962,000 copies were printed, and 27,287,000 press impressions were made.

f. Map Depot Operations. During FY 1958, an excess of issue over receipts at the USAREUR map depots resulted in a reduction of 5,796,000 in the number of available maps; as of 30 June 1958 the total number of maps on hand was 57,522,000.

g. Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid Conversion Project, Series M404. Since higher priority projects precluded further progress, the work scheduled for FY 1958 was reprogrammed for the following fiscal year.

h. Special Base Map, 1:500,000. The 23 sheets comprising this project were completed during FY 1958. These sheets provided using agencies with a uniform base for reporting significant activities pertaining to maneuvers or actual combat operations.

i. Trig Lists, Germany, 1:25,000 (Recovery Program). Published U.S. Army trig lists of Germany required major revision to correct errors caused by the destruction of stations during World War II and the relocation of stations by German survey agencies during the postwar period. The new stations had to be located, described, sketched, and added to the existing trig lists. A recovery program initiated in early 1957 utilized all available topographic units for visits to each station listed in the published trig lists. USAREUR topographic personnel had to verify the existence of the stations and prepare new or revised station descriptions and sketches, as required. A corollary program was conducted to obtain all available trigonometric station data from state survey agencies. In FY 1958 the recovery program was enlarged to include the southern section of the former French zone of occupation. This action increased the total number of stations to be visited to 123,229. During FY 1957, 53,152 stations had been visited, and 35,401 stations had been recovered; the corresponding figures for FY 1958 were 45,689 and 30,645, respectively.

j. Recast and Marginal Data Revision, France, Series M661. A survey of existing 1:100,000-scale maps of France disclosed that the sheets on hand were too large to be printed on field-size presses. French mapping agencies indicated a new 1:100,000-scale series of France would not be completed for 10 years. In the event of hostilities large quantities of 1:100,000-scale map sheets would be required along the line of communications through France; these would have to be produced on wartime printing facilities, consisting largely of the field presses organic to mobile topographic units in the theater. The Engineer Intelligence Center was therefore assigned the project of recasting 101 existing M661 sheets to a field press format. One sample sheet was completed during FY 1958.

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45. Military-Geographic Documentation Activities

a. Cross Country Movement Study. The Cross Country Movement Study of the Federal Republic of Germany, scheduled for completion in FY 1959, progressed normally; the twelve 1:100,000-scale map sheets programmed for FY 1958 were published. Extension of this type of study to Eastern Europe or France was under consideration.<sup>5</sup>

b. Military Engineering Geology Study. Seven 1:250,000-scale map sheets for the Military Engineering Geology Study of the Federal Republic of Germany were completed in FY 1958. This study was scheduled to be completed in FY 1959, and current plans did not provide for its extension to other geographical areas.

c. Routes of Communications Studies. Twelve 1:500,000-scale map sheets with texts of railway, highway, and waterway studies of Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland were published in FY 1958. While it was originally estimated that 17 text revisions to these studies would have to be made, only 7 actually were needed.

d. Construction Materials Map Study. The 1:100,000-scale Construction Materials Map Study of the Federal Republic of Germany progressed toward its programmed completion in FY 1959, with 29 dossier-type studies--map sheets and tables--published during the period under review.

e. Revisions to Railway Map Study. Fourteen text revisions to the Railway Map Study of the Federal Republic of Germany were completed during FY 1958.

f. Other Projects. Among the other military geographic documentation activities were terrain studies, a chemical-in-soils project, special engineer intelligence studies, and various routine tasks.

Section III: Counterintelligence Activities

46. Scope

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, continued to supervise the USAREUR counterintelligence program, which was designed to provide

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<sup>5</sup>This paragraph is based on Cmt 2, USAREUR G2 to Hist Div, 17 Oct 58, to DF, Hist Div to G2, 29 Sep 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1958 (U). SECRET. AEAHI 250/54 HI.

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security for USAREUR installations and activities.<sup>6</sup> Offensive counter-intelligence measures were directed against agencies and individuals of hostile powers and against subversive activities constituting a threat to the command. Defensive counterintelligence measures were directed at protecting information, personnel, equipment, and installations against sabotage, subversion, and espionage, and at detecting treason, sedition, subversion, or disaffection among USAREUR's military and civilian personnel.

#### 47. Areas of Collection Responsibility

With the objective of accurately estimating the security threat to the command, formulating countermeasures, and reporting pertinent information to higher and lateral echelons, USAREUR counterintelligence collection was directed toward areas in which the existence of hostile espionage and subversive elements had been determined. In addition to covering the areas within the USAREUR Zone of Interest--West Berlin, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy--the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, had counterintelligence coverage responsibility in the Soviet satellite countries of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, as well as Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the European section of the U.S.S.R. west of the Ural Mountains.

#### 48. Areas of Analysis Interest

Analysis of counterintelligence information covered all fields of espionage and subversion pertaining to the above-mentioned geographical areas. The analytical product, arrived at through a process of collation, evaluation, and interpretation, was derived not only from USAREUR-collected information, but also from other U.S. and Allied intelligence sources. This product was disseminated in various counterintelligence publications as an essential element of both offensive and defensive programs. The analysis process, whereby security threats to the command were related to security requirements, was instrumental in preparing USAREUR's defensive security measures.

#### 49. Counterintelligence Agencies

a. USAREUR Agencies. The 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, a subordinate command under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was responsible for detecting subversive activities, disaffection, sedition, and treason within USAREUR, and for contributing to the command's protection against espionage and sabotage. Operations in the fields of counterespionage, countersubversion, and countersabotage took place in the previously mentioned geographical areas.

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<sup>6</sup>The material in this section is based on a paper prepared by Capt L. R. Harrison, G2 CI Br. CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

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b. Seventh Army Agencies. Tactical counterintelligence corps detachments were attached to Seventh Army to provide security within the areas of responsibility. They were concerned only with document, personnel, and installation security. The clandestine counterintelligence operations pertaining to Seventh Army were conducted by the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group.

c. USACOMZEUR Agencies. The 766th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, responsible to the USACOMZEUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, performed the security functions for the USAREUR line of communications. Though limited by U.S.-French agreement to operating within American military installations, the 766th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was able to provide information on French political trends, particularly on Communist Party activities. Internal security was improved by conducting a limited number of covert operations.

d. USASETAF Agencies. Under the supervision of the USASETAF Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the 430th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment provided security coverage for the U.S. Army in Italy. Although restricted to American military installations by Italian-U.S. agreement, the 430th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment provided considerable information on Italian Communist and espionage activities. In addition, the detachment had the mission of conducting offensive counter-espionage operations against the intelligence services of Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

e. Liaison with Non-USAREUR Agencies. USAREUR counterintelligence agencies continued to maintain close contact with all levels of the West German security establishment. These liaison relationships produced valuable information both in support and in confirmation of the USAREUR effort. Other liaison contacts were maintained with British and French intelligence agencies in West Germany and, in general, with all security agencies located within the USAREUR areas of responsibility.

#### 50. Offensive Counterintelligence Activities

a. Countersabotage. Increased efforts were made during FY 1958 to tighten physical security as a barrier against sabotage by hostile elements. A system of security surveys continued to provide local commanders with the information needed to implement defensive measures. There were no known hostile sabotage incidents, the few cases of damage being attributable to vandalism. While the state of security was considered to be high, countersabotage defense measures were not actually tested by enemy agents.

b. Countersubversion. Operations in this field were conducted primarily against the Communist Parties of West Germany, France, and Italy. These subversive elements continued to propagandize against the presence of the U.S. Army in Europe; moreover, they were expected to affect adversely the activities of U.S. forces during wartime. Priority was given to determining the success of such subversive elements

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in penetrating USAREUR installations, Allied governments, and public utilities. The countersubversive effort also included coverage of the East German Communists and their activities in West Germany and West Berlin.

c. Counterespionage. The two phases of counterespionage operations against hostile intelligence--defensive and offensive--were emphasized during FY 1958. Having received proper security indoctrination, USAREUR personnel were able to discern and report a number of approaches by hostile agents who subsequently were identified and neutralized. Other internal clandestine operations succeeded similarly in exposing hostile intentions. External counterespionage operations were aimed at penetrating the hostile agencies at their bases, thus disclosing the identity of sources and agents collecting information pertaining to the U.S. Army, Europe.

#### 51. Defensive Counterintelligence Activities

a. Measures to Improve Security. The scope of security checks on indigenous personnel having access to areas immediately adjacent to sensitive sites was increased to include a check of the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group Central Registry, Provost Marshal records, and German Federal and State security agency files.

b. Security Clearances. Compared to the previous fiscal year, the number of national agency checks increased by 1,564 to 11,754, while the number of background investigations declined by 906 to 3,181. These figures seemed to indicate that the intensive program aimed at limiting the number of background investigations to those that were fully justified was successful.

c. Investigations of Security Violations. Though not responsible for conducting direct investigations of security violations, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, did review reports of such investigations for their over-all significance to the security program. The security violations that occurred during the past year were not of a serious nature and did not endanger the over-all security of the command.

d. Alien Enlistment Investigations. Public Law 597, 81st Congress (the Lodge Act), which provided for the Alien Enlistment Program, was extended to 30 June 1959, with arrangements being made for a further renewal. During FY 1958, 475 alien enlistment investigations were completed.

#### 52. Integration of Files into the Central Records Facility

a. USAREUR Central Registry. In implementation of AR 381-46, the integration of counterintelligence files from the USAREUR Central Registry into the Central Records Facility (CRF), Fort Holabird, Maryland, was continued by the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Of the 340,000 dossiers scheduled for reviewing during FY 1958, 202,119 were processed.

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At the end of FY 1958 a total of 271,082 dossiers required processing to determine if they met CRF retirement criteria.

b. Personnel Security Dossiers, USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Also within the purview of AR 381-46, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, retired 12,500 files directly to the Central Records Facility during FY 1958.

53. Significant Developments

There were three important counterintelligence developments during FY 1958.

First, the assignment of the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force added an entire new geographical area to USAREUR counterintelligence responsibilities, requiring preparation of guidance directives to integrate USASETAF counterintelligence coverage into the USAREUR program.

Moreover, USAREUR counterintelligence problems in the special weapons security field were given increased attention. This became necessary because of hostile intelligence interest in this subject and because USAREUR was assigned the responsibility for making these weapons available to NATO Allies.

Finally, the incidence of hostile espionage in the USAREUR area continued high during FY 1958, with an upward trend in hostile attempts to recruit U.S. personnel as sources. ✓

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CHAPTER 5

Planning and Preparations

54. Central Army Group (CENTAG) Planning

a. The Central Zone Plans. The Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1-57 (CZ JEDP 1-57) had been completed and forwarded to Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOURATAF) headquarters for comment in May 1957. During the first half of FY 1958 CENTAG repeatedly requested FOURATAF's concurrence in the Air Force portion of the plan, but in the third quarter FOURATAF nonconcurred, questioning the requirement for such a plan.<sup>1</sup> When asked for a decision, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) agreed with FOURATAF that the Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan (CE JEDP) did not require a CZ JEDP and that coordination between the army group and Allied tactical air force headquarters would suffice. Such coordination had been achieved by the publication of the Central Zone Joint Atomic Fire Plan 1-57 (CZ JPAW 1-57) as a separate document in January 1957. Therefore no further action was taken.

b. Emergency Planning. The Central Army Group Emergency Plan 1-57 (CENTAG EP 1-57), a single-service NATO operations plan providing for the execution of the mission and tasks of COMCENTAG during the initial phase of a general war, was published 20 July 1957. For tasks set forth for operations prior to outbreak of hostilities planning and execution were to be effected when subordinate commanders received the plan. The planning for tasks involving operations after the outbreak of hostilities was to

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<sup>1</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 4A, FY 58, 3d Qtr. SECRET.

<sup>2</sup>(1) For background information, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 105. (2) Intvw, Capt J. M. Sathrum, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt (G. S. Bare, CENTAG Plans Stf, 31 Jul 58. Both SECRET

be initiated on receipt, but execution after 15 September 1957 would be on order of COMCENTAG or higher authority. Because of the recent division reorganization and the intensive preparations for Exercise COUNTERPUNCH, the Seventh Army questioned its ability to execute the provisions of CENTAG EP 1-57 before 1 October 1957. As a result, the effective date for possible execution was postponed to 1 October 1957.<sup>3</sup>

It originally had been anticipated that CENTAG EP 1-57 would be valid through FY 1958. When minor changes became necessary; however, Corrigendum Number 1, published 29 April 1958, led to the redesignation of CENTAG EP 1-57 as CENTAG EP 1-58.<sup>4</sup> Also, in late April 1958 AFCEM published the CE JEDP 2-58, which envisioned a more forward strategy that was based on the increased effectiveness of the German land forces assigned to CENTAG as well as on a considerable increase in atomic weapons that would be available after 1 July 1958. This created the need for a completely new plan embodying the "Forward Concept." Therefore, CENTAG EDP 2-58, prepared in support of CE JEDP 2-58, was published shortly after the close of the reporting period to provide guidance for subordinate U.S., French, and German commanders in the conduct of operations in accordance with NATO strategic military objectives.<sup>5</sup> Also under preparation was the CENTAG Atomic Support Plan 2-58 (CENTAG ASP 2-58), which would replace the CZ JPAW 1-57 when published in FY 1959 as Annex D to CENTAG EDP 2-58.<sup>6</sup>

#### 55. Reorganization of CENTAG Headquarters

a. Wartime Staff. In July 1957 Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) directed CENTAG to submit plans for integrating Allied personnel into its wartime headquarters staff. Representation was to be based on the ratio of forces each country committed to the NATO organization. As submitted on 31 October, CENTAG's plan not only provided for the integration of Allied personnel into the headquarters but also revised the headquarters organization. Under existing plans the CENTAG wartime headquarters was organized according to the customary U.S. pattern, with four general staff divisions and various special staff divisions. The proposed reorganization would establish the Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, and Chaplain Divisions as branches of G1, and the Historical and Air Defense Divisions as branches of G3. The Engineer, Signal, Information, and Civil Affairs Divisions would remain separate staff divisions.

<sup>3</sup>(1) Cable 5318, Seventh Army to COMCENTAG for G3, 11 Sep 57. (2) Cable SX-5815, CENTAG to French First Army, Seventh Army, et al., 14 Sep 57. Both NATO CONF.

<sup>4</sup>(1) CENTAG EP 1-57, 20 Jul 57. COSMIC TS (info used CONF). (2) CENTAG EP 1-58, 29 Apr 58. COSMIC TS (info used NATO SECRET). Both in USAREUR G3 TS.

<sup>5</sup>(1) CENTAG EDP 2-58, 10 Jul 58. COSMIC TS (info used CONF). In file above. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col Bare, 31 Jul 58. SECRET.

<sup>6</sup>Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col J. C. Wood, Jr., CENTAG Plans Stf, 31 Jul 58. SECRET.

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The proposed staff would consist of 175 officers, 14 warrant officers, and 282 enlisted men, or a total of 471 personnel. Of these, 389 would be U.S., 44 French, and 38 German. The preponderance of U.S. personnel was considered justifiable, since the United States provided 62 percent of the forces assigned to CENTAG, while the French and Germans contributed about 19 percent each.

b. Peacetime Staff. In November 1957 COMLANDCENT requested that plans also be prepared for establishing integrated peacetime staffs for CENTAG headquarters and also for headquarters command and support units. The strength of the CENTAG headquarters staff would be 55--15 French, 15 German, and 25 American personnel; that of the command and support unit headquarters would be determined after CENTAG submitted estimates of the number of German and French personnel who would be needed and similar information. COMLANDCENT's request was based on a SHAPE directive that plans were to be prepared for integrating German personnel into the staffs of Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), CENTAG, Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF), and FOURATAF headquarters. COMCENTAG forwarded the required information on 24 December 1957.<sup>9</sup>

COMLANDCENT requested that German and French officers be integrated gradually. Although COMCENTAG agreed in principle to gradual integration, he felt that the staffing of his headquarters should remain predominantly American until NATO duplicated the facilities, services, troop support, and staffing that the U.S. would have to maintain in any event, because certain problems of both NATO and national origin encountered at CENTAG/USAREUR headquarters were without counterpart elsewhere in the NATO military structure. USAREUR, for example, had to free the U.S. Seventh Army from a vast number of problems that were not only outside of its combat mission, but even of its area of geographical interest. From the strictly national viewpoint, USAREUR had to perform most of the functions exercised for the other NATO forces by their ministries of defense. It also had to discharge heavy U.S. commitments in direct support of NATO as a whole as well as of the Central Region, such as the implementation of military assistance programs, the logistics of atomic support, and a very heavy NATO school and training program. Thus, the discharge of the U.S. national responsibility in support of the U.S. Seventh Army and other U.S. Army forces throughout Europe and the Middle East, plus the considerable NATO support provided from American resources, required a U.S. staffing that was not necessarily proportional to the ratio of combat forces within the

<sup>7</sup>(1) Intvw, Capt R. K. Sawyer, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. R. Gough, G3 Org & Eqp Br, 6 Mar 58. NATO CONF. (2) DF, CENTAG G3 to CofS, 23 Sep 57, subj: Organization of Headquarters, CENTAG (U). CONF. In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 1 (1957).

<sup>8</sup>(1) Cable PALC-12921, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 21 Nov 57. (2) Intvw, Capt Sawyer with Lt Col Gough, cited above. Both NATO CONF.

<sup>9</sup>(1) Intvw, Capt Sawyer with Lt Col Gough, cited above. (2) Ltr SHAPE to AFCENT, 4 Nov 57, subj: German Integration in AFCENT. AG 403. PA. NATO CONF. In USAREUR G3 Org & Eqp Br.

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Army Group. In addition, U.S. forces could not furnish the space, housing, and amenities that would be needed for a large augmentation of the peacetime CENTAG establishment.<sup>10</sup>

While AFCEM agreed with the CENTAG plan for integration by stages--as long as it would be completed in 1962--LANDCENT nonconcurred, primarily because of the level of the positions earmarked for French and German officers. On 10 April 1958 COMCENTAG submitted to AFCEM another table of organization in which the designations of the positions assigned to French and German officers within the existing plans staff organization were revised upward. For example, the position of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 to be offered to a German officer would refer only to the CENTAG Plans Staff and not to the wartime headquarters organization. Again LANDCENT nonconcurred, stating that what had been proposed was insufficient and that the CENTAG peacetime headquarters should be a completely separate, integrated, international headquarters financed with NATO funds. COMCENTAG's view was that a large peacetime headquarters would be an unnecessary duplication of effort.

SHAPE believed that the organization of CENTAG headquarters should be completely internationalized, with an international TOE to be established and posts filled at the earliest feasible date mutually agreeable to CINCUSAREUR and the French and German Ministers of Defense.

The problem had not been resolved by the end of the reporting period.<sup>11</sup>

56. Joint Operations Center with FOURATAF

In July 1957 CINCENT set forth an operational policy that closely conformed to that suggested by the ground forces commanders. While reaffirming that joint command and operations centers (JCOC) would be established at the army group/Allied tactical air force level of command, he indicated that the actual establishment of a center would be feasible only if it could be adjacent to the two component headquarters without prejudicing the accomplishment of their respective service missions. Whenever no JCOC was established officers would be interchanged so that the respective service views could be coordinated. These officers would maintain contact and communications with their parent headquarters.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ltr, CENTAG CofS to LANDCENT CofS, 21 Feb 58. NATO CONF. In CENTAG Plans Stf, OUT Corr file (1958).

<sup>11</sup> (1) DF, USAREUR ACoS G3 to CofS, 8 Apr 58, subj: CENTAG Peacetime Establishment. NATO CONF. (2) Ltr, LANDCENT CofS to CENTAG, 17 Mar 58. NATO RESTRICTED. (3) Ltr, SHAPE CofS to CINCENT, 1 Jul 58. NATO CONF. All in CENTAG Plans Stf, Peacetime Hq, CENTAG, file. (4) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 10 Apr 58. NATO CONF. In USAREUR SGS 250/58 (Perm). (5) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col E. E. Surdyk, CENTAG Plans Stf, 30 Sep 58. SECRET.

<sup>12</sup> Cable PPCE-11632, CINCENT to COMAIRCENT, COMNAVCENT, COMLANDCENT, 2 Jul 57. NATO SECRET.

To clarify the problem further, CINCENT directed that in future exercises and actual operations the relationship between JCOC's and joint operations centers (JOC) would vary with each phase of operations. In Phase I operations the JOC established at the location designated by the air commander as his command post would bear the title JCOC, and it alone would forward express traffic to higher echelons. During Phase II operations the JOC established at the location designated by the land commander as his command post would assume the title JCOC, together with the authority held by the JCOC of Phase I. CINCENT would announce the close of Phase I in each area according to the prevailing local situation and upon the advice of subordinate commanders. This policy was not to be construed as restricting JOC's--reserve JCOC's--from handling traffic necessary to their internal operations, provided these actions were in accordance with instructions and policies of the currently operational JCOC.<sup>13</sup>

CENTAG estimated that it would need 7,059 square feet for its own operational headquarters elements within a joint operations center. FOURATAF had offered 3,000 of the more than 14,000 square feet available at its site, and a FOURATAF study indicated that by remodeling certain portions of its command post and obtaining the release of space currently held by the French an additional 4,234 square feet could be allotted. Although the degree of structural modification needed would depend upon the actual allocation of rooms and areas to CENTAG, the cost of such modification was believed to be approximately the same regardless of the site selected. From a signal viewpoint, the primary advantage of moving CENTAG to the FOURATAF command post was that the communications facilities of the CENTAG/FOURATAF joint command and operations center were already established at the latter site. CENTAG concluded that the disadvantages of splitting the two headquarters applied about equally to each command post site. However, it was felt that the CENTAG command post site was more adaptable to the requirements of both headquarters because of its layout and size. In any case, although the efficiency of administrative functions might suffer, there would be a considerable gain in operational effectiveness if the operational elements of the two headquarters were placed together.<sup>14</sup>

In October 1957 COMFOURATAF forwarded to CENTAG headquarters a study of relocating the operational elements of CENTAG and FOURATAF headquarters in adjacent command post areas. This study indicated that FOURATAF elements would require 7,111 square feet of space to operate effectively. CENTAG made a similar study, which indicated that sufficient space to meet FOURATAF requirements could be made available at the CENTAG command post site. To provide this space, however, the CENTAG G1, G4, Engineer, Historical, Civil Affairs, and Information Divisions, as well as all liaison elements, would have to move in their entirety to the FOURATAF command post. In addition, the CENTAG Adjutant General Division, Headquarters Commandant, Signal Division, Secretary of the General Staff, and Staff Message Control (SMC) would

<sup>13</sup>Cable OPTIC-12318, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 17 Sep 57. NATO SECR

<sup>14</sup>DF, CENTAG G3 to CofS, 23 Sep 57, cited above. CONF.

require space in both locations. The primary disadvantages of moving FOURATAF operational elements to the CENTAG site would be the cost of moving signal equipment and the 1- to 2-year delay in obtaining infrastructure funds and completing the move. Moreover, the structural modification entailed could not be determined accurately until specific requirements for each FOURATAF function were known. The cost would be relatively minor if troop labor were used.<sup>15</sup>

On 12 November 1957 CENTAG forwarded its conclusions to FOURATAF and proposed that representatives of each headquarters work out a mutually acceptable solution.<sup>16</sup> However, planning and preparations that led to the subsequent move of Headquarters, FOURATAF, to Ramstein in June 1958 brought all further negotiations to a halt. At the end of the period the CENTAG/FOURATAF JCOC was located in the Kinsbach Cave. No specific action to colocate the remaining operational elements of the two headquarters was contemplated.<sup>17</sup>

#### 57. CENTAG's French Forces

a. French First Army. The forward concept, as directed by AFCENT and implemented by the CENTAG EDP 2-58, assigned a larger area of responsibility to the French First Army. This change became necessary because the initial defensive positions had been moved forward.<sup>18</sup>

b. Headquarters "R". The residual French headquarters of about 500 men, which was to remain in Koblenz after the withdrawal of the French II Corps headquarters, was designated as Headquarters "R". Although the French had agreed to move out of essential facilities in the area and to consolidate the residual headquarters in one casern, they actually retained 900 barracks spaces that otherwise would have been available for the continued buildup of the German III Corps. The inference drawn from this action was that Headquarters "R" was intended to be a French "Command of Assistance"--CINCENT's proposed new name for corps headquarters--in a future German army in the Koblenz area in 1962. However, it did not appear reasonable that the French headquarters should remain in Koblenz for five years without a mission.

On 10 June 1957 COMCENTAG had asked COMLANDCENT what the peacetime and war status, functions, and command relationships of Headquarters "R"

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<sup>15</sup>Incl B, to DF, CENTAG G3 to CofS, 9 Nov 57, subj: Relocation of CENTAG-FOURATAF Operational Elements. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 1 (1957).

<sup>16</sup>Ltr, CENTAG to FOURATAF, 12 Nov 57. NATO SECRET. In file above.

<sup>17</sup>Incl 4, to cmt 2, USAREUR G3 to Hist Div, 21 Nov 58, to DF, Hist Div to G3, 5 Nov 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAHI 250/54 HI. SECRET.

<sup>18</sup>Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col Surdyk, cited above. For further details, see the top secret supplement to this report. SECRET.

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were to be in the immediate and long-range future.<sup>19</sup> LANDCENT replied that the French Ministry of Defense had agreed to maintain the French II Corps (Reduced) in its present sector. This reduced corps would eventually become part of a German-French army under German command. In peacetime the corps was to control French units in the sector and maintain liaison with the U.S. Seventh Army and the German III Corps. On M-day it would pass under the operational command of a German-French army headquarters, or, if this army was not yet constituted, under the operational command of the German III Corps.

The two French colonial regiments remaining in the Koblenz area moved southward in early FY 1958, leaving the French II Corps (Reduced) in Koblenz and the French 1st Armored Division in Trier.<sup>20</sup>

c. French 1st Armored Division. On 26 June 1957 LANDCENT informed CENTAG that the French 1st Armored Division was attached to the French II Corps, which in peacetime would maintain the necessary liaison on operational matters with the U.S. Seventh Army and the German III Corps.<sup>21</sup>

In October 1957 Seventh Army requested that the French 1st Armored Division be made available for the defensive battle on Line RICHMOND positions not later than H/72 and that the restrictions on the use of elements of the division for rear area security be lifted. In December between 65 and 75 percent of the division's personnel were reported to be assigned and present for duty; 10 to 15 percent were assigned but on duty with the Tank Training Center at Trier, and the remainder were on 2-year reserve status and could be on duty within 48 to 72 hours after recall. Logistical support was not possible east of the Rhine unless the Bundeswehr established and allowed joint occupancy of supply points east of and in the vicinity of Koblenz. Until the question of forward supply capability was answered the division would not maintain any direct planning contact with the German III Corps. Headquarters "R" acted as the intermediary.<sup>22</sup>

The logistical support of the French 1st Armored Division in the operations east of the Rhine, anticipated in the operations plan of the German

<sup>19</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 10 Jun 57, subj: French Headquarters "R" in Koblenz. (2) DF, CENTAG Plans Stf to USAREUR G3, 13 Jul 57, subj: Status of Residual II French Corps (Headquarters "R") at Koblenz. Both NATO SECRET. Both in CENTAG Admin files, OUT Corr (1957), Items 54 and 76.

<sup>20</sup>(1) DF, CENTAG Plans Stf to USAREUR G3, 13 Jul 57, cited above. (2) Rapport Historique, 1 Jul 56-31 Dec 57, Contribution du Commandement en Chef des Forces Francaises en Allemagne au Rapport Historique du Groupe d'Armes Centre (hereafter cited as CCEFA's contrib to CENTAG Hist Rept), p. 6. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>21</sup>DF, USAREUR ACoS G3 to CofS, 13 Jul 57, subj: Status of Forces in German III Corps. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 3 (1957).

<sup>22</sup>Ltr, Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Gen H. I. Hodes, COMCENTAG, 20 Dec 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1957).

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III Corps, presented a problem for the French Minister of National Defense. He estimated that the support of the division would necessitate the distribution of about 30,000 tons of supplies in some 10 depots as well as increased expenditures. The Minister considered the logistical support of the division a national problem and proposed to make an over-all study of the problems inherent in the forward concept.<sup>23</sup>

58. CENTAG's German Forces

a. Assumption of Military Security by German III Corps. At a conference attended by U.S. Seventh Army and German III Corps representatives on 24 July 1957 it developed that the Germans were not then capable of providing peacetime military security on the eastern border of their sector. Moreover, the German Ministry of Defense had apparently not directed the corps to perform this mission, and the corps was not permitted to communicate directly with the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) but had to relay messages through the Ministry of Defense.<sup>24</sup>

On 2 July 1957 the Federal Ministry of Defense was asked to direct the German III Corps to assume the eastern border responsibility. When no reply had been received after more than three weeks, CENTAG/USAREUR on 26 July directed that the U.S. 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was to have been withdrawn from its screening positions in front of the German III Corps on 1 August, should remain in place until the Seventh Army was satisfied that effective peacetime security measures had been established.<sup>25</sup> On 13 August, however, the Germans agreed to provide military security, including cooperation with the Federal Border Police for the exchange of intelligence information and coordination in barrier planning.<sup>26</sup> The German III Corps assumed this responsibility on 8 November 1957.<sup>27</sup>

b. Assignment of German Units. Effective 1 July 1957 LANDCENT assigned the German II Corps headquarters and the 2d and 4th Infantry Divisions--composed of two combat groups each--to CENTAG. The assignment of the German 2d Infantry Division to CENTAG cancelled the assignment of Combat Group B-2, which was 1 of its 2 basic elements, to NORTHAG for employment in an emergency.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup>(1) Ltr, CCFFA to COMCENTAG, 17 Jan 58. In CENTAG Plans Stf, Ger Corr file (1958). (2) Ltr, CCFFA to COMCENTAG, 13 Feb 58. In CENTAG Plans Stf, CCFFA ltr file (1958). Both NATO SECRET.

<sup>24</sup>Cable 5085, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR for G3, 25 Jul 57. SECRET.

<sup>25</sup>Cable SX-4836, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 26 Jul 57. SECRET.

<sup>26</sup>Cable SX-5163, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 13 Aug 57. SECRET.

<sup>27</sup>G3 App, to Hist Rept, Ger III Corps, 1 Aug-31 Dec 57, p. 2. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>28</sup>Cable OPT/LC-11749, COMLANDCENT from Gen Speidel to COMNORTHAG, COMCENTAG, 15 Jul 57. NATO SECRET.

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One month later the German III Corps assumed responsibility for the former sector of the French II Corps, and by the end of 1957 its two divisions, the 2d Infantry and 5th Armored, were training and carrying out reconnaissance missions within their areas of responsibility.<sup>29</sup> In November 1957 the German II Corps assumed command of those elements of the mountain and airborne brigades that were not yet certified to NATO but would be made available to CENTAG in case of an emergency. The 4th Infantry Division, certified to NATO and under the administrative command of the German II Corps in peacetime, was assigned to the U.S. VII Corps for operations.<sup>30</sup>

In case of an alert the infantry training battalion at Hammelburg and the 34th Infantry Battalion at Wildflecken; assigned to the German II Corps for tactical purposes, were expected to perform a long lateral movement to the line of contact through the U.S. V and VII Corps. The tactical assignment of the two battalions was therefore changed to the German III Corps, effective 1 April 1958. In the course of normal alerting procedures the III Corps would assemble the battalions in the vicinity of Brueckenau and move them to the area of the German 2d Infantry Division. In the event of a surprise alert both battalions would be temporarily assigned to the U.S. V Corps.<sup>31</sup>

On 1 April 1958 the 1st Mountain Division, with 2 combat groups, and 1 combat group of the 1st Airborne Division were certified to SACEUR and assigned to CENTAG. In addition, 2 armored infantry battalions, 1 combat command of the 5th Armored Division, and a signal corps battalion of the German II Corps were assigned to CENTAG.<sup>32</sup>

c. Proposed Changes in NORTHAG-CENTAG Boundary. In October 1957 the U.S. Seventh Army noted that the NORCENT agreements provided for the opening of the Eder See Dam by the Belgian I Corps in an emergency. The resulting flood would create a strong barrier across the most likely avenue of enemy approach to the German III Corps' sector. Timing was of particular importance, because it was essential that the flooding not occur before the westward withdrawal of the German III Corps units stationed east of the area to be flooded. For this reason, the Seventh Army recommended that the NORTHAG-CENTAG boundary be moved; if the dam was within the U.S. Seventh Army sector, the army headquarters could assume responsibility for opening it. A suggested boundary trace, to be

<sup>29</sup>Intvw, Capt Sawyer with Lt Col G. S. Bare, CENTAG Plans Stf, 4 Mar 58. NATO SECRET.

<sup>30</sup>Memo, Maj Gen R. C. Cooper, CENTAG ACoS G3, to Gen Hodes, 27 Nov 57, subj: Status of German II Corps. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 3 (1957).

<sup>31</sup>Ltr, Col H. Reidel, Ger Ln Off at USAREUR Hq, to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jan 58. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Stf 1220.

<sup>32</sup>Ltr, Gen A. Heusinger, Ger Armed Forces CofS, to Gen Hodes, 27 Mar 58. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Stf, Ger Corr file (1958).

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delineated specifically after ground reconnaissance and direct coordination between adjacent subordinate elements, was the present NORTHAG-CENTAG boundary from the political border at Wanfried to the confluence of the Eder-Fulda Rivers, generally westward to Merxhausen-Netze-Voehl, to the Eder River at Herzhausen, and from that point as before.<sup>33</sup>

CENTAG replied on 4 December 1957, stating that no boundary change would be considered until a third German division had been assigned to the German III Corps. In any case, the opening of the Eder See Dam was to be coordinated with that of the Diemel See Dam, and NORTHAG felt that the same headquarters, the Belgian I Corps, should control both.<sup>34</sup>

In December 1957 NORTHAG proposed a new army group boundary that included Bonafort, Hohenkirchen, Fuerstenwald, Landau, and Hoeringhausen, and excluded Fuerstenberg, Sachsenberg, and Allendorf. The former boundary would be followed to Zeppenfeld. This change of boundary--which would require an agreement between the Belgians and Germans concerning an exchange of accommodations, including family quarters, in Holzminden and Hoexter--would be acceptable while Belgian troops remained temporarily in Kassel. The existing concept of operations envisaged the Belgian I Corps deploying on Line TOULOUSE and the German III Corps on Line YORK. The junction point was Gifflitz.<sup>35</sup>

SACEUR stressed the importance of increasing the number of German units and locating them so that no major moves would be necessary later. In view of the importance of the Hesse Gap, and in particular the approaches leading westward from the Kassel area, there was a strong justification for increasing the planned strength of the forces in that general area by at least one division. This additional division could be obtained only from German sources. The German program called for only two divisions to be located in that sector--the 5th Armored Division east of Koblenz and the 2d Infantry Division in the Giessen area. Therefore, LANDCENT strongly recommended that the Germans give favorable consideration to the assignment of a third division to the Kassel area. If possible, the peacetime location of this division should be in the eastern part of the zone then occupied by the Belgian I Corps.<sup>36</sup> COMCENTAG expressed the view that at least three divisions should be available to carry out the defense in the sector assigned to the German III Corps--originally the French II Corps area of

<sup>33</sup>Ltr, Seventh Army to COMCENTAG, 10 Oct 57, subj: NORTHAG-CENTAG Boundary (U). NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Admin, Seventh Army ltr file (1957).

<sup>34</sup>Memo for rec, Lt Col J. J. Hennessey, CENTAG Plans Stf, 9 Dec 57, atchd to ltr, Seventh Army to COMCENTAG, 10 Oct 57, cited above. NATO SECRET.

<sup>35</sup>(1) Cable G3 (OPS) 7, COMNORTHAG to COMCENTAG, 13 Dec 57. (2) Cable G3 (OPS) 8, COMNORTHAG to COMCENTAG, 21 Dec 57. Both NATO SECRET.

<sup>36</sup>(1) Ltr, LANDCENT ACoS G3 to CINCENT, 3 Mar 58. 1240/OPT/P/169. In CENTAG Plans Stf, ALFCE ltr file (1958). (2) Ltr, LANDCENT CoS to Min of Def, Bonn, 12 Mar 58. In CENTAG Plans Stf, Ger Corr file (1958). Both NATO SECRET.

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responsibility--which covered part of the most critical area in the Central Zone.<sup>37</sup>

It became known that the German Ministry of Defense was unlikely to agree to the peacetime assignment of an additional German division to the Kassel area. By 1961 five of the twelve assigned German divisions would probably be situated north of the CENTAG/NORTHAG boundary. The other 7 divisions would be distributed as follows: 1 mountain division on the Austrian border; 1 armored division in the Ulm area, a second north of Munich, and a third east of Koblenz; 1 airborne division (LANDCENT reserve) in the Stuttgart area; and 2 infantry divisions in the Giessen and Regensburg areas, respectively.

Agreement to the proposed change in the Army group boundary hinged upon the ability of the Germans to assign an additional division to the German III Corps area, since CENTAG could not enlarge its area of responsibility with the currently available forces. The Germans were having difficulty in finding facilities for billeting and training additional troops. Since the strengthening of German forces in the central sector thus became improbable, no major readjustment in the NORTHAG/CENTAG boundary appeared likely in the near future.<sup>38</sup>

d. Shortages and Deficiencies of German Units. Concerned about the German III Corps' shortage of combat support units, COMCENTAG stated in February 1958 that there was full justification for granting the corps a degree of priority because of its position in the most vital sector of the central region.<sup>39</sup> Many obstacles confronted the Germans in their efforts to attain early combat capability. It was recommended that USAREUR use its special position in the Military Assistance Program to eliminate these deficiencies.<sup>40</sup>

A survey of the strength of German III Corps headquarters and units was made by observers from the Ministry of Finance during Exercise LION BLEU. The commanding general had asked for an increase in the peacetime strength of his headquarters so that the corps could discharge its practice alert and exercise commitments without temporary augmentations, as was currently necessary. The findings of the observer team were not yet known. Similarly, the Ministry of Defense had taken no action to correct shortages and deficiencies in signal equipment that had been uncovered during Exercise LION BLEU.

The German Ministry of Defense apparently did not intend to implement COMCENTAG's suggestion regarding the conversion of portions of anti-aircraft

<sup>37</sup>DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 13 Jul 57, cited above. NATO SECRET.

<sup>38</sup>Ltr, LANDCENT CofS to COMNORTHAG, COMCENTAG, 31 Mar 58. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Stf, ALFCE ltr file (1958).

<sup>39</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 20 Feb 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/58 (Perm).

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 15 Mar 58. SECRET.

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artillery battalions to field artillery battalions. The requirement for antiaircraft artillery seemed to be as great as that for field artillery, and the Germans considered conversion at that time as uneconomical. On 1 May 1958 the German III Corps activated two field artillery battalions with 8-inch howitzers, and the activation of an additional battalion was anticipated for 1 December 1958. These activations provided the German III Corps both with a corps artillery support capability that had hitherto been lacking and with organic atomic delivery means. Even after these activations, however, the 2d Infantry Division artillery was still one battalion short, and the German III Corps planned to organize additional signal, reconnaissance, ordnance, quartermaster, surgical hospital, field hospital, and ambulance units.<sup>41</sup>

In order to press for the highest degree of combat readiness for the German III Corps, COMCENTAG prepared a troop basis that would give the II and III Corps the balanced ground forces they needed to accomplish their assigned missions.<sup>42</sup>

#### 59. Barrier and Denial Plans

a. German Reaction to the CENTAG Draft. The German Ministry of Defense did not concur in the draft that CENTAG had submitted on 27 May 1957 concerning procedures for the control, by army commanders, of the capabilities of German military regions (Wehrbereichskommando) (WBK) for barrier and denial operations. There were several points of difference. With respect to exchange of information on a "need-to-know" basis, the Defense Ministry felt that effective German cooperation would be possible only if the military regions became thoroughly familiar with CENTAG obstacle and demolition plans. Moreover, the military regions would have to act as planning coadvisors and be given an opportunity to make recommendations regarding the degree of denial and the type of obstacles to be used. The Ministry of Defense further believed--in disagreement with CENTAG--that MC 36/14<sup>3</sup> was not suitable for establishing the respective responsibilities of Allied tactical commanders and German military districts or for governing relationships between them.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>DF, CENTAG Plans Stf to CofS, 29 Apr 58. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Plans Stf, Ger Corr file (1958).

<sup>42</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 2 May 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/58 (Perm).

<sup>43</sup>A report by the North Atlantic Military Committee on the division of responsibilities in wartime between the national territorial commanders and the major and subordinate NATO commanders. SECRET.

<sup>44</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 13 Dec 57, subj: Integration of the German Military Districts to Barrier and Denial Operations (U). NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Admin files, OUT Corr (1957), Item 119. (2) Ltr, Ger Fed Min of Def to COMCENTAG, 5 Aug 57, subj: Inserting of German Military District Headquarters into Barrier and Denial Operations of CENTAG. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 3 (1957). For details of the draft plan, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 115. SECRET.

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b. The Agreement. The foregoing differences were resolved at a meeting in September 1957. CENTAG acceded to the German position on exchange of information, and the Germans agreed that MC 36/1 would remain the basis for peacetime planning and wartime execution of barrier and denial operations utilizing the capabilities of the German Military Regions.<sup>45</sup> On 21 December 1957 COMCENTAG approved the policy paper that was drafted after the meeting, and the Ministry of Defense announced mutual agreement on 28 January 1958.<sup>46</sup>

According to the agreement, the key principle in barrier and denial operations would be the establishment of a single command to control such operations in a tactical zone. Planning would be the responsibility of the respective Allied tactical commander, but representatives of the German military regions would participate in the planning and would have the opportunity to make recommendations concerning the type of barriers and the extent of denial. The military regions would be responsible for including provisions for expeditious denial operations in the design of structures of military value. For this purpose they would prepare demolition chambers in highway and rail bridges, airfields, inland waterways--locks, docks, and ports--and ocean ports and docks in accordance with German law and administrative regulations. The military regions would disseminate pertinent information to the interested Allied tactical commanders. They would also be responsible for assuring surveillance and maintenance of existing permanent demolition chambers.

Each military region would appoint an officer, cleared for access to cosmic top secret information, to handle requests for manpower and assistance. At or after OSA the military region's engineer demolition teams would be placed under operational control of the tactical commander of their area to assist in barrier and denial preparations in accordance with operational necessity as determined by the Allied commander. After specific missions were completed, these teams would be released to the control of their respective territorial defense headquarters.

Supplies for Allied barrier and denial structures would be furnished exclusively by the Allied tactical commander concerned and would be retained under his control in accordance with his national logistical

<sup>45</sup>(1) DF, G3 to CofS, 13 Dec 57, cited above. (2) Ltr, Col S. E. Otto, Asst Coord, CENTAG Plans Stf, to Ger Fed Min of Def, n.d., subj: Integration of German Military Districts (Wehrbereichskommando) (WBK) into CENTAG Barrier and Denial Operations (U), w/incl, "CENTAG-MOD Bonn Policy for Integration of German Military Districts (WBK) into CENTAG Barrier and Denial Operations." In USAREUR SGS NATO Nr 3 (1957). (3) Intvw, Capt Sawyer with Lt Col Bare, 4 Mar 58, cited above. All NATO SECRET.

<sup>46</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 13 Feb 58. NATO CONF. In CENTAG Plans Stf, OUT Corr file (1958). (2) Ltr, Ger Fed Min of Def to CENTAG, 28 Jan 58. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Engr Div Plans & Trps Br, 250/18F, Indigenous Support.

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procedures. Existing army- and corps-level demolitions and obstacles programs would be reviewed by army and corps commanders, in conjunction with the military regions, in order to determine those obstacles and demolitions that would affect the tactical battle and therefore would remain completely within the purview of the tactical commanders. Army and corps commanders were to take into account the German desire to utilize obstacles other than demolitions, insofar as would be militarily acceptable to the operational commanders, in order to minimize the destruction of facilities vital to the civilian population. This provision, however, did not imply in any way that the military regions would have access to detailed listings of tactical obstacles and demolitions, which existed only at division or battle group level and were to be used in the performance of the tactical battle.

The military regions were to inform Allied tactical commanders of the manpower and other resources at their disposal available for barrier and denial operations and other engineer missions. The Allied army commanders, in turn, would integrate the capabilities of the military regions into their barrier and denial planning and would utilize them to the maximum extent practicable.<sup>47</sup>

On 14 February 1958 the U.S. Seventh and the French First Armies were authorized to begin planning with appropriate German military regions in an effort to employ the capabilities of the latter in barrier and denial operations.<sup>48</sup> The Seventh Army was to employ unarmed civilian volunteers, hired through regular labor offices, for laying mines in barrier construction; military personnel were to accomplish the arming of the mines.<sup>49</sup>

#### 60. USAREUR Emergency and Alert Planning

a. Capabilities Plans. The command's basic unilateral war plan, USAREUR Capabilities Plan (CP) 1-56 (Basic), had been published in 1956. During FY 1958 this plan, redesignated Operation Plan 301 (Oplan 301), underwent revision in order to provide for the newest weapons' capabilities. USAREUR CP 1-56 (Alternate) provided for two contingencies--the failure of NATO command channels to be activated in the event of war, and the possibility that USAREUR's basic war plan could not be implemented. These concepts--drafted in Oplans 302 and 303 during FY 1958--were also very similar to the plans they replaced. The two new plans were scheduled to be published during the first part of FY 1959.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup>CENTAG-MOD Bonn Policy for Integration of German Military Districts into CENTAG Barrier and Denial Operations. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Engr Div Plans & Trps Br.

<sup>48</sup>Cable SX-1821, CENTAG to U.S. Seventh Army, French First Army, 14 Feb 58. NATO CONF. In file above, 250/18F.

<sup>49</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 29 Apr 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/58 (Perm).

<sup>50</sup>(1) Prog 4A, USAREUR Planning Prog, FY 58. SECRET. (2) Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col W. R. White, G3 Plans & Plcy Br, 23 Sep 58. SECRET.

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b. Emergency Plan 201. In February 1958 CINCUSAREUR approved a major revision of Emergency Plan (EP) 201 that provided for the employment of airborne and supporting units from Western Germany in the Middle East.<sup>51</sup>

When events in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, approached the crisis stage in June 1958, USAREUR authorized a readiness state preparatory to the possible implementation of EP 201.<sup>52</sup>

In June 1958 EP 201 was considered fundamentally sound for supporting possible operations in the Middle East. However, the number of qualified airborne personnel available for such operations was expected to decline by September 1958 because of the 33 months' option that personnel in former gyroscope units could exercise. Battle group personnel would therefore have to waive their redeployment rights--in the event of implementation of EP 201--if Force ALPHA, the first battle contingent of Army Task Force (ATF) 201 scheduled for deployment to the Middle East, was to be deployed at 100 percent strength. According to USAREUR policy, units that had to be maintained at full strength could be deployed at so-called present-for-duty strength, which was not allowed to fall below 85 percent of authorized strength. However, since an acceptable degree of combat effectiveness could be achieved only if certain key specialists were deployed at 100 percent strength, USAREUR requested the Department of the Army to authorize an overstrength that would assure the deployment of ATF 201 at full strength. The 11th Airborne Division was authorized the overstrength within USAREUR's ceilings.<sup>53</sup>

In another step toward implementing EP 201, the area commands were to be instructed that the families of personnel who might be deployed during the readiness period would retain their present quarters and that such personnel would be returned to their former units upon termination of the readiness state. Further, policy directives were to be prepared for extending the oversea tours of personnel whose rotation dates were suspended during the readiness period.<sup>54</sup>

c. Alert Plans. CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321 (Alert Measures), which pertained to all subordinate commands and units, was based upon CINCENT's alert measures and USCINCEUR's Oplan 100-2 and, in turn, supported CENTAG EP 1-57 and USAREUR CP 1-56. Annex M (Alerts) to USAREUR CP 1-56 was replaced on 1 December 1957, when EP 321 became effective for planning

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<sup>51</sup>(1) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 18 Feb 58. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 250/58 (Perm). (2) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 4A, FY 58, 3d Qtr, p. 2. SECRET.

<sup>52</sup>For details, see the top secret supplement to this report. TS (info used SECRET).

<sup>53</sup>DF, G3 to CofS, 23 Jun 58, subj: Result of USAREUR EP 201 Critique (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET.

<sup>54</sup>Memo, G1 to CofS, n.d., subj: Administrative Guidance--EP 201 (U). CONF.

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purposes. The latter would be executed when directed by COMCENTAG/CINC-USAREUR.<sup>55</sup> When USCINCEUR's alert measures became effective on 30 January 1958, the USAREUR Joint Emergency Alert Plan 1-56 (JEAP 1-56) was rescinded, except for Annex I, the USAREUR Consolidated Troop List. This document remained in effect as Annex I to CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321.<sup>56</sup>

During FY 1958 the NATO alert system was reviewed and revised. The SHAPE countersurprise military alert system had been developed because the formal system of simple, reinforced, and general alerts was considered inadequate to cope with a sudden or surprise attack. The countersurprise system--divided into two stages of orange and scarlet alerts--was essentially a military survival plan consisting of troop dispersal and a few preparatory combat-type operations, such as the activation of emergency communications nets.

Furthermore, CINCENT recommended the addition of the so-called military vigilance alert to the SHAPE system. This was, in effect, an early simple alert measure prescribing the attainment of a readiness posture, which was in fact the normal condition prevailing within CENTAG/USAREUR.

Since the Allied Command Europe (ACE) would not be operational during the period when the NATO alert system might be implemented, SACEUR, as a NATO commander, would not be able to order the execution of an alert unless pertinent agreements with each NATO nation were negotiated. While such agreements had been secured for the formal system, discussions concerning the countersurprise and military vigilance systems had only begun at the end of FY 1958.<sup>57</sup>

The participation of West German units in alert planning, and the introduction of the German III Corps to SACEUR's alert system in September 1957,<sup>58</sup> prompted the West German Ministry of Defense to recommend the simplification of the NATO alert system in a manner similar to that proposed by COMCENTAG/CINCUSAREUR. Specifically, the Ministry of Defense suggested that military vigilance be combined with the simple alert and that the orange and scarlet alerts be consolidated into one reinforced alert measure.<sup>59</sup>

CENTAG representatives carried these recommendations to the AFCENT Procedures Planning Conference in Fontainebleau in June 1958. The conferees were to discuss proposed revisions to the CINCENT Alert Measures

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<sup>55</sup>(1) Ltr, Asst CENTAG AG to COMCENTAG, 3 Sep 57, subj: CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321 (U), atchd to CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321. COSMIC TS (info used CONF). In G3 TS Con, CAG Cos 3165. (2) Cable SC-47961, USAREUR to subor comds, 26 Sep 57. SECRET.

<sup>56</sup>Cable SX-1468, USAREUR to DA, et al., 27 Jan 58. SECRET.

<sup>57</sup>Memo, USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br to Maj Gen T. L. Sherburne, ACoF S G3, 7 Jun 58, subj: Scarlet Alerts. SECRET. In G3 Plans & Plcy Br.

<sup>58</sup>Hist Rept, Ger III Corps, 1 Aug-31 Dec 57, cited above, p. 3. SECRET.

<sup>59</sup>Memo, Plans & Plcy Br, 7 Jun 58, cited above.

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Book, which were to be based on SACEUR's countersurprise alert system and the principle of military vigilance. The CENTAG representatives indicated that military vigilance could be included as a simple alert measure without affecting the normal readiness posture of CENTAG/USAREUR. Since this proposal and the idea of combining the orange and scarlet alerts were opposed by SACEUR and CINCENT, the CENTAG delegation attempted to reduce the number of measures constituting the countersurprise and military vigilance systems.

Thus, pending approval by the NATO powers, SACEUR was authorized to call the orange and scarlet alerts within ACE, and CINCENT was to execute these alerts in his area of responsibility. The latter proposed delegating this authority down to tactical air command, division, and group levels through army group and tactical air force commanders. However, the CENTAG representatives continued to press for retention of this authority at the army group and tactical air force level. Despite SHAPE's earlier rejection of the CENTAG position, the issue was expected to be raised again at SHAPE headquarters.<sup>60</sup>

The CENTAG delegation also opposed an AFCENT orange alert measure that would initiate the movement of the Northern Task Force (NORTAF) to the NORTHAG sector and would deploy certain atomic units to alternate operational sites, since the decision to execute these movements was the prerogative of CINCUSAREUR/COMCENTAG. Furthermore, adequate arrangements for taking such actions had been included in existing NORTHAG-CENTAG agreements.

CENTAG representatives also objected to the scarlet alert deployment of all atomic units to their operational sites before other ground forces were ordered to move to their positions, an action that would leave the atomic units unprotected. The representatives further recommended deletion of an orange alert measure providing for "movement of engineer units to the vicinity of their working locations and preparation of demolitions and minefields in the forward area of the combat zone," and the substitution of a measure to read: "Prepare for the installation of demolitions and minefields for use in the forward area of the combat zone." Furthermore, both CENTAG and NORTHAG representatives suggested that the proposed orange alert measure to evacuate families on the order of the respective government authority be rescinded, because each nation reserved the right to implement such procedures.

Despite the existing differences of opinion on the countersurprise and military vigilance systems, SACEUR and CINCENT agreed that COMCENTAG be given authority to call practice CENTAG alerts with the full participation of French and German forces. The granting of such authority was dependent upon the conclusion of an agreement between SHAPE headquarters and the French and West German Governments, however.

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid. See also, USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 120-21.  
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By the end of FY 1958 the draft of the CINCENT alert measures was being revised preparatory to submission to the army groups and tactical air forces for comment.<sup>61</sup>

d. Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) Planning. The revised NEO plan (USAREUR EP 312) developed in FY 1957<sup>62</sup> became effective 15 August 1957.<sup>63</sup> The plan incorporated the so-called free flow principle, rather than the formal march unit, during the early stages of the evacuation process. Seventh Army was responsible for U.S. noncombatant movement and control on most of the evacuation routes--E-5 through E-60--until USACOMZEUR could assume this function along the line of its forward service areas. Exact points of transfer were to be determined by Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR. On specific evacuation routes--E-70, E-80, and E-80A--in the French area of responsibility Seventh Army was to assist the French commander in executing NEO duties. Personnel from area command and military service units who were required in the Seventh Army area for NEO operations were to become available to USACOMZEUR after completing their NEO assignments. Those who were not needed by Seventh Army, would be made available to USACOMZEUR at the announcement of NEO.<sup>64</sup>

In September 1957 Seventh Army tested the new evacuation procedures in Exercise ROAD BOUND IV, which was the alert phase of Exercise COUNTER PUNCH. Observer teams followed the evacuation operations from several housing areas in West Germany to the staging areas in western France. Insufficient coordination was accomplished before the exercise began, so that traffic- and movement-control operations as well as activities in the service areas were adversely affected.<sup>65</sup> In addition, the exercise demonstrated the need for official West German cooperation if the NEO plans were to be successfully executed.<sup>66</sup> The West German Government was fully aware of the importance of its role in the execution of Allied evacuation plans but was naturally concerned about the implications for German nationals. When the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, which was negotiating various aspects of NEO with West German Government agencies, sought permission for U.S. military commanders to deal directly with local German police agencies on the preparation for a possible evacuation of U.S. non-combatants, the Ministry of Defense clarified its position. According

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<sup>61</sup>(1) Memo, Plans & Plcy Br, 7 Jun 58, cited above. (2) Memo for rec, Col K. Conner, Plans & Plcy Br, 10 Jul 58. NATO SECRET. In Plans & Plcy Br Emerg Plans Sec.

<sup>62</sup>For details of the plan, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 124-26. SECRET.

<sup>63</sup>Cable SX-5200, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, CINCNELM, et al., 14 Aug 57. SECRET.

<sup>64</sup>Cable SX-4653, USAREUR to subor comds, Wiesbaden Area Comd, 18 Jul 57. SECRET.

<sup>65</sup>USAREUR Memo 1-20-22, 8 Oct 57, subj: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference Notes. CONF.

<sup>66</sup>Cable ~~SX-6225~~ USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 3 Oct 57. SECRET.

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to the Germans, the evacuation of Allied noncombatants from the combat zone was a SACEUR alert function and, as such, became a responsibility of NATO commanders. Since the Allied commanders were required to act through or with the appropriate national territorial commanders, it was necessary to clarify the general military requirements of NEO with the Ministry of Defense and the specific details of the plans with the German military regions. In order to avoid large-scale refugee movements of the German populace through precipitate evacuation of Allied dependents, coordination of the forces' intentions with German plans was necessary. Although the Germans were willing to assist in the evacuation of Allied noncombatants, the amount of military aid had to be proportionate to the efforts of the German authorities to assist their own countrymen.<sup>67</sup>

By the end of FY 1958 these and other noncombatant evacuation problems were still being negotiated with West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and France.<sup>68</sup> Pending successful conclusion of the negotiations with the Swiss Government, USAREUR's NEO plans were expected to be sufficiently flexible to permit either the formation of march groupings before crossing the Swiss border or the diversion of noncombatants scheduled for Switzerland to France if necessary.<sup>69</sup>

After USASETAF became one of his major commands in January 1958, CINCUSAREUR assumed over-all responsibility for evacuating those noncombatants in Italy who were subject to his authority.<sup>70</sup>

e. Emergency Organization and Movement of USAREUR Headquarters. Although Headquarters USAREUR/CENTAG Emergency Evacuation Order (EEO) 1-56<sup>71</sup> specified that all alert groups begin their movement to wartime sites at the order for reinforced alert (ORA), there was no provision for an operational group to remain at Campbell Barracks until CINCUSAREUR opened the CENTAG forward headquarters. Consequently, to assure operational continuity during all alert stages, the addition of a G2-G3 war-room group, to be designated Alert Group W, became necessary. This group would be composed of 12 officers and 12 enlisted men. G3 personnel would man the operations and weapons sections, and G2, the war-room section; the special-weapons targeting section would be manned jointly. The group would become operational upon CINCUSAREUR's order; upon the announcement of OSA, ORA, or GAO; or upon the initiation of USAREUR practice alerts. The crews would report to the war room and would remain on duty until the CENTAG forward headquarters became operational and/or until they were relieved

<sup>67</sup>Ltr, Col H. Reidel, Ger Ln Off at USAREUR Hq, to Gen Hodes, 11 Jan 58. SECRET. In SGS 250/H5 NEO.

<sup>68</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Prog 4A, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 02. SECRET.

<sup>69</sup>Cable SX-4653, 18 Jul 57, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>70</sup>(1) Cable SX-2258, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Mar 58. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-3-1633, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>71</sup>See USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 129-30. SECRET.

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by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, after which they were to proceed to the CENTAG main headquarters.<sup>72</sup> By the end of 1957 the war-room group was established.<sup>73</sup>

61. Major Changes in U.S. Forces

a. Plans for the Indigenization of USASETAF. In September 1957 a recent Department of the Army proposal to "indigenize" USASETAF--to replace U.S. troops in that command with Italians--was under USCINCEUR consideration. Since USASETAF was to maintain a high state of readiness, only unit-for-unit replacements could be envisaged, and then only after the U.S. forces had fully trained the Italian units to assume their responsibilities.<sup>74</sup> USAREUR concurred in these views and commented that the unit replacement plan would probably be cheaper for the United States and was likely to be more acceptable to the Italian Government.<sup>75</sup> The Department of the Army was informed accordingly, with the recommendation that the unit replacement plan be presented to the Italian Government as a symbol of U.S. recognition of Italy's "natural aspiration" to play a major role in its own defense.<sup>76</sup>

When approached in October 1957, however, U.S. Ambassador Zellerbach pointed to the possible political repercussions on the forthcoming Italian elections and recommended that no discussion of the indigenization plan be conducted before the spring of 1958. While the Defense Department agreed to this delay in negotiations, U.S. planners were directed to proceed with the indigenization scheme, exercising extreme caution to prevent and disclosure of information.<sup>77</sup>

From the USAREUR point of view, indigenization was virtually a necessity. As early as July 1957, when the Department of the Army first proposed subordinating USASETAF to USAREUR, it was pointed out that if balanced forces were to be maintained in Europe, USAREUR's programmed manpower ceiling would have to be raised to provide for USASETAF and any

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<sup>72</sup>DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 16 Nov 57, subj: Revision of USAREUR/CENTAG EEO 1-56. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1957).

<sup>73</sup>Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col J. F. Stevens, G3 Ops Br, 24 Sep 58. SECRET.

<sup>74</sup>Cable EC-9-5161, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, SETAF, 16 Sep 57. SECRET NOFORN.

<sup>75</sup>Cable SX-6503, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 20 Sep 57. SECRET NOFORN.

<sup>76</sup>Ltr, USEUCOM J3 to DCSOPS, 30 Sep 57, subj: Indigenization of Southern European Task Force (S). SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br War Plans Sec.

<sup>77</sup>Cable EC-9-5710, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Oct 57. SECRET.

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other additional responsibilities.<sup>78</sup> When USASETAF was assigned to USAREUR on 1 January 1958, both its funding and manpower authorizations became a part of the over-all USAREUR authorizations.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the USAREUR troop program required a reduction of some 1,900 spaces in U.S. military personnel by the end of FY 1959, which was to be achieved by the USASETAF indigenization program.<sup>80</sup> SACEUR also stated that the combat potential of Army forces in Germany could be maintained only if manpower reductions in Europe were effected through indigenization.<sup>81</sup> Although USAREUR and USASETAF planned appropriate action to comply with the Department of the Army's program for space reductions, the Department of State was still reluctant to initiate early negotiations with the Italian Government for the substitution of Italian for U.S. units. While negotiations were expected to start in September 1958, USAREUR doubted that any effective indigenization could be accomplished during FY 1959 on the basis of such a late start. However, meeting the FY 1959 troop program would result in unacceptable operational deficiencies if Italian troops did not replace the U.S. personnel. This view was submitted to the Department of the Army in May 1958 together with requests that the indigenization plan be dropped temporarily and that the USAREUR FY 1959 troop program be raised accordingly.<sup>82</sup> No decision was reached before the end of FY 1958.<sup>83</sup>

b. Divisional Reorganization and Changes in Forces. In continuation of the program that had begun in FY 1957,<sup>84</sup> the 10th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions were reorganized under the pentomic concept, effective 1 July 1957; the reorganization of the 8th Infantry Division followed on 1 August, and that of the 3d Armored Division on 1 October.<sup>85</sup> The 2d Armored Division was replaced by the 4th Armored Division in a gyroscope operation that took place in December 1957-January 1958, and the 10th Infantry Division was similarly replaced by the 3d Infantry Division during the period March-May 1958; the incoming units were reorganized in the United States before coming overseas.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>78</sup>Cable 031240Z, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 3 Jul 57. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAREUR (1957).

<sup>79</sup>(1) Cable DA-934214, DA from Compt-B-B to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Dec 57.  
(2) Cable DA-934483, DA from DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Dec 57. Both CONF.

<sup>80</sup>DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 7 May 58, subj: SETAF (U). AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

<sup>81</sup>Ltr, Gen L. Norstad, SACEUR, to Gen Hodes, 28 Mar 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5 SETAF.

<sup>82</sup>(1) DF, G3 to CofS, 7 May 58, cited above. (2) Cable SX-3696, USAREUR to DA, 10 May 58. Both SECRET.

<sup>83</sup>Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. F. Cathrae, G3 Plans & Plcy Br, 7 Oct 58. SECRET.

<sup>84</sup>For details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 135. SECRET.

<sup>85</sup>USAREUR GO's 125, 126, & 127, 23 May 57; 241, 13 Sep 57. All CONF.

<sup>86</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Capt K. M. Kone, G3 Org & Eqp Br, 9 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

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Under the new organization the infantry divisions were reduced by one 155-mm and two 105-mm howitzer battalions. Offsetting this, one composite unit--consisting of one 8-inch howitzer, one Honest John rocket, and two 155-mm howitzer batteries--was added. While the infantry divisions also lost their regimental tank companies, the former reconnaissance company was replaced by an armored cavalry battalion.

Each division, infantry and armored alike, lost one antiaircraft artillery (automatic weapons) battalion. These battalions had actually been withdrawn from the divisions in FY 1957 in preparation for the reorganizations that took place in FY 1958; they were retained as nondivisional artillery battalions.

In the reorganization the armored divisions gained 261 personnel spaces. While the over-all infantry division strength was reduced by approximately 3,400, the frontline infantry elements were increased by about 450 men. The spaces recovered in the strength reductions were used toward meeting troop ceiling reductions and for new requirements within the command, to include the establishment of one Redstone missile group and the augmentation of advanced weapons logistical support units.<sup>87</sup>

In addition to the divisional reorganizations, six 90-mm antiaircraft artillery battalions were reorganized as Nike missile battalions--two each on 8 October, 1 November, and 5 December 1957. USAREUR's four Honest John rocket batteries were reorganized into battalions, effective 1 July 1957. On the other hand, one antiaircraft artillery (automatic weapons) and three 75-mm antiaircraft artillery (Skysweeper) battalions were inactivated; reorganizations and inactivations resulted in a net loss of two field artillery battalions during the fiscal year.<sup>88</sup>

c. Plans to Relocate the 10th Special Forces Group. According to guidance received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCEUR directed in July 1957 that the 10th Special Forces Group would have to maintain its capability for D-day commitment. When that matter had been brought up before, USEUCOM and USAREUR had asserted that the group would have to be relocated from Bad Toelz, Germany, farther to the rear. Moreover, the group depended on an airdrop for implementing its wartime mission, which in turn required immediately available air staging facilities. Potential locations in both the United Kingdom and France were surveyed for this purpose.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col R. L. Whitt, G3 Org & Eqp Br, 9 Oct 58. CONF.

<sup>88</sup> Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Capt Kone and Lt Col Whitt, cited above. CONF.

<sup>89</sup> Memo, USAREUR G3 to Dep CinC, 29 Jul 57, subj: Relocation of the 10th Special Forces Group (S). SECRET. In G3 Plans & Plcy Br War Plans Sec. The survey activity had begun in March 1957 and was carried over into FY 1958.

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However, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, opposed a transfer to the United Kingdom; he suggested that, if a move was made at all, the 10th Special Forces should be located near a U.S. airfield on the Continent where Air Force planes committed to support the group could be based. Moreover, since Air Force capabilities and intentions were not yet clearly established, he favored maintaining the status quo at least temporarily.<sup>90</sup>

Nevertheless, by December 1957 CINCUSAREUR had established the relocation of the 10th Special Forces Group as one of the major objectives to be accomplished during the second half of FY 1958.<sup>91</sup> Thinking centered on southern France or northern Italy for the new station of the group, and in March representatives of USEUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, the Support Operations Task Force, Europe, and the 10th Special Forces Group surveyed potential sites in the Bordeaux area in France and the Leghorn-Pisa area in Italy. The unanimous decision of the survey group was that Camp Darby, between Leghorn and Pisa, would be the best possible location for the 10th Special Forces.<sup>92</sup> Among the considerations leading to this decision were the favorable operational features of the location, the lower costs that would be involved in establishing a site there, and the availability of adequate dependent housing. The next steps were to obtain the authorization for the move, to initiate negotiations for entry rights into Italy, and to request \$200,000 for construction projects to provide the required facilities.<sup>93</sup>

In effect, the move was approved when the Department of the Army announced in June 1958 that negotiations with the Italian Government were being initiated to obtain entry rights for the 10th Special Forces Group.<sup>94</sup>

d. Transfer of the Rhine River Patrol Responsibilities. Toward the end of FY 1957 CINCNELM had indicated a desire to withdraw U.S. Naval personnel from the Rhine River; since the Rhine River Patrol's lift capability was essential to USAREUR's operational plans, however, the funds, personnel authorizations, and craft would have to be made available to Seventh Army.

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<sup>90</sup>Cable 5201, Seventh Army sgd Taylor to DA for Eddleman, 16 Aug 57. SECRET.

<sup>91</sup>Memo, C/G3 Plans & Plcy Br to ACoS G3, 9 May 58, subj: Objectives for FY 1959. SECRET. In Plans & Plcy Br 250/H5 (Movement of 10th Special Forces).

<sup>92</sup>Memo, Lt Col D. W. Osgood, USAREUR G3 War Plans Br, to ACoS G3, 1 Apr 58, subj: Trip Report. AEAGC-PL. SECRET.

<sup>93</sup>(1) Memo, C/G3 Plans & Plcy Br to ACoS G3, 9 May 58, cited above. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 3 Jun 58. In USAREUR SGS 250/56 (Perm). Both SECRET. (3) DF, USAREUR G4 to CofS, 2 Jul 58, subj: Relocation of the 10th Special Forces at Camp Darby, SETAF. AEAGD-I 285/H5.3 GD. CONF.

<sup>94</sup>Cable DA-943479, DA from DCSOPS to USCINCEUR, 18 Jun 58. SECRET.

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The only other alternative would be for West German military units to assume the patrol and lift functions.<sup>95</sup> In August 1957 the Chief of Naval Operations directed that CINCNELM phase out the patrol functions proper by 1 February 1958; the 21 patrol craft in use were to be declared excess to the Navy's needs and turned over to the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the entire Rhine River Patrol would be disestablished effective 30 June 1958, and the remaining lift craft would be turned over to USAREUR if the Department of the Army so desired.<sup>96</sup>

In September 1957 USAREUR began informal discussions with the German Ministry of Defense, which had indicated its willingness to accept the mission of the patrol. Simultaneously, Seventh Army was to determine the type of interim organization that would be required to support the phased transfer of responsibilities from the U.S. Navy to West German military units. The plan was to turn over the patrol function to the German Army by 1 February 1958, the lift operation by 1 July 1958, and the control element as soon as the Germans could fully support USAREUR emergency plans--presumably by the end of FY 1959.<sup>97</sup>

Planning and negotiations continued apace, with close coordination being maintained between USAREUR, Seventh Army, CINCNELM, the Rhine River Patrol, and, of course, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>98</sup> USAREUR's proposals were accepted by the Ministry of Defense, and on 1 February 1958 the patrolling function--together with 21 patrol craft--was turned over by the U.S. Navy to the German 791st Engineer River Company under the operational control of the Rhine River Patrol until the Patrol's disestablishment on 30 June.<sup>99</sup> Continuing discussions during February and March 1958 revealed that the German engineer company would be able to assume only part of the lift function, since it lacked sufficient strength to fully support Seventh Army's requirements. Urgent appeals were made to the Ministry of Defense to insure that loss of

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<sup>95</sup> USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 133. SECRET.

<sup>96</sup> Cable 211833Z, CNO to CINCNELM, 21 Aug 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Navy (1957).

<sup>97</sup> Summary Sheet for use by CinC during visit to DA, 2 Oct 57, subj: Disestablishment of Rhine River Patrol as Naval Activity. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1957).

<sup>98</sup> Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, n.d. [Dec 57], subj: Command Relationship and Responsibilities During Phase-Out of Rhine River Patrol (RRPAT) Function by the United States Navy (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Navy (1957).

<sup>99</sup> (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 11 Feb 58, subj: Responsibilities of Seventh U.S. Army During Phase-Out of U.S. Navy Rhine River Patrol (RRPAT) (U). AEAGC-OP 250/16 GC. SECRET. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. F. Stephens, G3 Ops Br, 7 Oct 58. UNCLAS.

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effectiveness would be minimized.<sup>100</sup>

At the same time, a chain of command was developed and agreed upon by USAREUR and the Ministry of Defense. In peacetime the 791st Engineer River Company would operate under the control of the IV German Military District (WBK IV), which would coordinate with the U.S. Seventh Army on all matters pertaining to exercises, alerts, and communications checks. In wartime--after OSA, ORA, or GAO--the German company would come under the direct operational control of Seventh Army for all matters pertaining to that Army's lines of communications across the Rhine. The Seventh Army was directed to establish and maintain liaison with WBK IV, effective 30 June 1958.<sup>101</sup>

By the end of May the German engineer company had been brought up to full strength, although the degree of training achieved indicated that full operational readiness equivalent to that of the Rhine River Patrol would not be attained by 30 June.<sup>102</sup> Nevertheless, on 30 June 1958 the 791st Engineer Company assumed responsibility for the lift mission of the former Rhine River Patrol; 16 medium landing craft (LCMRR), 1 flying ferry at Schierstein, 1 houseboat at Mannheim, and the 3 Rhine River bases at Karlsruhe, Mannheim, and Schierstein were turned over to the German unit. The remaining equipment--consisting of 4 British LCM's, 2 dollar-procured LCT's, and 6 tugs, which the Germans did not want--was disposed of by the U.S. Navy.<sup>103</sup>

e. Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Organizations. With the pentomic reorganization of the combat divisions completed, the problem of furnishing these divisions with organic combat surveillance and target acquisition units came under consideration in December 1957. Equipped with special electronic devices, such units would acquire targets for missiles and conventional artillery and provide surveillance of the battlefield so as to give timely warning of major enemy concentrations. Despite the obvious need for such units, USAREUR had neither the trained personnel nor the proper equipment.

However, since Continental Army Command (CONARC) plans called for training and equipping such a unit at the Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, USAREUR requested that the unit, with its equipment, be assigned to Europe as soon as possible. As a minimum, night and

<sup>100</sup>(1) Ltr, von Hobe, Ger Fed Min of Def, to USAREUR ACoS G3, 5 Mar 58. NATO CONF. In SGS 250/H5 NATO. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 15 Mar 58, SECRET (info used CONF); 24 Apr 58, CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>101</sup>Ltr, USAREUR CofS to CG Seventh Army, 13 May 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5 CAG Operations (1 yr).

<sup>102</sup>Ltr, Gen Heusinger to CINCUSAREUR, 28 May 58. NATO CONF. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5 NATO.

<sup>103</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Stephens, cited above. OFLUSE.

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day photographic systems, airborne side-looking radar, tracking radar, and short- and long-range ground radar should be provided. In addition to fulfilling an operational need, the assignment of the unit to Europe would permit extended field testing of equipment and the development of operating procedures.<sup>104</sup>

When the Department of the Army indicated that no surveillance unit would become available before 1961, CINCUSAREUR reemphasized that operational needs of the Seventh Army called for at least an interim solution to the problem; even prototype or nonstandard items of equipment in the field-test stage would be gladly accepted and put through thorough tests by Seventh Army units. Seventh Army had been provided a limited surveillance capability with locally available resources, but equipment was still needed.<sup>105</sup>

The Department of the Army replied that the side-looking radar equipment was not available, but that "crash" basis procurement had been initiated. The equipment would be delivered to USAREUR during the third quarter of FY 1959. In the meantime, a cadre of USAREUR personnel--6 officers and 80 enlisted men--could be sent to Fort Huachuca to be trained in the use of side-looking radar equipment. Certain other items of both standard and nonstandard equipment--including a drone photographic reconnaissance system--could be provided if so desired. Although these items would not meet USAREUR's full requirements and were not expected to perform with complete effectiveness, their use in the field would contribute to the development of better equipment and methods. General Hodes was pleased to accept this offer.<sup>106</sup>

Pending the arrival of equipment the U.S. Army Surveillance Unit, Europe, was established, with the following missions: First, to give USAREUR target acquisition capability; second, to train personnel within the theater in surveillance techniques and in the use of available equipment; third, to provide a focal point for manufacturers' technical representatives who were assisting USAREUR in the maintenance and operation of prototype equipment; and fourth, to perform field tests of prototype equipment as requested by CONARC and the Department of the Army.

The unit's table of allowances was submitted for departmental approval in June 1958.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to CofSA, 2 Dec 57. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1957).

<sup>105</sup>(1) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Maj Gen J. D. O'Connel, CSigO, 17 Feb 58. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 19 Feb 58, subj: Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition. AEASC AC-1 176/10 SC. Both CONF. Both in USAREUR SGS 250/H5.

<sup>106</sup>1st Ind, DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Mar 58, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 19 Feb 58, cited above, w/pencilled cmts of CINCUSAREUR. CONF. In file above.

<sup>107</sup>Tab B, draft ltr, to cmt 3, USAREUR Sig Off to SGS, n.d. [Aug 58], no subj. AEASC-SO. CONF.

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62. National Planning for the Use of Surface-to-Surface Missiles

In an effort to increase the efficiency of special-weapons units, CINCUSAREUR directed on 18 July 1957 that personnel of ordnance special-weapons support battalions, Corporal guided-missile battalions, and separate Honest John batteries be relieved from assignment to nonmission-type duties and functions. Furthermore, atomic artillery and ordnance support units were to maintain sufficient overstrength to assure 100 percent capability at all times.<sup>108</sup>

a. Requirement for a 500-Mile Missile. After reviewing the SHAPE study prescribing the minimum forces required for Allied Command Europe for the period 1958-63, CINCUSAREUR was of the opinion that countermeasures to the Soviet missile threat were inadequate. It was not unlikely that during the time frame of the study the Soviets would be capable of seriously damaging the Allied airbase structure through the use of ballistic missiles. The shield forces were woefully short of air support for the interdiction effort in the early phases of hostilities, and there was no improvement in sight. The Redstone missile could be expected to provide some relief, but, because of stationing problems and the depth necessary for safe positioning, that missile would not be able to reach vital targets that had to be covered. For example, the first Redstone unit was to be positioned in the vicinity of Bad Kreuznach; from there, even at its maximum range of 175 miles, it could not reach within 100 miles of the Oder-Neisse Line at its closest point.

Available information indicated that the Redstone missile could be modified readily to increase its range to approximately 500 miles and could be made available to Europe in the latter part of 1959. Therefore, CINCUSAREUR requested that the improved, 500-mile-range Redstone be made available to his command at the earliest practicable date.<sup>109</sup>

b. Mission for Redstone Missiles. The basic mission of Redstone missile units was to provide general support and to reinforce the atomic fires of the field armies. Usually the fixed-type interdiction targets within the range capability of the Redstone could be attacked with a smaller yield weapon than the 350-kiloton (KT) warhead that was then available for the Redstone. Such targets would be rail marshalling yards, highway and rail bridges, and airfields in Soviet Satellite countries, most of which were near major urban areas where the radioactive fallout of large-yield weapons could result in extensive civilian casualties. The smaller yield weapons would be capable of producing the desired degree of military damage without excessive "overkilling" of the target and without inflicting undue civilian casualties and damage. For this reason, smaller yield weapons--20-60 KT's--were programmed for use against these targets. An accurate

<sup>108</sup>(1) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 18 Jul 57. In SGS 250/57. (2) Cable SX-7769, USAREUR to Seventh Army, USACOMZEUR, 21 Dec 57. Both SECRET.

<sup>109</sup>Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 17 Dec 57, subj: USAREUR Requirement for a 500-mile Missile (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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delivery means would be needed so that a hit would cause cratering or destruction with a maximum degree of radioactive contamination in the target area and a long delay in repair activities.

The number of division-size assembly areas was expected to be greater during the early phases of hostilities, when they would be most vulnerable to atomic attack. The most profitable target for the Redstone missile appeared to be the division assembling in a rear area. While the entire division would not be destroyed, a well placed round would cause such damage that the division would be incapable of effective combat action. Therefore, on 6 May 1958, the USAREUR Chief of Staff approved the recommendation that the employment of the first Redstone group be limited initially to attacking troop-type targets of opportunity and that CENTAG atomic plans be revised accordingly.<sup>110</sup>

c. Deployment of the 40th Missile Group, Heavy (Redstone). At the beginning of FY 1958 the 40th Field Artillery Group was being reorganized in the United States to provide the headquarters of the 40th Missile Group, Heavy. The 217th Field Artillery Missile Battalion, the 630th Ordnance Company, and the 580th Engineer Company, assembled at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, to complete their training, were the operational elements of the group. The initial move to Europe was to be accomplished--less 1 firing unit and supporting engineer and ordnance elements--in April 1958, with the balance of the group arriving 2 or 3 months later. The second and third heavy missile groups were programmed to arrive in Europe 12 and 18 months later, respectively.<sup>111</sup>

In December 1957 the readiness date of the first echelon of the main body of the 40th Missile Group was established as 18 June 1958. The group was to be stationed in two areas: Bad Kreuznach and Wachenheim. Existing facilities were to be utilized and rehabilitated where possible and new ones constructed, where required, by 1 July 1958.<sup>112</sup>

The group arrived at St. Nazaire, France, on 26 June 1958 and began the road march across France to its home stations in Germany before the end of the reporting period.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup>DF, G3 to CofS, 6 May 58, subj: Employment of the Redstone Missile Group (S), w/Incl, Stf Study, 30 Apr 58, same subj, and cmt 2, SGS to G3, same date. SECRET NOFORN. In SGS 250/H5 Special Weapons.

<sup>111</sup>Memo for rec, C/G3 Wpns Br, 29 Jul 57. SECRET. In SGS 471.6 (1957).

<sup>112</sup>(1) Cable DA-934264, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Dec 57. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 15 Mar 58. In USAREUR SGS 250/58. (3) Cable SX-7242, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 23 Nov 57. All SECRET.

<sup>113</sup>Incl 6, to cmt 2, G3 to Hist Div, 21 Nov 58, to DF, Hist Div to G3, 5 Nov 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAHI 250/54 HI. SECRET.

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63. NATO Special Weapons Planning

a. SACEUR's Atomic Policy. At the end of FY 1957 the question of over-all control of the expenditure of atomic weapons in the CENTAG/FOURATAF interdiction plans had remained unresolved.<sup>114</sup> A solution was found when CINCENT decided to divide the area into two equal parts, assigning one-half to COMFOURATAF and the other to COMCENTAG as releasing commanders. This and other important matters were incorporated into the new atomic strike plan published on 30 May 1958.<sup>115</sup>

b. CENTAG Planning. Planning for the atomic support of non-U.S. NATO forces concerned the immediate problem of giving the Northern Army Group special weapons assistance, the long-range problem of supplying delivery systems to non-U.S. NATO forces, and the related problem of providing and safeguarding a NATO atomic stockpile.

(1) Special Weapons Assistance to NORTHAG. During FY 1957 USAREUR had been asked to furnish atomic support to NORTHAG. The First Provisional Artillery Task Force, consisting of two 280-mm gun battalions, two Corporal missile battalions, and two Honest John rocket battalions as well as the necessary logistical support units, had been formed for this purpose in January 1957. In the event of an emergency, and when ordered by CINCUSAREUR, the task force was to deploy to wartime sites in the NORTHAG area. Because there were obvious disadvantages to a long lateral displacement of atomic units at the outset of hostilities, as envisioned in the plan, NORTHAG had proposed that the task force be stationed in its area permanently. In May 1957 USCINCEUR had approved this plan in principle so that USAREUR/CENTAG could proceed with studies of the feasibility of permanently stationing the force closer to its potential wartime sites of employment.<sup>116</sup>

The initial cost of the redeployment--including rehabilitation of facilities, new construction, and equipment--was estimated at \$2,135,000. In addition, an estimated \$1,513,000 would be needed for utilities and services and for wages of U.S. and LWR civilians. USAREUR suggested that the cost of restationing, except for the initial expenditures of \$280,700 for equipment and \$318,000 for annual support, should be borne by the beneficiaries or paid from infrastructure funds,<sup>117</sup> since in wartime the task force would support not only the British but also other NATO Allies.

<sup>114</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 144-45. SECRET.

<sup>115</sup>Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. C. Wood, CENTAG Plans Stf, 9 Oct 58. SECRET. For further details, see the top secret supplement to this report.

<sup>116</sup>For additional background information, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 148-49. SECRET.

<sup>117</sup>Funds used primarily for initial construction of fixed operational facilities such as airfields, pipelines, etc., to be jointly utilized by three or more nations. UNCLAS.

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On 7 November 1957 USCINCEUR approved the peacetime deployment of the task force to NORTHAG, subject to the availability of funds. One month later, however, USCINCEUR indicated that the force could not qualify for infrastructure funds; the plan for its permanent peacetime deployment was therefore suspended.<sup>118</sup>

Meanwhile, in November, the First Provisional Artillery Task Force had been redesignated as the Northern Task Force (NORTAF). In December representatives of the two army-group headquarters met to consider the feasibility of stationing a reduced artillery task force, to consist of one 280-mm gun battalion and one Honest John rocket battalion, as well as appropriate administrative and logistical support elements in the NORTHAG area, but funds to cover the restationing and maintenance of even this reduced force were not readily available. On 18 April 1958 USAREUR notified the British that U.S. funds were not available and that there was no requirement for the future retention of casern space for the 2-battalion force.<sup>119</sup>

On 28 February 1958 USAREUR forwarded to NORTHAG two copies of a proposed combined agreement for employment of NORTAF. When approved by NORTHAG, this agreement was to replace the one then in effect between NORTHAG and U.S. Seventh Army. However, NORTHAG objected to some of the stipulations.

NORTAF's command relationships, responsibilities, and channels of communications with the several headquarters concerned with its peacetime support were to be as follows: When directed by higher headquarters, CINC-USAREUR would issue instructions for moving the task force, which would be relieved of assignment to Seventh Army only upon his direct order; when the force was deployed in the NORTHAG area, USACOMZEUR would continue to provide logistical, administrative, and special-weapons support, including the post D-day resupply of atomic weapons.<sup>120</sup>

(2) Supplying Delivery Systems to Non-U.S. NATO Forces. After SACEUR had determined the delivery systems that each NATO member would accept, the Department of the Army assumed the necessary supply responsibility. A study published by SHAPE headquarters in October 1957 specified the minimum forces required for Allied Command Europe for the period 1958-1963. Based on this study, MAP equipment for 3 Corporal missile battalions

<sup>118</sup>(1) Summary Sheet for use by CinC, 2 Oct 57, cited above. SECRET.  
(2) Cable EC-9-6123, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 57. SECRET. (3) Ltr, USEUCOM J3 to USAREUR, 9 Dec 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1957).

<sup>119</sup>(1) Intvw, Capt Sawyer with Lt Col J. C. Hansen, USAREUR G3 Ops Br, 4 Mar 58. NATO SECRET. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 18 Apr 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/58.

<sup>120</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 21 May 58. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 250/58. For further information, see the top secret supplement to this report.

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of 2 launchers each--assigned to Germany, France, and Italy, respectively--and 1 LaCrosse battalion of 4 launchers, assigned to Germany, was to be allocated during FY 1958. For the following year 1 Redstone, 2 Little John, 2 LaCrosse, and 5 Corporal battalions were programmed. Equipment programmed for FY 1958 would be operational by 31 December 1959, and the FY 1959 equipment one year later.<sup>121</sup>

When the stationing of NATO atomic delivery units was discussed in April 1958 at a LANDCENT conference attended by USAREUR representatives, the conferees agreed that the stationing of U.S. units outside the Seventh Army area was impractical and that NORTAF should be reduced to 1 Corporal and 2 Honest John battalions as the NORTHAG delivery units became operational in the mid-1964 structure. In addition to the units previously scheduled for the mid-1964 structure, LANDCENT was to initiate action to secure 1 German Corporal unit, 1 German Redstone unit, and 2 Honest John battalions that would be furnished by other national components of NORTHAG. COMCENTAG was of the opinion that the German Redstone unit should be issued the equipment scheduled for the third U.S. Redstone unit programmed for Europe. With this unit manned by German personnel and stationed in the NORTHAG area, atomic delivery coverage would be provided from Luebeck, on the North Sea, to the Swiss Alps.<sup>122</sup>

The following month, however, LANDCENT concluded that the German Redstone unit for the NORTHAG area would be needed earlier. Therefore, CINCUSAREUR recommended to the Department of the Army that the equipment for the last of the three Redstone groups planned for deployment to U.S. forces in Germany be made available to the Germans during FY 1960.<sup>123</sup>

(3) The NATO Atomic Stockpile. In June 1957 USEUCOM and USAREUR had initiated planning for the implementation of the concept that all atomic warheads programmed for use by NATO forces in an emergency were to belong to a NATO stockpile under U.S. custody. At the December 1957 meeting in Paris, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would deploy nuclear warheads under U.S. custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations concerned. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Council decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads for the defense of the alliance. In February 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved SACEUR's general plan for the stockpile, which was published the following month. On 1 June 1958 USAREUR submitted its plan for the safeguarding and supplying of nuclear warheads to non-U.S.

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<sup>121</sup>Cable ALO-962, USNMR SHAPE to S/D for ISA, 13 Nov 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957), Vol. IV.

<sup>122</sup>USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 4, 29 Apr 58, p. 5. SECRET.

<sup>123</sup>(1) Memo, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 27 May 58, subj: Early Atomic Delivery Capability (Redstone) for German Forces (S). In SGS 250/H5 Special Weapons. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 31 May 58. In SGS 250/58. Both SECRET. For further details, see the top secret supplement to this report.

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NATO delivery units. According to the plan, U.S. personnel would maintain custody--defined as the control of access--of the warheads at all times, as required by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. For this purpose, the storage sites were to be under the surveillance of at least 1 U.S. man, so that access could be gained only by applying physical force against him. The physical security of the storage area was to be provided by the nation manning the delivery system. In an emergency USCINCEUR would take the necessary action to transfer the warheads from the custodial organization to the delivery unit so that they could be employed in accordance with SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan.<sup>124</sup>

#### 64. NATO Air Defense Policy

a. The SHAPE Barrier Air Defense Concept. In mid-1957 SHAPE also prepared a draft plan for the air defense of NATO Europe in the 1960 period, which was based upon the concept of a surface-to-air missile defensive barrier extending from Denmark to the Adriatic. On 5 July 1957 representatives of USEUCOM and USAREUR met at the Camp des Loges headquarters to discuss the SHAPE plan. The conferees unanimously agreed that the planned deployment of the first 10 U.S. Nike battalions,<sup>125</sup> in the point defense of the Kaiserslautern-Bitburg-Rhine River area and the Nancy-Metz-Verdun area, should remain unchanged. They also agreed to recommend to SACEUR that studies of the relative merits of the barrier concept as opposed to the point defense be made before adopting the SHAPE plan for a barrier-type defense near the Iron Curtain. USAREUR representatives pointed out that adoption of the barrier plan at that time would leave vital U.S. Air Force and Army installations in the Nancy-Metz-Verdun area completely without missile defenses.<sup>126</sup>

USAREUR air defense planners felt that the effectiveness of the barrier depended upon the deployment of a sufficient number of Nike units--estimated at a minimum of 20 battalions--to span the gap across central Europe from the North Sea to the Adriatic. However, the expected number of units available for deployment in Western Germany by 1960 was believed insufficient to man the barrier adequately to prevent penetration by hostile aircraft willing to pay the "price of admission." Once the barrier was breached subsequent forces could pass through the gaps without further attrition, since rear area installations would be without missile protection. Such a barrier could accomplish large-scale attrition of hostile aircraft only if the attack were on a large, broad front, and it was not likely that an astute enemy would employ such tactics. Furthermore, the barrier could easily be outflanked or overrun by determined ground action, leaving major portions of the barrier unutilized.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>124</sup>Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col S. J. Mancuso, USAREUR G3 NATO Asst Br, 23 Sep 58. SECRET. Details of the logistics of this plan may be found in Chapter 7, Section III.

<sup>125</sup>Later reduced to six by Department of the Army action. SECRET.

<sup>126</sup>Cable SX-6038, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR for Palmer, 24 Sep 57. SECRET.

<sup>127</sup>DF, Air Def Div to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Dec 57, subj: Air Defense Policy. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

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Since the barrier concept sought to provide uniform defense for all of NATO Europe, all targets, regardless of their relative importance, would be given the same measure of protection, assuming the barrier were effective. On the other hand, if the barrier proved ineffective all targets would become equally vulnerable. Therefore, USAREUR proposed that the draft plan be modified to assure an effective defense of one or more vital areas or installations at each stage of missile unit deployment rather than attempt a barrier defense of NATO Europe with insufficient weapons. Subsequent units, as they became available, could be deployed forward to extend the defenses in depth. This proposal would allow air defense plans to be adjusted to available means, so that the full capabilities of the missile units would be utilized at each stage of deployment.<sup>128</sup>

When SACEUR's barrier air defense concept was submitted to the NATO Standing Group in Washington, the plan was approved and deployment orders were issued to the non-U.S. NATO SAM battalions. As a concession to USAREUR's viewpoint, the 6 U.S. Nike battalions were to remain at their present sites, most of which were temporary, in the point defense of vital rear-area installations.<sup>129</sup>

b. The SHAPE Proposals for Integration of Air Defense. In December 1957 SACEUR proposed to the NATO Standing Group that an integrated air defense system be created for NATO Europe to operate under Allied (NATO) control in peace as well as in war. The existing arrangement, by which peacetime air defense responsibilities were assigned to national authorities and wartime control--only in the combat zone--to the Allied command, was regarded as inadequate. The wartime effectiveness of an integrated air defense system would be greatly improved if the system could be developed under peacetime conditions.<sup>130</sup>

The NATO Standing Group approved the SHAPE proposals in principle and at the same time authorized SACEUR, together with the appropriate national authorities, to develop an organizational concept and a corresponding command and control system for submission to the Standing Group for approval. For this purpose a meeting, attended by representatives of the nations concerned and the higher NATO military headquarters, was held on 7-8 January 1958 at SHAPE headquarters. On 6 January the U.S. delegation, composed of representatives of USEUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, and CINCNELM, met at USEUCOM headquarters to develop a coordinated U.S. position. USAREUR/CENTAG representatives stressed that air defense means should be under the control of the field army commander, whose authority should be subject

<sup>128</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Cable SX-6038, 24 Sep 57, cited above. Both SECRET.

<sup>129</sup>Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. E. Barton, G3 Ops Br, 7 Oct 58. NATO SECRET.

<sup>130</sup>DF, Air Def Div to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 20 Dec 57, subj: Air Defense of NATO Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

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only to the air defense coordinating procedures of the NATO integrated air defense organization. However, USEUCOM directed that this subject not be raised, since it might induce the European NATO countries to offer resistance to the over-all concept of an integrated air defense system.<sup>131</sup>

At the conference several aspects of the air defense problem were discussed, but no definite conclusions were reached because the delegations failed to agree. From USAREUR's point of view, the most important topics discussed were the extent of Allied command and control of air defense forces and the problem of infrastructure funding. SHAPE headquarters planned to utilize the regional commanders' recommendations in framing a draft plan for a command structure and procedures integrating the national air defense facilities and forces of NATO Europe.<sup>132</sup>

c. The SHAPE Draft Plan. In his draft plan SACEUR recommended that the NATO nations assign to him the responsibility, authority, and necessary air defense means to defend NATO Europe against hostile air attack. Such assignment of responsibility and authority would have to be clear and unqualified, with no division of control between national and Allied NATO authorities. The forces would include all air defense fighter units, surface-to-air missiles, and conventional anti-aircraft units employed in the air defense of the Allied Command, Europe, together with their command and control units. These forces would be designated as assigned units and placed under SACEUR's operational command and control. Since the area to be defended was large, the proposed Allied air defense system would be organized on a regional basis with one headquarters for each region. The regional commander would then be given command and operational control of all assigned air defense forces and facilities in his region. Below regional level the command organizations would follow a pattern generally similar to the one already in effect but would be Allied in nature. Existing regional boundaries would apply until such time as adjustments became desirable.<sup>133</sup>

To safeguard national interests, national air defense forces assigned to SHAPE were not to be used for other tasks without national approval, and national and service representation on Allied staffs was to be broadly in proportion to the forces and facilities contributed. Moreover, logistical support, administration, and discipline were to remain national responsibilities. The proposed command reorganization would also utilize existing headquarters and provide an air defense deputy or coordinator and staff from

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<sup>131</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR Air Def Div to CofS, 14 Mar 58, subj: Integration of Air Defense. AEADD 250/17. (2) DF, Air Def Div to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Apr 58, subj: Letter by General Palmer on USAREUR Message to Department of the Army. AEADD 250/8. Both SECRET.

<sup>132</sup>DF, Air Def Div to CofS, 14 Mar 58, cited above.

<sup>133</sup>(1) Ltr, Gen L. Norstad, SACEUR, to Chmn, NATO Std Gp, 27 Feb 58, subj: Integration of Air Defense, w/atchd "Proposal for Integration of AD in Allied Command Europe." AG 1250 AD. NATO SECRET.

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SHAPE headquarters down through the Allied tactical air force level.<sup>134</sup>

d. USAREUR's Reaction. USAREUR objected to the transfer of all national air defense units to SACEUR's command because, the surface-to-air missile units in Seventh Army would be removed from the army commander's control. This would be in violation of AR 525-50, which stated that air defense weapons in the field army must remain under the control of the field army commander, subject only to the coordinating procedures established by the theater air defense commander. According to accepted doctrine, the theater air defense command should be a joint organization with both Army and Air Force representation. USAREUR therefore recommended to USCINCEUR that the Allied Air Defense Command staff in the Central Region include a U.S. Army representation commensurate with the ground force contribution to over-all air defense. Moreover, the anti-aircraft units assigned to Seventh Army should remain under the control of the army commander, subject only to such coordinating procedures as might be adopted by the Allied Air Defense Commander in the Central Region.<sup>135</sup>

e. Control of Army Air Defense Forces. Also to be considered was the contingency that the implementation of NATO defense plans might be so delayed in wartime that USAREUR would require a capability for independent air defense operations. Therefore, the organizational structure for the air defense of NATO Europe would have to be sufficiently flexible to permit the U.S. forces to conduct their own air defense, if necessary. Commenting upon SHAPE's concept of regional responsibility for air defense, USAREUR declared that, since this was to be a joint undertaking to which all military services would contribute forces, over-all responsibility for the air defense of each region should be vested in the commander in chief of all NATO forces committed to the region, i.e., CINCNORTH, CINCENT, and CINCOSOUTH. Furthermore, over-all responsibility for the air defense of the U.S. forces in Europe should remain with USCINCEUR or his deputy until the NATO organization was activated.<sup>136</sup>

f. USAREUR Recommendations. USAREUR's recommendations for amending the SHAPE plan were presented to the Department of Army in the form of an outline of a CENTAG draft plan that had been developed for coordination with FOURATAF. This plan included the establishment of an air defense boundary between the forward area, where the field army's interests predominated, and the rear area, containing static army and air force installations. CENTAG, in coordination with FOURATAF, would move this boundary to conform to the movements of the forces and facilities of the field army. Units forward of this boundary would be assigned or attached to the field

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<sup>134</sup>DF, Air Def Div to CofS, 14 Mar 58, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>135</sup>DF, Air Def Div to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 20 Dec 57, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>136</sup>DF, Air Def Div to CofS, 3 Jan 58, subj: Air Defense Organization for NATO Europe, w/atchd "Outline Concept of an Air Defense Organization for NATO Europe." AEADD 250/17. SECRET.

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army and would function under its control and direction, subject to coordination with FOURATAF operating procedures. Units to the rear of the boundary would function as parts of an integrated air defense organization under the direction of FOURATAF. While the locations of available surface-to-air missile units were fixed, the deployment or redeployment of newly assigned units would be coordinated by CENTAG and FOURATAF. In wartime movements of rear-area units would continue to be coordinated between CENTAG and FOURATAF, while the field army commander would move his units as necessary, informing FOURATAF of their new positions. The key parts of the CENTAG operational procedures were: (1) WEAPONS TIGHT under warning white; (2) WEAPONS FREE under warnings yellow or red; and (3) HOLD FIRE commands directed for rear-area units, but requested of the army commander for his forward units. The foregoing plan represented a suitable reconciliation of the principles embodied in AR 525-50 with the NATO plan for air defense integration.<sup>137</sup>

When these recommendations came to his attention, USCINCEUR/SACEUR assured CINCUSAREUR that full consideration had been given to the views of all commands concerned when the plan for integrating the national air defense forces in NATO Europe had been prepared.<sup>138</sup>

g. Efforts at Reconciliation. During the course of air defense planning, efforts were made to reconcile the divergent positions of NORTHAG and CENTAG/USAREUR on NATO's integration plan. NORTHAG's position represented a compromise in that it would accept transfer of corps and divisional light antiaircraft artillery units to regional (NATO) control, provided they would be made available to the field army commander when required for the defense of the field forces of which they were an organic part. CENTAG's position, on the other hand, was that all organic air defense means should remain under the army commander's control, which would place only the 32d Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) and its four Nike battalions under the NATO air defense commander's control. In an effort to overcome this divergence, LANDCENT headquarters called a conference on 13 June to discuss the matter. After extensive discussion of the two viewpoints, the LANDCENT Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, recommended that NORTHAG's and CENTAG's positions be adopted for their respective areas. This suggestion, however, was disapproved by the LANDCENT Chief of Staff; instead he recommended to the AFCEM Air Defense Committee that all U.S. Nike battalions be assigned to the integrated NATO air defense organization.<sup>139</sup> By the end of FY 1958 the SHAPE plan for air defense integration had been

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<sup>137</sup>Cable SX-2594, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 20 Mar 58. SECRET.

<sup>138</sup>(1) Ltr, Gen W. B. Palmer, Dep USCINCEUR, to Gen Hodes, 31 Mar 58. AEADD 250/8. (2) Memo, Gen Hodes to Gen Palmer, 11 Apr 58. (3) Memo, Gen Palmer to Gen Hodes, 18 Apr 58. All CONF. All in USAREUR SGS ADD.

<sup>139</sup>(1) Memo, Maj Gen Sherburne to USAREUR CofS, 11 Jun 58, subj: LANDCENT Meeting on NATO Integrated Air Defense Organization. AEAGC-PL 250/17 GC. (2) DF, ACofS G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 58, subj: Integrated Air Defense. AEAGC. Both NATO SECRET.

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forwarded to the NATO Standing Group for final consideration and decision.<sup>140</sup>

65. USAREUR Air Defense Planning

a. Control of Air Defense Units. In October 1957 Seventh Army recommended that all U.S. Army surface-to-air missile and Skysweeper units be consolidated under the command of the 32d AAA Brigade and controlled preferably by Seventh Army or alternately by USAREUR headquarters. In view of the plans for integrating the NATO air defense system, however, CINCUSAREUR decided not to change the command structure of the air defense system at that time.<sup>141</sup>

However, in January 1958 USAREUR headquarters modified the division of responsibilities for air defense between Seventh Army and the 32d AAA Brigade in accordance with AR 525-50, which defined the U.S. Army air defense doctrine. The west bank of the Rhine was established as the boundary between the forward area of the combat zone, in which were located virtually all the field forces and vital facilities of Seventh Army, and the rear area, where USACOMZEUR and USAFE forces and static facilities predominated. Air defense units in the forward area were assigned to Seventh Army, while those in the rear area became subordinate to the 32d AAA Brigade.<sup>142</sup>

b. The USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group. In mid-June 1957 three USAREUR officers had been sent to Ramstein, Germany, to serve as the U.S. Army element of a joint air defense staff that had been established at Twelfth Air Force headquarters. Later, when USEUCOM failed to authorize formally such a joint air defense staff, the three officers were designated the USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group with Twelfth Air Force headquarters. But the USAREUR and Twelfth Air Force representatives failed to develop joint U.S. air defense procedures; on 15 May 1958 USAFE headquarters announced that, in view of the NATO air defense reorganization, NATO channels were more appropriate for conducting air defense negotiations. Under these conditions the liaison group was no longer needed, and its personnel were withdrawn about 27 May 1958.<sup>143</sup>

<sup>140</sup>Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col Barton, 7 Oct 58. NATO SECRET.

<sup>141</sup>(1) DF, Air Def Div to Dep CINCUSAREUR thru CofS, 4 Nov 57, subj: Air Defense Organization. (2) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to CG Seventh Army, 6 Nov 57. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

<sup>142</sup>Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, CO 32d AAA Bde, 16 Jan 58, subj: Assignment of Responsibility for USAREUR Air Defense. AEADD 270/17 (AG-AO). SECRET.

<sup>143</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR Air Def Ln Gp to CofS, 5 May 58, subj: USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group. ADLG 250/17. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE (ADVON), 26 May 58, subj: USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group. AEAGC-PL 250/17 GC. CONF. (3) Memo, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 17 May 58, subj: Air Defense Liaison with Air Force. AEAGC-PL 250/17 AD. SECRET.

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c. The USAREUR Air Defense Operations Directive Number 1. Since the USAREUR Air Defense Liaison Group and Twelfth Air Force representatives had not produced definitive agreements by the end of 1957, CINCUSAREUR decided to prepare a unilateral directive for the Nike battalions that were about to become operational. In the USAREUR Air Defense Operations Directive Number 1 CINCUSAFE was made responsible for certain functions pertinent to the coordination of operations. CINCUSAFE, however, took exception to this on the grounds that he, and not CINCUSAREUR, must be the interpreter of his assigned responsibilities. In so doing, he advanced his claim to the unilateral establishment of coordinating procedures for both Army and Air Force air defense systems. This claim, however, was unacceptable to USAREUR, because no theater-wide air defense command had so far been established. Actually, the USAREUR directive contained nothing inconsistent with CINCUSAFE's normal operational functions.<sup>144</sup>

d. Establishment of Joint CENTAG-FOURATAF Procedures. Under SHAPE's plan for an integrated peacetime air defense organization, the operational air defense command would be delegated to CINCENT and by him to COMAIRCENT. Operational control, less redeployment authority, would then be delegated to the Second and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces. In anticipation of this reorganization, USAREUR had been discussing air defense procedures with FOURATAF headquarters. During these discussions USAREUR submitted informally a draft plan providing for an air defense boundary--initially the Rhine River--between CENTAG and FOURATAF. Units east of this boundary would be assigned or attached to the field army and under the army commander's control, subject only to the existing air defense coordinating procedures. These procedures would be based on the USAREUR Air Defense Operations Directive Number 1.<sup>145</sup>

COMAIRCENT stated in his comments to FOURATAF that, since all U.S. Nike battalions would be assigned to NATO, they would be under SHAPE operational command to the extent necessary to enable the appropriate NATO commander--in this case COMFOURATAF--to fulfill his peacetime mission. Operational control of all U.S. Nike battalions, less redeployment authority, was therefore delegated to COMFOURATAF. Pending revision of SHAPE's air defense procedures, COMFOURATAF was to seek an interim agreement with USAREUR and USAF headquarters to revise the USAREUR Air Defense Operations Directive Number 1 in consonance with his own requirements.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>144</sup>(1) Ltr, Gen F. F. Everest, CINCUSAFE, to Gen Hodes, 22 Mar 58. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Everest, 10 Apr 58. CONF. (3) DF, Air Def Div to CINCUSAREUR, subj: CINCUSAFE Letter on Air Defense, 5 Apr 58. SECRET. All AEADD 250/17 AD.

<sup>145</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR ACofS, 17 May 58, subj: Proposed FOURATAF Air Defense Procedures. AEAGC-PL 250/17. (2) Memo, Maj Gen Sherburne to USAREUR CofS, 17 May 58, subj: Air Defense Liaison with Air Force. AEAGC-PL 250/17 AD. Both SECRET.

<sup>146</sup>Memo, Gen Sherburne, 17 May 58, cited above. SECRET.

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Representatives of USAREUR, USAFE, and FOURATAF therefore met at FOURATAF headquarters on 9 May 1958 for the purpose of working out mutually agreeable air defense procedures. Discussion revealed that COMAIRCENT had authorized COMFOURATAF to establish an air defense system in his area of responsibility. Furthermore, COMFOURATAF had been designated the air defense commander, with the mission of exercising peacetime operational control over all air defense forces in his region in order to guarantee a wartime capability. In wartime his responsibilities were to include operational control over all air defense forces in his region. COMFOURATAF interpreted this directive to mean control over all Nike battalions in central Europe.

FOURATAF's concept of operations was that all air defense weapons would operate as a family under a single authority, which was essentially the same procedure as outlined in the North American Air Defense System (NORAD). The FOURATAF representatives outlined the proposed organization and functions of control and reporting centers that were to operate under FOURATAF control and be composed of officers of the national forces contributing to the air defense of the region.

The USAREUR representatives, however, maintained that air defense units organic to the field army should remain under the control of the army commander, subject only to the air defense commander's coordinating procedures. The air defense commander's efforts to limit the tactical freedom of the surface-to-air missile units were also opposed by the USAREUR representatives. The meeting was adjourned to permit study of the procedural recommendations.<sup>147</sup>

USAREUR's differences with FOURATAF essentially concerned the method of achieving the most favorable results with the available air defense means. Since resolution of the conflicting views was expected to take some time, and NATO Exercise GOOD PLAY--a phase of Exercise FULL PLAY--was imminent, some agreement on rules of engagement was required as soon as possible. Therefore, USAREUR suggested to FOURATAF that the procedures set forth in the USAREUR Air Defense Directive Number 1 be adopted for the forthcoming exercise without prejudice to any future position that FOURATAF might take concerning operational procedures.<sup>148</sup>

e. The Rules of Engagement. The problem of determining the rules of engagement--controlling the fire of surface-to-air missiles in the event of hostile air attack--had been acute for some time. Since both friendly manned aircraft and Army-operated missiles would be utilized in air defense, it was vital that USAREUR and USAFE headquarters agree upon rules of engagement to prevent confusion and possible destruction of friendly aircraft.

<sup>147</sup>(1) Memo, Col D. L. McMillan, USAREUR Air Def Ln Gp, to C/Air Def Div, 12 May 58, subj: FOURATAF Conference. ADLG 250/17. (2) DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to CofS, 17 May 58, subj: Proposed FOURATAF Procedures. AEAGC-PL 250/17. Both SECRET.

<sup>148</sup>Ltr, Maj Gen J. M. Willems, USAREUR CofS, to COMFOURATAF, 19 May 58, subj: Air Defense Plans and Procedures. AEAGC-PL 250/17 AD. NATO SECRET.

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It was basic Air Force doctrine that the optimum employment of all weapons operating in the same air space would require the close supervision of a single commander, exercising control of the various weapons systems through a central, highly integrated, tactical air control system. Because of the relatively short time the Nike batteries required to engage targets, they would operate most effectively within a framework of established SOP's covering rules of engagement applied to continuous track data, to include identification supplied by longer range air force and antiaircraft radar. Tactical decisions at the battery site could then be based upon comparisons of long-range track data with those from the battery's own radar system. Provided the track data were furnished by the Air Force, and joint Army-Air Force procedures had been established, all elements for effective control of the air defense system would be available. USAREUR opposed any alternate system of control as being more time consuming or not providing a sound basis for tactical decisions. USAREUR doctrine emphasized rapid identification--an Air Force responsibility--supplemented by established HOLD FIRE procedures that could be invoked in emergency conditions. Concerning joint use of air space, USAREUR opposed any system that "hand-cuffed" Nike units in order to permit friendly interceptors to engage targets. Oversolicitousness for the operations of friendly aircraft was rejected for the same reason.<sup>149</sup>

f. Limited Agreement. The representatives of AFCENT, LANDCENT, and FOURATAF, who met at AIRCENT headquarters on 22 May 1958, agreed that the FOURATAF air defense directive would apply temporarily for Exercise FULL PLAY and during the subsequent period until AIRCENT approved its contents. The rules of engagement contained in the directive were modified by the proviso that HOLD FIRE orders to Nike battalions in the Seventh Army area would be requested, not directed. This latter qualification represented a concession to USAREUR with regard to the control of air defense forces by field army units. The USAREUR position remained that surface-to-air missiles in the field army would have to be controlled by the army commander. Only certain designated weapons could be turned over to COM-FOURATAF's operational control.<sup>150</sup>

#### 66. Refugee and Civil Control Planning

In October 1957 the status of USAREUR/CENTAG refugee control planning was surveyed for the purpose of revising such plans and bringing them up to date. The survey revealed that the current plans of CENTAG's subordinate commands, based on instructions contained in MC 36/1, depended upon the host governments for the control of refugee movements in wartime.

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<sup>149</sup>DF, USAREUR Air Def Div to CofS, 20 Dec 57, subj: USAREUR vs USAFE Air Defense Policy, Integration of Air Defense Effort. SECRET. In SGS 660.2 (1957).

<sup>150</sup>(1) FOURATAF ltr, 23 May 58, subj: Air Defense. FOURATAF/OPS-2/1250. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DCSOPS, 7 Jun 58, subj: Rules of Engagement for SAM Weapons. AEASGS 250/HS. Both NATO SECRET.

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Having neither plans nor forces to accomplish this mission, the national governments had, in turn, placed full reliance upon the NATO forces' commanders. Consequently, there were no plans suitable for implementation in the event of an emergency. The USAREUR Civil Affairs Division therefore recommended that the subordinate commands of CENTAG be instructed to prepare effective plans for the control of refugee movement. These recommendations were approved, and in February 1958 civil affairs representatives of LANDCENT, AFCENT, CENTAG, U.S. Seventh Army, French First Army, USACOMZEUR, and U.S. V and VII Corps met at USAREUR headquarters to review and discuss the problem. At this conference the subordinate commands were given new policy guidance and instructions permitting them to bring their plans up to date. Progress reports on refugee control planning submitted by the subordinate commands in June 1958 indicated that this action would be completed by October 1958.<sup>151</sup>

67. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare

a. Psychological Warfare. During FY 1958 the psychological warfare plans were revised, which resulted in the publication of Annex H (Psychological Warfare) to CENTAG EDP 1-58 and the drafting of Annex J (Psychological Operations) to USAREUR OPLAN 301. Although neither plan reflected any major changes in concept, the new Annex J provided subordinate commands with substantial guidance for conducting the cold war activities that would contribute toward the achievement of national objectives.

b. Unconventional Warfare. No significant changes in unconventional warfare plans were made during FY 1958, with the exception of the previously mentioned relocation planning for the 10th Special Forces Group.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>151</sup>(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col G. W. Pohl, C/USAREUR Civ Affairs Div Plans Br, 29 Jul 58. CONF. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col Pohl, 20 Aug 58. SECRET.

<sup>152</sup>Intvw, Capt Sathrum with Lt Col D. W. Osgood, USAREUR G3 Plans & Ploy Br, 7 Oct 58. SECRET.

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## CHAPTER 6

### Training

#### 68. Training Policy

The continuing over-all objective of the FY 1958 USAREUR training program was to maintain the operational readiness of the United States Army, Europe, so that it could effectively perform its national and international missions at all times.

a. Changes in Policy. Seventh Army, in which the major combat potential of USAREUR was concentrated, set the pace in its evolution to a streamlined and highly mobile force. By the end of 1957 all major combat elements completed their conversion according to the pentomic and other new principles of the so-called atomic and guided missile age. Training emphasis and training facilities had to be adjusted to the new developments. Training areas were improved with the addition of realistic combat courses and firing ranges that were designed to achieve better tank-infantry-artillery coordination. Army training tests were revised to insure a uniform standard of proficiency for the reorganized tactical units. To insure that combat leaders, especially at company level, had maximum time for training and developing the combat readiness of their units, the administrative workload of smaller tactical units was reduced to a minimum. Thus, the consolidation of administrative and supply records and unit fund activities at battle group, battalion, or equivalent levels served to move the company or battery commander from his desk to his unit.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Seventh Army Summary of Actvs, 1957, 31 Dec 57. UNCLAS.

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Knowledge of Russian training methods and tactical doctrine led to a change in USAREUR training policy emphasis. For example, since Russian tactical air forces were closely integrated with their ground forces in East Germany, and U.S. forces were expected to be deficient in air support at the beginning of a conflict, enemy air action would have to be countered by appropriate ground tactics. In addition, a shortage of effective antiaircraft artillery to protect the ground elements, especially east of the Rhine River, dictated the need for emphasizing training in evasion, camouflage, and massed small arms fire by ground units. The Seventh Army used air support extensively in training tests and exercises, during which the enemy generally enjoyed air superiority. All units were tested on their reactions to enemy air attacks. This feature was stressed in day-to-day field training, in road marches, and at fixed installations. Associated with the vulnerability of ground forces to air attack was the ability to operate at night. Because of the Russians' known skill as night fighters a large portion of the U.S. training effort was devoted to night operations. In April 1957 the ranger training program, which involved extensive night operations, had been made mandatory for all infantry, armored infantry, and reconnaissance units. All training tests required continuous operations by the tested units, which were required to conduct defense operations, withdrawals, passage of lines, and night movements. Seventh Army instituted the so-called block scheduling system for unit training to insure uninterrupted day and night tactical training under field conditions while the units were at their home stations. Such routine activities as the preparation for training, unit schooling, maintenance, administration, and inspections were to be so scheduled that they would not interfere with training.<sup>2</sup>

b. Funding Problems. Budgetary restrictions during the first half of FY 1958 placed stringent limitations on the use of funds for training. In addition to curtailing USAREUR school activities and forcing postponement of a scheduled field training exercise, the shortage of funds resulted in USAREUR units using major training areas for only 2 instead of 3 periods a year. Furthermore, TDY funds for staff visits and for competitive marksmanship activities were cut.<sup>3</sup>

#### 69. Specialized Training

a. Special Weapons. With special weapons pervading nearly every aspect of ground combat, the only factors restricting more extensive special weapons training activity during FY 1958 were the lack of suitable firing ranges in the command and the shortages of skilled personnel and

<sup>2</sup>(1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, 1 Nov 57. (2) Ltr, Clarke to Hodes, 18 Nov 57. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

<sup>3</sup>Rept of DA Tng Stf Visit to USAREUR and SETAF, 17 Oct 57. CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

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certain items of equipment. Except for Honest John battalions, which were able to conduct service practice in Italy and Germany, rocket and missile units continued to send teams to the United States for training purposes.<sup>4</sup> In February 1958 a technical assistance team from the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, provided technical assistance to Seventh Army and USASETAF Corporal units, giving each unit one week of training to improve its operational capability. Another team from the center assisted Honest John units in April and May 1958. Although concerned mostly with gunnery problems, the team also covered new developments within the warhead field of the rocket program.<sup>5</sup>

Since the Department of the Army was unable to meet the mounting requirements for special weapons technicians, USAREUR had to intensify the on-the-job training of these personnel. Although they considered the possibility of organizing a special school, the unit commanders concerned agreed in March 1958 that training would be more effective in the ordnance battalions than in such a school. Such training would not interfere with the operational mission of the special weapons battalions, since their operational load was not so heavy as to require the continuous application of their entire capability. Therefore, the battalions could conduct training at their operational sites and still maintain and service their weapons. Furthermore, by establishing a school, both the training weapons with their associated test and handling equipment and a large number of highly skilled technicians would be diverted from the ordnance battalions. Consequently, the ordnance special weapons battalions were directed to start on-the-job training for replacements and for personnel from other USAREUR units.<sup>6</sup>

b. CBR Defense Training. The defensive aspects of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare received increased training emphasis during FY 1958. To minimize the vulnerability of Seventh Army personnel to chemical attack, requirements were broadened to include continuous integrated CBR training and a realistic CBR testing phase during battalion and battle group tests. This permitted appraisal of each unit's ability to perform its primary mission for extended periods of time while using protective equipment. Although this innovation was expected to reduce individual vulnerability, the achievement of an acceptable CBR defensive posture depended upon the field use of modern training agents with the military materiel needed for detection and protection. The specific items lacking were automatic field detection devices and alarms to determine the presence of chemical agents and protective

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<sup>4</sup>Incls 1, to ltrs, G3 Tng Br to TAG, ATTN: DCS Mil Ops (Tng Div), 18 Oct 57 (AEAGC-TR 353 GC), 23 Jul 58 (AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC), subj: Quarterly Training Status Report, USAREUR (RCS CSGPO-127) (U). CONF.

<sup>5</sup>(1) Incls 1, to ltrs, 23 Jul 58, cited above, and 22 Apr 58, same subj. CONF. (2) DF's, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 19 Feb, 15 Apr 58, subj: Daily Report of Staff Actions. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In SGS 250/H5.

<sup>6</sup>Memo for rec, USAREUR ACoS G3, 24 Mar 58, subj: Special Weapons Technicians. UNCLAS. In SGS 265/H5 Assignments.

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capas to deter the percutaneous effects of modern chemical agents on personnel. Also needed was a practical maneuver-type CBR training agent to provide realism and a basis for unit training assignments.<sup>7</sup>

Progress was made in improving USAREUR's radiological defense capability by the publication of a training pamphlet on the procedures for radiological defense operations, which was disseminated to all units of company- and battery-size or larger. Furthermore, 32 radiation survey training devices (48E1A) were distributed for the training of radiation survey teams. The device simulated radiologically contaminated areas, detected and surveyed such areas with receivers simulating the Radiac-meter, and simulated the decay or attenuation of radiation intensity. Finally, USAREUR collaborated with the other component commands in drafting theater plans for the mutual exchange of information on atomic strikes and fallout.<sup>8</sup>

c. Code of Conduct Training. Study of U.S. combat and prisoner of war experiences of the Korean conflict led directly to the evolvement of an Army-wide code of conduct program. The integration of this program into all aspects of the USAREUR training program received special emphasis during FY 1958.<sup>9</sup>

The number of hours to be devoted to code of conduct instruction was not specified, and certain related subjects were presented in the command's troop information and character guidance program. There were wide variations in the amount of time allotted to such topics by subordinate commands because of the diversity of units engaged in post-cycle training and because of the general flexibility of training programs.

Nevertheless, code of conduct training was successfully integrated in a number of ways. In field training at all levels, for instance, maximum combat realism was injected into all exercises. Aggressor forces were employed in field exercises and army training tests, where applicable, to simulate enemy action and contact as closely as possible. The techniques of evading capture, resisting as prisoner, and attempting escape were analyzed in the critiques following such tests and exercises. The practical application and integration of evasion and

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<sup>7</sup>Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Nov 57, subj: Essential Military Materiel Requirements for Effective CBR Defense Posture Within Seventh United States Army (S). AETCG 470.7. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957), Vol. II.

<sup>8</sup>(1) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to CG Seventh Army, 11 Dec 57, subj as above. AEACM 470.7. (2) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to DCSOPS, 11 Dec 57, subj: Essential Military Materiel Requirements for Effective CBR Defense Posture (C). Both SECRET. Both in file above.

<sup>9</sup>(1) AR 350-30, 30 Dec 57, subj: Code of Conduct. (2) USAREUR Cir 350-57, 2 Jun 58, subj: Code of Conduct Training. Both UNCLAS.

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escape techniques during field exercises and maneuvers were carried out at unit level by using stay-behind and long-range patrols. Patrol personnel were instructed in the techniques of prisoner-of-war camp organization, the responsibilities of the individual toward fellow prisoners, and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

Besides instruction in the code as a phase in unit intelligence training, important features of the code were highlighted in such training subjects as psychological warfare, military justice, field sanitation, and personal hygiene. Church attendance was encouraged to strengthen the individual's sense of morality and to develop faith and courage through religious motivation. Many promotion boards required a certain knowledge of the code as a condition for advancement. The news media were used extensively to support the program.<sup>10</sup>

d. 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Training. The specialized training of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) underwent few changes during FY 1958. Emphasis was placed on conducting cross-training in weapons, demolitions, communications, medical treatment and first aid, and in the organization and development of guerrilla forces. In addition to conducting instructor cadre training for service schools, the group gave 8th Infantry Division cadre personnel long-range patrol training in December 1957. A cold-weather indoctrination course was held during the same month. Seasonal field exercises involving cross-country movement and survival techniques were held to provide training in land navigation. Such an exercise in May 1958 required each officer and man to cross 40 miles of mountainous terrain in 72 hours with a compass and a 1:100,000-scale map.

Besides the emphasis on area background training, the operational teams of the 10th Special Forces received intensive tactical training in 3- to 5-day field exercises, which usually followed tactical parachute jumps. This training was vital to achieving sustained operational capability. Information that was of value for training purposes was obtained from the U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special Weapons School, Europe, Radio Free Europe, and the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.<sup>11</sup>

e. Reserve Training. The administration of USAREUR reserve training underwent a major change in FY 1958. Before this change reserve affairs were divided between the Assistant Chief of Staff,

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<sup>10</sup> Ltr, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to TAG, Attn: DCSOPS, 14 Mar 58, subj: Report Upon Code of Conduct Training (RCS CSGPO-130 (R1)). AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS.

<sup>11</sup> Ltrs, 10th Sp Forces Gp (Abn) to CO Spt Ops TF, Eur, 9 Jan, 10 Apr, & 10 Jul 58, subj: Operational Readiness Report (U). ASFCC 268/15. TS (info used CONF). In USAREUR G3 TS, AG 2750.

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G-3, which supervised training, and the Adjutant General Division, which administered reserve personnel not on extended active duty. The administration, jurisdiction, and supervision of U.S. Army Reserve activities were delegated to 6 military districts, covering 15 countries, with headquarters located in Paris, London, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Munich, and Berlin. The personnel administering the reserve program in Europe were assigned to the respective area commands.

On 15 September 1957 the six military districts were consolidated into the U.S. Army Military District, Europe, because the pertinent Army Regulations<sup>12</sup> required CINCUSAREUR to maintain an office in or adjacent to his headquarters to exercise jurisdiction over all Army reserve activities within his area of responsibility. Furthermore, not only was the split in functional responsibilities between two USAREUR staff divisions undesirable, but reserve activities at unit-adviser and subordinate USAREUR levels were neglected in favor of more pressing active Army projects.

Without an increase in operating personnel, the new staff agency assumed responsibility for the administration and supervision of the reserve program in Europe under a single chief, who was also Deputy Commander for Reserve Affairs. The new agency's S1 section relieved the Adjutant General Division of all reserve administrative responsibilities, while the S3 section assumed the reserve training functions formerly performed by G3.<sup>13</sup>

As of the end of FY 1958, the Army Reserve personnel in Europe consisted of 783 officers, 1,007 enlisted personnel, and 279 inactive or retired persons.<sup>14</sup>

f. Competitive Marksmanship Program. Objectives for the USAREUR competitive marksmanship program continued to be met during FY 1958. Teams of outstanding rifle and pistol marksmen were selected through competitive elimination matches to represent the command in the National Matches at Camp Perry and in the European International LeClerc Trophy Matches held in July 1957. The team from the 36th Armored Infantry Battalion, 3d Armored Division, representing USAREUR at the LeClerc trophy matches, placed second to a French team for the grand prize. The USAREUR team won the rifle and pistol shoots and lost only the automatic rifle match. In the All-Army Championship Matches at Camp Perry the Army Blue Team won the National Trophy Rifle Team Match, in which USAREUR's two representatives placed second and sixth. The USAREUR team placed

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<sup>12</sup>AR 140-305, 18 Dec 56, subj: Army Reserve, p. 7. UNCLAS.

<sup>13</sup>(1) Briefing for IG by Col C. P. Babcock, Dep Comdr, USAREUR G3 USAR Br, 21 Jul 58. In USAR Br. (2) USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Prog 13, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 13-05. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>14</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 91. CONF.

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fifth in the Infantry Trophy Match. Competing against 1,058 contestants--including 123 distinguished pistol shots--in the National Trophy Individual Pistol Match, USAREUR personnel captured 3 medals--2 gold and 1 silver--by placing 9th, 14th, and 34th in the event.<sup>15</sup>

Consecutive selection of outstanding marksmen at unit, battalion, and regimental levels constituted the bulk of the marksmanship program activities during the second half of FY 1958. The winners entered the USAREUR Championship Matches in April 1958, following which a rifle and pistol squad was chosen to represent USAREUR at the All-Army championships and at the national trophy contests. Entrants were also drawn from the small arms firing school held that same month.<sup>16</sup>

Until 1 January 1958 USASETAF participated in the Army-wide competitive marksmanship program as a separate overseas command. Subsequently, USASETAF rifle and pistol teams represented their command in USAREUR competitions during April and May 1958.<sup>17</sup>

#### 70. School Training

USAREUR and Seventh Army schools were operated to fulfill local requirements that could not be met by unit schools or through the usual training activities. The school training program was continually being reviewed to determine more efficient and more economical means of operation. In FY 1958 a number of changes were made to accomplish this purpose.

a. Change in Admission Requirements. To eliminate drifters and others who would not be able to pass on the benefits of their schooling to other personnel assigned to their units, the requirements for attending the USAREUR service schools were modified. The candidate for service school attendance would have to demonstrate the potential for advancement and the ability to perform in an excellent manner upon completion of school training. Moreover, he would be required to have passed at least 3 of the Army Classification Battery's 10 tests. The new requirements were to become effective 1 July 1958.<sup>18</sup>

b. Integration and Consolidation of Schools. The USAREUR Medical Training Center, which in FY 1958 was assigned to USACOMZEUR, was in effect a USAREUR service school, although its operations were carried out independently. Integration of the center, which was

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<sup>15</sup>USAREUR Prog Prog Rept, Prog 6, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 6-20. CONF.

<sup>16</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to CG CONARC, 19 Mar 58, subj: Selection of Candidates for U.S. Army Rifle and Pistol Teams. AEAGC-TR 268/13 GC. UNCLAS.

<sup>17</sup>Paper, n.d., subj: Miscellaneous Training Information Relative to SETAF. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 250/H5.3, Staff Visits, SETAF.

<sup>18</sup>Cmt 3, G3 to CofS, 12 Jun 58, no subj. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC (28 May 58). UNCLAS.

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monitored by the Medical Division, into the service school system would eliminate duplication and contribute to the standardization of procedures. In February 1958 the center was redesignated as the U.S. Army Medical Service School, Europe, and reassigned from USACOMZEUR to USAREUR headquarters, where it was attached to the Hospital Center for logistical support and placed under the operational control of the USAREUR Surgeon. The change became effective 1 July 1958.<sup>19</sup>

In April 1958 USAREUR approved Seventh Army's request to include the Weapons Assembly School in the USAREUR service school system effective in FY 1959. The requirement for this school was generated as a result of a Department of the Army inspection that revealed an unsatisfactory state of training in weapons assembly. Training improved with establishment of the school, which functioned as a provisional unit even though an indefinite requirement for it still existed. Integration of this school as a TD unit was intended to simplify its operations as well as solve many problems arising from its peculiar status.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to the consolidation of several USAREUR service schools in FY 1958, 50 of the 135 courses presented at the service schools were eliminated, effective 1 October 1957. During the following months 14 more courses were eliminated and the same number added, thus leaving the total unchanged. While the priority of some courses was modified, no further eliminations were made before 30 June 1958.<sup>21</sup>

c. Student Input and Output. In FY 1958 the actual input of students in USAREUR service schools was 18,523--2,272 officers and 16,251 enlisted men--and the actual output of the schools was 16,550 students--2,268 officers and 14,282 enlisted men. The programmed input and output figures were 19,289 and 16,786, respectively. Although the over-all program was not achieved, the accomplishments were within acceptable performance standards. Since quotas to USAREUR schools were not on a mandatory basis, the necessary flexibility was allowed to meet the constantly changing school training requirements of the using units. In some cases the reduction in FY 1958 funds caused a decrease from the number of students originally programmed for attendance. Besides reducing the number of course, the number of admissions to certain lower

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<sup>19</sup>DF, G3 to CofS, 5 Feb 58, subj: Integration of Service School Operated by USAREUR Medical Training Center into the USAREUR Service School System. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS.

<sup>20</sup>DF, G3 to CofS, 9 Apr 58, subj: Inclusion of Seventh Army Weapons Assembly School in the USAREUR Service School System, w/1st Ind, 11 Apr 58, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS.

<sup>21</sup>(1) USAREUR Prog Prog Repts, Prog 6, FY 58, 1st Qtr, p. 6-15; 2d Qtr, p. 6-15. CONF. (2) DF, G3 to CofS, 11 Jun 58, subj: Actions Directed by CINCUSAREUR Relating to USAREUR Service Schools. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS.

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priority courses was also reduced. These factors accounted for the variations between program objectives and actual accomplishments.<sup>22</sup>

#### 71. Training Areas

The major training problem of the command during FY 1958, as in previous years, was the unrelieved shortage of adequate training areas. In addition to being subjected to pressure to release areas to the growing German Army and to provide training time and space to other NATO forces, USAREUR was exposed to the threat of further curtailment of its available training areas in the renegotiation of the status of forces agreement with the West German Government.

a. Acquisition and Release. In July 1957 the Spesbach small-arms range in WACOM was released for use as a temporary site for two Nike missile batteries. The range had been hardly used, since it had not met U.S. and German safety standards. However, a gap continued to exist in the availability of range facilities in the Kaiserslautern complex, and WACOM was to make efforts to obtain a replacement range for known-distance firing or Trainfire requirements.<sup>23</sup>

USAREUR intended to introduce Trainfire, a new Army marksmanship training system, during FY 1959. Briefly, the system employed new types of target devices, including silhouette targets that fell automatically upon being hit. Apart from providing greater realism on the target range, this permitted immediate shooting practice without previous instruction. In addition, Trainfire involved the emplacement of electrically controlled targets in natural settings on the range for realistic target detection instruction.<sup>24</sup>

b. Renegotiations for Training Areas. The agreements authorizing USAREUR forces maneuver rights and training areas were under renegotiation since the Federal Republic of Germany had been granted its sovereignty in May 1955. USAREUR's position essentially was that the maneuver rights and the availability of training areas would have to remain unchanged lest its training program be adversely affected.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Incls 1, to ltrs, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, 21 Jan, 22 Apr, & 23 Jul 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>23</sup>Cables SX-4551, USAREUR to WACOM, 12 Jul 57; SMC-IN 5143, WACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 57; SX-4686, USAREUR to WACOM, 19 Jul 57. CONF.

<sup>24</sup>(1) Cable SX-7474, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 5 Dec 57. CONF.  
(2) Intvw, Mr. R. Sher, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. Cook, G3 Tng Br, 26 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>25</sup>Incl 8, 14 May 58, subj: German Forces Arrangements Negotiations Concerning Maneuver Rights and Training Areas, to DF, G3 to SGS, 15 May 58, subj: USAREUR Critical Problems. SECRET. In SGS 250/H5.3. For further details, see par 110a.

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c. NATO Training Area Requirements. Despite SHAPE's insistence that USAREUR/CENTAG give up more land training areas and allot more training time to other NATO forces, the situation remained essentially unchanged during FY 1958. This was mainly because CENTAG continued to be short of suitable land training areas for its forces. Despite the maximum use of available areas, the only realistic solution was the acquisition of more land. By the end of the reporting period the acquisition or use of sites at Daaden--lost in FY 1957--Stetting and Munsingen was being investigated. Also under study was the possibility of training in France some of the French forces stationed in Germany, thus freeing major training areas in Germany.<sup>26</sup>

d. Guided Missile Range Requirements. The acquisition of guided missiles by U.S. forces in Europe and by various NATO nations generated high priority requirements for firing ranges to continue essential training for missile units. Although the United States was able to fulfill its own missile unit training requirements from its own resources, the establishment of a NATO range would relieve the problem of returning troops to the United States for training and firing practice. Furthermore, the United States regarded such a range as a military essential, since neither NATO use of U.S. ranges nor the establishment of NATO facilities in the United States was practical. When SHAPE attempted to locate a NATO infrastructure range during June and July 1957, the Department of the Army suspended further action on a projected range in Libya.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, USAFE also deferred construction during FY 1958 of the military base at Benghazi, Libya, where the missile range had been tentatively projected.<sup>28</sup> By September 1957, when USAREUR representatives attended the Ninth Slice Infrastructure Conference, no progress had been made in determining the location of the proposed range.<sup>29</sup>

In April 1958 the Italian Government invited SHAPE representatives to inspect an area on Sardinia to determine its suitability for the needed missile range. Acting upon USEUCOM's request, USAREUR selected technical personnel to investigate the site. However, the problem of selecting a satisfactory NATO missile site was left unresolved at the

<sup>26</sup> Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to ACoFS G3, 25 Mar 58, subj: LANDCENT Training Conference. CONF. In SGS 205/H5, NATO.

<sup>27</sup> Ltr, Brig Gen T. F. Bogart, Ofc DCSOPS, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 57, subj: Proposed Guided Missile Range, Libya (S). OPS OT TR 2. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1957).

<sup>28</sup> Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 5404, USAF CofS to USNMR SHAPE, CINCUSAFE, 7 Aug 57. SECRET. For further details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 190-91. SECRET.

<sup>29</sup> 1st Ind, Maj Gen C. L. Dasher, USAREUR CofS, to CG Seventh Army, 14 Oct 57, to ltr, Gen Bogart to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 57, cited above. AEAGC-TR 353 GC (3 Oct 57). SECRET.

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end of FY 1958.<sup>30</sup>

e. USASETAF Training Areas. Under the terms of the U.S.-Italian infrastructure agreement, the Italian Government was to provide the training areas needed for USASETAF troops; however, no entirely suitable areas were made available. The training areas and ranges in Italy were controlled by military territorial commanders who permitted joint use by USASETAF, whose requirements were generally subordinated to those of the Italian Army. Negotiations to obtain additional areas, including a Trainfire range, continued through FY 1958. Honest John firings were accomplished on a space-available, case-by-case basis at an Italian training area, but Corporal firing packets had to be rotated to the United States annually.<sup>31</sup>

## 72. Maneuvers and Exercises

The feature characterizing most of the major maneuvers and exercises conducted during FY 1958 was the play of atomic and other special weapons. These exercises were nearly ideal training vehicles for the realistic testing of plans and new tactical principles and fulfilled the continuous requirements for maintaining a high level of operational readiness. Fund limitations and efforts to keep damage claims to a minimum were inhibiting factors in the conduct of maneuvers and exercises.

### a. CPX COUNTER PUNCH.

(1) Communications Preparation. Earlier exercises had shown the need for communications personnel to practice before the start of a major CPX the rapid installation and/or displacement of communications facilities, systems, nets, and circuits in unfamiliar surroundings. Exercise SPRING BACK, conducted during the three days preceding CPX COUNTER PUNCH, was to provide such practice. However, for the first time in CENTAG maneuver history, the primary means of communications was very high frequency (VHF) and microwave radio. Thus it was not necessary for signal troops to install and test wire communications weeks before the actual exercise. In his subsequent critique, CINCUSAREUR stressed the undesirability of accommodating a CPX

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<sup>30</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CofS, 24 Apr 58, subj: Daily Report of Staff Actions. In SGS 250/H5. (2) Intvw, Mr. Sher with Lt Col E. Cook, G3 Tng Br, 26 Aug 58. Both SECRET.

<sup>31</sup>Tab D, Summary Sheet, 9 Jan 58, subj: Range and Training Area Situation in USASETAF (U), to paper, Items of G3 Interest for CinC's Visit to USASETAF--Jan 58. CONF. In SGS 250/H5.3, Staff Visits, SETAF.

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problem to a previously organized signal exercise.<sup>32</sup>

(2) Objectives. COUNTER PUNCH--a SHAPE joint atomic exercise conducted from 17 to 22 September 1957--was to test the air forces' ability for directly supporting the ground forces with atomic attacks, conventional strikes, and reconnaissance during the first 72 hours of hostilities. In addition, the current plans for accomplishing the total reconnaissance requirements of both air and ground commanders were to be examined. Additional objectives were the testing of communications and current NEO and MISEV plans, the full practice of area damage control procedures beginning at depot level, the exercise of engineer procedures for the repair and rehabilitation of air force bases, and the practice of aerial resupply procedures.<sup>33</sup>

(3) Participation. Although all higher and lateral NATO commands in the Central Region participated in the exercise, they were limited to the play of atomic operations and intelligence. Besides NORTHAG headquarters, FOURATAF and all its subordinate commands participated on a live-flying basis. CENTAG area participation included CENTAG headquarters; USAREUR (Theater Army) headquarters, which took part in only the alert phase of the exercise; USAREUR (Theater Army) Interim headquarters, which was in the operational phase; Seventh Army, down to division and special-weapons delivery unit headquarters; USACOMZEUR, down to depot and special weapons support unit headquarters; and the headquarters of the French First Army, French I Corps, and several French divisions. Finally, exercise staffs of German units participated from their home stations.<sup>34</sup>

(4) Deficiencies. In laying engineer procedures for airfield repair, COUNTER PUNCH demonstrated what was known in advance of the exercise, namely, that there was not enough construction effort available to keep essential airfields operational. Only 2 construction battalions were on hand, where 11 or 12 were needed to meet the deluge of air force requests for aid in the exercise. The use of indigenous resources of the host country presented a possible solution to the problem of augmenting the engineer troop effort in the huge airfield repair job.

The testing of the air forces' ability to support ground forces during the first 72 hours was somewhat invalidated by the failure to play

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<sup>32</sup>(1) USAREUR Dir 1, Exercise COUNTER PUNCH (U), 6 Aug 57. AEAGC-TR 354.2 GC. (2) Incl 2, Detailed Data on Exercises, to ltr, 27 Jun 57, subj: CENTAG-USAREUR Forecast of Training Exercises. In SGS 354.2 (1957), Vol. I. Both CONF. (3) CENTAG Critique of Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, 1 Oct 57. SECRET. Cy in USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>33</sup>(1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, cited above. (2) CENTAG Dir 1, Exercise COUNTER PUNCH (U), 11 Jul 57. AEAGC-TR 354.2 GC. Both CONF.

<sup>34</sup>CENTAG Dir 1, cited above. CONF.

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the exercise within the framework of realistic priorities and by the air force failure to play losses from enemy action. Since the mission of ground support was of lower priority than the execution of SACEUR's atomic strike plan and interdiction program, realistic playing of the exercise would have shown that ground forces would be seriously lacking in reconnaissance and strike efforts at the start of hostilities. Although some factors impeded the implementation of air support and, in effect, compensated for the fact that no losses were played, a more realistic picture of air support operations could have been drawn if the air forces had sustained 30 to 40 percent losses.

From the intelligence viewpoint, more intelligence information was introduced than could reasonably be expected in time of war. Also unrealistic was the fact that the aggressor forces no longer represented the mobile forces that would compose the Russian Army in war.<sup>35</sup>

(5) Results. A feature introduced for the first time in COUNTER PUNCH was the play of ground liaison officers. Ground forces located liaison officers at each of the airbases from which the tactical air forces flew their planes. During the exercise the ground liaison officers were furnished with preplanned overlays depicting the aggressor tactical situation and with information provided by pilots flying reconnaissance or sortie missions over simulated enemy territory. Despite preliminary difficulties, such as the breakdown of communications between the ground liaison officers and the players, the new system achieved a greater degree of realism for the exercise.<sup>36</sup>

An element that contributed an unexpected bit of realism to the exercise was the outbreak of influenza among CENTAG personnel. General Hodes was impressed that, although the effect was comparable to having a small atomic weapon dropped on the friendly forces, the organization continued to function. More important, however, the exercise demonstrated that CENTAG's primary means to influence the battle at an early stage lay in its use of weapons in the interdiction plan. In the face of Russian surprise developments in weapons, equipment; missiles, and explosives there was an urgent need for greater scientific and technical intelligence.<sup>37</sup>

Since the exercise also revealed that the command did not have an efficient system for the operational use of special weapons in case of war, new procedures were to be established, delineating the responsibilities of each general and special staff section of CENTAG and

<sup>35</sup>CENTAG Critique of Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>36</sup>Intvw, Mr. Sher with Maj W. D. Bratton, G3 Tng Br, 13 Jun 58.  
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<sup>37</sup>CENTAG Critique of Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, cited above. SECRET.

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Theater Army and the operational responsibility of each NATO and U.S. headquarters down to and including division level.<sup>38</sup>

Besides developing valuable information about the wartime operation of the command's line of communications up to D/3, COUNTER PUNCH demonstrated the absolute necessity for devising a still more automatic strike program and for reducing to the minimum NATO's dependence on an overloaded and vulnerable communications system.<sup>39</sup>

Apart from the training of new personnel, one of the most valuable features of the exercise was that the tactical air force units gained a new awareness of the position of ground forces in the early stages of a war. Finally, General Hodes stressed the importance of the command being prepared to function on an emergency basis under any circumstances, with or without the orders for a simple or reinforced alert preceding a general alert order.<sup>40</sup>

b. CPX LION BLEU. This AFCENT exercise, conducted from 17 to 22 March 1958, involved all Central European headquarters and staffs down to divisional and comparable levels at a D/5 tactical setting. U.S. logistical support problems were played in the exercise at a D/30 setting. Also tested was the flexibility of communications in an atomic war, which included an examination of the impact of widespread nuclear bombardment on operations and logistics, beginning in a D/5 situation.<sup>41</sup>

LION BLEU focused attention on the responsiveness of SACEUR's atomic procedures to an attack situation, the development of procedures to minimize the effect of radiological contamination on military operations, and the adjustment of tactical thinking to the requirements of the atomic battlefield.

In the exercise an unprecedented ground situation developed that required a change in the authority of certain commanders to execute approved atomic strike (Code GREEN) plans.<sup>42</sup> The deployment of forces in the exercise led to an overlap in the areas of interest of Seventh Army and CENTAG headquarters, for example, which rendered atomic plans inoperable. CENTAG/FOURATAF responsibilities for a particular area

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<sup>38</sup> Memo, Gen Dasher to ACoS G3, 2 Oct 57, no subj. SECRET. In SGS 471.6 (1957), Vol II.

<sup>39</sup> (1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, cited above.  
CONF. (2) Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 7626, COMAIRCEN to CINCENT, 25 Sep 57. SECRET.

<sup>40</sup> CENTAG Critique of Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>41</sup> (1) Incl 2, Detailed Data on Exercises, cited above. (2) Cable SX-7376, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 30 Nov 57. Both CONF.

<sup>42</sup> See USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 144-45. SECRET.

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should have been shifted accordingly, instead of extending into the area of SACEUR's scheduled interdictions. Because these interdictions were specifically targeted and had weapons allocated to them, the releasing commanders could not be redesignated. Since CENTAG's troop targets were in locations that did not always coincide with SACEUR's target areas, the problem of weapons allocation and strike procedures arose. The exercise also bared the conflict of interest between air and ground commanders in the use of interdiction weapons. The former were interested in fixed-installation-type targets, i.e., rail and road bridges, defiles, and other physical features whose destruction would impede movement. Such targets would allow the preplanning of strikes, the preparation of target folders, and decentralized execution. On the other hand, ground commanders preferred to destroy enemy formations first and fixed installations second, when that would contribute to the first objective. There would be no point in blowing up a bridge a commander might want to use later, unless its destruction would impede the movement of enemy forces into a battle area or would compel the enemy to mass behind the obstacle and present itself as a profitable target. Consequently, air commanders would expend their weapons rapidly and early under an automatic strike plan, whereas ground commanders would wait for intelligence assurances of a worthwhile return. These differences between air and ground concepts displayed the difficulties of joint planning and the need for compromise.

LION BLEU exercised for the first time the nuclear strike information center (NUSIC), whose purpose was to maintain information on areas contaminated by radioactive fallout. Its operation demonstrated the need for accurate and expeditious reporting of contaminated areas, procedures for controlling these areas, and training troops to cope with contamination problems. In particular, the forces needed to be informed on the length of time they could remain in a contaminated area and how they could transit such an area safely. Thus, when contamination diminished to a safe level, action could be resumed in the area. CINCUSAREUR stressed the need for a solution to these problems by the end of FY 1958.

LION BLEU also showed that atomic battlefield tactics would have to be adjusted to a combat area of great depth, to a lesser density of forces, and to the application of overwhelming power at a given point through atomic attack. The older concepts of established lines, protected flanks, and mass attack were best forgotten. For the first time in any command exercise, the opening situation attempted to portray the presence of many friendly and enemy units in each other's rear areas instead of the normal dispositions of a war of movement and the usual fields of exploitation. The exercise showed the need for a greater appreciation of the new equation between fire power and maneuver.

As a result of this exercise the procedures and internal functioning of the CENTAG command post were revised. With the principle established in COUNTER PUNCH that COMCENTAG's greatest command influence on the land battle would be exercised through the use of air-delivered atomic weapons against enemy reserve formations, a G2-G3 operations center was devised to provide COMCENTAG with the intelligence and

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friendly information that he needed to make timely decisions. Within the operations center a targeting section was created to concentrate on the movement of enemy reserves, whose destruction would contribute materially to the favorable outcome of the land battle.

Other improvements achieved through LION BLEU were in the techniques of recording weapons status, in the exchange of information between G2 and G3 action officers, and in the use of NUSIC, thus making the command post establishment more responsive to command requirements. The Army component of the joint command and operations center (JCOC) was strengthened, and the reporting procedures between the JCOC and the CENTAG operations center were refined. Although the air-ground coordination was better than in any previous exercise, there was a need for multilingual personnel as ground liaison officers and as forward air controllers with international forces, so that commanders could direct tactical air strikes regardless of the pilot's nationality.<sup>43</sup>

c. Exercise FULL PLAY. This SHAPE-sponsored, combined atomic/air-defense exercise, conducted from 1 to 5 June 1958, involved the entire Allied Command Europe (ACE) in a D-day to D+2 setting. The areas evaluated at the CENTAG/USAREUR level were NUSIC operations; engineer operations, with emphasis on barrier and denial requirements and on the support of rear area damage control; air defense operations; and logistical support for advanced weapons. FULL PLAY was the first exercise in which the signal support area was remote from the command post. The communication vans were, on an average, 2,800 yards away, with only the necessary terminal facilities--largely point-to-point circuits--within the command post area.

The exercise drew attention to the implications of large-scale area damage control, especially in the service areas and along the line of communications. The procedures for improving the logistical support of advanced-weapons delivery units also required development.<sup>44</sup> As a matter of fact, FULL PLAY demonstrated that personnel of both the ordnance special-weapons units and the transportation units responsible for supporting the atomic delivery forces of Seventh Army were inadequately prepared to carry out their combat missions. Insufficient field training was responsible for the failure of these personnel to appreciate the situation of the units they were to support, the poor coordination between the transportation and the special-weapons units, and the unsatisfactory functioning of the special-weapons command communications. Consequently, a

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<sup>43</sup>(1) CENTAG Critique of Exercise LION BLEU, 28 Mar 58. SECRET. Cy in USAREUR Hist Div Docu Sec. (2) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 22 Apr 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>44</sup>(1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 23 Jul 58, cited above. (2) CENTAG Dir 1, Exercise FULL PLAY (U), 16 Apr 58. AEAGC-TR 354.2 CG. Both CONF.

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series of exercises and Army training tests was scheduled for all special-weapons support units. This training would terminate in a USAREUR-wide field training exercise (FTX) for all units with a special-weapons mission, including atomic delivery units.<sup>45</sup>

d. FTX SABRE HAWK. When, for reasons of economy, the Seventh Army FTX's BATTLE HAWK and SABRE THRUST, scheduled for November 1957 and February 1958, respectively were canceled,<sup>46</sup> the largest maneuver in the history of the Seventh Army in Europe was played as FTX SABRE HAWK from 10 to 20 February 1958. With 125,000 personnel participating, the FTX involved 2 opposing corps--V Corps was the friendly Blue Force, while VII Corps was the aggressor Red Force. The main objective of the FTX was to conduct individual and small-unit training under cold-weather conditions. The scenario included atomic weapons employment, target acquisition, close air support, aerial resupply, troop movement by helicopter, river crossings, and action by isolated units. The Twelfth Air Force participated in air-support operations, while USAFE took part in aerial resupply and evacuation problems. To assure the same training benefits for all, both corps assumed attack, defense, and delay and withdrawing roles, with neither side achieving a maneuver victory.<sup>47</sup>

e. Miscellaneous Exercises.

(1) FTX AIRMED ALPHA. Conducted from 19 to 24 August 1957, AIRMED ALPHA was a Seventh Army joint Army aviation and medical exercise in which aviation and medical operations were played simultaneously under simulated battle conditions. Participating were all Seventh Army aviation units, the 30th Medical Group, an 11th Airborne Division battle group, and supporting units. The FTX provided training in various types of air operations, including the air movement of the battle group on a tactical mission and the aerial resupply of that unit; in mass casualty evacuation by air and ground; and in mass medical treatment involving the processing of casualties through medical facilities.<sup>48</sup>

(2) FTX BROWN JUG. This AFNORTH NATO exercise, held from 19 to 28 September 1957, involved LANDCENT in the role of the enemy.

<sup>45</sup>Incl 1, Field Training Program for Special Weapons Units, to DF, Dep ACofS G3 to SGS, 19 Jun 58, subj: Ambassador-Commanders' Conference. AEAGC 250/8. SECRET.

<sup>46</sup>Cable SX-6903, CENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 6 Nov 57. CONF.

<sup>47</sup>(1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 22 Apr 58, cited above.  
(2) Cable SX-7376, cited above. Both CONF. (3) Seventh Army Ex Dirs, FTX SABRE HAWK, 29 Nov 57, 3 Jan 58. CONFMOD. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1957).

<sup>48</sup>(1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, cited above.  
(2) Incl 2, Detailed Data on Exercises, cited above. Both CONF.

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As such, CENTAG contributed Seventh Army's 503d Battle Group and one company of the 8th Transportation (Helicopter) Battalion to the aggressor force dropped into Denmark. For the U.S. forces the exercise provided training in theater air mobility and in airborne operations.<sup>49</sup>

(3) USASETAF Exercises. Among the exercises conducted by USASETAF after that command became subordinate to USAREUR was FTX WHIP SAW II, held from 20 to 24 January 1958, which tested with excellent results USASETAF's anticipated role in the first phase of wartime operations. Four Italian units participated in the security of U.S. weapons-delivery units. Exercise COLD WAVE, conducted from 10 to 14 February 1958, was designed to exercise USASETAF's support of an Allied offensive begun after the first month of war. Finally, USASETAF participated on a CPX basis in the NATO joint atomic exercise GREEN COBRA, held from 25 to 27 March 1958.<sup>50</sup>

### 73. Mutual Security Program (MAP) Training

The military assistance training program in USAREUR was an adjunct to the training provided in the United States for Area I and II countries<sup>51</sup> and also provided training assistance, support, and school spaces for the German Army.<sup>52</sup>

a. USAREUR MAP Training. During FY 1958 USAREUR accepted 902 MAP students eligible for certain courses in its schools on a space-available basis. In addition, 1,167 observer spaces were filled by foreign visitors during the fiscal year. These informal observers at USAREUR schools, depots, and installations witnessed specific training and practical demonstrations by U.S. personnel. USAREUR also provided a total of 85 mobile training or technical assistance teams during the same period.<sup>53</sup>

b. Advanced-Weapons Training. The position of eminence occupied by special weapons in the USAREUR training picture was also reflected in the growing demands for advanced-weapons instruction under the military assistance training program.

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<sup>49</sup>See note above. CONF.

<sup>50</sup>Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 22 Apr 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>51</sup>Area I countries--Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia--paid for the training received from the United States. Area II countries--Ethiopia, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran--received mutual assistance funds for their trainees. CONF.

<sup>52</sup>Prog 6, USAREUR Tng Prog, FY 58. CONF.

<sup>53</sup>Rev of USAREUR Comd Progs, FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 89. CONF.

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(1) USAREUR's Responsibilities. USAREUR had been assigned responsibility in March 1957 for over-all coordination and provision of assistance and consultative service in connection with the introduction of Nike equipment to NATO forces.<sup>54</sup> In September 1957, and again in March 1958, USAREUR received new instructions from USEUCOM relating to the introduction of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to NATO powers. Specifically, in addition to acting as coordinator for the SAM program for NATO countries and to insuring the implementation of the SAM portion of SHAPE air-defense plans, USAREUR was made responsible for providing technical assistance and advice, for coordinating with USCINCEUR on final site selections, and for monitoring all training matters in the areas prescribed by USEUCOM. These instructions, which in effect broadened the scope of USAREUR's training responsibilities from Nike to other surface-to-air missiles, were expected to provide USAREUR with the basis for conducting an enlarged advanced-weapons program.<sup>55</sup>

(2) USAREUR Assistance. Illustrative of the type of special- or advanced-weapons training assistance during FY 1958 were 3- to 4-day orientation conferences held to acquaint the personnel of receiving countries with the technical aspects of the Nike system, the siting and construction criteria, and the planning, designing, and evaluating of Nike defenses. Field trips to Nike sites in Germany were projected as part of the orientation. Each conference would accommodate a maximum of eight officers who were associated with the operations, planning, radar, or construction aspects of their nation's Nike program.<sup>56</sup>

Since a number of non-NATO countries expressed their interest in obtaining orientation training in special weapons, USAREUR recommended an annual 1-week course by a USAREUR mobile training team in each of the requesting countries. The teams would consist of 5 officers and 3 enlisted personnel. Since instruction would be in English, the host country would provide interpreters. Another recommendation was to send no more than two officers each year from the countries concerned to a special 3- to 4-week course at the U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special Weapons School, Europe, in Oberammergau. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel stationed in the respective countries would then be able to present limited instruction between the visits of the mobile training teams. In support of these and

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<sup>54</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 200. SECRET.

<sup>55</sup>(1) USAREUR Cinc's Whay Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58. (2) Ltrs, USEUCOM to USAREUR, 15 Sep 57, 14 Mar 58, subj: Letter of Instructions, Army Surface-to-Air Missiles for NATO Countries, quoted in source above. Both SECRET.

<sup>56</sup>Cable SX-6776, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, MAAG Brussels, 31 Oct 57. SECRET.

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other similar measures, the Department of the Army was considering the use of mobile training teams to provide special-weapons training during FY 1959.<sup>57</sup>

In addition to projected Honest John cadre training for Italy, Greece, and Turkey by USASETAF during FY 1958, Turkey and Greece accepted the U.S. offer of training and equipment for Nike units under the FY 1958 grant-aid Military Assistance Program.<sup>58</sup> Nike site suitability tests were also conducted in Denmark and Italy by USAREUR mobile radar test teams from the 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and Seventh Army.<sup>59</sup>

#### 74. Operational Readiness

The primary objective of all training activities was to maintain operational capability at the highest possible level so that the command could perform its assigned missions. The measure of training effectiveness was determined through battalion and other unit tests and through a broad program of training inspections and staff visits. These indicated the over-all satisfactory state of operational readiness of the command during FY 1958 while disclosing certain deficiencies in the personnel and equipment--and consequently in the capabilities--of certain atomic and special-weapons units.

a. Battalion Test Results. In FY 1958 a total of 170 battalions were tested, of which 19 scored superior ratings, 111 excellent, and 40 satisfactory. The testing teams observed that the units could maintain their assigned alert status and were prepared to fire within the prescribed time limits.<sup>60</sup>

b. Department of the Army Training Staff Visit. The annual Department of the Army training staff visit to USAREUR and USASETAF was made in October 1957 in order to determine and help resolve problems in the two oversea commands. The visiting team considered USAREUR's operational readiness and status of training excellent; all units displayed

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<sup>57</sup> Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 2764, USCINCEUR to MAAG Teheran, et al., 9 Oct 57. CONF.

<sup>58</sup> Cables USAREUR SMC-IN 1834, JUSMMAT to USCINCEUR, 6 Dec 57; and SMC-IN 6524, USCINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, SETAF Supt Comd, 22 Oct 57. Both SECRET.

<sup>59</sup> DF, Air Def Div to CofS, 6 Feb 58, subj: USAREUR Mobile Test Team. AEADD. CONF. In SGS 285/H5, Missile Sites.

<sup>60</sup> Incls 1, to ltrs, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, 21 Jan, 22 Apr, & 23 Jul 58, cited above. CONF.

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a high state of morale, combat readiness, discipline, and esprit de corps, as well as complete confidence in their ability to accomplish assigned operational missions.<sup>61</sup>

c. Status of Atomic and Special-Weapons Units. During FY 1958 the Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) Inspector General conducted Army technical proficiency inspections (TPI) and technical standardization inspections of USAREUR's atomic and special-weapons units. The TPI's were concerned with the ability of units to perform the atomic-weapons portion of their mission, including technical functions, the organization's ability to meet special-weapons requirements, and limitations on the ability to maintain and produce reliable atomic weapons. Functions relating solely to the maintenance, operation, or employment of conventional artillery weapons were not within the scope of TPI's. The inspecting teams observed the safety and security procedures governing the handling and processing of atomic weapons and related documents and equipment. Evaluation of the units was based on the observation of a technical exercise; the inspection of records, materiel, and facilities; and the interrogation of personnel. Joint special-weapons publications and Army technical manuals provided the detailed criteria and standards for such inspections.<sup>62</sup>

(1) Results of Autumn 1957 TPI's. From 9 October to 27 November 1957 the Department of the Army inspected all of Seventh Army's atomic delivery units and the 9th Ordnance Special Weapons Support Battalion. All units were rated satisfactory, and some were orally described as outstanding. The considerable improvement shown over the previous inspection, particularly in ordnance special-weapons support of delivery units, forward-assembly capability within delivery units, and in the status of special-weapons supply, was the result of using both the Army-wide standard assembly procedures and checklists and the Seventh Army Weapons Assembly School, which turned out the needed specialist personnel.<sup>63</sup> The deficiencies were the lack of TOE positions for forward-assembly teams in atomic artillery units, a shortage of training weapons in gun-type units and of implosion weapons, the need for improved radiological safety procedures, and the tendency of delivery units to rely too heavily on ordnance special-weapons units for training in forward-assembly operations. These deficiencies demonstrated the need for

<sup>61</sup>Rept of DA Tng Stf Visit to USAREUR and SETAF (U), cited above.  
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<sup>62</sup>(1) DA ltr, TIFO to CG SETAF thru CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 58, subj: Technical Proficiency Inspection of Army Atomic Organizations (U). IG-TIFO 333.2 SETAF (14) (FY 58). (2) DA ltr, TIG to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Mar 58, same subj. IG-TIFO 333.2 USAREUR (16) (FY 58). Both SECRET RESDAT.

<sup>63</sup>Ltr, Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Gen Hodes, 27 Nov 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1957).

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continued stress on all phases of atomic operations, especially on the education of commanders down to battalion level in the proper supervision of technical and operational atomic specialists and in the tactical use of atomic weapons.<sup>64</sup>

Besides increasing command attention at all echelons, USAREUR took various steps to improve the technical proficiency of special-weapons units. Changes were made in the TOE of 280-mm gun units to provide forward-assembly personnel, and temporary overstrengths were authorized in ordnance special-weapons support and depot battalions to provide on-the-job training for mechanic and assembly technicians. The latter action was taken to undercut anticipated critical shortages of personnel. A related problem was the inability to identify by MOS the personnel trained in the United States in forward-assembly operations. This resulted in their loss in the pipeline and in the inability of the using units to requisition against their known losses. On-the-job training, which was meant to offset the shortage in one field, merely created shortages in another, since the selected replacements who were being retrained were already qualified in other MOS's. The solution was to add a new identification digit to the MOS for forward-assembly technicians. In addition, all atomic-weapons delivery units were authorized an overstrength to assure their full operational capability at all times.<sup>65</sup>

The Department of the Army also assisted USAREUR in maintaining and improving the technical proficiency of its atomic organizations by compiling and distributing detailed lists of the deficiencies discovered in year-round TPI's. The value of these reports was illustrated in USAREUR's request for a distribution of 102 instead of 55 copies; the request was granted.<sup>66</sup>

(2) Atomic Readiness in May 1958. CINCUSAREUR's dissatisfaction with the command's atomic capability at the end of FY 1958 was based on a report of atomic operational readiness of Seventh Army and USASETAF units: 21 Seventh Army units were considered operational, 22 were at reduced capability, and 6 were not operational; the 4 USASETAF units were operational. Although all ordnance support units in Seventh Army and USASETAF were technically operational, almost all suffered from personnel and

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<sup>64</sup>Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 14 Dec 57. SECRET. In file above.

<sup>65</sup>(1) Incl 1, to ltr, G3 Tng Br to TAG, 18 Oct 57, cited above.  
(2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Gen M. D. Taylor, CofSA, 14 Dec 57. SECRET. In SGS 333 (1957).

<sup>66</sup>DA ltrs, TIG to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 3 Feb, 10 Mar, & 19 May 58, subj: Compilation of Deficiencies, TIFO, OTIG, DA, Inspection Reports, 1st, 2d, & 3d Quarters, FY 1958 (U). SECRET RESDAT. In G3 Tng Br 268/11.

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equipment shortages. The reasons for the reduced capabilities were the shortages of special-weapons electronic equipment, Honest John special-  
ized equipment, spare parts for the 280-mm guns and 8-inch howitzers,  
and certain signal communications equipment. As to the almost chronic  
nature of the personnel and equipment shortages in special-weapons units,  
these deficiencies were accepted matter-of-factly as calculated risks  
in building up the entire atomic weapons and missiles program.<sup>67</sup>

Although the achievement of full operational capability for the  
USAREUR atomic weapons and missile systems was vital, General Hodes  
also recognized that the future progress of missile development from  
its current embryonic stage would be characterized by continuous change  
that would make day-to-day maintenance of a strong capability difficult.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup>(1) DF, G3 to CofS, 14 May 58, subj: Report of Atomic Opera-  
tional Readiness. AEAGC-WP 250/H5.3 GC. (2) Incl 1, Comments by  
CinC, Final Review of Command Objectives, FY 1958, 9 Jun 58, to DF,  
SGS to all stf divs, 13 Jun 58, subj: Objectives of the Commander  
in Chief. In SGS 250/H5.3. Both SECRET.

<sup>68</sup>Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 14 Dec 57, cited above.  
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## CHAPTER 7

### Logistical Support

#### Section I: Planning

##### 75. Security Preparations

During FY 1958 the logistical support plans for emergency and wartime operations were developed further. While the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, continued to be responsible for security planning proper, the preparation of the corollary and complementary logistical support plans was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

a. USAREUR Logistical Capabilities Plan. The current plan provided guidance for developing logistical support in accordance with operational concepts and covered the one-time, emergency-type instructions and actions required to make the transition from peace to actual warfare. Pre-D-day priorities were listed according to the deficiencies shown in the USAREUR Logistical Estimate. The logistical platform to support future combat operations was the line of communications--developed under the provisions of the USACOMZEUR Depot Outline Plan--which extended through France from the west coast ports between St. Nazaire and Bordeaux to the U.S. Seventh Army maintenance area. Under wartime conditions approximately 40 percent of the total cargo would be handled by offshore (over-the-beach) discharge and transshipment. To the extent permitted by available funds and personnel, peacetime operations were to be geared to giving the line of communications maximum capability to respond in an emergency.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Change 1, 17 Feb 58, to USAREUR CP 1-56 (Basic), Vol. II (Logistics), pp. IV-VI, 1-6. TS (info used SECRET NOFORN).

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An alternate capabilities plan to cover extraordinary contingencies subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities was also prepared.<sup>2</sup>

b. Theater Army Wartime Logistical Standing Operating Procedures. The Theater Army SOP contained the recurring portions of the capabilities plans that pertained to sustained wartime operations. It was completed in August 1957 after having been tested in command post exercises during the latter part of FY 1957.<sup>3</sup>

c. USAREUR Logistical Estimate. The USAREUR Logistical Estimate was intended to correlate logistical capabilities with current tactical and strategic concepts. Among the factors to be taken into consideration were the status of USACOMZEUR resources, Seventh Army's logistical readiness for its wartime mission, USAREUR's interservice commitments, the status of host nation arrangements as they affected administrative missions in wartime, the impact of post D-day military aid to Allied forces, the effect of technical information on materiel and service operations, and recent developments in the fields of organization and manpower.<sup>4</sup> Since publication of the USAREUR Logistical Estimate 1-57 was indefinitely postponed, USACOMZEUR estimates developed for FY 1958 were used instead.<sup>5</sup>

d. Special and Emergency Logistical Planning. In addition to the above plans, a number of other special and emergency plans were prepared in the field of logistics.

(1) Evacuation of Technical Services Supplies and Equipment (ETSSE 1-55). During FY 1957 serious doubts had arisen as to whether the plan for evacuating technical services supplies and equipment would actually work in an emergency.<sup>6</sup> Under ETSSE 1-55 approximately 159,000 tons of both critical and noncritical supplies and equipment were to be evacuated from depots in the exposed portion of Germany, beginning at the simple alert and continuing at a greatly accelerated pace at the reinforced alert. The magnitude of the proposed evacuation--when realistically evaluated in terms

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<sup>2</sup>For further information on both USAREUR CP 1-56 (Basic) and USAREUR CP 1-56 (Alternate), see the top secret supplement to this report. SECRET.

<sup>3</sup>USAREUR (Theater Army) Fld SOP, 8 Aug 57, Pt. IV, Ch. III, Logistics. SECRET NOFORN. For further details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 207. SECRET.

<sup>4</sup>(1) DF, G4 to distr, 24 May 57, subj: USAREUR Logistical Estimate 1-57 (U). AEAGD-PL. (2) Memos for rec, Lt Col E. C. Holland, C/G4 Plans Br War Plans Sec, 1 Jun & 6 Aug 57, subj: Development of the USAREUR Logistical Estimate 1-57. In G4 Plans Br. Both SECRET.

<sup>5</sup>Intvw, Mr. J. R. Moenk, Hist Div, with Lt Col Holland, 16 Jul 58. SECRET.

<sup>6</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 207-8. SECRET.

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of time available, depot outloading capabilities, and the availability of railroad cars--was such that only an insignificant proportion of the overall tonnages could actually be moved.<sup>7</sup>

In anticipation of the rescision of ETSSE 1-55, USACOMZEUR was requested to prepare emergency plans for evacuating certain critical ordnance classes II and IV items from its depots in Germany. In addition, station stocks of quartermaster classes I and III items in the exposed area of Germany were to be substantially reduced, and medical classes II and IV items located in hospitals in the same area were to be earmarked for issue to Seventh Army at the reinforced alert. USACOMZEUR and the area commands were to consult with Seventh Army and coordinate plans for the turnover of operating stocks at the reinforced alert. Stocks that could not be evacuated in organic transportation--as augmented for MISEV movement--or turned over to Seventh Army for combat use were to be destroyed by their peacetime custodians.<sup>8</sup>

Upon the rescision of ETSSE 1-55 on 26 August 1957, the "exposed area of Germany" was defined as the area situated between the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany and points approximately 20,000 yards west of the Rhine River.<sup>9</sup> As a corollary, the evacuation annex of the logistical portion of the USAREUR Capabilities Plan was revised, and the change was published on 22 October 1957.<sup>10</sup> Five months later the USACOMZEUR evacuation and demolition plan, developed in consonance with the above decisions, was published.<sup>11</sup>

(2) Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO). During FY 1958 a new concept was adopted for the evacuation of noncombatants in the event of an emergency; stockage requirements for the logistical support of the operation had to be revised accordingly. Service areas west of the Rhine River--Freiburg excepted--were to be stocked with classes I, III, and IV supplies and equipment, while those east of the river were to contain only class III stocks.<sup>12</sup>

During the latter half of the fiscal year a new bill of materials, based on the provisions of the revised NEO planning, was being prepared.

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<sup>7</sup>Memo, G4 Plans Br to ACoS G4, 26 Jul 57, subj: Emergency Rail Evacuation of Supplies. SECRET. In G4 Plans Br, ETSSE (1957).

<sup>8</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 22 Aug 57, subj: Evacuation of Supplies. AEAGD-PS 400 GD. (3) DF, USAREUR ACoS G4 to QM, 14 Oct 57, same subj and file. All SECRET.

<sup>9</sup>Cable SX-5046, USAREUR to subor comds, 26 Aug 57. SECRET.

<sup>10</sup>DF, G4 to distr, 22 Oct 57, subj: Evacuation of Supplies. AEAGD-PS 400 GD. SECRET.

<sup>11</sup>USACOMZEUR ltr, 21 Mar 58, subj: Evacuation of Supplies and Equipment (U). AEZLG-PL 250/18 AG. SECRET.

<sup>12</sup>Cable SX-1057, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, et al., 6 Jan 58. CONF.

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A set of gross requirements for the operation was developed, against which current TOE and other operational assets would be matched. The net requirements would then be balanced against the old bill of materials currently on hand in order to determine what items would have to be requisitioned from the United States.<sup>13</sup>

Service area requirements were to include POL stocks on the basis of 15 gallons per vehicle; transportation, medical evacuation, and emergency facilities; ordnance light maintenance service; and rest and comfort facilities. On the other hand, the staging areas had to be prepared to support a large number of women and children for up to 30 days. They therefore needed more elaborate and extensive stocks and preparations than service areas, even though only minimum essential facilities were to be provided. In an effort to reduce the transportation requirements for POL to a minimum, prestocks were to be located at or near the place where they would be needed.<sup>14</sup> NEO assets and requirements were still being reviewed at the end of the fiscal year; the status of NEO stocks on hand in France on 21 May 1958 is shown in Table 5.

(3) Berlin Planning (EP 102). During FY 1958 a new support plan for a Berlin airlift, which was to replace outdated previous plans, was prepared on a unilateral basis. The airlift operation was to take place in two phases, with the first phase conducted from Rhein-Main Airbase and the second phase from the airfield at Wunsdorf. At L-day a minimum of 250 metric tons of fresh food, in addition to mail, industrial raw materials, and garrison requirements, would have to be airlifted. The immediate support requirements for West Berlin were estimated at a minimum of 500 metric tons a day. To sustain the economy of West Berlin, the highest possible priority would have to be given to industrial requirements--amounting to approximately 600 metric tons a day on L-day and increasing to 1,200 tons a day by L/90. USAREUR airlift responsibilities included the organization of a ground support command capable of cargo handling and traffic management. Eventually this command would be replaced by German units, over which USAREUR was to exercise direction and control. The plan provided for development of a cargo handling capacity--including both inbound and outbound cargo--of 1,500 metric tons a day by L/30, increasing to 2,280 tons by L/60 and 2,945 tons by L/90.<sup>15</sup>

(4) Middle East Planning (EP 201). Because of increasing tensions in the Afro-Arabian areas, logistical planning in support of USAREUR EP 201

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<sup>13</sup> Memo, Maj E. L. McCoy, G4 Plans Br Emerg Plans Sec, to Col J. H. Wagner, C/G4 Plans Br, n.d., subj: Development of NEO Requirements. UNCLAS. In G4 Plans Br, 250/18 NEO #1 (1958).

<sup>14</sup> Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 26 May 58, subj: NEO Assets and Requirements (U). AEAGD-PS 250/18 GD. CONF.

<sup>15</sup> USAREUR Support Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Unilateral) (C), 21 Feb 58. TC 28-20. SECRET NOFORN. In G4 Plans Br, 250/18 EP 102 (1958).

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Table 5--Status of NEO Stocks in France, 31 May 1958

1. Class I<sup>a/</sup>

- a. 3,750,000 adult rations, including 486,000 C rations.<sup>b/</sup>
- b. 600,000 infant rations, including strained and chopped baby foods, evaporated milk, and corn syrup.

2. Class III<sup>c/</sup>

Fifteen gallons per vehicle scheduled to pass through each service area. Approximately 600,000 vehicles were to be supported.

3. Classes II and IV

Supply and material requirements adequate to shelter and support approximately 30,000 noncombatants for 30 days were stocked at each of the following installations:

- |                  |              |             |           |
|------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Chinon        | c. Ingrandes | e. Poitiers | g. Bussac |
| b. Croix Chapeau | d. Braconne  | f. Fontenet |           |

4. EES Supplies<sup>d/</sup>

Packages and prestocks at each of the installations listed above to support 200,000 noncombatants. Quantities per 1,000 noncombatants were as follows:

- |                               |          |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| a. Nursing bottles, with caps | 12 dozen |
| b. Disposable diapers         | 10 cases |
| c. Baby powder                | 3 cases  |
| d. Absorbent cotton           | 1 case   |
| e. Cleansing tissue           | 2 cases  |
| f. Petroleum jelly            | 1 case   |
| g. Sanitary napkins           | 1 case   |
| h. Aspirin                    | 1 case   |
| i. Baby oil                   | 10 cases |
| j. Adhesive plaster           | 1 case   |

- a. Rations were evenly distributed and stocked at the installations listed in 3 above. All rations not consumed in staging areas were to be shipped to safehavens concurrent with the movement of the last convoys.
- b. These rations, supplemented by available EES and commissary stocks, were considered adequate to provide minimum caloric requirements for 200,000 noncombatants for 30 days.
- c. Total Class III stocked at each installation varied, depending upon the number of service areas supported per installation.
- d. EES supplies were not intended for use in staging areas but were to be moved to safehavens.

Source: Cable SX-4238, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 May 58. CONF.

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grew in importance. In November 1957 USAREUR recommended prestocking the required classes I, III, and V items at suitable locations. In conveying the approval of the prestocking plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army directed that an operational project be used as a basis for replenishing USAREUR theater reserve stocks.<sup>16</sup> In May 1958 USAREUR established Project Number ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-1-58; it provided for prestocks in the objective area, items to be stocked in Seventh Army facilities, initial issue requirements to be stocked in USACOMZEUR, resupply items for Forces Alfa and Bravo to be prestocked in USACOMZEUR, and 20 days of resupply requirements for Army Task Force (ATF) 201. In general, the project included items of all classes of supply not currently authorized for USAREUR or, if authorized, requiring relocation.<sup>17</sup> The bill of materials for the new project was not completed by 30 June 1958. Actual positioning of the prestocks was deferred until formal approval could be obtained from the nations involved.<sup>18</sup>

#### 76. Requirements Planning

In requirements planning, the destruction that USAREUR installations were expected to suffer during an initial exchange of atomic attacks was related to the logistical capability needed to support wartime operational concepts.

a. Concept C Revised.<sup>19</sup> Economy measures imposed by the Department of the Army hampered the implementation of Concept C during FY 1958. At the same time, the threat of atomic warfare required a more realistic repositioning of USAREUR reserve stocks. Existing plans were therefore to be so revised that Seventh Army could be supported from the ADSEC area for approximately 40 days of actual combat without moving up additional reinforcements or supplies; this would permit reducing BASEC to a reserve or standby status during peacetime. Maximum peacetime economy was to be effected in replenishing the forward depots by using the cheapest routing from the United States. The ratio of cargo tonnages to be channeled through the various port areas was once more revised, with only 20 percent to be received through the French ports and 80 percent through the North Sea ports

<sup>16</sup> Cable DA-935951, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 58. SECRET. For further information, see the top secret supplement to this report.

<sup>17</sup> USAREUR ltr, 13 May 58, subj: Class IV Project in Support of EP 201 (U). AEAGD-RR 250/18 AG (AG-AO). SECRET.

<sup>18</sup> Cable MLP-A-37634, CINCUSAFE to CINCSPCOMME, 24 Jul 58. SECRET. In G4 Plans Br, EP 201 Cables.

<sup>19</sup> Concept C provided for the buildup of the line of communication through France and the simultaneous phasing down of the Bremerhaven line of communication, with all war-risk material to be received through France and only nonwar-risk items through Bremerhaven. SECRET.

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of Bremerhaven and Rotterdam. In general, cargo destined for BASEC and all POL supplies were to be shipped through the French port complex. Cargo intended for Germany and ADSEC was to be routed through the North Sea ports without any distinction between war- and nonwar-risk items.<sup>20</sup> This was a drastic reversal of original plans, which provided for 70 per cent of the cargo to be routed through the French port complex and 30 per cent through Bremerhaven. However, significant savings were expected to result from shortening the peacetime line of communication, increasing stock levels and missions of the forward depots, and reducing BASEC to a reserve status.<sup>21</sup>

In notifying the Department of the Army of its intentions to revise Concept C, USAREUR indicated that the major share of cargo tonnages would be shipped through the North Sea ports. The diversions of increased tonnages to the French ports during FY 1957, which had been directed by the Department of the Army, had increased operational costs by over \$3,800,000. The Revised Concept C operations would save some \$1,500,000 in FY 1958 and approximately \$3,000,000 in FY 1959.<sup>22</sup> The Department of the Army replied that increased operational costs for using the French port complex had been considered in determining the USAREUR Annual Funding Program for FY 1958. Consequently, no changes were to be made in the USAREUR supply pattern, and implementation of the revised Concept C should be deferred until the pertinent staff studies had been completed. These studies were to consider such factors as the cost of reassigning depot functions, the political implications, including possible misinterpretation of the proposed changes by the various governments involved, and the continued capability of USACOMZEUR.<sup>23</sup>

On 9 October, however, CINCUSAREUR verbally approved the recommendations of his logistical planners and directed that the Concept C plans be revised accordingly. Supplies for 30 days were to be stored in ADSEC installations west of the Rhine River, and supplies for 10 days were to be prestocked at multiservice supply points east of the river. The USACOMZEUR depots were to be converted into balanced, multiservice installations as quickly as possible. Moreover, in imposing personnel or fund reductions on USACOMZEUR, every effort was to be made to maintain ADSEC's

<sup>20</sup>(1) DF, G4 to Tech Svcs, 4 Sep 57, subj: LOFC Realignment. SECRET.  
(2) Memo, C/G4 Svcs Br to C/Plans Br, 6 Sep 57, same subj. CONF. (3) DF, ACoS G4 to C/Plans Br, 27 Sep 57, subj: USAREUR Construction Programming Board Meeting (U). CONF. (4) DF, QM to ACoS G4, 4 Oct 57, subj: Outline Plan for Major ComZ Installations and their Missions. SECRET. All in G4 Plans Br, LOFC Realignment (1957), Vol. II.

<sup>21</sup>Stf Study, G4, 8 Oct 57, subj: Concept C Revised. SECRET. In file above.

<sup>22</sup>Cable SX-5629, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 6 Sep 57. SECRET.

<sup>23</sup>Cable DA-929395, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 57. SECRET.

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capability to store and function in its wartime role.<sup>24</sup> Concurrently, the Department of the Army was informed that maximum transportation economies were already in effect. Following the reduction in command funding levels for FY 1958, the receipt of major tonnages through the French ports could no longer be supported.<sup>25</sup> Actually, the changes constituted only a partial reversal of the original Concept C plans. They were made solely in the interests of economy of operation, and USAREUR intended to exercise the line of communication through France to the maximum extent possible.<sup>26</sup>

(1) Diversions of Cargo from LOFC Ports. In the future no distinction was to be made between war- and nonwar-risk items in routing technical service cargo through the port of discharge that provided the lowest delivery cost to the point of first destination. Only items destined for installations in BASEC were to be discharged in the French port complex. Rotterdam was to be the port of discharge for quartermaster class I non-perishable items, for classes II and IV supplies and equipment--except vehicles--destined for both ADSEC and Germany, for wheeled and tracked vehicles destined for ADSEC, and for outsize pieces weighing more than 40 tons. Bremerhaven was to be the port of discharge for all wheeled and tracked vehicles destined for Germany, with the exception of heavy outsize items, and for all class V items destined for either ADSEC or Germany. Quartermaster class I chill-and-freeze items and class III supplies would continue to be routed through Bremerhaven and Donges, respectively.<sup>27</sup>

(2) New Administrative Instructions. USAREUR's new administrative instructions pertaining to the revised Concept C provided that the zone comprising the ADSEC and Seventh Army areas be stocked with sufficient Special Theater Reserve Number 1<sup>28</sup> supplies and equipment to sustain wartime operations for 35 to 40 days. Though in a reserve status, BASEC installations were to be capable of expanding to full operation by no later than D+30. The major peacetime line of communication was to pass through the North Sea ports to active ADSEC depots, unless shipment through

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<sup>24</sup>(1) Memo, CINCUSAREUR to ACofS G4, 7 Nov 57, subj: LOFC Realignment. CONF. (2) DF, ACofS G4 to SGS, 18 Oct 57, subj: Concept C Revised. AEAGD-PL 400 GD. SECRET. (3) Ltr, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 25 Oct 57, same subj. SECRET. All in G4 Plans Br, LOFC Realignment (1957), Vol. II.

<sup>25</sup>Cable SX-6317, CINCUSAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 9 Oct 57. SECRET.

<sup>26</sup>Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen C. B. Magruder, DCSLOG, 24 Oct 57. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 322 ComZ (1957).

<sup>27</sup>Cable SX-6337, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 10 Oct 57. CONF.

<sup>28</sup>Special Theater Reserve Number 1 was a reserve of materiel for the post D-day support of U.S. Army forces in Europe, plus a limited quantity of supplies earmarked for the reinforcements scheduled to arrive by D+30. SECRET.

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French ports was more economical. A reduced line of communication through the west coast ports of France was to be kept intact to maintain BASEC in reduced operation. Repositioning of the stocks was to be accomplished without extra construction or real estate acquisition. The USACOMZEUR program of establishing from 3 to 5 general depots in the ADSEC area was to be continued. Special Theater Reserve Number 1 stocks were to be so repositioned as to provide a minimum of 20 days' supply at wartime rates in ADSEC installations. BASEC stock levels could then be readjusted in accordance with the current theater limits for the special reserve. The missions of the ADSEC installations were to be increased to insure sustained support of the shortened peacetime line of communication and to maintain the Seventh Army in the highest possible state of readiness for war. In addition to USACOMZEUR stockage, the Seventh Army was to maintain 3 days' supply at wartime rates in the hands of its units, 7 additional days' at prestock points east of the Rhine River, and 5 days' in Seventh Army installations west of the Rhine.<sup>29</sup>

(3) USEUCOM Objections. USEUCOM objected to the new administrative instructions implementing the revised Concept C and pointed out that the Department of the Army had never approved such a revision. Being primarily concerned with the logistical readiness of the U.S. forces to perform their assigned missions in the event of war, USEUCOM directed suspension of any actions that would alter USAREUR's logistical structure or would implement a revised Concept C. The plans would have to be further reviewed, and USAREUR would have to answer a number of questions before the revised concept could be recommended to the Department of the Army for final approval.<sup>30</sup>

(4) Department of the Army Directives. This situation changed when the Department of the Army restored some of the previously imposed personnel reductions. In redefining the missions that were to be accomplished within the newly established troop ceiling and structure, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to maintain five full-strength divisions, to keep the communications zone in operational status all the way from the Atlantic Ocean to West Germany, to maintain the line of communication through France in condition to respond to an emergency, and to move all war-risk cargo over it.<sup>31</sup>

According to the Department of the Army, the degree of operational readiness of the French line of communication would depend mainly upon establishing a workload that provided for continuous exercise of all

<sup>29</sup>USAREUR ltr, 6 Nov 57, subj: Concept C Revised--Administrative Instructions (U), w/Incl 1, Administrative Instructions. AEAGD-PL 400 GD. SECRET.

<sup>30</sup>Cable EC-9-6330, USCINCEUR sgd Palmer to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Nov 57. SECRET.

<sup>31</sup>Cable DA-933097, DA from Taylor to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Nov 57. SECRET.

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phases of the system and for the highest possible state of training of the constantly changing civilian and troop labor force. Because of existing budgetary limitations, however, the diversion of specified items of war-risk cargo from the French ports to Rotterdam or other appropriate North Sea ports would be authorized. Tanks and other heavy items, for example, would have to be moved over the French line of communication only to the extent that both personnel and essential handling equipment were maintained in a satisfactory state of readiness.<sup>32</sup>

USAREUR did not object to making maximum use of the French line of communication so long as the necessary funds were made available. Additional costs for FY 1959, for instance, were estimated to amount to at least \$3.5 million. Moreover, according to Section 626, Public Law 85-117, 85th Congress, no Department of Defense appropriations were to be used for economic assistance to foreign governments. Based on past experience, USAREUR might be criticized for paying price differentials to receive war-risk supplies and equipment through France.<sup>33</sup> According to the Department of the Army, however, the major objective of routing all war-risk cargo over the French line of communication was to maintain adequate logistical support for the U.S. forces in Europe in case of an emergency. Any economic benefit that might accrue to France as a result of the implementation of this policy was merely a by-product and not an influencing factor.<sup>34</sup>

(5) Second Revision of Concept C. In conformity with these directives, USAREUR rescinded its orders to divert cargo from the French ports. USACOMZEUR was to receive all war-risk cargo through the appropriate French ports, except for Modern Army Supply System (MASS) supplies and certain specified items whose diversion to North Sea ports would have to be authorized by the Department of the Army.<sup>35</sup>

The administrative instructions for implementing a revised Concept C were also modified. The USAREUR objectives of repositioning supplies to achieve more self-sufficiency in the forward area and of establishing Special Theater Reserve Number 1 supplies at 40 days' wartime consumption rates within the ADSEC and Seventh Army areas were retained. However, the line of communication through France was to be maintained as fully operational as available funds and personnel permitted. War-risk materiel was to be shipped through the French ports and bulk POL was to be delivered through the pipeline from Donges to Metz. Funds expended on port handling and transportation of war-risk tonnages so shipped were to be isolated

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<sup>32</sup> Cable DA-935730, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 58. SECRET.

<sup>33</sup> Cable SX-1447, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 24 Jan 58. SECRET.

<sup>34</sup> Cable DA-936250, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jan 58. SECRET.

<sup>35</sup> Cable SX-1577, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 31 Jan 58. CONF.

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and reported separately in all future budget estimates and budget execution plans.<sup>36</sup>

Special Theater Reserve Number 1 items were to be repositioned in available facilities in West Germany and in appropriate ADSEC installations in France. Combat elements and other U.S. assigned forces in the combat zone would be backed up by 15 days' supply stored in the Seventh Army area and 25 days' under ADSEC control.<sup>37</sup>

b. USACOMZEUR Depot Outline Plan. USACOMZEUR had initiated plans for the establishment of a general depot system during FY 1957.<sup>38</sup> By the time they were published, these plans were outdated and had to be revised in accordance with the previously mentioned administrative instructions. In addition to implementing the forward supply concept for support of Seventh Army, the plans provided for combat reserve stocks to be dispersed over at least three sites in ADSEC--one of them in Germany--and two others in France. One general depot and an ammunition depot were to be established immediately in the German area of ADSEC and three general depots in the French area. Moreover, four general depots were scheduled for BASEC. At a later date two additional general depots were to be established in the German area of ADSEC and an additional general depot and an ammunition depot in the French area, while BASEC was to enlarge two of the general depots and establish an ammunition depot.<sup>39</sup>

The USACOMZEUR outline plan, though issued before the second revision of Concept C planning, was in substantial agreement with USAREUR's revised instructions; no basic change was required.<sup>40</sup>

c. Post D-day Logistical Support. The expected effects of atomic warfare on combat operations and on the logistical support systems, as well as the latest developments in the field of transportation, led to a reexamination of post D-day logistical support plans.

(1) U.S. Army, Europe. Prior to the beginning of FY 1958 the Department of the Army had decided that the major portion of combat

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<sup>36</sup>USAREUR ltr, 19 Feb 58, subj: Concept C Revised--Administrative Instructions (U), w/Incl 1, Administrative Instructions. AEAGD-PL 250/17 GD. SECRET.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., Annexes A through G. SECRET.

<sup>38</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 209-10. SECRET.

<sup>39</sup>(1) USACOMZEUR ltr, 27 Jan 58, subj: Outline Plan for Major ComZ Installations and Their Missions (U), w/Incl 1, 24 Jan 58, subj: Outline Plan for Major Installations and Their Missions. AEZLG-PL 250/16 AG.

(2) USACOMZEUR ltr, 14 Mar 58, same subj and file. Both SECRET.

<sup>40</sup>DF, USAREUR G4 Plans Br to Sup Br, 19 Feb 58, subj: Concept C Revised (U). AEAGD-PL 250/17 GD. UNCLAS.

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reserve items should be positioned in Europe. As a result, all or part of Special Theater Reserve Number 3<sup>41</sup> would have to be moved to Europe. While a departmental staff study indicated that USAREUR had neither storage facilities nor sufficient personnel to accommodate the entire Special Theater Reserve Number 3, stockage of essential combat reserve items for an additional 30 days, excluding class V and bulk class III supplies, was feasible.<sup>42</sup> However, such an increase of 30 additional days' supply would not eliminate the requirement for Special Theater Reserve Number 3, even though some tonnage reductions in the various shipments could be effected. Because of the nature of the items to be stored, only installations west of a line extending from Verdun to about Toul, France, could be considered for use. If the present, aboveground-type storage facilities were to be used, one-time additional costs would amount to \$6,645,000 and annually recurring costs to \$2,250,000. If underground-type storage was to be used--as planned by both the Department of the Army and USAREUR--an additional \$12,240,810 would be required for one-time costs and \$1,889,450 annually for recurring costs. USAREUR also recommended that serious consideration be given to an increase in reserve levels for both classes III and III A.<sup>43</sup> These plans, however, were held in abeyance because of the economy measures that the Department of the Army imposed upon USAREUR during FY 1958.

(2) U.S. Air Forces, Europe. USAREUR planning for the post D-day Logistical support of USAFE concerned POL products and classes II and IV items. Of particular concern was the wartime supply of POL to the USAFE Dispersed Operating Bases. Current plans provided for the construction of supplemental pipelines to these bases and the erection of 10,000-barrel, bolted-steel tanks for terminal storage, but completion of such construction--unless accomplished prior to D-day--seemed very doubtful. Also, the bases generally had little or no existing storage facilities and were about 3 to 7 miles from the nearest railhead. For these reasons, the construction of the required tank facilities was initiated during FY 1958, with USAREUR engineer construction troops undertaking the work. In addition, USAREUR accepted responsibility for transporting POL on a point-to-point basis to the airfields rather than to the nearest railhead. Toward the close of FY 1958 the USAREUR Transportation Office and the Joint Area

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<sup>41</sup>Special Theater Reserve Number 3 was a stockpile of supplies and equipment maintained in the continental United States for automatic post D-day shipment to Europe. SECRET.

<sup>42</sup>(1) DA ltr, 17 May 57, subj: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AGAO-CC-400 (14 May 57) DCSLOG. (2) Incl 1, Stf Study, DCSLOG Stor and Distr Div Sup Br, DA, 10 Apr 57, subj: Combat Reserve Levels in Europe, to above. LOFC/C2. Both SECRET.

<sup>43</sup>(1) 1st Ind, Hq USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Oct 57, AEZLG-SP 280/56 (3 Jun 57), to USAREUR ltr, 3 Jun 57, subj: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AEAGD-RR 400 GD. (2) Incl 2, Stf Study, USACOMZEUR G4, Aug 57, subj: Increasing Reserves of Combat Essential Items in Europe, to above. Both SECRET.

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Petroleum Office were instructed to prepare a comprehensive base distribution plan for classes III and III A in support of USAFE post D-day operations.<sup>44</sup>

The Army and the Air Force had previously agreed to discontinue the storage of classes II and IV items of Special Theater Reserve Number 1 for the wartime support of USAFE. But, since the Air Force position on prestocking and resupply seemed unrealistic, USAREUR developed a new position on post D-day support of USAFE, which was to be discussed on the departmental level. Also, a list was prepared for the prearranged shipment of earmarked supplies and equipment--similar to Special Theater Reserve Number 3--from the United States to USAFE in the post D-day period.<sup>45</sup>

(3) NATO Forces. USEUCOM suspended the requirement for planning the post D-day support of NATO headquarters. This action resulted from a NATO study on the possibility of providing such support from other than U.S. sources. However, no final decision was made on this matter.<sup>46</sup>

## Section II: Management

### 77. Logistical Management

a. Transfer of Logistical Installations and Facilities to USACOMZEUR. Planning for the realignment of logistical functions between USAREUR technical service commands and USACOMZEUR had begun during FY 1956,

- <sup>44</sup>(1) Memo for rec, Brig Gen E. P. Newberry, USAFE DCS Materiel, 30 Apr 58, subj: USAREUR Post D-day Support Capability. SECRET.  
(2) Memo for rec, Brig Gen A. W. Beeman, USAREUR QM, 28 Apr 58, subj: Post D-day POL Support for USAFE (U). SECRET. (3) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to Engr, Trans Off, 7 May 58, same subj. AEAGD-PL 250/18 GD. UNCLAS. All in USAREUR G4 Plans Br, 250/18 USAFE Post D-day Support (1958).  
(4) Cable SX-3727, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, Seventh Army, 13 May 58. CONF.

<sup>45</sup>Memo for rec, Lt Col E. C. Holland, C/USAREUR G4 Plans Br War Plans Sec, 10 Jun 58, subj: USAFE Post D-day Support Requirements (U). AEAGD-PL 250/18 GD. SECRET.

- <sup>46</sup>(1) 2d Ind, Hq USEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Sep 57, ECJD-L, to ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Sep 56, subj: ComZ Wartime Logistical Support Responsibilities to Allied Headquarters (U). AEZLQ-PL 400 GD.  
(2) Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 8 Oct 57, same subj. AEAGD-P 400 GD. Both CONF.

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and selected installations and facilities had been transferred during FY 1957.<sup>47</sup> On 1 July 1957 the Rhine Ammunition Depot, the Rhine Ordnance Barracks (Central), the U.S. Army Quartermaster Market Center, the Signal and Ordnance Procurement Centers, and the Ordnance Finance and Accounting Office were transferred from the USAREUR technical service commands to USACOMZEUR.<sup>48</sup> With the transfer of the U.S. Army Transportation Depot, Sandhofen, on 1 April 1958, the reorganization program was completed.<sup>49</sup> With the exception of the Signal Command, all USAREUR technical service commands were discontinued on 1 July 1957, and the units previously assigned to them were assigned to USACOMZEUR or reassigned as separate commands and units of USAREUR headquarters.<sup>50</sup>

b. Reduction in Logistics Staff, Headquarters, USAREUR. Coincident with the realignment of logistical functions, CINCUSAREUR decided that the technical services staff divisions of his headquarters should delegate all operational functions and confine their efforts to policy making and staff supervision.<sup>51</sup> In November 1957 the technical services were directed to cease all actual operations without delay. Exempted were the medical and signal staffs and Transportation Division personnel in the processing field. However, even these staffs were to be reduced to a minimum consistent with wartime operations and the peacetime health and welfare of the command. A personnel reduction of approximately 50 percent in the technical services staffs was to take place shortly after 1 January 1958.<sup>52</sup> To effect such drastic reductions, all theater supply and maintenance functions--including execution and supervision--would have to be transferred to USACOMZEUR, with only relatively few personnel retained in the USAREUR technical services for policy direction.<sup>53</sup>

The personnel reductions approved in January 1958 ranged from a low of 28.4 percent for the Signal Division to a high of 48.3 percent for the Quartermaster Division. Even though the Medical Division continued to

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<sup>47</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 210-11. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>48</sup>DF, USAREUR ACoS G4 to ACoS G3, 16 Jul 57, subj: Progress Report, Logistical Reorganization. AEAGD-MN 320.2 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>49</sup>Cable SC-21646, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 27 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>50</sup>(1) DF, ACoS G4 to ACoS G3, 16 Jul 57, cited above. (2) USAREUR GO 162, 24 Jun 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>51</sup>Memo, ACoS G4 to Tech Svcs, 25 Jun 57, subj: Reduction of Personnel in Headquarters, USAREUR, Technical Services Staffs. UNCLAS. In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Tech Svcs Reduction (1958).

<sup>52</sup>Memo, CINCUSAREUR to ACoS G4, 7 Nov 57, subj: Reduction of Technical Services Staffs. CONF. In file above.

<sup>53</sup>Memo, ACoS G4 to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 30 Dec 57, subj: Reorganization of the USAREUR Technical Service Staff. UNCLAS. In file above.

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conduct operations, it took a 46 percent cut in personnel.<sup>54</sup> A reduction of approximately 352 spaces in the USAREUR technical services staffs was effected between 1 July 1957 and 1 April 1958. In April, 37 additional spaces were cut so that the supply and service personnel of those staffs were virtually eliminated.<sup>55</sup>

c. Transfer of Theater Logistical Functions. The transfer of theater logistical functions continued while these personnel reductions took place.<sup>56</sup> The majority of these functions--with the exception of certain medical, and quartermaster laundry and dry-cleaning responsibilities--were transferred to USACOMZEUR on 1 April 1958.<sup>57</sup> USACOMZEUR thereupon requested that all personnel actions affecting its future strength be suspended until after 1 June 1958, by which time the impact of the additional functions could be determined. Seventh Army objections to assigning to USACOMZEUR the authority to supervise, inspect, and issue directives within its area of responsibility were overruled by CINCUSAREUR. In approving its position with regard to personnel actions, he gave USACOMZEUR full authority to perform theater logistical functions in all his subordinate commands without distinction.<sup>58</sup> The new logistical mission embodying the changes resulting from the transfer of these functions was issued to USACOMZEUR on 17 April 1958.<sup>59</sup>

d. Reorganization of the Logistical Command Structure. An Unsuccessful effort had been made during FY 1957 to consolidate, reorganize, and reduce the USAREUR logistical support structure.<sup>60</sup> Shortly after the beginning of FY 1958 the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,

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<sup>54</sup>DF, ACofS G4 to CofS, 27 Jan 58, subj: Reduction of Headquarters, USAREUR, w/cmt 2, SGS to ACofS G4, 30 Jan 58. AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>55</sup>(1) Memo, Maj W. F. Veaudry, C/G4 Mgt Br Log Mgt Sec, to ACofS G4 & Dep ACofS G4, 3 Apr 58, subj: Reduction in Tech Svcs and G4 Strengths. (2) Briefing for CINCUSAREUR by ACofS G4, 5 Apr 58, subj: Transfer of Logistical Functions. Both UNCLAS. Both in G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Tech Svcs Functions (1958).

<sup>56</sup>Briefing for CINCUSAREUR, 5 Apr 58, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>57</sup>USAREUR ltr, 8 Apr 58, subj: Realignment of Logistical Functions. AEAGD-MN 250/17 AG (AG-AO). UNCLAS.

<sup>58</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 5 Apr 58, subj: Realignment of Logistical Functions, w/cmt 2, SGS to ACofS G4, 7 Apr 58. AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS. (2) Memo for rec, Maj Veaudry, 5 Apr 58, subj: Briefing for the CinC. CONF. In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Tech Svcs Functions (1958).

<sup>59</sup>USAREUR ltr, 17 Apr 58, subj: Logistical Mission and Authority of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (U). AEAGD-MN 250/17 AG (AG-AO). CONF.

<sup>60</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 213-14. SECRET.

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completed a staff study showing the feasibility of combining HACOM and WACOM headquarters; personnel savings would result from the elimination of one of the major subheadquarters of the command. In approving continuation of the staff study, the Chief of Staff directed that a possible move of ADSEC headquarters from Verdun, France, to Kaiserslautern, Germany--where WACOM headquarters was situated--be considered.<sup>61</sup> The definitive staff study was completed in early October 1957, at which time it was decided to hold consolidating action in abeyance but to develop detailed implementing plans.<sup>62</sup> USACOMZEUR, however, objected to the displacement of ADSEC headquarters to the Kaiserslautern area on strategic, logistical, and political grounds.<sup>63</sup> In approving the USACOMZEUR position, CINCUSAREUR directed that the problem be restudied on the basis of three possible courses of actions: WACOM to absorb HACOM; NACOM to absorb HACOM; or NACOM to absorb the Mannheim-Heidelberg complex with Karlsruhe assigned to SACOM.<sup>64</sup> After having studied the recommendations that were submitted to him, General Hodes decided to consolidate NACOM and HACOM. This was to be accomplished by establishing a subarea of NACOM in the Mannheim-Heidelberg area with a subordinate post at Karlsruhe.<sup>65</sup> The effective date of the consolidation was 1 April 1958.<sup>66</sup> Toward the end of FY 1958 further consolidations were under study.

e. USASETAF Logistical Plan. In anticipation of assuming command over the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF), effective 1 January 1958, USAREUR developed a plan for the transfer of functions previously performed by that command as an independent component of USEUCOM. According to the USAREUR plan, USASETAF would retain responsibility for post, camp, and station supply, while USACOMZEUR would assume policy and technical supervision. Supplies shipped from the United States

<sup>61</sup> DF, ACofS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., subj: Consolidation of HAC and WAC, w/cmt 2, CofS to ACofS G4, 7 Sep 57. AEAGD-M. UNCLAS.

<sup>62</sup> DF, ACofS G4 to CofS, 5 Oct 57, subj as above, w/cmt 2, CofS to ACofS G4, 8 Oct 57. AEAGD-MN. CONF.

<sup>63</sup> (1) Cable SX-6375, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, WACOM, & HACOM, 11 Oct 57. CONF. (2) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Nov 57, subj: Plan for Relocation of Headquarters, ADSEC (U). AEZCS 250/18. SECRET.

<sup>64</sup> Memo for rec, Col R. W. Arthur, USAREUR Dep ACofS G4, 17 Dec 57, subj: Plan for Relocation of Headquarters, ADSEC. UNCLAS. In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Reorgn - HAC/WAC/ADSEC (1958).

<sup>65</sup> (1) Memo, ACofS G4 to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 23 Dec 57, subj: Consolidation of Area Commands. CONF. (2) Memo for rec, G4 Mgt Br, 27 Dec 57, subj: Area Command Consolidation. UNCLAS. (3) Memo, Dep ACofS G4 to ACofS G4, 27 Dec 57, subj: Results of Meeting with D/CINCUSAREUR. UNCLAS. All in file above.

<sup>66</sup> Ltr, Dep CINCUSAREUR to CG NACOM, CO HACOM, 6 Jan 58, subj: Consolidation of Northern and Headquarters Area Commands. CONF. In file above.

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to Italy would continue to be unloaded at Leghorn, and USASETAF would retain command of the Support Command and its subordinate elements, the general depot, and the port. USACOMZEUR would be responsible for supply control, stock control, and accountability over the U.S. Army's logistical assets in Italy. In addition, USASETAF was to be included in the USAREUR Financial Management System, was to be integrated into MASS at a date to be determined later, and was to be funded through USAREUR General Operating Agency 89 after discontinuance of its own general operating agency. USACOMZEUR was to be responsible for depot maintenance, while USASETAF was to accomplish its own field maintenance. CINUSAREUR would have to redelegate the procurement authority held by USASETAF. Finally, USASETAF would continue to provide service support from its own facilities, except that the mortuary at Leghorn would become an integral part of the USAREUR Quartermaster Mortuary Detachment under USACOMZEUR.<sup>67</sup> This plan was subsequently implemented.

#### 78. Financial Management

a. Stock Funds and Consumer Funds. In July 1957 the Department of the Army announced an austerity program that seriously affected operations under the stock and consumer fund concept. Obligations for the first quarter of the year were to be limited to 21 and for the first half to 45 percent of the total annual funding program. To accomplish this, USAREUR was to draw on stocks and defer replacement to the maximum extent possible until the second half of the fiscal year. Except for subsistence and medical supplies, the requisitioning objective for post, camp, and station supplies was to be reduced to 30 days plus order and shipping time.<sup>68</sup> In implementing this austerity program, USAREUR directed that stock-fund tools, equipment, supplies, and repair parts be requisitioned only to the extent required for minimum essential needs to protect the health and welfare of the command, for unanticipated tactical or disaster situations, and for immediately essential operational requirements. Subordinate commanders were to make maximum use of unit and direct-support unit account materials before submitting demands against theater stock-fund accounts.<sup>69</sup> The austerity program was partially rescinded for the second half of FY 1958, but curtailments were necessary in order to stay within the FY 1958 Operations and Maintenance

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<sup>67</sup>(1) Memo, USAREUR Dep ACofS G4 to all br chiefs, 27 Aug 57, subj: Assumption of Command, SETAF. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR ACofS G4, Outline Logistical Plan for SETAF, 15 Nov 57. CONF. Both in G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Reorgn - SETAF (1958).

<sup>68</sup>(1) Cable DA-544016, DA from COMPT/B-E to USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, et al., 31 Jul 57. (2) Cable SC-40354, USAREUR to subor comds, 3 Aug 57. Both OFLUSE.

<sup>69</sup>Cable SC-44794, USAREUR to subor comds, 5 Sep 57. OFLUSE.

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Program expenditure targets.<sup>70</sup> The expenditure controls retained for the remainder of the fiscal year affected stock funding and consumer funding only where repair of equipment was concerned. Subordinate commanders were to interpret serviceability standards so as to requisition only the most essential replacement parts for repair of equipment.<sup>71</sup>

(1) Effect of Austerity Program. In February 1958 USAREUR apprised the Department of the Army of the effects of the austerity program. Troop issues of supplies and equipment had been curtailed to a point below safety levels, and depot issues were restricted to emergency cases for troops and to those vital to the health and welfare of the command. These actions resulted in a heavy reduction of forward stocks<sup>72</sup> that could not be replaced; this in turn severely restricted field maintenance activities and greatly increased vehicle and equipment deadlines. Because of the need to remain within the expenditure targets, the shortage in consumer funds for the second half of the fiscal year was expected to amount to \$17,568,000--a shortage that would affect all consumer activities, including organization and field maintenance.<sup>73</sup>

(2) Third Quarter Obligation Rate. During the third quarter USAREUR reminded its subordinate commands that legislative restrictions on the obligation of funds during the last two months of the fiscal year made mandatory the maximum obligation of funds by 30 April 1958. By that date cumulative obligations were to be at least 83 percent of the command annual funding program. All consumers--except Seventh Army MASS--were authorized to requisition in excess of currently authorized stock levels so long as they did not exceed the normal consumption rate and the consumer credits available for FY 1958.<sup>74</sup> By 30 April 1958 cumulative USAREUR-wide obligations of operations and maintenance funds reached 86.3 percent of the total, and continued analysis was to assure maximum obligation of the remaining funds by 30 June.<sup>75</sup>

(3) Obligation of MASS Funds in the United States. The Department of the Army had been highly critical of the extensive deobligation of funds caused in previous years by compliance with regulations that required

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<sup>70</sup>(1) Cable DA-596207, DA from DCSLOG/J2 to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Dec 57. OFLUSE. (2) DF, ACofS G4 to G4 Brs, Tech Svcs, 18 Dec 57, subj: USAREUR FY 59 Preliminary Program and Budget Guidance to Subordinate Commanders. AEAGD-MF 120 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>71</sup>(1) Cable SC-13457, USAREUR to subor comds, 28 Jan 58. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Memo 700-12-1, 29 Jan 58, subj: Economy Objectives to be Attained. OFLUSE.

<sup>72</sup>Shelf-stocks located at installation-level supply points. UNCLAS.

<sup>73</sup>Cable SC-16010, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 14 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>74</sup>(1) Cables SC-22030, SC-22235, USAREUR to subor comds, 29 Mar, 1 Apr 58. UNCLAS.


<sup>75</sup>Cable SC-29455, same to same, 22 May 58. UNCLAS.

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Chart 4

## USAREUR Consumer Credit System



Source: USAREUR Cir 700-10, 12 May 58, subj: USAREUR Consumer Credit System.UNCLAS.

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the obligation of consumer funds under Project MASS for direct-delivery items on extract requisitions from the United States. To avoid a possible repetition, USACOMZEUR deobligated during the first half of FY 1958 some \$2.3 million of such extracts. Early in January 1958 USAREUR and USA-COMZEUR suggested to the Department of the Army that the requirement for obligating funds for extracted items be eliminated. This suggestion was not followed up; as of 30 June 1958 the USACOMZEUR supply control agencies held a balance of \$6,759,000 in unliquidated consumer funds against extracts from the United States. On the basis of past experience, approximately 80 percent of this amount would have to be deobligated, with a corresponding loss of funds to the command.<sup>76</sup>

(4) Withdrawal of Stock Funds to the United States. Repeated recommendations that stock fund accountability be retained in the United States and that USAREUR be treated as a single large customer of the Army Stock Fund<sup>77</sup> were not formally answered. However, USAREUR representatives were informally apprised of the opinion held by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics that the Army Stock Fund should be confined to the technical services depots in the United States and that consumer funding should be maintained at the theater level.<sup>78</sup>

b. Consumer Credit System. USAREUR had introduced the Consumer Credit System to ration available funds and control supply consumption.<sup>79</sup> Under the system, the adequacy of supply within authorized allowances depended entirely upon what each commander chose to "buy" with his consumer credits. The flexibility of choice depended largely upon how effectively he controlled the use of consumer credits within his command.<sup>80</sup> (For a graphic presentation of the Consumer Credit System, see Chart 4; for a review of consumer credit operations during FY 1958, see Table 6.)

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<sup>76</sup>Cable AEZCP-5-12921, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>77</sup>(1) Memo, USAREUR ACoS G4 to Asst S/D, Sup & Log, 25 Oct 57, subj: Stock Fund-Consumer Fund System in USAREUR. In G4 Mgt Br, 255/6 Stock Funding and Consumer Funding (1958). (2) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 3 Feb 58, subj: Operation under the Army Stock Fund-Consumer Funding Concept. AEAGD-M 253/6 GD. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>78</sup>Memo, Mr. O. J. Hankinson, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br Fin Mgt Sec, to C/Mgt Br, 5 Jun 58, subj: Trip Rept--Mr. Hankinson's Visit to Washington. UNCLAS. In G4 Mgt Br.

<sup>79</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 215-16. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>80</sup>USAREUR Cir 700-10, 12 May 58, subj: USAREUR Consumer Credit System. UNCLAS.

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Table 6--Status of Consumer Credits, Operations and Maintenance, Army, 30 June 1958

	<u>Annual Allocation</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Due-In</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$186,574,162</u>	<u>\$177,670,091</u>	<u>95.2</u>	<u>\$51,200,013</u>	<u>28.8</u>
<u>Tech Svcs</u>	<u>186,574,162</u>	<u>177,670,091</u>	<u>95.2</u>	<u>51,200,013</u>	<u>28.8</u>
Cml	1,368,855	1,339,078	97.8	170,599	12.7
Engr	12,485,041	12,165,559	97.4	4,771,243	39.2
Ord	104,284,162	96,448,390	92.4	35,583,842	36.8
QM	58,889,795	58,392,070	99.1	8,679,720	14.8
Sig	8,824,528	8,626,462	97.7	1,803,736	20.9
Trans	721,781	698,532	96.7	190,873	26.4
<u>Comds</u>	<u>186,574,162</u>	<u>177,670,091</u>	<u>95.2</u>	<u>51,200,013</u>	<u>28.8</u>
Berlin	1,178,311	1,177,725	99.9	168,996	14.3
USARPEB	904,873	904,871	99.9	177,986	19.6
USACOMZEUR	25,230,996	24,324,006	96.4	6,843,573	28.1
HACOM	6,051,787	6,048,312	99.9	1,125,136	18.6
NACOM	12,040,035	12,022,866	99.9	2,644,271	18.6
SACOM	16,310,841	16,225,636	99.4	2,807,565	17.3
WACOM	12,764,075	12,703,293	99.5	2,035,427	16.0
Seventh Army	110,327,937	102,569,000	92.9	35,006,000	34.1
Engr	1,171,990	1,122,088	95.7	315,963	28.1
Sig	593,317	572,294	96.4	75,096	12.6

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Source: USAREUR G4 Mgt Br Fin Mgt Sec. UNCLAS.



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Section III: Advanced Weapons

The Department of the Army programmed the issuance of seven types of advanced weapons both to USAREUR and to NATO forces during the period from the beginning of FY 1958 until the end of FY 1963. These weapons would include Honest John and Little John rockets, Corporal/Sergeant, Redstone, LaCrosse, and Hawk guided missiles, as well as Nike guided missiles of the Ajax and the more powerful Hercules types.<sup>81</sup>

79. NATO Support Functions

In May 1957 the Department of the Army had asked USAREUR to develop the logistical capability deemed essential to support all U.S. ground forces advanced weapons destined for Europe. The guidance provided for this purpose included information on supply support and maintenance responsibilities for missile systems<sup>82</sup> and on atomic warhead supply and support.<sup>83</sup>

Pertinent USAREUR plans were repeatedly revised during FY 1958. The first logistical support plan, dated 17 July 1957,<sup>84</sup> was revised at the request of the Department of the Army, which asked for separate annexes dealing with supply, maintenance, transportation, communications, personnel and administration, and the proposed organization of required units.<sup>85</sup> The revised plan, completed in February 1958, was again changed in May. This final plan was considered fundamentally sound, so that its vital data could be used by departmental staffs to initiate essential programming of advanced-weapons logistical support for non-U.S. NATO countries.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>81</sup> DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 11 Jun 58, subj: USAREUR Missile and Weapons Program, 1 Jul 58-30 Jun 63 (U). AEAGC-250/H5.3 GC. SECRET.

<sup>82</sup> The complete guided-missile or free-rocket delivery system includes the launcher equipment, ground guidance equipment, and other ancillary and component equipment except the atomic warhead. SECRET.

<sup>83</sup> DA ltr, 29 May 57, subj: Logistical Support of Advanced U.S. Weapons in Europe (U). AGAM-P 471.6 TS (15 May 57) DCSLOG. TS (info used SECRET).

<sup>84</sup> USAREUR Log Spt Plan of Adv U.S. Wpns (U), 17 Jul 57. USAREUR/GLD/7-57. TS (info used UNCLAS). In G4 TS, AG 3277.

<sup>85</sup> DF, ACoFS G4 to stf divs, 14 Jan 58, subj: USAREUR Logistical Support Plan of Advanced U.S. Weapons (U). AEAGD-RW 280/H5.3 G4. TS (info used SECRET NOFORN). In file above.

<sup>86</sup> Wkly Summary of Maj Act, Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 29 May 58. SECRET. In SGS 250/58.

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a. Missile System Support. In accordance with the departmental directive of May 1957, USAREUR intended to establish Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) ownership accounts for the purpose of managing component repair parts and ancillary equipment for NATO missile systems. These parts and items of equipment were to be physically located in USAREUR depots, where they would be appropriately segregated. Inventory control points were to be established to perform separate supply and stock-control functions and maintenance-direction for the missile systems, to include calibration, surveillance, in-storage maintenance, and associated activities. USAREUR would accomplish all future resupply of repair parts, components, and ancillary equipment from the MAP ownership accounts. In addition, it would provide technical guidance and consultant services in order to aid the recipient NATO countries in establishing the required support systems and heavy-maintenance facilities. A 24-month supply of concurrent repair parts would be required for the initial basic load of direct- and heavy-support units and for minimum replenishment purposes.<sup>87</sup>

b. Warhead Support. Under existing legislation U.S. personnel were to exercise maximum control over atomic weapons earmarked for non-U.S. NATO forces. For this reason, CINCUSAREUR was to have operational control of all units involved in monitoring, storage, maintenance, modification, operational readiness, custody, and security of atomic weapons to be furnished to other NATO countries. Before dispersing warheads in support of any non-U.S. unit, CINCUSAREUR was to insure that the respective country had observed the bilateral agreements concerning the security forces, installations, and procedures for the physical security of atomic warheads. To achieve the desired atomic readiness of the NATO delivery unit, most of its allocated weapons were to be the basic load stored in the immediate vicinity. The remaining weapons, constituting the reserve, were to be stored as a maintenance float by U.S. ordnance support units appropriately deployed to provide backup support. The basic load of surface-to-air missile warheads was to be assembled and retained on the racks at the launching site under the custody of U.S. personnel.<sup>88</sup>

(1) Unit Requirements. Because of this responsibility, one U.S. support detachment was to be allocated to each NATO surface-to-air missile battalion, whereas in the case of surface-to-surface missile units the ratio of support units would correspond to U.S. Army usage. Several U.S. Army support-group headquarters were to be established at command level, each of which was to administer a number of the detachments. These group headquarters were to be allocated according to the geographical area as well as to the density and dispersal of the custodial units. Finally, U.S. Army special-weapons

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<sup>87</sup>USAREUR Log Spt Plan for Adv U.S. Army Wpns in non-U.S. NATO Countries (U), 28 May 58, Vol. II, pp. 8-17. USAREUR/GLD/58-70. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In G4 Adv Wpns Br.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., Vol I, pp. 17-28. USAREUR/GD/19/58. TS (info used SECRET NOFORN). In G4 TS, AG 3277.

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support battalions located in various areas were to provide the maintenance for certain types of guided missiles.<sup>89</sup> In all, the plan called for the establishment of 11 support-group headquarters, 116 surface-to-surface missile support detachments, 57 surface-to-air missile support detachments, and 15 special-weapons support battalions. The activation of these units was to be phased through FY 1963, as required.<sup>90</sup>

(2) Storage Facilities. Requirements for storing atomic weapons included sites for basic loads and for the maintenance float (reserve). Initially all warheads were to be stored in basic-load sites, and only a relatively small number of maintenance-float facilities was planned at the special-weapons support storage sites, where additional igloos could be constructed if necessary. No basic-load storage facilities were to be constructed for surface-to-air missile units, since all such warheads were to be stored in the ready sheds at the launching sites. (For further details, see Table 7.)<sup>91</sup>

c. Implementation. Although the plan had not yet been formally approved by 30 June 1958, it was already being implemented in support of an Honest John battalion that the Turkish Army activated during the month of June.<sup>92</sup>

#### 80. National Support Functions

a. Receipt and Movement of Special Weapons. In August 1957 USAREUR published its new plan for the receipt and movement of the special weapons for which it was assigned responsibility by higher headquarters.<sup>93</sup> The new plan was implemented on 12 December 1957, replacing the USAREUR Special Weapons Logistical Plan that had been in effect since early 1955.<sup>94</sup>

b. Helicopter Resupply. When USACOMZEUR asked for the assignment of one helicopter company to carry out its advanced weapons support responsibility to the U.S. Seventh Army, French First Army, and NORTAF, administrative and technical difficulties prevented the previously directed

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., Vol II, pp. 25-38. USAREUR/GLD/58-70. Info used SECRET NOFORN.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 14-15. USAREUR/GD/19/58. Info used SECRET NOFORN.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., Vol. II, p. 52. USAREUR/GLD/58-70. Info used SECRET NOFORN.

<sup>92</sup>Intvws, Mr. Moenk with Col D. W. Hayes, C/G4 Adv Wpns Br, and Col W. J. Pritchard, C/Adv Wpns Br NATO Sec, 5 & 7 Aug 58. SECRET.

<sup>93</sup>USAREUR ltr, 19 Aug 57, subj: Receipt and Movement of Special Weapons in USAREUR (C), (RAMS) (U). AEAGD-SM 471.6 GD. TS (info used SECRET NOFORN). In G4 TS, AG 3206.

<sup>94</sup>(1) Cable SX-7581, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 12 Dec 57. (2) Cable AEZLG-8-18, USACOMZEUR to ADSEC, BASEC, 8 Jan 58. Both SECRET.

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Table 7--Advanced-Weapons Storage Requirements for Non-U.S. NATO Nations

Part I: Facilities Requirements

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fiscal Years</u>					
		<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
<u>Installations</u>							
Special-Weapons Support Storage Sites	<u>14</u>		3	2	4	4	1
Special-Weapons Support (Augmented) Storage Sites	<u>2</u>			1	1		1
Basic-Load Storage Sites	<u>116</u>	1	3	32	17	33	30

Part II: Cost Estimates<sup>a/</sup>  
(Millions of Dollars)

<u>Total</u>	<u>37.1</u>						
Special-Weapons Support Storage Sites	<u>21.0</u>		4.5	3.0	6	6	1.5
Special-Weapons Support (Augmented) Storage Sites	<u>4.5</u>			1.5	1.5		1.5
Basic-Load Storage Sites	<u>11.6</u>	.1	.3	3.2	1.7	3.3	3.0

a. Based on current USAREUR construction costs.

Source: USAREUR G4 Adv Wpns Br. SECRET.

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"in-place" transfer of the 26th Transportation Company (Helicopter). In an effort to give USACOMZEUR the required helicopter lift, the Seventh Army was directed to make available the necessary elements of the company so that they could train for their priority mission. In the event of an emergency, the entire company, with the appropriate field maintenance detachment, was to be relieved from its assignment to Seventh Army and transferred to USACOMZEUR. A suitable installation was to be prepared for eventually stationing the company as close as possible to the advanced-weapons depots in France. The outright transfer of the company to USACOMZEUR was contingent upon the arrival of an additional helicopter company in Europe and the provision of appropriate facilities in France.<sup>95</sup>

c. Storage. During FY 1958 storage facilities were needed to support 6 Corporal battalions, 4 Honest John battalions, 4 Honest John batteries, 6 Nike-Ajax battalions, and 1 Redstone missile group. In addition, the Department of the Army planned to deploy by the end of FY 1961 1 Honest John battalion, 1 Honest John battery, 4 Redstone missile groups, 4 Hawk missile battalions, and 6 LaCrosse missile battalions. The 6 Nike-Ajax battalions were to be converted to Nike-Hercules missiles by that time. During FY 1958 the existing Type II magazines<sup>96</sup> were to be used for the storage of advanced weapons requirements. Future construction was to consist of two new structures designed by the Department of the Army: the Stradley magazine and the inert warehouse.<sup>97</sup> The inert warehouse was to be used for the Corporal aftersection, with fins, and for the Redstone missile, while other weapons were to be stored in the Stradley or Type II magazines (Table 8).<sup>98</sup>

d. Prestock Points and Depots. The FY 1958 antiaircraft construction program included an advanced-weapons prestock point at Morbach,

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<sup>95</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 18 Jan 58, subj: Helicopter Support of ComZ. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, CG USACOMZEUR, 20 Jan 58, subj: Helicopter Support of ComZ. AEAGC-OP 250/17 GC. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 250/H5 ComZ (1958).

<sup>96</sup>The Type II magazine is an earth-covered structure with inside dimensions of 40 by 60 feet; it has vertical walls and a flat roof, giving an inside height of 15 feet. The magazine is capable of sustaining an overpressure of 14 pounds per square inch. SECRET.

<sup>97</sup>The Stradley magazine is an earth-covered structure with inside dimensions of 26 by 80 feet; it has vertical walls, and the roof is barrel-arched, rising from a height of 8 feet at the walls to a crown of 14 feet. The magazine is designed to withstand an overpressure of 25 pounds per square inch without rupture. The inert warehouse, with inside dimensions of 100 by 200 feet, has the same physical characteristics and overpressure specifications as the Stradley magazine. SECRET.

<sup>98</sup>Memo for rec, USAREUR Ord Div, 1 Jul 58, subj: Requirements for Facilities for Guided Missiles and Rocket Storage (U). AEAOR-AW 250/H5.2 OR. SECRET.

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Table 8--USAREUR Advanced-Weapons Storage Facilities

Missile and Rocket Types	Number of Missiles and Rockets Available		Number of Magazines Required for Storage		Number of Magazines Available		Location
	June 58	June 61	June 58	June 61	June 58	June 61	
Total	1,652	4,278	87	218	177	299	
Corporal	114	156	19	26	2	2	Boeblingen <sup>a/</sup>
Nike Ajax	700	1,008	27	39	7	7	Munster <sup>a/</sup>
Honest John	838	1,408	41	80	12	12	Lorsch <sup>a/</sup>
Hawk	-	576	-	10	13	13	Bruchsal <sup>a/</sup>
Nike Hercules	-	84	-	11	13	13	North Point <sup>a/</sup>
Redstone	-	26	-	26	20	20	Rhine Ordnance Barracks <sup>a/</sup>
LaCrosse	-	1,020	-	26	30	30	Rhine Ammunition Depot <sup>a/</sup>
					80	80	Fischbach <sup>a/</sup>
					-	114	Vatry-Chalons <sup>b/</sup>
					-	8	Morbach <sup>b/</sup>

a. Type II.

b. Stradley type.

Source: USAREUR Ord Div Adv Wpns Br. SECRET.

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in WACOM. This project provided for the construction of 8 Stradley-type magazines, 2 of which were to be modified for the storage of liquid propellants. The eight magazines were scheduled for completion during FY 1960.<sup>99</sup> The original FY 1958 construction program for France included 3 major ordnance class V facilities--1 at Captieux, in BASEC, and 2 in ADSEC. USACOMZEUR had issued technical instructions for the Captieux depot in May 1957,<sup>100</sup> but four months later USAREUR suspended all further action on this project.<sup>101</sup> The installation scheduled for Captieux was to be relocated in a more forward area, and the 2 depots originally scheduled for ADSEC were to be combined into 1 facility. USACOMZEUR selected a site in the Verdun area for the facility previously scheduled for Captieux and one at Vatry-Chalons for the second depot. The two depot projects, which were to contain identical operational facilities, were included in both the FY 1958 and FY 1959 construction programs for France. The depot at Vatry-Chalons was scheduled for beneficial occupancy by the end of FY 1961; that at Verdun, by the end of FY 1962. The Vatry-Chalons depot was to include 114 Stradley magazines, 5 Stradley liquid-storage magazines,<sup>102</sup> 1 guided-missile heavy-support shop, and 1 guided-missile and heavy-rocket explosive shop. In addition, each depot included toxic-ammunition storehouses as well as administration and assembly buildings.<sup>103</sup>

e. Support of the Northern Task Force. The Northern Task Force (NORTAF), formerly the 1st U.S. Artillery Task Force (Provisional), had a wartime mission of providing atomic support to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).<sup>104</sup> Its peacetime mission was to be so trained, organized, and equipped as to insure successful accomplishment of its wartime mission. NORTAF, or the 42d Field Artillery Group, was regularly assigned to the U.S. Seventh Army for peacetime training, administration, and logistical support. In the event of an emergency NORTAF would be reassigned to USAREUR (Theater Army) on order of CINCUSAREUR, who alone had the authority to move the force--or parts thereof--when directed by higher headquarters. If and when NORTAF was deployed to, or carried out

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ltr, USACOMZEUR to JCA, 17 May 57, subj: Technical Instructions: BASEC Cl V Depot, Station 8331, Captieux Ordnance Depot. CONF. In USAREUR Engr Div Rep & Util and Const Br Adv Wpns Sec.

<sup>101</sup> Cable SC-46631, USAREUR to Dir USACAF, 18 Sep 57. CONF.

<sup>102</sup> A variation of the Stradley magazine equipped with drains and sumps. SECRET.

<sup>103</sup> Memo for rec, Ord Div, 1 Jul 58, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>104</sup> (1) USAREUR ltr, 21 Jan 57, subj: Establishment of Provisional Artillery Task Force (U). AEAGC-WP 471.6 GC. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMNORTHAG, 21 Feb 58, subj: Restationing of U.S. Battalion. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 250/H5 Emer Sec Planning (1958).

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peacetime training exercises in, the NORTHAG area, USACOMZEUR was to provide wartime advanced-weapons support and post D-day resupply of atomic weapons as well as conventional logistical support.<sup>105</sup>

#### 81. Nike Logistics

a. Acquisition of Sites. Acquisition of the first Nike launching sites in Germany had begun during FY 1957.<sup>106</sup> Of the 24 planned sites, 17 were to be located west of the Rhine--16 in the Rhineland Palatinate and 1 in the Saar--and 7 east of that river--5 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1 in Hesse, and 1 in Bavaria, a site that had been relocated from Hesse in October 1957. By 30 June 1958, 5 of the sites in the Palatinate were available, and 2 more were located on U.S. Army or German Army real estate, with the state (Land) government indicating favorable consideration. Of the remaining 9 sites, 3 were located on private property, and the state government's approval seemed possible; no consideration was to be given to the other 6 for the time being. Negotiations concerning the site in the Saar made satisfactory progress after January 1958, when the Saar was politically integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany. In Baden-Wuerttemberg, 3 of the 5 proposed sites were available for construction. Although the remaining 2 sites had been approved by the state government, local issues had to be resolved before construction could begin. The Darmstadt site, though situated on Federal land, had been rejected by the Socialist Hesse state government without any suggestion for an alternate solution. The Federal authorities documented the site in May, and site design was underway at the end of FY 1958. Negotiations concerning the remaining site in Bavaria were being conducted with the Bavarian government.<sup>107</sup>

b. Status of Construction. Contracts for construction of the first two Nike sites in the Palatinate had been awarded in April 1957.<sup>108</sup> Two sites were completed and occupied by firing batteries during FY 1958. (See Map 1.) Construction contracts were awarded for 1 site in the Palatinate in February 1958 and for 1 in Baden-Wuerttemberg in April.

<sup>105</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G3 to CofS, 19 May 58, subj: Administrative Letter of Instructions, NORTAF. AEAGC-OP 250/16 GC. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 21 May 58. In SGS 250/58. (3) USAREUR ltr, 29 May 58, subj: Administrative Letter of Instructions, NORTAF. AEAGC-OP 250/16 AG (AG-AO). All SECRET.

<sup>106</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 168-70. SECRET..

<sup>107</sup>Memo, ACoFS G4 to DCS for Adv Wpns & GM, 14 Jul 58, subj: Background Data on Nike Site Land Acquisition and Construction, w/TAB B, 10 Jul 58, subj: Nike Real Estate Summary, Status by Land. AEAGD-I 285/9 GD. CONF.

<sup>108</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY-57, pp. 170-71. SECRET.


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Map 1

Nike Sites, 30 June 1958



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Source: USAREUR G4 Instl Br. CONF

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At 8 additional sites construction was to start between 1 July and 31 December 1958, with completion and beneficial occupancy scheduled from 1 July to 31 August 1959. In addition to the launching sites, 6 ordnance direct-support shops and 1 ordnance heavy-maintenance shop were scheduled for construction. The first direct-support shop was to be completed by November 1958, while the construction of the other facilities was to begin during the first quarter of FY 1959, with beneficial occupancy scheduled for March 1959.<sup>109</sup>

c. Temporary Sites. Since real-estate acquisition and permanent site construction had not progressed sufficiently to accommodate the 6 Nike battalions, a program of constructing temporary sites was initiated during FY 1958. The funds needed for this purpose had to be diverted from essential USAREUR repair and utilities maintenance projects; consequently, only \$630,234 was allocated for the 24 firing batteries.<sup>110</sup> Altogether, 10 temporary sites were selected to house 2 batteries each, while 4 batteries were to be located at Baumholder; all sites were located on U.S. Army- or French-controlled property in order to obviate the need for German approval for construction.<sup>111</sup> The construction was completed in time to permit immediate occupancy by the Nike cadres and equipment arriving from the United States.<sup>112</sup>

Because of the haste in construction and the austere standards applied, many of the sites were unsuitable for extended occupancy and therefore required additional expenditures by the latter part of FY 1958. Delays in the acquisition and construction of the permanent sites meant that many of the temporary sites would be occupied for a considerable length of time. Improvements desired included the widening and strengthening of interior roads, walkways, and fueling and joining areas, as well as the construction of generator shelters, sentry boxes, and latrines. In addition, commercial power was to be installed wherever the expenditure was reasonable and could be justified by the length of occupancy. In April 1958 USAREUR allocated an additional \$250,000 for improvement of the sites, bringing

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<sup>109</sup>TAB C, 10 Jul 58, subj: Status of Nike Construction as of 1 Jul 58, to memo, ACoS G4, 14 Jul 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>110</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 170. SECRET. (2) DF, Air Def Div to Ofc of Compt, 8 Aug 57, subj: Funds for Unprogrammed Nike Requirements and Construction of Temporary Sites. AEADD 600.1. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br.

<sup>111</sup>(1) Cable SX-4945, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 1 Aug 57. CONF. (2) DF, USAREUR Engr to Air Def Div, 15 Oct 57, subj: Construction Progress on Temporary Nike Sites. AEAEN-RC 285/15 EN. UNCLAS.

<sup>112</sup>(1) Memo, C/Air Def Div Plans & Ops Br to C/Air Def Div, 31 Dec 57, subj: Temporary Site Construction. In G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec. (2) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col J. B. Clark, G4 Instl Br, 14 Aug 58. Both UNCLAS.

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the total cost of the temporary Nike program to approximately \$880,000.<sup>113</sup>

d. Basic Load Requirements for Permanent Sites. In March 1958 USAREUR established the basic-load requirements for Nike batteries occupying permanent launching sites and capable of maintaining their class V basic load of Ajax missiles. Each firing battery was to maintain 2 training missiles and 1 set of training warheads. The total on-site basic load for each firing battery--including training rounds--was established as 36 missiles. Thus, 864 missiles would be needed for the 6 Nike battalions on permanent sites, while 144 additional missiles were to be stored in ordnance facilities as a maintenance float.<sup>114</sup>

e. NATO Site Planning. In line with his over-all responsibility for technical assistance and consultative services in introducing Nike equipment to NATO nations, CINCUSAREUR was to assist in the planning, selection, design, and layout of launching sites and ancillary installations; in the installation of communications, fire-control, and operations facilities; and in the development of indigenous logistical-support systems. In addition, USAREUR was to be responsible for all Nike spare-parts supply in the NATO area and for depot-level maintenance until the respective countries could assume such responsibilities themselves.<sup>115</sup>

By 30 June 1958 USAREUR had furnished interested NATO countries--through their respective MAAG's--two full sets of construction plans and specifications of a typical Nike battery site. The plans selected for this purpose represented the USAREUR aboveground concepts and incorporated the essential elements of departmental technical guidance, except that NATO Nike batteries were to be composed of three launchers per section. This particular set of plans and specifications was also included in the "SHAPE Criteria and Standards for Nike Infrastructure" published in April 1958. Supply and maintenance support plans were prepared for France, the Netherlands, and Belgium in particular--the three countries intending to deploy their Nike battalions in Western Germany.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup>(1) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col Clark, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CO 32d AAA Bde thru CG Seventh Army, 25 Mar 58, subj: Funds for Temporary Nike Site Improvement. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>114</sup>USAREUR ltr, 17 Mar 58, subj: Ordnance Class V Support of Nike-Ajax on Permanent Sites (U). AEAOR-AW 250/17 OR. SECRET.

<sup>115</sup>USEUCOM ltr, 11 Sep 57, subj: Letter of Instructions, Nike Missiles for NATO Countries (U). ECMAA-472. CONF.


<sup>116</sup>Cable SX-4616, USAREUR to DA for CofOrd, 13 Jun 58. SECRET.

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
Chart 5

**Comparison of FY 1957 and FY 1958  
Obligations by Major Type of Requirements  
(Millions of Dollars)**



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Source: USAREUR G4 Proc Br. UNCLASSIFIED.



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Section IV: Procurement

During FY 1958 USAREUR procurement, including Deutsche Mark procurement, amounted to approximately \$283 million, which was about \$17.2 million more than in FY 1957. However, the FY 1958 figure included \$3.5 million for the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) and approximately \$22 million for the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France (USACAF), both of which were assigned to USAREUR during the course of the fiscal year.<sup>117</sup> (For a comparison of FY 1957 and FY 1958 procurement by quarter and by major type of requirements, see Chart 5.)

82. Transfer of Responsibilities and Consolidation of Functions

On or before 1 July 1957 the principal agencies engaged in procurement in support of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) had been assigned to USACOMZEUR, which supervised their activities. USAREUR headquarters continued to be responsible for over-all procurement policies and procedures.<sup>118</sup>

During FY 1958 the general reduction in MAP procurement, and the requirement to reduce personnel to the minimum essential in all areas, dictated a contraction of procurement activities throughout the command. The Ordnance Procurement Center field offices at Ankara, Turkey; Lisbon, Portugal; Bourges, France; Milan, Italy; and Frankfurt, Germany, as well as engineer offices at Berlin and Munich, Germany, were closed.

In March 1958 USACOMZEUR directed a further reorganization by consolidating the Engineer, Medical, and Signal Procurement Centers in Frankfurt into the USACOMZEUR Procurement Center, in the same city, effective 1 August 1958. In April USACOMZEUR directed that the USAREUR Quartermaster Market Center move to Giessen and merge with the Quartermaster Supply and Accounting Center into the U.S. Army Quartermaster Supply Center. This consolidation was to be effective 1 July 1958. During May the Ordnance Procurement Center, Sandhofen, was directed to merge with the 53d Ordnance Group into the U.S. Army Industrial Center at Sandhofen, to be effective 15 July 1958.

The consolidations effected during the first 9 months of FY 1958 resulted in a saving of 353 personnel spaces; it was anticipated that the consolidations scheduled for the following months would produce

<sup>117</sup>USAREUR G4, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, 15 Aug 58. UNCLAS.  
In G4 Mgt Br.

<sup>118</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 26 Jun 57, subj: Expanded Procurement Mission of USACOMZEUR. AEAGD 400.12 GD. UNCLAS.

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a further reduction of 196 spaces for a total saving of 549.<sup>119</sup>

### 83. Dollar Procurement

In FY 1958 offshore procurement was effected by USAREUR in support of the U.S. forces in Europe and of the Military Assistance Program. Table 9 lists the FY 1958 offshore procurement appropriated-dollar obligations by obligating agency. The total amount obligated was \$265,218,082, as compared with \$220,551,000 in FY 1957.<sup>120</sup>

a. Limitation on Obligations. When the Department of the Army imposed a limitation of 21 percent of the annual funding program for obligations during the first quarter of FY 1958 and a ceiling of 45 percent for the first half, USAREUR was also instructed to restrict offshore procurement to immediate operational requirements while maintaining only minimum operating levels.<sup>121</sup>

b. Procurement in Support of U.S. Forces in Europe. Approximately \$248.8 million, or 93.4 percent, of the appropriated-dollar procurement obligations for FY 1958 were in support of the U.S. forces; the principal procurement areas were subsistence items, construction, and solid fuel.<sup>122</sup>

c. Military Assistance Program. Procurement in support of the Military Assistance Program encompassed the Military End Items and Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Programs and the Consumables and Construction Segment.<sup>123</sup> MAP obligations totaled only \$16.4 million in FY 1958, as compared with \$43 million in FY 1957 and a peak of \$913 million in FY 1953. Procurement contracts were placed in 4 European countries--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy--for supplies, equipment, and facilities to be delivered to 11 countries in Europe and the Middle East, as well as to the Philippine Commonwealth.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup>(1) Stf Study, USACOMZEUR Gen Pur Div, 16 May 58, subj: Consolidation of Technical Services Procurement Centers. (2) Memo for rec, USAREUR G4 Proc Br, 30 Jun 58, subj: Computation of Procurement Personnel Data. (3) DF, USAREUR Compt to ACofS G4, 15 Aug 58, subj: Selection of Outstanding Management Improvements. All UNCLAS. All in USAREUR G4 Proc Br.

<sup>120</sup>(1) G4 Proc Br, Summary of Proc Act, FY 1958, 30 Jun 58. UNCLAS. In file above. (2) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 219. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>121</sup>Cable DA-554016, DA from Compt/B to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jul 57. OFLUSE.

<sup>122</sup>G4 Summary of Proc Act, FY 1958, cited above.

<sup>123</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 219. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>124</sup>(1) G4 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, cited above. UNCLAS.  
(2) G4 Proc Br, FY 1958 MAP-OSP Recap, 30 Jun 58. CONF. In G4 Proc Br.

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Table 9--USAREUR Appropriated-Fund Offshore Procurement, FY 1958

<u>Procurement Activities</u>	<u>Obligations</u>
<u>USAREUR Total</u>	<u>\$265,218,082</u>
<u>USACOMZEUR Total</u>	<u>\$133,924,852</u>
BASEC, ADSEC, OAC, Cen Proc Bd	33,099,862
Ordnance	30,769,982
Quartermaster	49,784,542
Signal	8,753,486
Engineer	10,771,166
Medical	745,814
<u>USAREUR Commands and USASETAF Total</u>	<u>\$ 62,127,231</u>
NACOM	19,081,690
WACOM	9,964,136
HACOM	4,470,994
SACOM	20,498,067
Berlin Command	134,838
USAPEB	4,427,611
USASETAF	3,549,895
<u>USAREUR Engineer Division<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>\$ 57,131,910</u>
<u>USAREUR Signal Division</u> (Circuit Ordering Agency)	<u>\$ 11,278,123</u>
<u>Miscellaneous<sup>b/</sup></u>	<u>\$ 755,966</u>

a. Including the Rheinau Coal Point and the U.S. Army Construction Agencies, Germany and France.

b. Including USAREUR G2 and Information Division, Det "R", USADEG, and the Publication and Training Aids Center, Hoechst.

Source: USAREUR G4 Proc Br. UNCLAS.

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(1) Military End Items Program. This program consisted of such ordnance and signal items as armored cars, personnel carriers, ammunition, radar, and radio equipment. Of the \$10,567,400 obligated for military end items, \$8,543,007 was for ordnance items and the remainder for signal equipment intended for Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Philippines.<sup>125</sup>

(2) Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Program. This program, instituted in FY 1954, served the purpose of increasing European production capacity for explosives and propellants. During FY 1958 USA-REUR executed four contracts for projects totaling \$3,608,145, all of which were located in France.<sup>126</sup>

(3) Consumables and Construction Segment. In FY 1958 the Consumables and Construction Segment aided Libya, Cambodia, and Turkey in meeting current needs of their armed forces. Items involved were uniforms and items of ordnance organizational equipment intended for Libya, water purification equipment for Cambodia, and bakery oven repair parts for Turkey. The FY 1958 program amounted to \$346,125--a small fraction of the previous year's total.<sup>127</sup>

#### 84. Deutsche Mark Procurement

Deutsche Mark procurement totaling some DM 75 million (\$18 million) for FY 1958 was accomplished in part with funds provided by the Berlin Senat for support of the Berlin Command (DM 41 million) and in part with Deutsche Marks generated through deobligation of occupation-cost and defense-support funds (DM 34 million).<sup>128</sup>

a. Liquidation of Occupation-Cost and Defense-Support Funds. During FY 1957 the German Federal Ministry of Finance had granted an indefinite extension for the liquidation of all unexpended Deutsche Mark balances held by the U.S. forces in Germany. The Deutsche Marks used during FY 1958 were funds that had been previously obligated but never expended. Approximately DM 34 million was thus deobligated and converted into new obligations.<sup>129</sup>

b. Settlement of Claims by the Federal Republic of Germany. Contract claims appeals involving procurement with occupation-cost funds had been transferred to the German Federal Ministry of Finance on

<sup>125</sup> FY 1958 MAP-OSP Recap, cited above. CONF.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> G4 Summary of Proc Act, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>129</sup>

Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Maj P. M. Anderson, G4 Proc Br, 20 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

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1 August 1956.<sup>130</sup> Between that date and 30 June 1958 the Federal Ministry of Finance adjudicated 133 contract appeals with a cash value of DM 21,560,163. While 27 appeals were denied, cash settlements in the other 106 cases totaled DM 4,117,846. As of 30 June 1958 there were still 164 contract claims appeals pending.<sup>131</sup>

85. Procurement in West Berlin

The most significant procurement action taken in FY 1958 to aid the economy of West Berlin was the publication of a USAREUR directive providing for solicitation of West Berlin suppliers on prospective procurement actions of \$5,000 and over instead of the previous \$10,000 minimum. An apparent result of this action was an increase of \$860,000 in the value of dollar-funded contracts awarded to West Berlin suppliers during FY 1958. The value of all contracts placed in West Berlin decreased by approximately \$2 million from the previous fiscal year total, due principally to the reduced availability of Deutsche Mark funds to the U.S. forces in West Germany and to reduced procurement by the Berlin Command.<sup>132</sup>

86. Debarment and Suspension of European Contractors

Prior to FY 1958 USAREUR had been responsible for preparing a list of debarred and suspended European contractors for U.S. Army procurement offices. In February 1958 USCINCEUR designated CINCUSAREUR as his representative for establishing, maintaining, and publishing a consolidated list of offshore suppliers against whom restrictions had been imposed or removed by either USEUCOM, its component commands, the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or the Treasury Department. The new list was to supplement existing Department of Defense mediums for imposing restrictions on suppliers and was intended for use in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility and the Middle East.<sup>133</sup>

The new USEUCOM list was published in April 1958; as previously, recipients were cautioned against releasing to unauthorized persons any information concerning the list, the restrictions imposed, or the

<sup>130</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 223. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>131</sup>Ltr, Ger Fed Min of Fin to USAREUR G4 Proc Br, 5 Aug 58, w/Incl 1. UNCLAS. In G4 Proc Br.

<sup>132</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 224-25. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) DF, G4 to Hist Div, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of Annual Historical Report, Hq USAREUR, FY 1958 (U). AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. SECRET.

<sup>133</sup>USEUCOM Ploy Dir 70-11, 20 Feb 58, subj: Consolidated List of Debarred, Ineligible, and Suspended Suppliers. OFLUSE.

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reasons for imposing the restrictions. One change to the list was published in May 1958.<sup>134</sup>

#### Section V: Supply Functions

##### 87. Implementation of Depot Planning

a. USACOMZEUR General Depots. According to a plan published in January 1958, the USACOMZEUR depot system was to consist almost exclusively of general depots and ammunition depots. As rapidly as the availability of personnel, funds, and facilities would permit, 4 general depots were to be established in ADSEC--1 of which was to be located in Germany--and 4 in BASEC.<sup>135</sup> In addition to the previously established Bussac general depot in BASEC, three new general depots were installed in ADSEC during FY 1958 at Verdun and Nancy, France, and Kaiserslautern, Germany.<sup>136</sup>

b. Field General Depots (Cut-and-Cover). In addition to operating general depots, USACOMZEUR planned to establish field general depots from which direct issue would be made only in the event of an extreme emergency.<sup>137</sup> Planning for the establishment of two underground general depots had been underway since FY 1956;<sup>138</sup> after numerous delays and setbacks USAREUR abandoned the idea of developing underground sites in August 1957 and directed USACOMZEUR to prepare plans for "cut-and-cover" storage areas with Yurt igloos and natural terrain features affording protection against atomic blasts.<sup>139</sup>

<sup>134</sup>USAREUR Manual 715-5, 24 Apr 58, "USEUCOM Consolidated List," w/Change 1, 29 May 58. OFLUSE.

<sup>135</sup>USACOMZEUR ltrs, 27 Jan, 14 Mar 58, subj: Outline Plan for Major ComZ Installations and Their Missions (U). AEZLG-PL 250/16. SECRET.

<sup>136</sup>(1) USACOMZEUR ltr, 21 Nov 57, subj: USACOMZEUR Depot Missions--USAGD, Verdun. AEZLG-SP 250/17. (2) USACOMZEUR ltr, 3 Dec 57, subj: USACOMZEUR Depot Missions--USAGD, Kaiserslautern. AEZLG-SP 250/17. (3) USACOMZEUR ltr, 18 Jul 58, subj: USACOMZEUR Depot Missions--USAGD, Nancy. AEZOR 250/16. All UNCLAS.

<sup>137</sup>USACOMZEUR ltr, 27 Jan 58, cited above. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>138</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 226. SECRET.

<sup>139</sup>(1) Cable AEZLG-IN-C2908, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Aug 57. (2) Cable SX-5278, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 19 Aug 57. (3) Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 30 Aug 57, subj: Cut-and-Cover Storage Area. AEAGD-I 600.12 GD. All CONF.

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(1) ADSEC. Altogether 56 Yurt igloos were to be constructed at a location having a long terrain compartment with numerous cross compartments in sides of hills to afford maximum protection. The area was to be rural and sparsely populated and the terrain not suitable for agriculture. Distance between the igloos would depend solely on the selected terrain. Real estate could be secured in small lots comprising only sufficient land for the structures, but additional rights-of-way would be required if public roads were not adequate. Parallel to the long axis of the main terrain compartment would run a two-way road from which short branch roads would permit access to each Yurt igloo in the cross compartments. Each igloo was to be in a hillside cut with the spoil used for construction of an earthen ramp barricade so located as to protect the exposed front of the igloo from blast. In addition, each igloo was to be provided with a small hardstand so that vehicles could turn around outside the protected area.<sup>140</sup>

In February 1958 USACOMZEUR located a site about 13 miles northeast of Metz, France. During the following months a design contract for the installation was awarded, a topographic survey of the site was completed, and tentative sites for all buildings were selected.<sup>141</sup>

(2) WACOM. The USAREUR MCA program for FY 1959 included the construction of an underground general depot in the caves at Massweiler, Germany. Use of these caves, however, was abandoned because the construction would have been too costly, the humidity control too complicated, and the vulnerability too great.<sup>142</sup> In October 1957 the Department of the Army directed that the depot be relocated to the northern Sarr-WACOM area to place it within V Corps boundaries; moreover, the underground concept was abandoned in favor of "cut-and-cover" construction.<sup>143</sup>

Based on the results of a feasibility survey, CINCUSAREUR approved the location of the WACOM depot in widely scattered, deep ravines in the extremely rough terrain of the Pfaelzer Wald, south of

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<sup>140</sup>(1) Cable SX-7056, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, WACOM, 15 Nov 57. (2) Cable SX-7057, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG/M2, 15 Nov 57. Both CONF.

<sup>141</sup>(1) USACOMZEUR ltr, 17 Feb 58, subj: Location of Field General Depot (U). AEZLG-IN 285/9. (2) Cable SX-2098, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 27 Feb 58. Both CONF. (3) Briefing for CINCUSAREUR by G4, 8 Jun 58, subj: Logistical Objectives for FY 1958, p. 2. SECRET. In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 FY 58 Objectives for CinC.

<sup>142</sup>Cmt 10, ACofS G4 to G4 Adv Wpns, Sup, & Instl Brs, 18 Jul 58, subj: Release of Caves in Pirmasens Subarea. AEAGD-PL 285/9 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>143</sup>(1) MRS, C/USAREUR G4 Sup Br to Dep ACofS G4, 17 Oct 57, subj: WACOM Underground Depot. In G4 Sup Br, 323.3 (1957). (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CO WACOM, 30 Oct 57, subj: Underground General Depot (U). AEAGD-I 600.12 GD. Both CONF.

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Kaiserslautern. Dispersal of buildings was so planned that no more than 2,000 square feet of storage space would be destroyed by an atomic blast from any direction. The facility was to store Seventh Army supplies of all classes for five days' consumption, except for large end items, advanced weapons, and their components. Packaged class III supplies for two additional days' consumption were also to be stored. As of 30 June 1958 the acquisition of the required small sites was in progress.<sup>144</sup>

#### 88. Supply Distribution Planning

a. The Army Primary Program. In FY 1958 the Army primary program for supply distribution was oriented toward the use of small, dispersed general depots designed for maximum protection from nuclear or chemical, biological, and radiological damage, sabotage, and theft. In general, levels of supply were not to exceed those established by pertinent regulations. However, supply stocks were not merely to conform to established levels but were also to correspond to local experience factors. In addition, stockage of perishable items was subject to further reductions as directed by the departmental technical services. For items not stocked in the theater, overseas commanders were to adjust the stated order-and-shipping times to provide sufficient procurement lead time.<sup>145</sup>

b. USAREUR Supply Distribution Program. Based on the Army primary program, and to the extent allowed by the availability of funds and continuation of the command's peacetime missions, the USAREUR supply distribution program for FY 1958 emphasized the general depot concept and protection against thermonuclear damage. Since the number of depots was to be held to the minimum consistent with the proper dispersal of supplies under thermonuclear warfare conditions, the use of small, dispersed general depots was advisable. Regardless of authorized supply levels, consumable supplies within the command were to be held to the lowest level required to meet normal consumer demands. Depots were to be prepared to receive and store materiel originating from new procurement--except that scheduled for direct shipment to the consumer--from the United States, from command rebuild facilities, and from excess usable property. In general, all units within the command were to be issued 100 percent of their authorized equipment, subject only to the availability of funds and spare parts and to the discretion of CINCUSAREUR.<sup>146</sup> (For the location of major depots, see Map 2.)

<sup>144</sup>Summary Sheets, G4 Plans Br, 30 Jul, 2 Aug 58, subj: Cut-and-Cover Plans in the Kaiserslautern Area. SECRET. In G4 Plans Br, 250/18 ABREST (1958).

<sup>145</sup>Change Order 2, 1 Nov 57, to DA Sup Distr and Maint Prog, FY 58 (U), pp. 10-11. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>146</sup>Prog 9, USAREUR Sup Distr and Maint Prog, FY 58, 21 Nov 56, w/Change Orders 1, 29 Apr 57, and 3, 22 Jan 58. CONF.


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MAP 2

## USACOMZEUR MAJOR DEPOTS AND INSTALLATIONS 30 JUN 58



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c. Revision of Department of the Army Theater Reserves. The Department of the Army required an annual review of the priority and selected nonpriority items contained in the USAREUR theater reserves. USAREUR's review for FY 1958, which was developed in coordination with USACOMZEUR and Seventh Army, represented the actual post D-day requirements; the revised lists were forwarded to the Department of the Army in February 1958. To prevent further delays while awaiting departmental approval, USAREUR proceeded with computing requirements based on the revised list of items, deferred submission of stateside requisitions for new items, and withheld excess declarations on available quantities of new items recommended for inclusion in the list.<sup>147</sup> During the month of June USAREUR received departmental approval of the quartermaster, medical, and chemical priority lists and the chemical and ordnance nonpriority lists.<sup>148</sup> Approval of the remainder of the lists was delayed beyond 30 June 1958 because of a difference of opinion on eliminating aircraft from the theater reserves.<sup>149</sup>

d. Improvements in the USAREUR Supply System. The USAREUR supply system was affected by the numerous major changes that had recently been introduced either by the Department of the Army or by USAREUR, itself. These changes included the adoption of financial inventory, accounting and the Army stock-fund program, the revision of Army Theater Reserve Number 1<sup>150</sup> in accordance with the departmental instructions of May 1956, the implementation of the multiservice storage system, the transfer of logistical operating responsibilities from USAREUR to USACOMZEUR headquarters, the implementation of Project MASS in the Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR areas and the integration of the two systems, the centralization of stock-control and accounting activities, the reconstitution of Theater Reserve Number 1 based on the pentomic reorganization, and the implementation of the Army field stock-control system. In addition to

<sup>147</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR ACoFS G4 to Tech Svcs, 22 Nov 57, subj: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AEAGD-RR 400 GD. UNCLAS.  
(2) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 27 Feb 58, same subj. AEAGD-RR 250/18 GD. SECRET.

<sup>148</sup>(1) DA ltrs, 12 Jun, 16 Jun 58, subj: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AGAM-P (M) 400 (3 Jun 58) DCSLOG. (2) DA ltrs, 26 Jun, 27 Jun 58, same subj. AGAM-P (M) 400 (13 Jun 58) DCSLOG. All UNCLAS.

<sup>149</sup>(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col W. W. Davis, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 30 Jun 58, subj: Supply of Aircraft to Theater Reserves 1 and 4. In C4 Sup Br, Stayback FY 58. (2) Cable DA-346695, DA from DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Jun 58. Both SECRET. (3) Cable SC-34727, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG, 1 Jul 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>150</sup>Formerly Special Theater Reserve Number 1. Redesignated by Cable DA-928508, DA from DCSLOG/C2 to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 23 Aug 57. SECRET.

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these changes in logistical concepts, numerous reorganizations were implemented on the basis of manpower studies and budgetary reductions.<sup>151</sup>

(1) ORO Study. In October 1957 USAREUR requested the Operations Research Office (ORO) Field Team of Johns Hopkins University to prepare a study of the USAREUR supply system in order to simplify procedures. ORO was to use the ordnance supply system as a model, since the problems encountered there would, in general, be typical, and the proposed solutions would be applicable to other technical services. Problems within the system were to be approached from the viewpoint of what was required by good judgment and common sense rather than what was dictated by existing limitations, including outmoded traditions and delineations of responsibility. Any recommended system was to be operable in both peace and wartime. Possible improvements would have to simplify and increase the efficiency of the system, while at the same time reducing the cost of operations in terms of manpower, money, and facilities.<sup>152</sup>

The ORO study team made its preliminary recommendations in December 1957<sup>153</sup> and submitted its final recommendations to CINCUSAREUR two months later. Recommendations were made in the following five areas:

(a) Supply Control. A theater logistical center was to replace the various agencies existing in the subordinate commands, and all supply management, information, and functions were to be centralized at one site. The center was to be located at an underground site and equipped with one large-scale electronic computer for all stock control in the command. Moreover, direct-support units were to be provided with transceivers for greater supply efficiency.

(b) Planning and Management. A permanent planning group was to be established to recommend changes in supply procedures.

(c) Depots. USAREUR stocks were to be withdrawn from participation in the Army Stock Fund System. Peacetime operating stocks were to be concentrated in a minimum number of depots in Germany, war reserves placed on a standby basis, and approximately 30 small general depots established in a standby status to supplement the existing depot system. In addition, one depot was to be selected for experimentation on personnel requirements, and a competent U.S. commercial agency was to be given a contract to conduct a time-and-motion study within the depots.

(d) Seventh Army. The study recommended that Seventh Army develop a system of composite direct-support units, design an adequate

<sup>151</sup>DF, USAREUR Sig Off to ACoS G4, 17 Mar 58, subj: ORO Study of the USAREUR Supply System (U). AEASC-PDIA 280/H5.3 SC. UNCLAS.

<sup>152</sup>Memo, CoS to Dir ORO Fld Team, 31 Oct 57, subj: ORO Study of the USAREUR Supply System. CONF. In SGS 471.6 (1957).

<sup>153</sup>Memo, ACoS G4 to CoS, 17 Dec 57, subj as above. CONF. In SGS 280/H5 Sup (GEN) (1958).

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number of general mobile depots for classes II and IV repair parts, transfer fourth-echelon maintenance to area commands, and abolish the consumer credit system.

(e) Area Commands. The only two recommendations pertaining to area commands were that they be organized in France on the same basis as in Germany and that depots with peacetime operating missions be transferred to area command control.<sup>154</sup>

(2) USAREUR Action. USAREUR headquarters accepted all the ORO recommendations concerning planning and management and Seventh Army; however, reservations were made as to relieving Seventh Army of fourth-echelon maintenance responsibility and withdrawing the consumer credit system. All recommendations regarding depots were accepted with reservations, except for the two concerning personnel requirements experimentation and the hiring of a commercial firm for a time-and-motion study, in which USAREUR nonconcurred. The recommendations pertaining to the supply control agencies and to the area commands were also accepted.<sup>155</sup>

(3) USAREUR Supply and Maintenance Board. The ORO recommendation for a permanent planning group, was to be implemented by forming a board of senior logistical officers.<sup>156</sup> CINCUSAREUR directed that the board study and evaluate not only the ORO proposals but the entire supply system. Maintenance organizations and operations in particular were to be subjected to close scrutiny. The major purpose of the board was to create a USAREUR supply system that would provide simple, efficient, and economical service in peacetime, yet at the same time insure effective support in the event of a war. The board was presided over by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and composed of the chiefs of USAREUR technical services, the Comptroller, the commanding general of the Seventh Army Support Command, the USACOMZEUR Engineer, the NACOM Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, and the Seventh Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G4.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Briefing for General Hodes by ORO, 24 Feb 58, subj: Supply and Maintenance, pp. 57-59. ORO-SP-5 (USAREUR). UNCLAS.

<sup>155</sup> Memo, ACoFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Mar 58, subj: ORO Study of the USAREUR Supply System (U). SECRET. In file above.

<sup>156</sup> Memo, same to same, 2 Apr 58, subj: Evaluation of ORO Proposals for Revision of the USAREUR Supply System. UNCLAS. In SGS 280/H5 Supplies (GEN) (1958).

<sup>157</sup> (1) Memo, USAREUR CofS to ACoFS G4, 9 Apr 58, subj: USAREUR Supply and Maintenance Board. UNCLAS. In file above. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 9 Apr 58, p. 1. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In Hist Div Docu Sec.

(3) USAREUR LO 4-437, 28 Apr 58. UNCLAS.

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Between 28 April and 30 June 1958 the board met three times and discussed supply and maintenance matters. Further study and tests were to be made of the more important board and ORO recommendations selected for implementation, whereupon final recommendations were to be submitted to CINCUSAREUR.<sup>158</sup>

89. Supply

a. Command Stocks on Hand. At the end of FY 1958 USAREUR's command stocks on hand amounted to 2,000,677 short tons, which was approximately 106,000 tons more than a year before. (See Table 10.) Of the total tonnage, 1,376,344 tons were stored in covered warehouses, and 624,333 tons in open storage spaces in Germany or France.<sup>159</sup>

b. Distribution of Stocks in NATO Combat Zone. SHAPE requirements for the logistical support of NATO combat units provided that a 10-day stock of all supply classes be located east of the Rhine River, and theater stockage for 90 additional days west of the Rhine. In February COMLANDCENT was informed that USAREUR was complying with SHAPE logistical directives, its stockage requirements east of the Rhine being 100 percent complete. Stockage west of the Rhine was complete only for class V, while the respective percentage of completion was 70 for class I, 65 for class III, and 88 for classes II and IV of all technical services.<sup>160</sup>

c. Theater Reserve Number 1. Theater Reserve Number 1<sup>161</sup> was a reserve of materiel for the post D-day logistical support of U.S. forces in Europe, plus a limited quantity of supplies earmarked for the reinforcements scheduled to arrive by D/30. This reserve was stored in Europe to meet the emergency requirements stipulated in the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan.<sup>162</sup>

At the beginning of FY 1958 Theater Reserve Number 1 consisted of 32 numbered sections and a 60-day combat reserve. In September 1957 joint action by the Departments of the Army and Air Force canceled Section 15, which had consisted of a 60-day maintenance and replacement reserve for

<sup>158</sup> Memo, ACoS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jul 58, subj: Progress Report--USAREUR Supply and Maintenance Board. UNCLAS. In G4 Sup Br, 280/H5.3 Sup & Maint Bd (1958).

<sup>159</sup> USACOMZEUR Depot Ops and Prog Perf Rept, 30 Jun 58. RCS-CSGLD-807. CONF.

<sup>160</sup> (1) Ltr, Hq LANDCENT to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jan 58, subj: Distribution of Reserve Stocks by Class in the Combat Zone, Central Europe (U). 6001/LOG/915/58. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to COMLANDCENT thru USCINCEUR, 27 Feb 58, same subj. AEAGD-RR 250/18 GD. Both NATO SECRET.

<sup>161</sup> Formerly Special Theater Reserve Number 1. Redesignated by Cable DA-928508, DA from DCSLOG/C2 to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 23 Aug 57. SECRET.

<sup>162</sup> Memo for rec, Lt Col Davis, 1 Jul 58, subj: Theater Reserve Data as of 1 July 1958. SECRET. In G4 Sup Br.

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Table 10--Command Stocks on Hand, 30 June 1958  
(Short Tons)

Type	Total	Percent	Ammunition	End Items	Repair Parts	Subsistence	Other
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,000,677</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>330,994</u>	<u>462,895</u>	<u>230,136</u>	<u>103,796</u>	<u>872,856</u>
Chemical	5,021	.3	1,170	3,552	299		
Engineer	260,662	13.0		248,771	11,891		
Medical	11,874	.6		11,874			
Ordnance	660,647	33.0	329,824	104,361	213,179		13,283
Quartermaster	982,697	49.1		58,702	1,647	103,796	818,552
Signal	32,477	1.6		32,477			
Transportation	47,299	2.4		3,158	3,120		41,021 <sup>a/</sup>

a. Rail equipment and water craft.

Source: USACOMZEUR Depot Ops and Prog Perf Rept, 30 Jun 58. RCS-CSGLD-807. CONF.

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the Air Force.<sup>163</sup> (For the composition and status of Theater Reserve Number 1 on 30 June 1958, see Table 11.)

During FY 1958 the supply levels for distribution of the theater war-time reserves in Theater Reserve Number 1 were revised in accordance with the forward stockage concept as follows:

	Total Days of Supply	BASEC	ADSEC	Seventh Army Prestocks
Class I	60	30	15	15
Class II & IV	75	45	30	-
Class III & IIIA	75	45	15	15
Class V	120	40	20	60

Seventh Army prestocks were accounted for and held in Theater Reserve Number 1 but were to be turned over to Seventh Army automatically on declaration of the reinforced alert or earlier on order of CINCUSAREUR. Seventh Army classes I and III prestocks for 7 days' consumption were located east of the Rhine River and 8 days' supply west of the River, while 15 days' supply of class V prestocks were located east of the River and 45 days' west.<sup>164</sup>

d. Critical Equipment in Short Supply. At the beginning of FY 1958 substantial shortages existed in ordnance class V items in Section 9 and in engineer and ordnance classes II and IV items.<sup>165</sup> By 30 June 1958 the ordnance class V shortages in Section 9 had been eliminated with the exception of M19 heavy mines and pull-type firing devices, both of which were scheduled for delivery during the second quarter of FY 1959. New shortages, however, appeared in Section 21, particularly for the 5-ton M51 dump truck. Serious shortages still existed in ordnance vehicles, tanks, guns, and ammunition, as well as in signal radio, telephone, and teletype equipment.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>163</sup>(1) DA ltr, 6 Sep 57, subj: Section 15, Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP (U). AGAM-P (M) (27 Aug 57). (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col Davis, 19 Sep 57, same subj. In file above. Both CONF.

<sup>164</sup>Memo, USACOMZEUR Dep ACofS G4 to Maj Gen E. J. O'Neill, CG USACOMZEUR, 21 Nov 57, subj: Supply Levels. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br, UCP folder (1957).

<sup>165</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 12 Aug 57, subj: Status of SR #1, RCS-AEAGD-168-R1 (U). AEAGD-RR 280 GD. SECRET.

<sup>166</sup>USACOMZEUR Perf Rept Supp, 30 Jun 58, pp. 14-21. SECRET.

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Table 11--Theater Reserve Number 1, 30 June 1958  
(Short Tons)

	<u>Target</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Total</u>	1,204,110.5	1,129,828.5	93.8
<u>Subtotal</u>	395,347.5	359,596.5	90.9
<u>Section</u>			
5. Medical combat replacement and expansion units	1,235	1,206	97.6
7. Engineer bridging equipment for training and emergency use	62,215	58,029.9	93.2
9. Barrier line	129,149.5	126,452	97.8
13. Noncombatant Evacuation Order	20,649.45	20,312.45	98.3
15. Canceled	-	-	-
16. POL 6-inch military pipeline material (flexible)	82,976	70,385	84.8
17. Port rehabilitation	9,094	9,283	102.2
18. Items to augment water supply capability	278	181	65.0
19. Fire-fighting equipment	773	750	97.0
20. Camouflage material	1,286	1,214	94.4
21. Construction supplies and equipment	8,272	5,906	71.3
22. Censorship supplies	185.55	48.55	26.1
24. Equipment for Groups F & G (major headquarters)	569	579	101.7
25. Chemical, biological, and radiological equipment	1,733	1,733	100.0
26. Generator reserve for USACOMZEUR	729	516	71.0
28. Railway cars	7,179	7,868	110.0
29. Floating equipment reserve	28,083	26,905	96.0
30. TOE equipment for airlift units	19,814	13,597.6	68.6
31. Engineer items for beach stabilization and airfield construction	21,000	14,515	69.0
32. POL bulk handling equipment	127	115	90.0
<u>60-day Combat Reserve Subtotal</u>	<u>808,763</u>	<u>770,232</u>	<u>95.2</u>

Source: USACOMZEUR Perf Rept Supp, 30 Jun 58. SECRET.

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e. Theater Reserves Numbers 3 and 3A. Theater Reserve Number 3<sup>167</sup> consisted of eight numbered shipments that were stored in the United States and were scheduled for automatic arrival in the European theater at 15-day intervals from D/30 through D/135.<sup>168</sup> In May 1958 the Department of the Army decided that henceforth the departmental technical services would maintain the supply requirements availability records for each increment of Theater Reserve Number 3. At the same time progress reports for the stockpile in the United States were suspended.<sup>169</sup>

After USAREUR was authorized to retain command excess stocks of Theater Reserve Number 3 items, the quantities stored in Europe were deducted from the stateside requirements. By 30 June 1958 these items--designated Theater Reserve Number 3A--amounted to 2,052 short tons of readily available material.<sup>170</sup>

f. Theater Reserve Number 4. Theater Reserve Number 4 was an in-place reserve of emergency stocks--similar to Theater Reserve Number 1--maintained in Italy to meet USASETAF requirements for transition to war-time supply consumption.<sup>171</sup> In January 1958 approximately 54 percent of the prepositioned portion of the 30-day supply reserve was on hand in two locations in the Verona-Vicenza area. The remainder of the reserve was stocked at Camp Darby, near Leghorn. Since USASETAF had no bulk storage facilities for class III supplies, only 25 percent of the class III reserve, stored in packaged form, was available. The remainder of USASETAF's requirement was on order with Italian commercial firms with a government guarantee of availability. USASETAF was thus placed in the undesirable position of being dependent upon outside commercial sources for the major portion of its post D-day class III requirements.<sup>172</sup>

As of 30 June 1958 USASETAF had on hand 5,578 tons of reserve supplies. Stockage of quartermaster classes I and III supplies was complete; ordnance and chemical class V supplies were 87 and 98 percent complete, respectively; and stockage of classes II and IV supplies varied by technical service.

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<sup>167</sup> Formerly Special Theater Reserve Number 3. Redesignated at the same time as Theater Reserve Number 1. SECRET.

<sup>168</sup> Memo for rec, Lt Col Davis, 1 Jul 58, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>169</sup> DA ltr, 9 May 58, subj: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AGAM-P (M) 400 (30 Apr 58) DCSLOG. UNCLAS.

<sup>170</sup> (1) Cable DA-564542, DA from DCSLOG/C2 to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Aug 57. UNCLAS. (2) Cable SX-7169, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG/C2, 20 Nov 57. CONF. (3) USACOMZEUR Perf Rept Supp, 30 Jun 58. SECRET.

<sup>171</sup> Change Order 2, to DA Supp Distr and Maint Prog, FY 58 (U), cited above. CONF.

<sup>172</sup> DF, USAREUR ACoFS G4 to SGS, 15 Jan 58, subj: Items of Interest for CinC's Visit to SETAF (U), w/Incl 1, subj: Background Information for CinC's Visit to SETAF. AEAGD-MN 250/H5.3 GD. SECRET.

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Quartermaster and chemical stockage of the latter two classes of supplies was complete, while engineer was 96 percent, medical 94 percent, ordnance 88 percent, and signal 84 percent complete.<sup>173</sup> Responsibility for Theater Reserve Number 4 was to be transferred to USACOMZEUR with the beginning of FY 1959.<sup>174</sup>

g. Issues and Loans from Theater Reserve Stocks. Supply agencies repeatedly tried to offset normal supply and maintenance deficiencies by requesting authority to use reserve stocks. This trend was accentuated by the departmental policy of restricting procurement for the mobilization reserves.<sup>175</sup> According to USAREUR policy, however, reserve stocks could be used only to meet emergency conditions, subject to approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.<sup>176</sup>

h. USAREUR Tank Exchange Program. Most of the 499 M48A2 tanks shipped to Europe in FY 1958 were intended to replace the M41 light tanks of the three armored cavalry regiments screening the Iron Curtain border. Seventh Army was to issue 369 of the new tanks, plus the required maintenance float, to the three regiments, even though their M41's had meanwhile been replaced with M48A1 tanks. The remaining M48A2 tanks were issued to the 3d Infantry Division and the Villseck Tank Training Center. The M48A1 tanks that were exchanged were to be redistributed to other Seventh Army units as required, with the remainder reverting to Theater Reserve Number 1. This plan was implemented, and the redistribution allowed Seventh Army to release M47 tanks still in use in armored units because of the bulldozer blade attachment. Tank-dozer blades for use with M48A1's arrived simultaneously with the M48A2 tanks.<sup>177</sup>

i. Project MASS. The Department of the Army directed that the Seventh Army test of Project MASS for the resupply of repair parts would continue until 30 June 1958. At that time the accepted elements of the test would be selected for extension to other Army overseas commands. During FY 1958 the project was extended to USACOMZEUR, where MASS operations included the three major elements tested by Seventh Army, namely, the use of the Army Field Stock Control System, of high-speed

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<sup>173</sup> 1st Ind, Hq USASETAF to C/USAREUR Hist Div, 8 Oct 58, to ltr, Hist Div to USASETAF, 12 Sep 58, subj: Information for USAREUR Annual Historical Report, FY 1958. AEAHI 250/54 HI. SECRET.

<sup>174</sup> Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col R. T. Shaver, C/USAREUR G4 Sup Br Plans & Rqr Sec, 9 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>175</sup> Memo for rec, Lt Col Davis, 25 Sep 57, subj: Request for Publication of USAREUR Circular "Issues and Loans from TR Stocks." UNCLAS. In G4 Sup Br, 6.1 Gen Corr (1957).

<sup>176</sup> USAREUR Cir 711-15, 17 Oct 57, subj: Issues or Loans from Theater Reserve Stocks. UNCLAS.

<sup>177</sup> (1) DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 8 Feb 58, subj: M48A2 Tanks. AEAGD-RS 280/165 GD. (2) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Maj W. Yri, G4 Sup Br, 3 Sep 58. Both SECRET.

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communications and electronic data processing, and of high-speed transportation facilities, to include air delivery, CONEX cargo containers, and Marine Express Service.<sup>178</sup>

(1) Seventh Army. The ORO field team indicated in its study of the USAREUR supply system that Seventh Army MASS operations did not constitute a field test of a fully developed system, since certain aspects were still in the research and development stage. Since no research and development technical assistance group was assigned to the project, operating personnel had to accomplish these additional functions although they were overburdened by their operating workload. According to the ORO study, certain of the detailed procedures developed by the original research group did not stand the test of actual application. Other procedures led to paper work saturation and inhibited rather than expedited effective supply management unless they could be adjusted to actual MASS operations.<sup>179</sup> The Inspector General noted in his final report that Project MASS had paid Seventh Army dividends by reducing the order and shipping times for repair parts. The same report indicated, however, that fund shortages--such as those experienced in both FY's 1957 and 1958--threatened to negate the beneficial effects of the project.<sup>180</sup>

(2) USAREUR. With the Project MASS test scheduled to end on 30 June 1958, a board--composed of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, the Comptroller, and the chiefs of the technical services--was to determine which elements had proved effective and which were compatible with USAREUR plans for a command supply system.<sup>181</sup> General Hodes directed that the board's evaluation cover not only the two proposed objectives, but also the adoption of Project MASS as a wartime system and its potential expansion to supply items other than repair parts.<sup>182</sup>

The board recommended the following elements of MASS for permanent adoption:

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<sup>178</sup>Change Order 2, to DA Sup Distr and Maint Prog, FY 58 (U), cited above, p. 7. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>179</sup>Memo, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 17 Dec 57, cited above. CONF.

<sup>180</sup>Incl 1, to DF, USAREUR ACofS G3 to Hist Div, et al., 15 Nov 57, subj: Report of DA Training Staff Visit to USAREUR and SETAF (U), p. 4. CONF. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>181</sup>Memo, ACofS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Mar 58, subj: Evaluation of Project MASS. UNCLAS. In SGS 280/H5 Supply (GEN) (1958).

<sup>182</sup>(1) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 20 Mar 58. In Hist Div Docu Sec. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACofS G4, 21 Mar 58, subj: Evaluation of Project MASS. AEAGD-RS 280/57 GD. (3) USAREUR LO 3-338, 27 Mar 58. All UNCLAS.

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- (a) Single-line and daily requisitioning;
- (b) Establishment of an authorized organization stockage list;
- (c) Preparation of a selective stockage plan with modification to the stockage criteria;
- (d) Use of radio transceivers for transmission of supply data;
- (e) Adoption of the concept of mobile Army depots and direct-support units with some modification of complete mobility;
- (f) Direct delivery of fringe items to direct-support units;
- (g) Premium transportation to provide service in lieu of stockage;
- (h) Elimination of formal accountability; and
- (i) Transfer of responsibility for direct repair-part support of Seventh Army from U.S. installations to USACOMZEUR.<sup>183</sup>

Moreover, within USAREUR proper optimum mobility for field-army depots and optimum stockage criteria for depots and direct-support units were to be reevaluated. In order to improve the mobility of the field-army depots, USACOMZEUR would have to deliver heavy tonnage items automatically to Seventh Army. The use of prepunched requisition forms was to be perfected and extended, and the performance of direct-support unit personnel improved. As a final recommendation, the board proposed that the Seventh Army Stock Control Center be further tested in order to determine the best method of controlling the repair-parts stocks of a field army.<sup>184</sup>

(3) Integration of USAREUR and Seventh Army Systems. In mid-June 1958 the Department of the Army directed that Seventh Army's repair-parts support be transferred from U.S. installations to USACOMZEUR effective 1 July 1958. Direct shipment from the United States to Seventh Army was authorized for items whose delivery would reduce USACOMZEUR operating stocks to the extent of jeopardizing other USAREUR customers. However, USACOMZEUR--not the Seventh Army Stock Control Center--was to forward the requisitions for such repair parts to the United States.<sup>185</sup>

<sup>183</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 11 Jun 58, subj: Evaluation of MASS. AEAGD-RS 250/H5.3 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>184</sup>USAREUR MASS Eval Bd Rept, 1 Jun 58, p. 19. UNCLAS. In G4 Sup Br.

<sup>185</sup>Cable DA-344487, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

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Coincidental with the transfer of MASS support responsibility to USACOMZEUR, that command was authorized to transfer to its operating stocks the 30-day safety level held by Seventh Army.<sup>186</sup>

#### 90. POL Pipeline Operations

USAREUR POL pipeline operations were under the direct supervision of the USACOMZEUR Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Command for both U.S.-owned pipelines and U.S.-used NATO lines. Over-all supervision of pipeline activities and petroleum distribution was exercised by the USAREUR Quartermaster in his capacity as USAREUR Joint Area Petroleum Officer.<sup>187</sup> (Map 3 shows the U.S. and NATO pipeline system in Europe.)

a. The USAREUR Pipelines. Pipelines constructed and owned by the United States were located in France and Germany.

(1) France. The major U.S. pipeline extended for approximately 400 miles from the port of Donges, on the west coast of France, to Metz, near the Franco-German border. The system had a discharge facility at Donges and an offshore installation at Point Piriac, which was not operational during FY 1958. The pipeline was operated by TRAPIL--a French pipeline agency--under the supervision of the USACOMZEUR Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Command. The entire line and the storage facilities located at Donges, Melum, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Metz were operational during FY 1958.<sup>188</sup>

(2) Germany. The U.S. pipeline in Germany was to lead from Zweibruecken to Huttenheim, on the east bank of the Rhine River. This line--approximately 56 miles long, with storage space for 145,000 barrels at 3 locations--was to be the major source of POL support for Seventh Army elements operating in that area. The line was completed as far as Germersheim, on the west bank of the Rhine, by 30 June 1958 but was not operational.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Cable SC-32540, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, CG Seventh Army, 16 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>187</sup> Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col J. M. Willis, USAREUR QM Div Jnt Area Petrl Ofc, 4 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>188</sup> (1) Memo, USAREUR QM Div Jnt Area Petrl Ofc to DCS, 21 Nov 57, subj: Status of Pipelines. SECRET. In SGS 322 ComZ (1957). (2) USEUCOM Comd Summary, 31 May 58, pp. 46-47. CONF. (3) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col Willis, cited above. CONF.

<sup>189</sup> (1) USEUCOM Comd Summary, 31 May 58, pp. 46-47. (2) DF, QM Div Jnt Area Petrl Ofc to ACoFS G4, 3 Jun 58, subj: Final Report, CinC's Objectives for FY 1958, w/Incl 1. AEAQM-JAPO 280/84 QM. Both CONF.

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

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
Map 3

# U.S. and NATO Military Pipeline System ( Central Europe )

As of 1 April 1958



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b. Integration with the NATO Pipeline System. According to a study prepared in FY 1957, USAREUR would make considerable savings and achieve an improved logistical posture if POL products could be put through the NATO pipelines connecting with the U.S.-owned Donges-Metz pipeline. The lines in which USAREUR was initially interested were those extending from Metz to Zweibruecken and from there to Bitburg and Mainz.<sup>190</sup> In early September 1957 USEUCOM approved the initiation of negotiations between the United States, Germany, and France for American use of the NATO lines within those countries.<sup>191</sup> The trilateral agreement, approved by the Central European Pipeline Policy Committee of NATO on 21 September 1957, specified the terms of U.S. operation and use of the Metz-Zweibruecken, Zweibruecken-Bitburg, and Zweibruecken-Mainz pipelines.<sup>192</sup> The Zweibruecken-Bitburg line became operational in March 1958 and began supplying 1 Canadian, 1 German, and 5 U.S. airfields at reduced capacity. Full capacity was assured in April with completion of the NATO pump station at Vilcey, France, and the introduction of two-shift pumping by the German operating agency.<sup>193</sup>

#### 91. Maintenance Operations

a. Depot Maintenance. The FY 1958 USAREUR program called for 29 depot maintenance shops to rebuild equipment valued at \$217,936,000 at a total cost of \$42,219,000 for a return of \$5.37 for each dollar expended. Actually, material valued at \$224,929,000 was rebuilt at a cost of \$38,463,000, or a return of \$5.85 for each dollar expended. Approximately \$66.3 million worth of rebuilt or rehabilitated materiel was delivered in implementation of the Military Assistance Program, with about 90 percent of that amount originating from ordnance rebuild depots.<sup>194</sup>

b. Field Maintenance. The field-maintenance program for FY 1958 was practically fulfilled. (See Table 12.) Expenditures totaled \$94,585,188, or approximately 102 percent of the programmed estimates. Only transportation field maintenance remained within its cost estimates, while the remaining technical services exceeded their program estimates

<sup>190</sup> See note above. CONF.

<sup>191</sup> (1) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen W. B. Palmer, Dep USCINCEUR, 29 Aug 57. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Gen Palmer to Gen Hodes, 6 Sep 57. CONF. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 ComZ (1957).

<sup>192</sup> Cmt 2, QM Div Jnt Area Petr1 Ofc to ACofS G4, 16 Oct 57, to DF, ACofS G4 to QM, 11 Oct 57, subj: NATO Pipelines. AEAGD-PL 400 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>193</sup> DF, QM Div Jnt Area Petr1 Ofc to ACofS G4, 3 Jun 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>194</sup> (1) G4, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, cited above, p. 4. UNCLAS. (2) G4 Sup Br, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis Dep Maint, 30 Jun 58. CONF. In G4 Sup Br.

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Source: G4 Sup Br, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev and Analysis, Fld Maint, 30 Jun 58, Table 4. CONF. In G4 Sup Br.



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by from 1 to 20 percent. As of 30 June 1958, 15.3 percent of the jobs remaining on hand exceeded a 45-day backlog. Altogether, 189 field-maintenance shops employing 16,444 personnel operated during FY 1958, which meant an increase of 25 shops and 1,830 personnel over the previous year. Military personnel totaled 68.9 percent, the remainder being mainly LWR civilians.<sup>195</sup>

92. Disposal of Excess Property

CINCUSAREUR was assigned the missions of formulating and promulgating coordinated policies and exercising technical supervision over excess military and foreign personal property generated by the three component services in France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Portugal.<sup>196</sup>

a. Changes in the Disposal Program. In order to improve the process of declaring and disposing of excess property in Europe, USAREUR established and conducted a joint Army-Air Force property disposal management course. Disposal officers attending this course were to be acquainted with specialized techniques, accounting procedures, legal guidance, and merchandising practices. Eight such courses were held during FY 1958 at the USAREUR Quartermaster-Engineer School, and an additional six were scheduled for FY 1959.<sup>197</sup> In January 1958 USAREUR and USAFE jointly published a manual on disposal procedures as a standard reference source for pertinent activities.<sup>198</sup>

b. Accomplishments. The excess property disposal program was executed in two phases--the identification and declaration of supplies and equipment no longer required, and the utilization and disposition of such excess property. Under Operation ELIMEX, the USAREUR technical service stock-control agencies were assigned responsibility for reviewing all stock cards, identifying and declaring excesses, screening all excess stocks for further utilization, and transferring nonusable property to disposal officers for final action.<sup>199</sup>

The FY 1958 objectives were \$500 million for declaration of excess property and \$475 million for utilization or disposal. The latter goal included \$275 million for utilization and the remainder for other disposition. By 30 June 1958 excess declarations totaled \$588,000,000, and the utilization and disposition achievement was \$413,000,000. (See

<sup>195</sup>See note above. CONF.

<sup>196</sup>USEUCOM Plcy Dir 65-5, 13 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>197</sup>Info furnished by the G4 Sup Br Prop Dspo Sec, 4 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>198</sup>USAREUR Manual 755-15/USAFE Manual 67-4, "Disposal of Supplies and Equipment," 1 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>199</sup>DA ltr, 20 Dec 57, subj: Disposal of Surplus and Foreign Excess Personal Property. AGAM-P (M) 400.703 (6 Dec 57) DCSLOG. UNCLAS.

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Chart 6.) The utilization and disposition of excess property included redistribution within the Department of the Army, return to depot stocks, transfer to other Government agencies, donation to authorized recipients, sale to the general public, and, as a last resort, abandonment or destruction.<sup>200</sup>

## 95. Stock Control

To eliminate duplication of supply-management, stock-control, and accounting functions, a single agency was to assume these responsibilities for each technical service. The centralized system was expected to reduce the incidence of administrative error caused by double record keeping; eliminate the requirement for feeder FIA, stock-fund, and depot operating reports; facilitate the control of consumer credits; place a greater emphasis on rapid, electronic communications; provide the best possible use of critical skills, electrical accounting equipment, and communications facilities in both peace and war; and result in significant savings in operational costs.<sup>201</sup>

In October 1957 accountability for USAREUR command stocks was transferred to the USACOMZEUR technical service supply-control agencies, which assumed the stock-control functions hitherto performed at the depot level, including initial processing of requisitions. Personnel and electrical accounting equipment retained at the depot level to control and process documents, maintain depot location data, and conduct transceiver operations were held to a minimum. Alternate facilities were to be established for each central agency in order to decrease its vulnerability to enemy destruction, sabotage, or natural disaster.<sup>202</sup> USACOMZEUR action to centralize stock control and accountability for all technical services was completed by 10 January 1958;<sup>203</sup> the new system was expected to save about \$2 million a year in operating costs.<sup>204</sup>

<sup>200</sup> USAREUR G4 Sup Br, Mthly Rpts of Ex, Surplus, and Fgn Ex Pers Prop, MOS-CSGLD-257 (R-5), FY 58, passim. UNCLAS. In G4 Sup Br Prop Dspo Sec.

<sup>201</sup> (1) Memo, C/USAREUR Ad Hoc Com to ACoFS G4, 1 Oct 57, subj: Centralization of Accountability and Stock Control. (2) Summary Sheet, ACoFS G4, 4 Oct 57, subj: Centralized Stock Control and Accounting. Both UNCLAS. Both in G4 Sup Br.

<sup>202</sup> Ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 7 Oct 57, subj: Centralization of Accountability and Stock Control of USAREUR Command Stocks. AEAGD-RR 140 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>203</sup> Cable AEZLG-5-292, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR, 10 Jan 58. UNCLAS.


<sup>204</sup> Summary Sheet, USAREUR ACoFS G4, 24 Dec 57, subj: Centralized Control of USAREUR Supply Assets. UNCLAS. In G4 Sup Br, 7.1 Sup Con (FY 1958).

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Chart 6

USAREUR Utilization and Disposition\* of Excess and Foreign Excess  
Personal Property, 1 July 1957-30 June 1958



\*Total excesses: \$588,000,000. Total utilization and disposal: \$413,000,000.

\*\*Of total amount sold 67% was usable and 33% scrap salvage.

Source: USAREUR G4 Sup Br Prop Dspo Sec. UNCLAS.

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Section VI: Transportation

94. Transportation Planning

a. Evacuation of Rail Equipment from Germany. Responsibility for planning the evacuation of West German rail equipment in the event of a war had been transferred from USAREUR to SHAPE during FY 1956. After a long period of inaction on this matter, the West German Ministry of Defense informed USAREUR that planning in conjunction with the German Federal Railways (Deutsche Bundesbahn) was underway.<sup>205</sup>

b. Port and Beach Planning. Two emergency plans were revised in the light of factors that arose during FY 1958.

(1) Post D-day Off-loading Capability Data. As a result of lessons learned during offshore discharge exercises, USACOMZEUR was directed to revise its post D-day plans for off-loading U.S. military supplies.<sup>206</sup> Previous plans had provided for 13 offshore discharge points, where 42 vessels were to unload simultaneously--from 1 to 6 vessels at each location--approximately 1,294,000 long tons per month.<sup>207</sup> New offshore discharge points were designated in addition to those previously selected, with each site being at least five miles distant from any other; probable D-day targets were eliminated. No more than three vessels were to be discharged simultaneously at any one site. (See Table 13.)<sup>208</sup>

(2) Emergency Plan. The USACOMZEUR Emergency Port and Beach Plan, prepared in July 1956, was outdated by late FY 1958. Major changes had occurred in the Emergency Reinforcement Troop List and in personnel and dollar funding ceilings. Another matter of concern was the buildup of personnel needed for handling the large convoys that would initially arrive in the theater. If the over-all tonnage requirements from D/30 to D/120 could be leveled off, the number of troops required to handle the first few convoys would be reduced correspondingly.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Ltr, Ger Fed Min of Def to CINCUSAREUR thru CENTAG, 10 Jul 58, subj: Denial of Rail Resources. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Trans Div Plans Br.

<sup>206</sup> (1) Cable SX-1635, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 4 Feb 58. (2) Cable EC-3-195, USEUCOM from JMTB to USACOMZEUR, 12 Mar 58. Both SECRET.

<sup>207</sup> Cable AFZTR-8-271, USACOMZEUR to USCINCEUR, 7 Mar 58. SECRET.

<sup>208</sup> Ltr, USACOMZEUR to USCINCEUR, 18 Jun 58, subj: Port and Beach Capability Data (U). AFZTR-PT 268/17. SECRET.

<sup>209</sup> DF, USAREUR ACoS G4 to Trans Div, 21 May 58, subj: Emergency Port and Beach Plan (U). AFAGD-SM 278/H5.3, GD. SECRET.

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Table 13--USAREUR Off-loading Capability, D-day to D+150

<u>Ports and Beaches</u>	<u>Number of Vessels Planned for Simul- taneous Discharge</u>	<u>Maximum Monthly Off-loading Capa- bility (Long Tons)</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>1,137,200</u>
1. Port Haliguen-Quiberon	2	38,400
2. Trinite sur Mer	2	38,400
3. Suscino	3	57,600
4. Le Verdon	2	38,400
5. Pontaillac	1	19,200
6. St. Gilles	2	38,400
7. Les Sables d'Olonne	3	57,600
8. Pornic	2	38,400
9. St. Pallais	1	19,200
10. Benodet-Ptede	2	38,400
11. Concarneau	2	38,400
12. Pte. de Riec	1	19,200
13. Le Polau	1	19,200
14. Etel	2	38,400
15. Auray River	2	38,400
16. Le Croisic	1	19,200
17. La Baule	2	38,400
18. Pornichet	1	19,200
19. Ile d'Oleron	2	38,400
20. Le Clapet	2	38,400
21. Donges (Bulk POL)	1	446,000

Source: Ltr, USACOMZEUR to USCINCEUR, 18 Jun 58, subj: Port and Beach Capability Data (U). AEZTR-PT 268/17. SECRET.

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During the month of June 1958 USACOMZEUR completed the revision of the plan in draft form.<sup>210</sup>

c. The Alternate Line of Communication. The French political crisis during the first half of 1958 made it advisable to prepare plans for an alternate line of communication to be used in case existing agreements were renounced. The planning was to be based on the three possibilities that a line of communication through Belgium would have to be ready within a 3-, 6-, or 12-month period following official notice of renunciation by the French. Ostend and Antwerp were to be considered as ports of entry, since Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Bremerhaven were too vulnerable to air attack and too susceptible to invasion by ground forces. This plan was under preparation at the end of FY 1958.<sup>211</sup>

95. The USAREUR Floating Equipment Reserve

The USAREUR Floating Equipment Reserve consisted of all vessels, harbor craft, and marine equipment contained in the bills of materials for the numbered sections of USAREUR Theater Reserve Number 1, plus the marine items stocked in accordance with Department of the Army instructions for post D-day logistical support. Except for necessary storage and preservation measures, the reserve vessels were maintained in a state of full readiness. Since a number of similar craft were in active use in the port areas, restrictions on use of substitute reserve items were even more specific than those pertaining to other items in the theater reserves. Specifically prohibited were the activation of stored craft, the interchange of reserve and active craft, the cannibalization of component parts, and the issue of reserve spare parts to meet current operational requirements.<sup>212</sup> The authorized floating marine reserve had remained unchanged since late FY 1957, when USACOMZEUR had revised its storage plan. As of 30 June 1958 a total of 231 of the authorized 242 craft were on hand; still short were eight 65-foot diesel harbor tugs, two 120-foot deck-cargo barges, and one LCM 6.<sup>213</sup> According to the plan proposed at the end of FY 1958, 218 craft were to be stored at 5 locations: at Nantes--in 2 separate areas--La Rochelle, Rochefort,

<sup>210</sup> Cmt 2, Trans Off to ACoS G4, 7 Jun 58, to DF cited above. AEATC/PLN 250/18 TC. CONF.

<sup>211</sup> (1) Memo for rec, Lt Col C. E. Pister, G4 Plans Br War Plans Sec, 4 Jun 58, subj: Transportation Estimate. In G4 Plans Br, 250/18 Trans Planning (1958). (2) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col J. E. Feliz, C/Trans Div Plans Br War Plans Sec, 10 Sep 58. Both SECRET.

<sup>212</sup> Ltr, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 8 Jul 58, subj: Transportation Floating Marine Equipment (U). AEATC-MAT 250/18 TC. UNCLAS.

<sup>213</sup> USAREUR Trans Div, Status Rept, Trans Corps Items, Thtr Res Nr 1, 30 Jun 58. SECRET. In Trans Div Mat Br.

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and Bordeaux. Altogether 107 of these craft were to be stored in wet storage areas.<sup>214</sup>

#### 96. Port Operations

a. USAREUR Operations. Port operations were conducted by the U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB), in Germany, and the 11th Transportation Terminal Command B of USACOMZEUR Base Section, in France. The French port complex consisted of facilities at Bassens (Bordeaux), St. Nazaire, and La Pallice for general cargo and at Donges for bulk POL. In addition to regular commercial port facilities, the French line of communication port complex included the USACOMZEUR new offshore discharge exercise (NODEX) sites.<sup>215</sup>

(1) Tonnages. The actual tonnages handled during FY 1958--3,170,400 measurement tons--exceeded the programmed figures by 9.7 percent.<sup>216</sup> (See Chart 7.) USAPEB handled 64.4 percent of the tonnage, and the French port complex the remaining 35.6 percent; the FY 1957 ratio of 65:35 thus remained virtually unchanged.<sup>217</sup>

(2) Personnel Movements. During FY 1958 USAPEB moved 220,491 personnel of all categories by surface transportation, including a relatively small number of passengers using commercial ships through Le Havre, Genoa, and Leghorn. The decrease of approximately 39,100 surface-movement passengers in comparison to FY 1957 resulted from further intensification of air movements. The actual figure was approximately 36,600 less than that programmed for FY 1958. Only 513 personnel moved through the French port complex; this was a replacement packet for the 532d Artillery Battalion arriving in France as a part of the NODEX 17 operation.<sup>218</sup>

(3) Sea-Van-Tote Program. The "sea-van-tote" method of transporting household goods, instituted in FY 1957, consisted of employing commercial carriers on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>219</sup> In October 1957 an acute

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<sup>214</sup>USAREUR Trans Div, Proposed Marine Craft Dspo Rept, 30 Jun 58. SECRET. In file above, 250/18 TR-Sec 29 (1958).

<sup>215</sup>USACOMZEUR Mthly Perf Rept, 30 Jun 58. RCS-AEZCS-2. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>216</sup>Contrary to previous years, USAREUR port tonnage figures for FY 1958 do not include bulk POL. UNCLAS.

<sup>217</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 251. SECRET (info used CONF).  
(2) Tonnage figures for FY 1958 furnished by USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br Frt Sec, 15 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>218</sup>(1) Personnel movement figures furnished by Trans Div Tfc Br Pax Sec, 11 Sep 58. UNCLAS. (2) NODEX 17 Rept, 1-18 Oct 57, 15th Trans Bn (Term), 11th Trans Term Comd B. CONF.

<sup>219</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 256. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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
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Chart 7

Cargo Tonnes Handled Excluding POL, FY 1958  
(Thousands of Measurement Tons per Quarter)



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shortage of CONEX containers in Europe brought about the suspension of shipments of household goods by the sea-van-tote method for a period expected to last from 120 to 180 days. As a relief measure, USAREUR authorized subordinate commands to use commercial transportation firms for packing, crating, and transporting household goods to the Mannheim subport. The shortage of engineer repairs and utilities funds prevented the area commands from resuming their packing and crating activities.<sup>220</sup> The sea-van-tote suspension remained in effect until 15 January 1958.<sup>221</sup>

Effective 14 February 1958 the 12 commercial carriers participating in the sea-van-tote program applied Military Rates Tariff Number 4, thus raising rates by 10 percent, or approximately \$50 per average shipment of household goods. Because of this increase in rates, the sea-van-tote method was no longer competitive with the engineer packing and crating method, since the latter was about \$75 to \$100 cheaper for a typical shipment. On principle, an increased cost to the government could be incurred only if a marked increase in service was obtained.<sup>222</sup>

(4) Van-Sea-Van Program. In March 1958 the Department of the Army directed that a new method of shipping household goods on a completely commercial basis be tested for 90 days. With the new "van-sea van" system, commercial carriers were responsible for each shipment from pickup to delivery, whereas sea-van-tote carriers assumed responsibility from the point of pickup to the port of departure and again from the port of destination to the final point of delivery. Between ports the shipments returned to military responsibility. The van-sea-van system eliminated military port handling and MSTTS shipping and did away with the requirement for Army shipping documents.<sup>223</sup> In concurring with the 90-day test for Germany, USAREUR pointed out that comparative costs indicated the new method would cost \$40 more than sea-van-tote for a 1,500 pound shipment. Consequently, superior service would have to be offered to compensate for the difference in costs.<sup>224</sup> The program was inaugurated in Germany on 2 April 1958, but, due to a delay in negotiations with the customs administration, the inauguration in France

<sup>220</sup>(1) Cable SC-51122, USAREUR from Trans Off to subor comds, 21 Oct 57. (2) Cable SC-51841, USAREUR from Trans Off to DA for CofT, 25 Oct 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>221</sup>Cable SC-11755, USAREUR to subor comds, 15 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>222</sup>Cable SC-15993, USAREUR from Trans Off to subor comds, 14 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>223</sup>(1) Cable DA-318620, DA from CofT to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Mar 58. (2) Cable SC-21033, USAREUR to subor comds, 21 Mar 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>224</sup>Cable SC-18904, USAREUR to DA for CofT, 22 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

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took place on 16 May instead of 7 April, as scheduled.<sup>225</sup>

The first 11 shipments from Germany to the United States required an average of 35 days from pickup to delivery. The shortest time--30 days--was from Wuerzburg, Bavaria, to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and the longest--42 days--was from Schweinfurt, Bavaria, to Ogden, Utah.<sup>226</sup> During the last quarter of FY 1958 a total of 489,674 pounds of household goods were shipped by the van-sea-van method from Germany. (Corresponding figures for shipments from France were not available.)<sup>227</sup> At the end of May 1958 the Department of the Army extended the time period for the test from 90 to 120 days.<sup>228</sup>

(5) Roll On, Roll Off (RORO) System. The "roll on, roll off" system of shipping commercial cargo and vehicles, tested during FY 1957 with a chartered commercial vessel,<sup>229</sup> was used again in February 1958, when a new, specially constructed ship was put into service.<sup>230</sup> On its first voyage, the USNS Comet arrived in St. Nazaire on 5 February 1958 with a load of 399 vehicles. During the following 4 months the ship made 6 voyages, unloading at St. Nazaire and loading retrograde cargo at both St. Nazaire and Bremerhaven.<sup>231</sup> During FY 1959 the ship was to use only the port of St. Nazaire in order to exploit fully its fast turnaround features. Retrograde cargo, consisting of rolling stock, CONEX containers, and other fast-moving items, was to be sent to St. Nazaire for shipment to the United States.<sup>232</sup>

During the voyages made in FY 1958 the Comet's suitability for all types of military vehicular cargo was to be tested, and experience data

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<sup>225</sup>(1) Cable DA-323822, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Mar 58. (2) Memo for rec, Mr. P. L. Costello, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br Negotiations Sec, 18 Apr 58, subj: Customs Clearance of Commercial Shipments of Household Goods. In Trans Div Tfc Br, 278/30 Van-Sea-Van (1958). (3) Cable AEZTR-5-11-95, USACOMZEUR to DA for CofT, 28 May 58. All UNCLAS.

<sup>226</sup>Ltr, Neptune Van Lines Eur Agent, to USAREUR Trans Div, 22 May 58. UNCLAS. In Trans Div Tfc Br, 278/30 Van-Sea-Van (1958).

<sup>227</sup>Ltr, same to same, 5 Aug 58. OFLUSE. In file above.

<sup>228</sup>Cable DA-343273, DA from CofT to CINCUSAREUR, 29 May 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>229</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 257. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>230</sup>MRS, C/G4 Svcs Br to ACoS G4, 27 Feb 58, subj: Plan for Using USNS Comet, w/Incl 1, n.d., subj: DA Plans for Using the Comet Ship. CONF. In G4 Svcs Br, 278/H5.3 RORO Comet (FY 1958).

<sup>231</sup>(1) Memo, C/G4 Svcs Br Sup & Mov Sec to C/G4 Svcs Br, 24 Feb 58, subj: Report of RORO Operations at St. Nazaire, 6-7 Feb 58. (2) Memo, C/G4 Svcs Br to ACoS G4, 19 Mar 58, subj: Second Voyage of the USNS Comet. Both AEAGD-SM 278/H5.3 GD. (3) DA-342834, DA from CofT to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 58. All UNCLAS.

<sup>232</sup>Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 5763, COMSTS to COMSTSELMAREA, 19 Jun 58. UNCLAS.

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were to be obtained concerning its loading, unloading, and cargo-carrying capabilities. The experience factors were to be used in developing military doctrine, techniques, and skills for emergency deployment of military forces by RORO ships and in determining the role that such ships could play in increasing the emergency deployment mobility of Army forces. Also to be examined were the peacetime requirements for additional RORO ships and for other types of specialized ships that could be used for similar purposes.<sup>233</sup>

b. NODEX Operations. Only NODEX 17, a large-scale, logistical-support training exercise, roughly three times the size of a normal offshore discharge operation, was held during FY 1958. In order to generate sufficient cargo for that exercise, NODEX 16 and 18 were canceled.<sup>234</sup>

(1) Problem Areas. At the beginning of FY 1958 curtailment of NODEX operations seemed justified, since nearly all the beaches that would be used in wartime had been covered. Moreover, a reduction would release supporting personnel and decrease fund expenditures. One NODEX a year with participating troops from the United States was considered to be sufficient. As a result, CINCUSAREUR directed that offshore discharge operations be suspended with the completion of NODEX 17. A small residual organization was to be retained in the theater to provide a capability nucleus for the future, but all other NODEX support troops were to be transferred to more important functions.<sup>235</sup> In April 1958 the Department of the Army inquired about the continuation of offshore discharge exercises, which it considered essential for refining and evaluating USAREUR plans for the post D-day discharge of cargo. Sufficient funds for these exercises had been provided in USAREUR's FY 1959 operating budget, and the Department of the Army would pay for the movement of units from the United States.<sup>236</sup> CINCUSAREUR replied that recent exercises had produced only a minimum advancement in techniques, since no truly advanced equipment had been made available. Until operations could be conducted using such improved craft as the RORO ships and beach lighters, one exercise a year would suffice. Also, since no extra funds were provided for such exercises in the FY 1959 budget estimates, since the FY 1959 budget execution program was \$92.7 million less than fund requirements, and since, finally, USAREUR strength was

<sup>233</sup>MRS, C/G4 Svcs Br to ACofS G4, 27 Feb 58, cited above. CONF.

<sup>234</sup>(1) Memo, ACofS G4 to CofS, 25 Apr 57, subj: Logistical Support Training Exercise (NODEX 17). CONF. In G4 Svcs Br, 268/17 Tng Ops (FY 1958) (2) Cable SX-6233, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA, 4 Oct 57. SECRET.

<sup>235</sup>(1) Memo for rec, Dep ACofS G4, 12 Jul 57, subj: Curtailment of NODEX. CONF. In file above. (2) Cable SX-6233, cited above. SECRET.

<sup>236</sup>Cable DA-939866, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Apr 58. SECRET.

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reduced by about 7,000 troop spaces, there was no possibility of conducting more than one NODEX operation per year.<sup>237</sup>

(2) NODEX 17. This logistical-support exercise had three major objectives: to test and physically exercise the principal supply activities of USACOMZEU in support of U.S. Army forces in central Europe under simulated D-day conditions; to test the adequacy of the USACOMZEU Basic Operations Plan to support the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56; and to test USACOMZEU's capability to function as a theater communications zone.<sup>238</sup> NODEX 17 was originally planned as a 3-site operation, taking place at 1 minor port and connected beach, 1 conventional beach, and 1 site using the DeLong pier and the aerial tramway. This last portion of the exercise was to function as a ship-to-railhead operation at Batz, France. However, hurricane conditions on 22 and 23 September 1957 substantially damaged and beached one section of the DeLong pier. In addition, several caisson sections of other barges slipped through the wells and sank. This portion of the exercise had to be canceled and the ships diverted to conventional ports.<sup>239</sup>

At the remaining 2 sites 7 cargo vessels, carrying 28,710 short tons, and 1 troop carrier, with 2 officers and 511 enlisted men, were unloaded. The site at Quiberon tested the capability of the minor port of Haliguen and an adjoining pocket beach. Three cargo vessels were unloaded by means of LCU's and LCM's over the pocket beach and by dry cargo barges powered by LCM 6's at Haliguen. Troops were unloaded from the troop ships into LCU's by means of "scramble nets" and then over the beach to the staging area. On the day after their landing they were dispatched by plane and train to their destination in Germany. For the first part of the operation at the Suscino site 4 vessels were discharged into DUKW's operated by both U.S. Army and French military personnel. After completing operations at Quiberon, all available lighterage was transferred to Suscino, where two vessels were discharged simultaneously for the first time in NODEX operations.<sup>240</sup>

(3) Recommendations for Future Exercises. As a result of lessons learned from NODEX 17, USACOMZEU recommended that the use of both the DeLong pier and the aerial tramway be reevaluated. Requirements for sheltered water during erection and for proximity to road nets made this equipment unsuitable for emergency port and beach operations, and further

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<sup>237</sup>Cable SX-3310, USAREUR to DA, 23 Apr 58. SECRET.

<sup>238</sup>USACOMZEU ltr, 31 Aug 57, subj: USACOMZEU Exercise Directive 1, Logistical Support Training Exercise. AEZLG-PL 268/17 AG. SECRET.

<sup>239</sup>Cable SC-47444, USAREUR to DA for DCSLOG/F4, 24 Sep 58. OFLUSE.

<sup>240</sup>

(1) NODEX 17 Rept, cited above. (2) Memo, C/Trans Div Trfc Br Frt Sec to Dep Trans Off, 14 Jan 58, subj: NODEX 17 Report. In Trans Div Tfc Br. Both CONF.

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use in offshore discharge exercises was not considered feasible. USAREUR therefore recommended the deletion of this equipment from future exercises and its transfer to the command floating equipment reserve; its complete withdrawal from the theater was under consideration.<sup>241</sup>

c. USASETAF Port Operations. While the integration of USASETAF added Leghorn to the USAREUR ports, the port operations and logistical support complex remained under USASETAF jurisdiction. Approximately 61.5 percent of the cargo unloaded at Leghorn was for USASETAF consumption, 21 percent was destined for the U.S. Air Force, 13 percent for the Military Assistance Program, 2.5 percent for the United Nations Expeditionary Force, and the remaining 2 percent for the U.S. Navy.<sup>242</sup>

d. Routing of Cargo Through Other Ports. In keeping with the Department of the Army authorization to divert specific items of cargo from the French line of communication to North Sea ports, USAREUR requested the diversion of heavy equipment to Rotterdam, since such action would not affect the emergency capability of the line of communication to handle this type of equipment.<sup>243</sup> In March 1958 the Department of the Army authorized that 597 M59 personnel carriers and 400 M48A2 tanks destined for Seventh Army be diverted to Rotterdam. However, 99 tanks that were destined for USACOMZEUR storage as part of the theater reserve and 66 personnel carriers were to be shipped through the French ports.<sup>244</sup>

In planning for FY 1959, USACOMZEUR estimated that 379,240 short tons of anticipated cargo could be received more economically through the North Sea ports. Savings in port handling costs alone were estimated at \$540,615, while by using Bremerhaven or Rotterdam, savings in transportation costs would amount to \$3,321,656 and \$4,041,278, respectively.<sup>245</sup> (For a comparison of cargo handling costs at major European ports, see Table 14.)

<sup>241</sup>(1) 1st Ind, Hq USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Apr 58, AEZTR-PT 268/17 (25 Mar 58), to ltr, USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 25 Mar 58, subj: Addendum to NODEX 17 Report (U). AEAGD-SM 268/17 GD. (2) Cmt 2, USAREUR Trans Div to Engr Div, G4, 3 May 58, to DF, G4 to Trans Div, Engr Div, 28 Apr 58, subj as above. AEAGD-SM 268/17 GD. (3) Cmt 3, Engr Div to G4, 28 May 58, to DF, cited above. (4) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Mr. P. J. Rogan, Trans Div Tfc Br Frt Sec, 15 Sep 58. All CONF.

<sup>242</sup>Memo for rec, Lt Col Davis, 9 Dec 57, subj: Report on Staff Visit of USAREUR to SETAF, 24-29 Nov 57 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 Reorg SETAF (1958).

<sup>243</sup>Cables SX-2203, SX-2204, USAREUR to DA, 5 Mar 58. SECRET.

<sup>244</sup>Cable DA-938302, DA from DCSLOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Mar 58. CONF.

<sup>245</sup>Cable AEZTR-8-567, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Apr 58. CONF.

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Table 14--Cargo Handling Costs<sup>a/</sup> at Major European Ports, 30 June 1958

Port	General Cargo	Ammunition Under 5 Tons		Military Vehicles 5-20 Tons		Military Vehicles Over 20 Tons		Reefer Cargo	FIM	CONEX	FOV
Bassens (Bordeaux)	\$ 8.89	\$ 9.73	\$ 8.94	\$ 8.90	\$ 8.90	(b)	\$ 8.98	\$ 8.98	\$ 8.46		
Bremerhaven	6.67	7.01	6.03	5.84	4.30	5.13	9.57	4.27	7.02		
La Pallice	7.43	7.68	11.41	8.03	8.03	(b)	10.38	9.39	12.19		
Leghorn	11.23	24.60	10.83	10.29	10.29	13.20	12.54	16.75	17.92		
Marseilles	16.19	18.64	15.41	18.76	18.76	(b)	15.95	16.19	(b)		
Rotterdam	3.36	4.06	4.15	3.32	2.91	(b)	7.02	3.79	4.58		
St. Nazaire	12.50	14.73	11.33	11.57	11.57	(b)	16.23	15.93	7.93		

a. Figures include total handling costs per long ton from or to stowage in vessel and from or to securing on-line-haul transportation. Contributing costs, such as stevedoring, checking, personnel salaries, hire of cranes, tugs, etc., are included in unit costs.

b. Category of cargo was not handled through this port.

Source: USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br. UNCLAS.

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## 97. Air Transportation

a. Personnel Movements. As during previous years, the use of air transportation was emphasized for personnel movement to and from the United States. Air shipments were handled by the Frankfurt Air Passenger Center, operated by USAREUR, and the Paris Air Traffic Center, operated by USAFE.<sup>246</sup> Against a program estimate of 214,000, some 236,762 passengers were actually moved by MATS and commercial aircraft.<sup>247</sup>

b. Expansion of Army Aviation Program. The number of assigned Army aircraft increased from 629 to 867 during FY 1958. The types of aircraft used included the L-19, L-20, L-23, and U-1A fixed-wing, and the H-13, H-19, and H-34 rotary-wing aircraft. The introduction of larger, more complicated aircraft resulted in higher costs for the initial purchase, maintenance, amortization, and parts stockage. The maintenance workload, for instance, increased by approximately 59 percent during the year.<sup>248</sup>

## 98. Rail Transportation

a. Changes in Freight and Passenger Rates. The following changes in tariff agreements concerned the U.S. forces in Europe:

(1) West Germany. Negotiations for rate changes were conducted between the NATO forces having troops stationed in the Federal Republic and the Deutsche Bundesbahn (German Federal Railways). In January 1958 the Bundesbahn announced increases of 8.7 percent for commercial passenger rates and 15 percent for commercial freight rates. Similar increases were to be applied effective 15 February for military passengers and on 1 March for military freight shipments. USAREUR's annual rail transportation expenditures would thus increase by \$3.8 million. On 15 March the Bundesbahn gave notice of a complete revision of the commercial tariff-rate structure and termination of the military rate convention. As of 30 June 1958 negotiations for a new military rate convention were under way.

On 1 December 1957 USAREUR's agreement with the German Tank Car Company (Vereinigte Tanklager und Kesselwagen G.m.b.H.) (VTG) expired. A new agreement was negotiated between the U.S., British, and French Embassies and the West German Ministry of Transportation, which controlled this government subsidiary. Under the new agreement, the U.S. forces could call upon the VTG to furnish up to 1,500 tank cars for U.S. military use. As of 30 June 1958 USAREUR was holding 497 such cars.

<sup>246</sup> Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Maj G. T. Hunt, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br Pax Sec, 11 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>247</sup> USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br, Pax Repts, 30 Jun 57. UNCLAS. In Trans Div Tfc Br.

<sup>248</sup> (1) Intvw, Mr. Moenk with Maj T. F. Begley, C/Trans Div Mat Br Avn Sec, 5 Sep 58. (2) Figures furnished by Trans Div Mat Br Avn Sec, 11 Sep 58. Both UNCLAS.

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(2) Belgium. Negotiations for a preferential freight tariff agreement with a discount of approximately 20 percent--began in FY 1957--were stalled when the Belgian Army lost its 20-percent discount. While the U.S. Embassy at Brussels continued its efforts, the matter was under consideration by the Belgian Ministry of Communications. Current rates paid by USAREUR offered a 5-percent discount off commercial freight rates.

(3) The Netherlands. The Dutch Government agreed to grant USAREUR a 16-percent reduction from commercial rates, effective 1 July 1958.

(4) Luxembourg. Negotiations with the Luxembourg national railways for a downward revision of rates began on 15 November 1957 and were nearing successful completion as of 30 June 1958.

(5) France. On 22 July 1957 the French National Railways (S.N.C.F.) approved an adjustment of rates for the period July 1955 through 31 March 1957, thus granting a refund of approximately 390 million French francs.

Efforts to secure a percentage reduction of costs for movements in U.S.-owned or controlled cars resulted in a reduction of approximately 8 percent applied to 3 types of cars, effective 1 March 1958. As of 30 June 1958 further negotiations to apply this reduction to all types of cars were underway; this would produce annual savings of approximately \$115,000.

(6) International. In February 1958 the International Refrigerator Car Company was asked to place rates for all international refrigerator car traffic under one agreement and to grant a rate reduction. The negotiations were continuing on 30 June 1958.<sup>249</sup>

b. Rail Spur Agreement with France. Over five years of negotiations were culminated in early April 1958 when USAREUR approved the Rail Spur Convention, and USACOMZEUR and the French Central Liaison Mission exchanged letters on the subject.<sup>250</sup> The convention proper was signed by the French

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<sup>249</sup>Material for this entire paragraph was furnished by Mr. J. T. Haswell, Mr. P. J. Costello, and Mr. A. Rosenberg, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Negotiators, 16 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>250</sup>(1) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CG USACOMZEUR, 3 Apr 58, AEAGD-SM 278/30 GD (26 Mar 58), to ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Mar 58, subj: Spur Track Agreement. AEAZLG-SV 278/30. (2) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to Fr Cen Ln Msn, 4 Apr 58, subj: Exchange of Letters Governing the Conditions of the Rail Spur Track Convention. AEZLG-OP-S 278/30. Both UNCLAS.

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National Railways and the French Central Liaison Mission, acting as contractor for USAREUR, on 29 April 1958.<sup>251</sup> The agreement became effective on 1 May 1958<sup>252</sup> and governed the general aspects of rail spur operations, including construction modification and removal, maintenance and renewal, real-estate questions, and operations and liabilities on the rail spur tracks. The agreement provided for the establishment of 29 Army and 12 Air Force rail spurs, delineated the respective liabilities of the U.S. forces and the S.N.C.F., and permitted a 22-franc-per-ton rebate and a 20-percent reduction on commercial switching charges. Based on past experience, a saving of approximately \$1,500 per month was expected to accrue to the U.S. forces.<sup>253</sup>

## 99. Highway Transportation

a. Less-Than-Truckload Express Service. The daily less-than-truckload (LTL) scheduled line-haul express service had been established for the movement of badly needed priority stock items. Operational control was a responsibility of USACOMZEUR, and, because of the very nature of the service, no target tonnages were fixed. Schedules between terminals in France and between points in France and Germany were strictly adhered to, even if no full trailerload of priority shipments was available each day.<sup>254</sup>

b. General Transport Administrative Vehicle Program (GTAV). During FY 1958 a total of 4,400 motor vehicles--compared to 5,050 at the end of FY 1957--were in use in Germany, traveling approximately 58 million miles. The cost of operation was \$6,447,000, as compared with a cost of \$7,000,000 for approximately the same workload in the previous fiscal year.

Excess Deutsche Mark-procured vehicles were transferred to USACOMZEUR and USASETAF in anticipation of extending the GTAV program to France and Italy. By 30 June 1958 approximately 1,000 vehicles replaced tactical vehicles formerly used by the 2 commands for administrative purposes.

c. Radio-Equipped Taxis. Fleets of radio-equipped taxis were introduced throughout the U.S. area of responsibility in Germany; the

<sup>251</sup> Cable AEZLG-5-10120, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>252</sup> USAREUR Cir 700-100, 8 Apr 58, subj: Construction, Maintenance, Real Estate, and Operations of Rail Spur Tracks in France. UNCLAS.

<sup>253</sup> DF, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 4 Apr 58, subj: Rail Spur Track Agreement. AEAGD-SM 278/30 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>254</sup> USACOMZEUR Mthly Perf Rept, 30 Jun 58, p. 59. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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number of sedans in use was reduced by 132, for an estimated annual saving of \$100,000.<sup>255</sup>

## Section VII: Installations Support

### 100. Construction in Germany

a. U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany. The U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, was responsible for accomplishing all U.S. military construction in Germany, including Air Force projects that were assigned to the agency on 1 September 1957.<sup>256</sup> The in-place value of construction accomplished during FY 1958 was \$11,600,000.<sup>257</sup>

b. Deutsche Mark Construction Program. While no Deutsche Mark construction program proper was developed for FY 1958, funds originating from reprogramming and deobligating actions were made available for a limited number of projects. Moreover, projects considered as nonessential were deobligated in December 1957 so that sufficient funds would be available to cover all pending claims on construction contract appeals.<sup>258</sup>

(1) Status. Construction programs funded from occupation cost and defense support funds for the period GFY 1949 through U.S. FY 1956 totaled the equivalent of \$1,070,600,000. During FY 1958 obligations increased by \$1,100,000 to \$1,066,500,000 and value of work in place, by \$8,900,000 to \$1,057,400,000.<sup>259</sup>

(2) Bachelor Officers' Quarters. After undergoing numerous revisions, the FY 1954 housing construction program provided for 4,683

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<sup>255</sup>(1) Info furnished by USAREUR Trans Div Mat Br Highway Sec, 17 Sep 58. UNCLAS. (2) Rev of USAREUR Progs FY 58, 4th Qtr, p. 100. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>256</sup>Cable EC-3-5835, USCINCEUR to DA, 16 Aug 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>257</sup>Briefing for Lt Gen C. B. Magruder, DCSLOG, by USAREUR Engr Div, 1 Sep 57, subj: USAREUR Construction Programs. UNCLAS. In Engr Div Const Br.

<sup>258</sup>DF, ACoFS G4 to CofS, 31 Dec 57, subj: Status of DM Construction Program. UNCLAS. In SGS 285/H5 Construction (1958).


<sup>259</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Reports, w/ Incl 1. AEAEN-RC 285/15 EN. UNCLAS.

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
Chart 8

Status of Deutsche Mark Construction Programs,  
Including Berlin Programs, 30 June 1958  
(Millions of Dollars)



Source: USAREUR Engr Div Const Br. UNCLAS.

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BOQ units. By 31 August 1957 all were completed and occupied.<sup>260</sup>

(3) Dependents' Housing. The FY 1954 dependents' housing program, providing for 22,096 units, was completed by 30 November 1957.<sup>261</sup> The FY 1955 program, consisting of 1,246 family apartments--instead of the 1,252 originally planned--and 1,451 single and duplex homes for senior officers, was completed by 31 January 1958. That date marked the end of the USAREUR housing program supported by Deutsche Mark funds.<sup>262</sup>

(4) The Berlin Program. Since Berlin was still under occupation status, construction in the U.S. sector was funded by the West Berlin Magistrat funds. The program submitted by the Berlin Command for FY 1958 contained 15 projects for an estimated \$4,277,100. Upon review of the program CINCUSAREUR deleted 6 of the projects, totaling \$1,083,800, and directed that 2 others be reestimated. The revised estimates for the approved program amounted to \$3,193,300; by 30 June 1958 this figure had risen to \$4,094,000.<sup>263</sup>

The Berlin construction programs for FY's 1953 through 1956 were completed, while the FY 1957 program, amounting to \$6,014,000, was fully obligated, with \$1,951,000 worth of work in place.<sup>264</sup> (For the status of the Deutsche Mark construction programs through 30 June 1958, including the Berlin programs, see Chart 8.)

c. Status of the FY 1957 MCA Construction Program for Germany. The dollar-funded FY 1957 construction program for Germany was in two segments. The normal program was funded for \$2,202,000,<sup>265</sup> and a separate Nike construction segment amounting to \$10,145,000 was authorized as a part of the Army-wide program. As of 30 June 1958, \$5,109,000 had been obligated for both segments; \$1,839,000 of the Nike construction and \$101,000 of the normal USAREUR program had been completed.<sup>266</sup>

<sup>260</sup> USAREUR Engr Div, BOQ Const Prog Rept, 30 Sep 57. UNCLAS. In Engr Div Const Br.

<sup>261</sup> USAREUR Engr Div, FY 54 Hsg Const Prog Rept, 31 Dec 57. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>262</sup> USAREUR Engr Div, FY 55 Hsg Const Prog Repts, Fam Apts, Sr Off Qtrs, 31 Mar 58. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>263</sup> (1) Memo, ACoFS G4 to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 24 Sep 57, subj: Berlin Command FY 1958 MCA Construction Program. In SGS 600.1 (1957).

(2) Memo for rec, Engr Div Const Br, 28 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Programs. In Const Br, 285/15.2 Status of Progs. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>264</sup> Memo for rec, Engr Div Const Br, 28 Jul 58, cited above.

<sup>265</sup> USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 267. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>266</sup> Memo for rec, Engr Div Const Br, 28 Jul 58, cited above. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Reports, w/Incl 1. AEAEN-RC 285/15 EN. Both UNCLAS.

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d. FY 1958 MCA Construction Program. The FY 1958 MCA Construction Program, Germany, consisting of 85 projects for \$20,026,000, had been deferred in favor of higher priority items in other areas of the world.<sup>267</sup>

e. FY 1959 MCA Construction Program. The construction program for FY 1959 consisted of 20 projects for \$16,159,000, including 5 projects estimated at \$3,717,000 that had been reprogrammed from FY 1957.<sup>268</sup> Eventually, only one new project of the FY 1959 program--an underground depot in WACOM for \$8,500,000--was approved.<sup>269</sup> The Department of the Army tentatively apportioned \$1,000,000 for previously authorized but unfunded projects.<sup>270</sup>

f. POL Pipeline Construction, Germany. As of 30 June 1958 the Zweibruecken-Germersheim section of the pipeline extending to Huttenheim was completed. Tank farms and pump stations for this portion were still under construction, with completion scheduled for the first quarter of FY 1959.<sup>271</sup> Two of the previously authorized projects, the Huttenheim pipeline and river crossing and the Huttenheim POL tank storage facilities, were scheduled for construction in FY 1959. Two additional projects, the Sandhofen pipeline and river crossing and the Sandhofen barge unloading facility, were programmed for FY 1960.<sup>272</sup> (See Map 3.)

g. Construction by Troop Units. Troop-unit construction was performed by the 7th Engineer Brigade, which provided 67 battalion-months of construction effort on 136 projects in Germany. Construction projects included the building of roads, hardstands, guard towers, water reservoirs, ammunition bunkers, Nike sites, rifle ranges, POL drum storage areas, and washracks, the erection of prefabricated and masonry buildings, and the

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<sup>267</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 268. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>268</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to CofEngrs, 1 Jun 57, subj: Justification Data for FY 1959 MCA Program, Germany. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Engr Div Const Br, 285/16b(2) FY 59 MCA Prog (1958).

<sup>269</sup>This project was authorized by Congress in September 1958. (Cmt 2, G4 to Hist Div, 15 Dec 58, to DF, Hist Div to G4, 14 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAHI 250/54 HI. SECRET.)

<sup>270</sup>

Cable DA-939822, DA from DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Apr 58. SECRET.

<sup>271</sup>DF, QM Div Jnt Area Petrl Ofc to ACoS G4, 3 Jun 58, cited above, w/Incl 1. CONF.

<sup>272</sup>(1) Memo, C/G4 Instl Br to C/Mgt Br, 15 Apr 58, subj: POL Pipeline and Storage Construction in MCA Program. AEAGD-I 285/10 GD.  
(2) Cmt 2, n.d., ACoS G4 to QM Div, to DF, USAREUR QM to ACoS G4, 5 May 58, subj as above. AEAQM-JAPO 250/H5.3. Both UNCLAS.

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rehabilitation of permanent buildings and Army airfields. The estimated value of these projects was \$9,546,948.<sup>273</sup>

h. German Alternate Construction. The German alternate construction program, initiated in May 1953, originally provided for 3,236 family units, which were in USAREUR's possession by 31 August 1957. During the following months 32 units at 3 locations were turned over as a part of local agreements to derequisition badly needed German housing. In addition, USAREUR acquired 60 units that USAFE no longer needed at Munich and 9 units that the British turned over at Kiel. As of 30 June 1958 USAREUR was in possession of 3,337 alternate housing units.<sup>274</sup> During the latter part of FY 1958 the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to replace the housing units at Fuessen and Scheyern, which were to be released to the Bundeswehr. The alternate construction was to consist of 138 units, 72 of which were to be located at Mannheim and the remainder at Baumholder. Under the terms of agreement, the housing at Fuessen and Scheyern was not to be released until the alternate units were completed and made available to USAREUR.<sup>275</sup>

i. Temporary Family Quarters Program. In order to alleviate the shortage of family quarters at most troop stations throughout Germany, a program of converting maids' rooms to temporary family quarters was instituted. In addition, General Hodes directed that excess BOQ space be similarly converted and that consideration be given to the conversion of playrooms.<sup>276</sup> The conversion program called for 2,310 units, the addition of which would result in a 6-percent increase in housing assets. As of 30 June 1958, 1,365 of these units were in the process of being turned over for occupancy; the program was scheduled for completion by the end of the first quarter of FY 1959.<sup>277</sup>

j. Surplus-Commodity Housing Program. Another means of providing additional housing was the development of a surplus-commodity housing program for Germany, which was to be similar to that executed in France.<sup>278</sup> In November 1957 USAREUR submitted a proposed 5,406-family-

<sup>273</sup> Ltr, Hq 7th Engr Bde to USAREUR Hist Div, 2 Oct 58, subj: Statistical Summary--7th Engineer Brigade. AEUEO-0 285/52. UNCLAS.

<sup>274</sup> Info from USAREUR Engr Div Real Estate Br, 23 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>275</sup> USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58, p. 5. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>276</sup> Memo, ACofS G1 to Dep ACofS G1, 12 Mar 58, no subj. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br, 285/10 Hsg Prog and Const (1958).

<sup>277</sup> USAREUR G4, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, cited above, p. 12. UNCLAS.

<sup>278</sup> Memo for rec, Mr. W. J. Pool, G4 Instl Br Real Estate Off, 19 Nov 57, subj: Surplus Commodity Housing, Germany. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br, 600.121a (GEN) (1957).

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unit first increment of the surplus-commodity program.<sup>279</sup> The Department of the Army certified 5,194 of these units, but the Department of Defense disapproved the entire program for Germany.<sup>280</sup> Nevertheless, the Department of the Army continued its efforts to initiate a surplus-commodity housing program for Germany.<sup>281</sup>

k. Rental-Guarantee Housing in Germany. With the surplus-commodity housing program for Germany in jeopardy, the Department of the Army directed that a rental-guarantee housing program be prepared as a supplement to other prospective programs. After developing the program, USAREUR was to coordinate it with the U.S. Embassy at Bonn.<sup>282</sup> At the end of June 1958 the Embassy indicated that there was no objection in principle to discussing the proposal with the respective German Government agencies at the appropriate time. For political reasons, however, such discussions would have to be delayed until after 1 August 1958.<sup>283</sup>

101. Construction in France

a. U.S. Army Construction Agency, France. With the phase-out of the Joint Construction Agency, the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France (USACAF), assumed responsibility for the military construction program on 1 August 1957.<sup>284</sup> During FY 1958 USACAF accomplished construction for both the Army and Air Force with a total in-place value of \$57,749,000.<sup>285</sup>

b. FY 1958 MCA Construction Program. The FY 1958 MCA construction program for France submitted to the Department of the Army contained projects amounting to \$23.4 million. Upon its approval in January 1958

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<sup>279</sup>(1) Cable SX-6868, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Nov 57. (2) Cable EC-9-6103, USCINCEUR to DA for DCSLOG/T4, 6 Nov 57. Both CONF.

<sup>280</sup>(1) Cable DA-932985, DA from DCSLOG/T4 to USCINCEUR, 20 Nov 57. CONF. (2) Cable DA-325010, same to same, 27 Mar 58. OFLUSE.

<sup>281</sup>(1) Cable DA-333542, DA from DCSLOG/T4 to USCINCEUR, 25 Apr 58. OFLUSE. (2) Cable DA-939706, DA from DCSLOG to USCINCEUR, 7 Apr 58. CONF.

<sup>282</sup>(1) Cable DA-337983, DA from DCSLOG/T4 to CINCUSAREUR, 12 May 58. (2) Cable EC-3-3415, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>283</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jun 58, subj: Rental Guarantee Housing. AEAGD-I 285/10 GD. CONF.

<sup>284</sup>(1) DA ltr, 19 Jul 57, subj: Military Construction in the EUCOM Area. AGAM-P(M) 323.261 (10 Jul 57) DCSLOG. (2) Ltr, USEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Jul 57, same subj. ECJD-C 322. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>285</sup>Briefing for Gen Magruder by Engr Div, cited above. UNCLAS.

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it was reduced to \$20,754,000.<sup>286</sup> (See Table 15.)

c. FY 1959 MCA Construction Program. The FY 1959 program for France, amounting to \$8,284,000, was reduced to \$4,265,000 by the Department of the Army and then submitted to Congress.<sup>287</sup>

d. FY 1958 Reprogramming Actions. During FY 1958 the Department of the Army established guidelines for USAREUR reprogramming actions regarding MCA construction in France. Future construction directives were to be issued in terms of Department of Defense category codes, which would give CINCUSAREUR latitude--within the limit of available funds--to reprogram line items within each construction category code and transfer funds between such codes, thus permitting full use of authorized funds. However, the following guidelines were to be observed in reprogramming actions:

(1) Depot requirements were to be reduced as a result of Project MASS;

(2) No additional projects in support of EES wholesale activities were to be authorized;

(3) No additional hospital nuclei were to be constructed unless they were usable as peacetime troop billets;

(4) Support buildings were to be provided only where absolutely essential for already completed installations;

(5) No new depots were to be authorized except those contained in the FY 1958 requests;

(6) No facilities were to be constructed as replacements for facilities previously constructed from MCA funds;

(7) No sheds for static storage of either vehicles or artillery were to be considered; and

(8) Requirements for morale and welfare projects were to be minimized.<sup>288</sup>

<sup>286</sup>(1) DA ltr, 21 Jan 58, subj: Authorization-Construction of FY 1958 MCA Program, LOFC France (FY 1958 MCA-USAREUR Dir Nr 1). ENGEC-LOFC France. (2) DA ltr, 27 Feb 58, subj: Authorization-Modification of Previous Authorization for MCA Program, FY 1958 LOFC France (FY 1958 MCA-USAREUR Dir Nr 2). ENGEC-LOFC France. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>287</sup>(1) Ltr, USAREUR to CofEngrs, 1 Jun 57, subj: Justification Data for FY 1959 MCA Program, LOFC France. AEAEN-RC-600.13 EN. UNCLAS. (2) Cable DA-939822, DA from DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Apr 58. SECRET.

<sup>288</sup>Cables DA-301698, DA-312050, DA from DCSLOG/M2 to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jan, 10 Feb 58. UNCLAS.

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army  
for the Line of Communication, France, 30 June 1958  
(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Category Code</u>	<u>Total Program</u>	<u>FY's 1951-53</u>	<u>FY 1957</u>	<u>FY 1958</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>282,602</u>	<u>256,231</u>	<u>5,617</u>	<u>20,754</u>
<u>Operational and Training Facilities</u>				
111 Runways, Landing Strips, Pads, etc.	372	372		
123 Land Vehicle Dispensing, Normal Fuel	34	34		
125 POL Pipeline (excluding Terminal & Bulk Tank)	28,392	28,392		
131 Buildings for Radio, Radar, etc. (excluding Navigational Aids)	1,117	1,117		
132 Other: Antenna Towers, Control Links, (excluding Navigational Aids)	405	405		
149 Other: Tactical Structures, Protective Construction	1,151	1,151		
152 Wharfs	559	559		
165 Dredging Not Related to Specific Construction	639	639		
179 Other: Training Courses, Ranges, etc.	465	465		
<u>Maintenance and Production Facilities</u>				
211 Aircraft	313	313		
212 Guided Missiles	2,488			2,488
213 Ships, Spares	92	92		
214 Tank, Automotive	4,384	4,244	20	120
215 Weapons, Spares	5,733	5,733		
216 Ammunition, Explosives, Toxics	912	912		
217 Electronics and Communications Equipment	1,215	1,215		
218 Facilities for Miscellaneous Procured Equipment	5,627	5,627		
219 Installation, Repair, and Operation	1,550	1,490		60

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army for the  
Line of Communication, France, 30 June 1958--Continued  
(Thousands of Dollars)

Category Code	Total Program	FY's 1951-53	FY 1957	FY 1958
<u>Supply Facilities</u>				
411 Bulk Depot, Terminal and Bulk-Type Storage, POL, etc.	31,248	31,248		
421 Depot and Arsenal	17,743	7,014	3,121	7,608
422 Installation and Ready Issue	50	50		
441 Depot and Arsenal	28,732	23,975		4,757
442 Installation and Organizational	3,880	3,840		40
451 Depot and In-Transit Paved and Stabilized Areas	5,925	5,925		
452 Installation and Organization, Day-to-Day Storage	1,006	1,006		
<u>Hospital and Medical Facilities</u>				
510 Hospital Buildings	23,317	23,317		
520 Infirmary Buildings	190	190		
530 Laboratories and Clinics	117	117		
550 Dispensaries	415	415		
<u>Administrative Facilities</u>				
610 Administrative Buildings	5,275	5,175		100
<u>Housing and Community Facilities</u>				
721 EM Barracks and Mess	13,188	12,000	86	1,102
723 Detached Facilities	2,610	2,610		
724 Bachelor Officers' Quarters	3,982	3,729		260
725 Emergency Hutments and Tents	2,080	2,080		

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army for the  
Line of Communication, France, 30 June 1958--Continued  
(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Category Code</u>	<u>Total Program</u>	<u>FY's 1951-53</u>	<u>FY 1957</u>	<u>FY 1958</u>
<u>Housing and Community Facilities</u>				
730 Community Facilities, Personnel Support and Services	4,768	4,693		75
740 Community Facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreational, Internal	8,087	7,813		274
750 Community Facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreational, External	215	215		
<u>Utilities and Grounds Improvements</u>				
812 Distribution and Transmission Lines	95			
821 Steam, Source	4,002			
841 Supply, Treatment and Storage	15			
843 Fire Protection	194			
851 Roads, including Incidental Parking Areas	30,421	27,521	1,300	1,600
852 Sidewalks and Other Pavement	596			
860 Railroad Tracks	8,245	7,681	564	
872 Fencing, Gates, and Guard Towers	2,081	2,481	260	340
890 Miscellaneous Utilities	27,062	24,866	266	1,930
<u>Real Estate</u>				
932 Site Improvement	599	599		
933 Demolition of Structures and Obstructions	9	9		

Source: DA ltr, 27 Feb 58, subj: Authorization--Modification of Previous Authorization for MCA  
Program, Army, for FY 1951-53, LOFC France (USAREUR Dir Nr 10). ENGMC-LOFC France FY  
1951-53 MCA. UNCLAS.

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e. Revised Total Requirement Programming. At the beginning of FY 1958 construction in France was still being funded under MCA construction programs for FY's 1951, 1952, and 1953. The total authorization for the three-year program given in Department of the Army Directive Number 7 of 6 June 1957, including some \$10,983,000 reprogrammed from other areas, was \$255,961,000.<sup>289</sup> In January 1958 the reprogrammed funds--meanwhile reduced to \$9,365,000--were withdrawn and placed in a separate FY 1957 program. Upon reviewing this program, the Department of the Army authorized the construction of projects amounting to only \$5,617,000 (see Table 15).<sup>290</sup> The reduction in the 3-year program was protested by USAREUR, whereupon the Department of the Army pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had restored the amount authorized in Directive Number 1, dated 21 November 1955.<sup>291</sup> Department of the Army Construction Directive Number 10 (Table 15) clarified this point by restoring the authorization for the 3-year program to \$256,231,000.<sup>292</sup> Thus, after two and one-half years of reviewing and reprogramming actions as well as of delays and freezes, the construction authorization for the line of communication through France amounted to the same figure that had been approved originally. Directive Number 10 also included authorization for the FY 1957 and FY 1958 programs, increasing the total construction authorization for France to \$282,602,000 (Table 15).

f. Funding.

(1) FY 1958 Apportionment. As of 1 July 1957 USAREUR had received \$235.5 million for construction in France. While the Department of the Army announced in January 1958 that an additional \$20 million would be made available before the end of FY 1958, actual

<sup>289</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 272-74. SECRET.

<sup>290</sup>(1) DA ltr, 16 Jan 58, subj: Authorization--Modification of Previous Authorization for MCA Construction Program, Army, for FY 1951-53, LOFC France (MCA-USAREUR Dir Nr 9). ENGEC-LOFC France FY 1951-53. (2) DA ltr, 21 Jan 58, subj: Authorization--Construction of FY 1957 MCA Program for LOFC, France (USAREUR Dir Nr 1). ENGEC-LOFC France (57) MCA. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>291</sup>For further details on Directives 1, 6, and 7, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 274-76. SECRET (info OFLUSE).

<sup>292</sup>(1) Cable DA-312050, cited above. (2) Cable SC-16337, CINCUSAREUR to DA for DCSLOG/M2, 18 Feb 58. (3) Cable DA-316140, DA from CofEngrs to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Feb 58. (4) DA ltr, 27 Feb 58, subj: Authorization--Modification of Previous Authorization for MCA Program, Army for FY 1951-53, LOFC France (USAREUR Dir Nr 10). ENGMC-LOFC France FY 1951-53 MGA. All UNCLAS.

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apportionments amounted to \$15.1 million, bringing the total as of 30 June 1958 to \$250.6 million. (See Chart 9.)<sup>293</sup>

(2) Withdrawal of Unobligated Funds. At the same time that the authorization for the 3-year program was restored to \$256,231,000, all previously authorized funds exceeding this ceiling figure were withdrawn.<sup>294</sup>

g. Status. During FY 1958 USACAF obligated only \$7.8 million--less than 25 percent of the FY 1957 obligations. Value of work in place increased by \$29.8 million, while completed construction projects increased by \$61.7 million, or almost twice as much as in FY 1957.<sup>295</sup> (See Chart 9.)

h. POL Pipeline. With the POL pipeline through France becoming operational during the early part of FY 1958, the construction project was considered completed as of 30 November 1957.<sup>296</sup> However, a number of subsidiary projects that did not affect the operational status of the pipeline were still under way on 30 June 1958. In the port area these were the Donges dock and trestle, the alternate offshore unloading facilities at La Croisic, and two 14-inch pipelines connecting the Donges A and B storage facilities. In the interior of France work was in progress on laboratories, decontamination tank systems, and barracks for enlisted men at all tank farms. In addition, a water system for the Chalons tank farm and an inter-tank-farm communications system were under construction. These projects were scheduled for completion in early FY 1959.<sup>297</sup>

i. Construction by Troop Units. In France, as in Germany, troop-unit construction was performed by the 7th Engineer Brigade, whose units provided 17 battalion-months of construction effort on such projects as the building of roads, hardstands, and railroad sidings, the erection of prefabricated buildings, and the modification of existing buildings. The estimated value of the construction accomplished during FY 1958 was \$2,374,241.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>293</sup>(1) DA ltr, 21 Jan 58, (USAREUR Dir Nr 1), cited above. (2) Ltr, USACAF to USAREUR Engr, 18 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Programs. RCS-ECJD-1 (R-1). Both UNCLAS.

<sup>294</sup>Cable DA-316140, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>295</sup>(1) USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 277. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Program, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>296</sup>DF, ACofS G4 to Engr Div, 13 Dec 57, subj: Pipeline Construction Progress Report (RCS-AEAGD-153). AEAGD-MN 250/33 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>297</sup>Ltr, USACAF to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Apr 58, subj: Status of Construction of Donges-Metz POL Facilities. AEUFC-O-NC. UNCLAS.

<sup>298</sup>Ltr, Hq 7th Engr Bde to Hist Div, 2 Oct 58, cited above. UNCLAS.


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Chart 9

Total Requirement Program, MCA Dollar Construction for Line of Communication, France, 30 June 1958  
(Millions of Dollars)



\*Authorized by DA Const Dir Nr 10, LofC France, 27 Feb 58.

Source: USAREUR Engr Div Const Br. UNCLAS.

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j. Dependents' Housing.

(1) Rental-Guarantee Housing. The housing constructed under the rental-guarantee program proved unsatisfactory, because the apartments were extremely small, the rental was excessive considering the living area provided, heating and hot water supplies were inadequate, and maintenance was substandard. However, another rental-guarantee housing program was under active consideration since USEUCOM had received a corresponding directive from the Department of the Army in early June 1958. The French Government was approached on the subject; but its reaction was not yet known by 30 June 1958.<sup>299</sup>

(2) Surplus-Commodity Housing. The first increment of surplus-commodity housing for France had been contracted for in May 1957.<sup>300</sup> This increment was increased to 2,800 units, 1,068 of which were for Army use and the remainder for the Air Force. In August 1957 CINCUSAREUR was delegated responsibility for the entire surplus-commodity housing program in France, including that for the Air Force. As of 30 June 1958 the estimated cost per unit was \$18,518.52, which was a \$14.48 reduction from the original estimate. The new figure was broken down as follows: Net contract cost \$16,574.08; contingencies and furniture, \$1,230.00; and governmental cost, \$714.44. At the end of FY 1958 the value of construction in place for the first increment was \$12,481,000.<sup>301</sup>

In November 1957 USAREUR submitted for approval the second increment, which consisted of 2,895 units at 15 locations for Army use, 310 units at 3 locations for Air Force use, and 364 units for USEUCOM, the Seine Area Command, and attached units. The second increment was reduced to 2,364 units by the Department of the Army and then further reduced to 298 units by the Department of Defense.<sup>302</sup>

102. Construction in Italy

While USASETAF construction in Italy came under USAREUR supervision on 1 January 1958, the Mediterranean Division of the U.S. Army

<sup>299</sup> Memo, USAREUR G4 Instl Br Real Estate Off to C/Instl Br, 22 Aug 58, subj: Status of Housing Construction Program. UNCLAS. In Instl Br, 285/H5.3 Briefings (1958).

<sup>300</sup> USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 278-79. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>301</sup> (1) Ltr, USEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Aug 57, subj: Delegation of Authority, Surplus Commodity Housing, France. ECJD-P 322. (2) Briefing for Gen Magruder by Engr Div, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>302</sup> (1) Ltr, USEUCOM to CofSA, 27 Nov 57, subj: Surplus Commodity Housing, France, 2d Increment (U). EDJD-C 600.1. (2) Ltr, DA to USCINCEUR, 26 Nov 57, subj: Surplus Commodity Housing Program (U), w/Incl 1. AGAC-CC-600.12 (25 Nov 57) DCSLOG. (3) Cable DA-325010, DA from DCSLOG/T4 to USCINCEUR, 27 Mar 58. All CONF.

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Corps of Engineers continued to be responsible for the execution of construction work. This arrangement corresponded to the division of responsibility following the phase-out of the Joint Construction Agency.

a. FY 1958 MCA Construction Program. The USASETAF FY 1958 MCA construction program consisted of one single project, a small advanced-weapons storage facility for the USASETAF Logistical Command funded for \$950,000.<sup>303</sup>

b. FY 1959 MCA Construction Program. The USASETAF FY 1959 program consisted of 3 projects, 2 of them at Vicenza for the Sky Cavalry Battalion and the Heavy Missile Command, and the other at Verona, where an air facility was to be rehabilitated. Cost estimates for the projects totaled \$3,710,000, which the Department of the Army approved for funding.<sup>304</sup>

c. Status of Construction. As of 30 June 1958 the current working estimate for implemented construction programs was \$14,008,000, as contrasted to the \$14,328,000 that had been approved. Of this amount, \$7,311,000 had been obligated, the value of work in place was \$6,409,000, and construction worth \$5,995,000 actually had been completed.<sup>305</sup>

d. Dependents' Housing. In response to a request from USASETAF, the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense approved reprogramming surplus-commodity housing to provide 371 badly needed units at Vicenza.<sup>306</sup> This approval was granted in January 1958, but the agreement with the Italian Government for constructing these units was delayed until the first part of June, and bids for construction were not opened until the end of that month.<sup>307</sup> The approved unit cost for USASETAF housing was \$13,750, as opposed to \$18,518 for France. Despite this considerable difference in cost, the Department of the Army objected to so-called costly features not normally available in family housing in other areas.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>303</sup>USASETAF Instl Const Prog Repts, MCA FY 1956-60, 30 Jun 58. UNCLAS. In USAREUR Engr Div Cons Br files.

<sup>304</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Cable DA-939822, DA from DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Apr 58. ~~SECRET~~.

<sup>305</sup>Ltr, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jul 58, subj: Status of Construction Reports, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>306</sup>Cable DA-301211, DA from DCSLOG/T2 to USCINCEUR, 3 Jan 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>307</sup>(1) Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 3017 Aug 58, Am Emb Rome to State Dept, 6 Jun 58. (2) Ltr, USA Southern Dist Engr Off, Vicenza, to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jun 58. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 285/10a SETAF (1958). Both CONF.

<sup>308</sup>Cable DA-943182, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jun 58. CONF.

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103. Real Estate in Germany

a. Utilization of Facilities. On 1 July 1958 the Army-wide utilization ratio for barracks space was increased from 88 to 92 percent of total capacity. The USAREUR percentage of 91 percent was below the accepted standards, mainly because of the physical plan of the barracks occupied by the command. The caserns occupied in Germany were designed for the horse-drawn or partly mechanized troops of World Wars I and II, and some for troops of even earlier vintage. Even though such installations were not conducive to full occupancy by modern troop units, USAREUR utilization ratios improved steadily during FY 1958.<sup>309</sup>

b. Relocation of Troop Stations.

(1) Double Switch. The troop relocation plan Double Switch was to be implemented in conjunction with the gyroscope move of the 2d Armored Division. The plan provided for moving the 8th Infantry Division into the former area of the 2d Armored Division and stationing the replacement 4th Armored Division in the VII Corps area in order to provide an armored division for each of the two U.S. corps. The sum of \$1.5 million was made available to Seventh Army to finance the triple shift as well as additional construction needed for the armored units.<sup>310</sup> Double Switch was completed by 28 January 1958 with an expenditure of only \$800,000, because Seventh Army was able to make some savings.<sup>311</sup>

(2) Seventh Heaven. Seventh Heaven was a restationing plan according to which the U.S. forces in Germany were to be placed in a better tactical position by being concentrated north of the Danube River.<sup>312</sup> In February 1958 USAREUR forwarded its completed restationing plan to the West German Ministry of Defense for consideration. Exclusive of real estate, the project was estimated to cost the equivalent of \$200 million.<sup>313</sup> (For details concerning the consolidated requirements, see Table 16.)

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<sup>309</sup>G4 Instl Br, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, 24 Jul 58. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br, 250/34, Rev & Analysis (FY 1958).

<sup>310</sup>(1) Memo, Gen Clarke to Gen Hodes, 7 Nov 57, subj: Triple Shift. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACofS G4 to CofS, 12 Nov 57, subj: Restationing Plan, 7th Army. Both UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957).

<sup>311</sup>(1) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Feb 58. (2) Memo, C/USAREUR G3 Ops Br to CofS, 24 Feb 58, subj: Final Restationing Summary, 8th Infantry, 4th and 2d Armored Divisions. Both UNCLAS. Both in USAREUR SGS 250/H5 Seventh Heaven (1958).

<sup>312</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 281. SECRET.

<sup>313</sup>Ltr, Dep CINCUSAREUR to Ger Fed Min of Def, 5 Feb 58. SECRET. In SGS 250/H5 Seventh Heaven (1958).

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Table 16--USAREUR Consolidated Requirements for  
Restationing Plan Seventh Heaven

<u>Required Facilities</u>	<u>Units of Measure</u>	<u>Total Units</u>
<u>Troop Facilities</u>		
Troop Housing, Std 216-man Bks	ea	83
Administration Buildings, Regt Hq @ 4,340 sq ft	ea	8
Administration Buildings, Bn Hq @ 2,100 sq ft	ea	20
Troop Classroom Buildings @ 3,500 sq ft	ea	8
Mess Halls, 500-man @ 5,220 sq ft	ea	28
Supply Buildings @ 2,860 sq ft	ea	24
Signal Exchange Expansion, Line	lines	2,300
Signal Exchange Buildings @ 12,000 sq ft	ea	5
QM Laundry, 10,000-man @ 43,200 sq ft, with Equipment	ea	3
QM Class I Supply Points	sq ft	44,750
QM Bakery @ 12,000 sq ft	ea	1
QM Class II and IV Storage	sq ft	15,000
QM Furniture Warehouse	sq ft	10,000
QM Sales Store	sq ft	18,000
QM Gasoline Stations	ea	5
QM Field Maintenance Shop @ 25,000 sq ft	ea	1
Central Heating Plants	ea	4
Hospitals: 300-bed		
150-bed	beds	450
Dispensaries	beds	30
Dental Clinics	chairs	44
Commissaries	sq ft	123,500
Rehabilitation of Medical Facilities	--	--

Storage and Maintenance Facilities

Hardstands, Concrete	sq yds	165,013
Hardstands, Bituminous	sq yds	114,306
Maintenance Administration	sq ft	4,000
Maintenance Shops	sq ft	303,475
Grease Racks	ea	68
Washracks	ea	149
Oil and Paint Storage	sq ft	3,390
Class III Storage, with Pumps	gal	399,603
Warehouses, General, Technical Service	sq ft	232,000
Signal Shops	sq ft	10,000
Engineer Shops	sq ft	68,400
Ammunition Bunkers	ea	4
Move of Equipment	--	--

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Table 16--USAREUR Consolidated Requirements for Restoration Plan Seventh Heaven--Continued

<u>Required Facilities</u>	<u>Units of Measure</u>	<u>Total Units</u>
<u>Community Support Facilities</u>		
Family Housing	apts	7,105
BOQ, Std, 34-man	ea	16
Dependents' Schools, Classrooms @ 850 sq ft	rooms	284
Chapels, Seats @ 17 sq ft	seats	5,000
EES Buildings	sq ft	270,900
EES Garages	sq ft	46,800
EES Parking	sq yds	6,500
Libraries	sq ft	35,000
Officers' Clubs	sq ft	25,200
NCO and EM Clubs	sq ft	95,000
Special Services Clubs	sq ft	53,000
Theaters	seats	3,894
Gymnasiums	sq ft	61,814
Bowling Alleys, Lanes @ 850 sq ft	lanes	42
Outdoor Recreational Facilities	acres	32
Community Activity Buildings	ea	4
EES Depot	sq ft	150,000
EES Photo Processing Plants	sq ft	17,000
EES Shoe Repair Shops	sq ft	500
EES Dry-Cleaning Plants	sq ft	11,000
EES Cold-Storage Plants	sq ft	1,000
EES Laundry	sq ft	20,000
Move Families--Transportation and Dislocation	--	--
<u>Airfields</u>		
Runways	sq yds	28,888
Hardstands and Heliports	sq yds	53,379
Hangars and Shops	sq ft	82,000
Operations Offices	sq ft	4,000
Gasoline Storage	gal	250,000
Control Towers	ea	2
<u>Airborne Training Facilities</u>		
34-foot Tower	ea	4
Suspended Harness Sheds	ea	2
Drying Towers @ 1,500 sq ft	ea	2
Parachute Packing and Maintenance	ea	2
Storage Warehouses	ea	2
Heavy Drop Rigging Sheds	ea	2

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Table 16--USAREUR Consolidated Requirements for Restoration Plan Seventh Heaven--Continued

<u>Required Facilities</u>	<u>Units of Measure</u>	<u>Total Units</u>
<u>Airborne Training Facilities</u>		
PLF Platform @ 100 sq ft	ea	8
Mockups, C-119 Type	ea	4
Land Training Areas	acres	56,000
<u>Prestock Facilities</u>		
Real Estate	acres	260
Bunkers, 26 ft x 80 ft	ea	52
Shed-Type Storage	ea	3
Gasoline Class III Storage Point, Underground Tanks	barrels	52,500
Transportation of Ammunition	tons	14,200

Source: Ltr, Dep CINCUSAREUR to Ger Fed Min of Def, 5 Feb 58, w/Incl 1, Consolidated New Requirements--Seventh Heaven. SECRET. In SGS 250/H5 Seventh Heaven (1958).

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In April 1958 the USAREUR position pertaining to Seventh Heaven negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany was further clarified. Tactical integrity of units was to be maintained at all times, and moves would not begin before construction was 100-percent complete. Minimum standards of acceptance were provision of required barracks, dependent housing, and allied facilities to enable relocation of one tactical division at a time. The deployment schedule for USAREUR units was contingent upon a "time frame" to be established by negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>314</sup>

In their counterproposal of 14 May 1958, the Germans insisted on a release of 15,000 troop spaces south of the Danube by 31 December 1958 as a condition for approval of any restationing plan. Their terms contained no offers of suitable caserns, buildings, or other structures and no commitment for providing dependent housing. Negotiations were to be resumed as soon as possible.<sup>315</sup>

c. Release of Facilities. The long-standing policy of releasing real estate that had become surplus to the requirements of the U.S. forces was continued. During FY 1958 the release rate was slow, because the few requisitioned properties still on hand were needed until alternate facilities could be provided. Altogether 634 facilities were released, including 180 residences, 62 apartment houses, 9 hotels, 1 school, 1 restaurant, 1 theater, 1 hospital, 8 caserns, 234 parcels of open land, 90 miscellaneous commercial facilities, and 47 other military-type facilities. (For the cumulative real estate releases since 1948, see Table 17.)<sup>316</sup>

d. Release of Isolated Facilities. Shortly before the end of FY 1957 CINCUSAREUR had directed that a program for the release of isolated real properties be initiated.<sup>317</sup> The facilities to be released were located apart from military caserns or other major complexes, were primarily of a nonmilitary nature, and were located in urban areas not adjacent to U.S. forces installations. Dependent housing, training or tactical facilities, and airfields and landing strips were specifically exempted from the program.<sup>318</sup>

<sup>314</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 2 Apr 58. SECRET. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>315</sup>Briefing for CINCUSAREUR by ACoS G4, 8 Jun 58, subj: Logistical Objectives for FY 1958, p. 8. SECRET. In G4 Mgt Br, 250/H5.3 FY 58 Objectives for CinC (1958).

<sup>316</sup>USAREUR G4 Instl Br Mthly Rept, 31 Jul 58, subj: Release of Real Estate, 30 June 1958. UNCLAS. In G4 Instl Br.

<sup>317</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 281-82. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>318</sup>USAREUR Memo 405-5-13, 19 Aug 57, subj: Release of Isolated Real Properties (RCS AEAGD-200). UNCLAS.

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Table 17--Cumulative Totals of USAREUR Real Estate Releases, 1948-1958

Type	1948-56	30 Jun 57	31 Dec 57	30 Jun 58
Total	28,199	29,034	29,475	29,668
Residences	13,192	13,700	13,834	13,880
Apartment Houses	3,583 <sup>a/</sup>	3,655	3,715	3,717
Hotels, Pensions	483 <sup>a/</sup>	522	527	531
Schools	205	205	205	206
Restaurants	365	368	369	369
Theaters	70	71	71	72
Hospitals	68	68	69	69
Caserns	96 <sup>b/</sup>	109	111	117 <sup>c/</sup>
Open Land Parcels	1,486	1,587	1,745	1,821
Others <sup>d/</sup>	8,651	8,735	8,792	8,825
Other Military-Type Facilities	0	14	37	61

a. Figures corrected from 30 June 1957 report.

b. Fragmentary records also indicate some 571 partial releases, including single buildings.

c. Plus two partial releases of caserns to the West German Armed Forces during FY 1958.

d. Includes shops, offices, warehouses, factories, and miscellaneous commercial facilities.

Source: G4 Instl Br Real Estate Sec. UNCLAS.

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Of the 292 isolated facilities occupied on 1 July 1957, 83 were released by 30 April 1958, another 8 were scheduled for release by 30 June, and 42 were under consideration for future release dependent upon the outcome of negotiations for alternate provisions. The remaining 159 properties were required indefinitely; their forced release before adequate alternate facilities were available would seriously affect operational efficiency without any corresponding savings in rentals and maintenance.<sup>319</sup>

e. Release of Facilities to the German Armed Forces. During FY 1958, 8 USAREUR facilities were released outright, and 11 were partially ceded to the Bundeswehr. The released facilities, located in NACOM and SACOM, consisted of troop housing, office buildings, military prisons, ammunition storage dumps, rifle ranges, and training areas.<sup>320</sup>

f. Acquisition of Land. One of USAREUR's major problems in Germany concerned the acquisition of land. At the beginning of FY 1958 USAREUR requirements totaled 82,960 acres; while this acreage was reduced during the year, 17 new requests for land acquisitions were generated. Acquisitions amounted to 7,051 acres, leaving a 63,523-acre carryover of unfilled requirements for FY 1959.<sup>321</sup>

## 104. Real Estate in France

As of 30 June 1958 USACOMZEUR real-estate requirements amounted to 280 sites, 251 of which had been acquired. Of the 29 sites remaining to be acquired, 8 involved major installations.<sup>322</sup>

## Section VIII: Logistical Relationships with U.S. Military and Civilian Agencies in Europe

### 105. Relationships with Miscellaneous Civilian Agencies

a. Logistical Support of U.S. Government Agencies. Logistical support of the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and of attached diplomatic and

<sup>319</sup>DF, ACofS G4 to CofS, 21 Apr 58, subj: Release of Isolated Properties. AEAGD-I 285/9 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>320</sup>MRS, Engr Div Real Estate Br to Hist Div, 30 Sep 58, subj: Report of Release to the German Armed Forces During FY 1958. UNCLAS. In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>321</sup>G4 Instl Br, 4th Qtrly Prog Rev & Analysis, cited above. UNCLAS.

<sup>322</sup>USACOMZEUR Perf Rept, 30 Jun 58, p. 40. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

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consular activities in West Germany continued in reciprocity for Embassy support furnished to military elements in the vicinity of the West German capital. Support of civilian agencies of the U.S. Government outside of Germany was limited to those instances where support was unobtainable from civilian sources or the local economy and where support from military sources would not prejudice the fulfillment of troop requirements.<sup>323</sup>

## b. Logistical Support of Nongovernmental Agencies and Individuals.

(1) New USEUCOM Directive. USEUCOM made only minor revisions in the draft directive, prepared by USAREUR in coordination with USAFE and NELM, which was to implement the joint logistical support regulation that had been published in FY 1957.<sup>324</sup> Under the terms of the directive, USAREUR was assigned responsibility for preparing, coordinating, and disseminating appropriate instructions to insure uniform application of the provisions of the joint regulation in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Italy--except the metropolitan area of Naples--Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Ethiopia.<sup>325</sup> USAREUR's implementing instructions were under preparation on 30 June 1958.<sup>326</sup>

## (2) Curtailment of Support.

(a) West Berlin. The withdrawal of commissary, post exchange, and class VI privileges from press correspondents and other private agencies had been accomplished by 30 June 1957. Subsequent appeals to the Department of the Army for restoration of these privileges proved ineffective.<sup>327</sup>

(b) Changes. Among the FY 1958 changes in support rendered to nongovernmental agencies and individuals was an increase of approximately \$10 per month--effective 1 April 1958--in rental rates for all persons not entitled to free government quarters or quarters allowances. Moreover, students enrolled in the University of Maryland daytime program at Munich were requested to furnish their own linens effective

<sup>323</sup>For further details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 283-84. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>324</sup>For details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 284. SECRET (info UNCLAS).

<sup>325</sup>USEUCOM Plcy Dir 60-8, 20 Dec 57. UNCLAS.

<sup>326</sup>DF, ACofS G4 to CofS, 25 Feb 58, subj: Logistic Support of Nongovernmental Agencies and Individuals. AEAGD-S 280/2 GD. (2) DF, ACofS G4 to Hist Div, 8 Aug 58, same subj and file. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>327</sup>(1) MRS, Mr. William Ross, USAREUR G4 Svcs Br, to Mr. Moenk, 20 Jun 58, subj: USAREUR Relationships with Miscellaneous Military and Civilian Agencies. In Hist Div Docu Sec. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Mr. Frank Higgins, ASA, 29 Oct 57. In G4 Svcs Br. Both UNCLAS.

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with the beginning of the fall semester in 1958. Finally, family housing privileges were withdrawn from technical representatives in the USAREUR area effective 30 June 1958.<sup>328</sup>

At the request of the Federal Republic of Germany, USAREUR prepared an up-to-date list of assimilated and supported nongovernmental agencies and transmitted it in May 1958 through the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.<sup>329</sup>

(3) Extension of Support. In May 1958 USEUCOM directed USAREUR to furnish logistical support to the United Service Organization (USO) in the Paris area. When USAREUR objected that this action was contrary to the NATO Status of Forces Convention, USEUCOM pointed out that its directive was based on pertinent Army regulations.<sup>330</sup>

106. Interservice Supply Support

During FY 1957 USAREUR had been assigned responsibility for providing general depot-level supply and maintenance support, except for certain classes of USAFE supplies, to all U.S. forces in Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. This assignment was in accordance with the Department of Defense interservice supply-support program.<sup>331</sup> During FY 1958 the Air Force and Navy were furnished supplies worth \$37,720,940 and \$162,047, respectively. Only 1.4 percent of the support rendered to the Air Force and .2 percent of that given to the Navy was nonreimbursable.<sup>332</sup>

107. Support of MAAG's and Military Attaches

USAREUR had supported Army activities within the USEUCOM area of responsibility since FY 1956.<sup>333</sup> During FY 1958 the supported agencies

<sup>328</sup>(1) USAREUR Cir 614-39, 24 Mar 58, subj: Maintenance Charges for Quarters Furnished Persons Not Authorized Free Quarters. (2) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CG SACOM, 15 Jan 58, subj: Student Dormitories, University of Maryland. AEAGD-S 268/6 GD. (3) Cable SC-55203, USAREUR to subor comds, 20 Nov 57. All UNCLAS.

<sup>329</sup>Am Emb Bonn, First Note Verbale 454, 8 May 58, subj: USAREUR Assimilated and Supported Nongovernmental Agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLAS. In USAREUR G4 Svc Br files.

<sup>330</sup>(1) Cable EC-3-3309, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 May 58. (2) AR 950-1, 15 Apr 57, subj: Army Utilization of USO services. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>331</sup>(1) USEUCOM Ploy Dir 65-1, 13 Dec 56. (2) Ltr, USEUCOM to DA, 4 Mar 57, subj: Interservice Supply Support Furnished (RCS-ISSC-1001). ECJD-1-400. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>332</sup>Ltrs, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 10 Feb, 8 Aug 58, subj: Report of Interservice Supply Support Furnished (RCS-ISSC-1001). AEAGD-RR 280/29 GD. UNCLAS.

<sup>333</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 286. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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were divided into the following categories: First, agencies authorized common and Army-peculiar items only if like or similar items were not obtainable from the host nation or from State Department sources; second, agencies authorized full logistical support, including transportation, in accordance with applicable Department of the Army directives; and third, agencies authorized only Army-peculiar items of supply on a non-reimbursable basis. Army aircraft, regardless of location, were considered as Army-peculiar items.<sup>334</sup>

108. Support of International Commands and Agencies

a. United Nations Emergency Force. During FY 1958 USAREUR supply support of the United Nations Emergency Force assumed a routine aspect. On 1 June 1958 supply responsibility was transferred to USASETAF, with USACOMZEUR furnishing backup support.<sup>335</sup>

b. NATO Headquarters. A circular published in January 1958 formalized USAREUR's logistical responsibilities toward national and international elements of NATO headquarters and agencies in the central European area. According to these instructions, full support was to be rendered to the U.S. national elements of NATO headquarters in the same manner as to other U.S. military elements. Support of international elements was to consist of providing through sale or lease such materials or services--with the exception of personnel--normally available within USAREUR, through other resources of the command, or through Army supply channels from the United States.<sup>336</sup>

109. Phase-out of Operation SAFEHAVEN

Phase II of Operation SAFEHAVEN, concerned with evacuating selected Hungarian refugees to the United States, was still in effect on 1 July 1957.<sup>337</sup> Shortly after the beginning of FY 1958 Southern Area Command was authorized to terminate the operation, because no further shipments were scheduled.<sup>338</sup> During Phase II Southern Area Command received, processed, and arranged transportation for 4,359 Hungarian refugees at a cost of \$62,712. This sum included \$36,873 for supplies, while the balance was spent on travel obligations and various expenses.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>334</sup>USAREUR Cir 700-25, 8 Jul 58, subj: Supply Support of MAAG's, Missions, and Miscellaneous Activities. UNCLAS.

<sup>335</sup>Cable SX-4013, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, USASETAF, 21 May 58. CONF.

<sup>336</sup>USAREUR Cir 700-26, 27 Jan 58, subj: Supply Support of Certain International NATO Military Headquarters. UNCLAS.

<sup>337</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 285. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

<sup>338</sup>(1) Cable AES-2051, CG SACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jul 57. (2) Cable EC-3-5029, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 57. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>339</sup>Ltr, CG SACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 57, subj: Report on Phase II of Operation SAFEHAVEN. UNCLAS. In USAREUR G4 Svcs Br, 278/H5.3 Op SAFEHAVEN (1957).

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## CHAPTER 8

### Military-Political Relationships and Activities

#### Section I: Developments in the U.S. Area of Responsibility in Germany

##### 110. Status of Forces Negotiations

The negotiations to replace the Bonn Conventions with a new arrangement based upon the NATO Status of Forces Agreement were conducted by diplomatic representatives, and USAREUR's role was therefore essentially a secondary one. While USCINCEUR furnished the chief military representative to the U.S. negotiating team, USAREUR supplied technical information and stated its position on issues considered vital to the U.S. Army in Germany.<sup>1</sup> The negotiations came to a virtual standstill during the months preceding the September 1957 elections, after which the Germans submitted to the Allies their so-called final proposal for the resolution of the outstanding issues. A continuation of the status quo based on the Conventions seemed more favorable than any agreement likely to emerge from the current negotiations, but the Germans were unwilling to extend the existing convention or the negotiations indefinitely. Therefore, rather than risk a breakdown of the negotiations, the U.S. Ambassador recommended to the State Department that the German proposal be accepted in principle as a basis for concluding an over-all agreement. On 29 April 1958 the

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<sup>1</sup>For details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 289. SECRET (info CONF).

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State Department approved this recommendation, but even so, it appeared unlikely that a new Status of Forces agreement would be implemented before July 1959.

In May 1958 negotiations were resumed by ad hoc working groups that the heads of delegations staffed to prepare implementing procedures for articles previously agreed upon and to complete negotiations on the remaining issues. By 30 June 1958 the heads of delegations had resolved 5 of the 7 outstanding issues; the agreements reached had been submitted to the respective foreign ministries for approval.<sup>2</sup>

a. Training Areas and Maneuver Rights. The most difficult problem concerned the availability of training areas and the question of maneuver rights. Here the basic issue seemed to be whether or not the Sending States would continue to exercise control over these areas without being subject to the restrictions of German legislation. USAREUR's position was that, unless there was a corresponding reduction in troop strength, the availability of training areas would have to remain unimpaired. The Germans, however, insisted that the Sending States would have to operate within the general provisions of German legislation that applied to their own armed forces. At the same time, they assured the Allied negotiators that, by means of "exceptions" and liberal interpretations of pertinent laws, a practical formula could be found that would provide the Sending States with adequate maneuver rights and sufficient training areas.<sup>3</sup>

Essentially the problem resulted from the forces' growing needs for larger training areas in West Germany, whose population density had risen by more than 30 percent from 1939 to 1958. At the same time, modern weapons and increased firepower had increased acreage requirements per man. Moreover, post-war expansion was rapidly drying up the remaining sources of unutilized land, with an average of 195 acres per day being absorbed by industrial construction, highway extensions, and home building.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>(1) Cmt 2, USAREUR ACoS G3 to SGS, 18 Feb 58, subj: German Forces Arrangements. AEAGC-PL. CONF. (2) Cable 268, Am Emb Bonn sgd Trimble to Sec State, 4 Dec 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957). (3) Annex A, Status of Forces Briefing, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 4, 29 Apr 58. SECRET (info used CONF). (4) DF, USAREUR ACoS G3 to CofS, n.d. Aug 58, subj: Interim Report on Status of Forces Agreement, August 1958. AEAGC-PL. CONF.

<sup>3</sup>(1) Annex A, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf Nr 4, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Memo, Col P. F. Oswald, C/G3 Tng Br to ACoS G3, 26 Feb 58, subj: Training Area Problems in Status of Forces Negotiations. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. CONF.

<sup>4</sup>Ltr, Maj Gen C. L. Ruffner, C/MAAG, Bonn, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINUSAREUR, 19 Dec 57, w/Incl, memo for rec, 26 Nov 57, subj: Summary of Briefing by Foreign Ministry of Defense on Accommodations and Facilities. MGCH 337. CONF.

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Another factor to be considered was the possible implementation of the restationing plan. If all U.S. forces were moved north of the Danube, an additional need for 50,000 acres of permanent and semipermanent training areas would arise, since the areas south of the river, which would be relinquished to the Germans, would have to be replaced.<sup>5</sup>

In an effort to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Germans on this issue, the USAREUR Training Area Survey and Negotiation Board was established on 12 March 1958 under the chairmanship of Brig. Gen. James K. Wilson, Jr. In accordance with instructions from USEUCOM, the board was to compile factual data for future negotiations with the German Defense Ministry concerning the number, size, location, and usage of training areas required by the U.S. Forces.<sup>6</sup> As of 30 June 1958 the negotiations concerning the availability of training areas and the question of maneuver rights were still underway.<sup>7</sup>

b. Telecommunications. Final agreement was reached in this area of negotiations. The Germans agreed to reduce rental charges by 33 1/3 percent on long telephone lines used by the Forces for official business and by 18 percent in the case of long teletype lines. The Forces agreed to an increase in certain telecommunication service charges to bring them in line with standard rates charged to all users in Germany, including military and civilian agencies. USAREUR expected a net annual saving of approximately \$500,000 to result from this change. Individual members of the Forces, however, were to lose their current preferential rates, which would increase their monthly private telephone bills by about \$3.00.<sup>8</sup>

c. Insurance and Taxation. The new agreement called for relief from the transportation tax for military, but not for civilian, freight warrants. USAREUR's transportation expenditures in Germany would thus be reduced by approximately \$2,200,000 annually. All automobile insurance companies doing business with the Forces would either have to operate under German license or by mail from the United States. Five of the six USAREUR-approved companies had already obtained German licenses; upon implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement they would become subject to the

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<sup>5</sup>Ltr, Gen Hodges to Gen W. B. Palmer, Dep USCINCEUR, 7 Feb 58. AEAGC-PL 268/H5.1 GC. SECRET.

<sup>6</sup>(1) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 26 Feb 58. AEAGY 250/54. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) DF, USAREUR CofS to ACofS G1, 26 Feb 58, subj: Training Area Survey and Negotiations Board. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS. (3) USAREUR LO 3-126, 12 Mar 58. UNCLAS. (4) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 25 Apr 58, subj: Administrative Negotiations Concerning Training Areas and Maneuver Rights. AEAGC-TR 268/6 GC. UNCLAS. (5) Annex A, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf Nr 4, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>7</sup>DF, ACofS G3 to CofS, [Aug 58], cited above. CONF.

<sup>8</sup>(1) Ibid. CONF. (2) Annex A, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf Nr 4, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF).

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rules and regulations of the German Insurance Commissioner. While tobacco, coffee, liquor, and gasoline rations would remain unchanged, there was to be closer cooperation between the Forces and the German customs authorities to prevent abuses. After coordination with the appropriate commanders, the German authorities would be authorized to inspect such agencies as post exchanges, class VI stores, clubs, and messes. Otherwise there were no substantial changes in the current rights and privileges of members of the Forces.<sup>9</sup>

d. Criminal Jurisdiction. One of the most fundamental changes was expected to occur when the German authorities acquired the primary right of criminal jurisdiction over all offenses committed by U.S. military and civilian personnel against the person or property of local inhabitants, excluding official duty acts or omissions. In several points the agreement submitted for State Department approval was more advantageous to the U.S. forces than similar agreements with other NATO countries. In the above-mentioned cases the Germans agreed to grant a general waiver of their primary right of jurisdiction. They would have the right to recapture jurisdiction, however, by notifying the appropriate U.S. authorities within 21 days following their own notification. The Germans indicated that they would recall the waiver only for such crimes as homicide, rape, robbery, and assault, but they would not be precluded from recalling other types of cases if major considerations of German administration of justice so required. Another favorable provision was that U.S. personnel would be permitted to remain in American custody until completion of the trial or other procedures in the German courts. Many factors, however, indicated that the change in criminal jurisdiction procedures in Germany would result in a considerable increase in the USAREUR judicial workload.<sup>10</sup>

e. Real Estate and Accommodations. Throughout the negotiations USAREUR maintained that all real properties held by the Forces under Article 48 of the Conventions would have to remain available until satisfactory alternatives were furnished. Although the Germans refused a blanket extension of the old requisitions, they offered "special assurances" with respect to certain categories of property. Except for federal postal, railway, and highway properties, these assurances meant that the Forces might retain the federal and state properties held by them. The Federal Republic of Germany would either guarantee retention of non-residential, privately owned properties--of which only about 30 constituted a real problem between the U.S. forces and the owners--or would provide adequate replacements. Still under negotiation at the end of the reporting period was an agreement by which the Federal authorities would guarantee to the Forces such utilities as heat, electricity, and water when such requirements were not covered by contracts between the Forces and the suppliers.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See note above. CONF.

<sup>10</sup> Cmt 2, JA Div to Hist Div, 22 Oct 58, to DF, Hist Div to JA Div, 14 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAHI 250/8. CONF.

<sup>11</sup> (1) Annex A, to USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf Nr 4, cited above. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) DF, ACoS G3 to CoS, [Aug 58], cited above. CONF.

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f. Damage Claims. No substantial changes were made in the division of financial responsibility between the Federal Republic and the United States. The United States was granted the right to review the German determinations concerning damage claims and to present objections as deemed appropriate. Claims on privately owned real estate requisitioned during the occupation and released after the effective date of the Status of Forces Agreement were to be shared equally by the Sending State and the Federal Republic.<sup>12</sup>

111. Retention and Release of Facilities

a. The Neu-Isenburg Housing Dispute. Under the terms of the Federal Requisition Law (Bundesleistungsgesetz) that had taken effect on 1 January 1957, the Forces could be required to vacate private dwellings by 30 September 1957 and commercial and industrial facilities after 31 December 1958, even though alternate facilities might not be available.<sup>13</sup> As the September deadline drew near, a number of property owners in the Neu-Isenburg area, near Frankfurt, filed eviction suits in the German courts. At a conference on 27-28 August representatives of USAREUR, USAFE, the State of Hesse, and the Federal Republic considered the implications of the impending legal actions. The USAREUR position was that, under Articles 37, 38, and 48 of the Bonn Conventions, the German Federal Government was obliged to assure the Forces continued occupancy of the accommodations or to provide suitable alternate housing. The manner and method of fulfilling these obligations was regarded as a strictly internal German affair.<sup>14</sup>

On 13 September American and German representatives met again in an effort to reach an amicable solution to the dispute. One of the German representatives suggested that, since it would be difficult for the Federal Republic to defend members of the Forces in the courts, some other means be found to settle the claims of the property owners. If, however, the Americans could give assurance that they would honor the court judgments, the German Government would undertake the defense. Even though the U.S. Embassy could not give such assurances, the Germans seemed willing to appoint an attorney to plead the cases that they considered justifiable. It was estimated that some 50 suits would be filed; amicable agreements had been reached with the owners of the remaining properties.<sup>15</sup>

On 21 November another meeting was held to consider a German offer of 72 units in the Wetzlar area--about 30 miles from Frankfurt--for an

<sup>12</sup>DF, ACoS G3 to CoS, [Aug 58], cited above. CONF.

<sup>13</sup>USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, pp. 291-92. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>14</sup>DF, USAREUR JA Div to Polit Ad, n.d., subj: Retention of Requisitioned Housing in the Federal Republic of Germany Subsequent to 30 September 1957. UNCLAS. In SGS 092 Ger (1957).

<sup>15</sup>Memos, Col S. W. Russ, USAREUR Act Dep JA to SGS, 26 Sep, 4 Oct 57, subj: Retention of Requisitioned Housing. CONF. In SGS 601 (1957).

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indefinite period pending the outcome of the negotiations. While construction of alternate housing in the Frankfurt-Langen area was expected to solve the problem eventually, such housing would not be available for at least one year. The German offer represented, therefore, a stop-gap solution pending completion of the alternate construction. The following month USAREUR agreed to accept the German offer, provided the 72 units could be retained indefinitely. Action to release a corresponding number of housing units occupied by Air Force personnel in the Neu-Isenburg area was initiated simultaneously. The first group of USAFE families moved to Wetzlar before Christmas.<sup>16</sup>

Of the 162 privately owned housing units originally held by the Air Force in the Neu-Isenburg area, only the 72 units listed as hardship cases were affected by the U.S.-German agreement. Of this number, 71 were released by 31 March 1958 and the last one by 10 April. Satisfactory arrangements were reached concerning the remaining units, and no further action was anticipated by USAREUR.<sup>17</sup> The long-range effect of the solution to the Neu-Isenburg dispute was that the U.S. forces acquired 72 additional housing units that previously had not been available.<sup>18</sup>

b. Release of Facilities. USAREUR's release of facilities program, which had reached its high point during FY 1957, decreased because the majority of the properties not absolutely essential to operations had already been returned to the Germans. Nevertheless, USAREUR maintained close liaison with the German Defense Ministry, paying particular attention to facilities that the Germans expressly desired. Under CINCUSAREUR's direct supervision, any property for which there was no valid requirement was released as soon as possible. In addition, barracks space that was not utilized in various caserns scattered throughout the U.S. area of responsibility was released so long as the integrity of U.S. units could be maintained by construction of fencing. Facilities that were temporarily not needed were loaned to the Germans on condition that they would be returned to the U.S. forces when required.<sup>19</sup>

Whenever possible, isolated real properties that were located apart from caserns or major complexes and were primarily of a nonmilitary nature

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<sup>16</sup>USAREUR CA Div Jnl, Nov & Dec 58. CONF.

<sup>17</sup>(1) Memo, Col L. E. Roth, G/USAREUR G4 Instl Br to Mr. D. A. Flinn, Polit Ad, 3 Apr 58, subj: Disposition of Air Force Housing in Neu-Isenburg Area. AEAGD-I 285/9 GD. (2) Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, Hist Div, with Mr. W. M. Pool, G4 Instl Br, 13 Aug 58. Both UNCLAS.

<sup>18</sup>Cmt 2, G4 to Hist Div, 24 Oct 58, to DF, Hist Div to G4, 14 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAAHI 250/8. OFLUSE.

<sup>19</sup>(1) Cable SX-5379, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 23 Aug 58. CONF. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Ruffner, 27 Sep 57. UNCLAS. In USAREUR SGS 601 (1957).

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were released, except for airfields, dependent housing, and training and tactical facilities that were still required by the forces. A quarterly report was instituted to check on the progress made in this sphere.<sup>20</sup>

c. Bremerhaven Port Property Rentals. The long-standing dispute between USAREUR and Bremen concerning the payment of rentals for the port properties utilized by the U.S. forces in Bremerhaven subsequent to 5 May 1955 remained unresolved. It appeared, however, that USAREUR would eventually find it difficult to avoid resumption of rental payments for the disputed properties, since payments had been made for the period 1 October 1952 to 5 May 1955.<sup>21</sup>

#### 112. War Criminals

In August 1957, 96 war criminals still remained under USAREUR's jurisdiction; they included 10 in confinement, 85 on parole, and 1 on good conduct release. Eight months later only four prisoners remained confined in the Landsberg Prison, and on 9 May 1958 these were also released on parole.<sup>22</sup> Upon the mandatory unanimous recommendation of the Mixed Board created by the Bonn Conventions, CINCUSAREUR remitted the unserved portions of the sentences of the remaining 28 parolees on 11 June 1958. This constituted their final discharge from American jurisdiction; with the return of the Landsberg Prison facility to the Germans, which was accomplished about the same time, the U.S. Army, Europe, had finally completed its duties as a war-crimes law-enforcement agency.<sup>23</sup>

#### 113. Flying the German Flag

In the spring of 1957 the State Department had first suggested that the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany be flown at U.S. installations in Germany. The decision on this matter was delayed by funding difficulties and by the necessity for obtaining the approval of the German Defense Ministry. The German flag was to be given the position of honor and flown at corps and higher headquarters only. Both flags were to be raised by American military personnel, and both were to be flown at half-mast on occasions of national mourning. American funds were to be used to install the additional flag poles. After USCINCEUR had approved these recommendations, his representative in Bonn and the German Defense Ministry selected 28 March 1958 as the date on which the German flags were to be

<sup>20</sup>DF, ACofS G4 to CofS, 29 Oct 57, subj: Release of Isolated Properties. UNCLAS. In file above.

<sup>21</sup>Cmt 2, G4 to Hist Div, 24 Oct 58, cited above. OFLUSE.

<sup>22</sup>(1) USAREUR JA Div Jnl, Aug 57. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Memo, Brig Gen E. F. Penaat, USAREUR PM, to CofS, 10 May 58, subj: War Criminals. AEAJA 260/H5.3 (1 yr). UNCLAS.

<sup>23</sup>(1) USAREUR GO 57, 11 Mar 58. UNCLAS. (2) Cmt 2, JA Div to Hist Div, 22 Oct 58, cited above. CONF.

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raised at key U.S. Army headquarters in Germany.<sup>24</sup>

In a number of impressive ceremonies, the black, red, and gold flag of the Federal Republic of Germany was hoisted to a place of honor alongside the Stars and Stripes. This marked the first time that these two national flags flew together over a U.S. military installation.<sup>25</sup>

#### 114. Community Relations

a. Policy. During 1957-58 USAREUR conducted a very active community relations program.<sup>26</sup> The pertinent plans and policies were coordinated as closely as possible with the other U.S. military and civilian governmental agencies, as well as with the German-American Troop-Community Relations Working Group, in Bonn. General Hodes considered the maintenance of good troop-community relations as second only to the defense mission, and he directed his subordinate commanders to give their personal attention to the community relations activities within their areas of responsibility. USAREUR staff agencies were to consider the impact of policy decisions upon community relations, and local commanders were to determine the activities best suited to their community.<sup>27</sup>

b. The USAREUR Program. The basic objective of the USAREUR community relations program was to develop sympathetic relations between the local communities and the U.S. Army, Europe. This was to be achieved by removing causes of friction and misunderstanding as well as by promoting wholesome individual and group contacts; a continuing program in eight general fields of activity was developed for this purpose. Staff direction and supervision of the program was the responsibility of the Information Division.<sup>28</sup>

(1) Language Study. The language barrier, though not insurmountable, was recognized as one of the major obstacles to the promotion of better understanding between American military personnel and local civilian communities. Fund limitations and military training requirements

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<sup>24</sup>(1) DF, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br to CofS, 23 Oct 57, subj: Flying of German Flag. CONF. In SGS 353 (1957). (2) DF, ACoS G1 to CofS, 4 Feb 58, same subj. AEAGA-P 250/H5.3 GA. SECRET.

<sup>25</sup>Info Div, Press Rel 58-87, 28 Mar 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>26</sup>Community relations programs conducted in the USACOMZEU and USASETAF areas of responsibility are discussed in the pertinent sections of this chapter. The over-all policy and program are analyzed in this section because the great majority of U.S. Army troops were stationed in Western Germany. UNCLAS.

<sup>27</sup>(1) Cable SX-7599, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Dec 57. CONF. (2) Info Div Brochure, submitted to American Public Relations Association, 15 Feb 58 (hereafter cited as PR Brochure). AEAIN-C 260/25. UNCLAS.

<sup>28</sup>(1) PR Brochure. (2) USAREUR Cir 360-5, 3 Apr 57, subj: Public Information, Community Relations. Both UNCLAS.

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prohibited establishment of a compulsory, on-duty, language training program for all personnel, but USAREUR sought to reduce the obstacle somewhat by encouraging off-duty language study. Low-cost facilities were provided through the University of Maryland Overseas Education Program and the United States Armed Forces Institute correspondence courses. Approximately 9,000 adults were enrolled annually in such language courses, and during the school year 1957-58 an estimated 33,800 children attending the U.S. Army dependents' schools studied German, French, or Italian, depending upon the country of their residence.

(2) Liaison with the Press. Information officers maintained liaison with the local press wherever they were stationed. They held press briefings before large-scale maneuvers were staged or before any other move was made that was expected to have a widespread effect on the community. These briefings were found to be helpful in preparing the public to accept the inconveniences often caused by the actions of the military forces. Press officers also utilized briefings and news releases to soften the adverse effects of unfavorable incidents, to check rumors and unfounded reports, and to inform the local public of U.S. policies and objectives.

(3) Orientation. Prior to embarkation for overseas duty, while en route, and at frequent intervals after arrival, all personnel were given a thorough orientation designed to familiarize them with their mission abroad and the reasons for their presence in Europe. This included a discussion of the general historical background of and necessity for NATO as a defensive alliance against Communist aggression. The differences in the living conditions encountered in Europe were explained to American personnel so that they could take an intelligent and understanding part in the life of the local community where they were stationed.<sup>29</sup>

The Stars and Stripes and the American Forces Network played important roles in the orientation program. Feature articles describing local customs, government, traditions, and places of interest appeared frequently in the columns of the newspaper, and a travel column sought to encourage the soldier to make the best use of his leave time by seeing more of Europe, its people, and historic sights. In 1957 the Armed Forces Network increased the number of programs designed to interest personnel in the local community and also introduced a regular Sunday community-relations program. These programs sought to bring to the American listener information concerning the European Coal and Steel Community, the functioning of NATO, the impact of Europe upon American personnel, and their influence on Europe. Other radio programs featured such joint activities as international clubs, festivals, and sporting events, as well as travel information for all personnel.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>(1) PR Brochure. UNCLAS. (2) Rept, 22d Mtg of Eur Community Rel Working Gp, 19-20 Sep 57. AEA IN. CONF.

<sup>30</sup>(1) PR Brochure. UNCLAS. (2) Rept, 23d Mtg of Eur Community Rel Working Gp, 26-28 Mar 58. AEA IN. CONF.

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(4) Hospitality. The hospitality program sought to stimulate good community relations on a person-to-person level. American families were encouraged to invite Germans to visit their homes and to attend social functions. Germans invited approximately 9,500 U.S. servicemen to their homes during the Christmas holidays of 1957, and many American families offered their hospitality whenever possible during the holiday season. Exchange visits of German and American children to their respective schools were also arranged as part of the hospitality program.<sup>31</sup>

(5) Charities. Acts of charity by U.S. military units and clubs were not too much publicized, since public-opinion surveys indicated that the publicity given such acts tended to impress Europeans with their own weakness. The solution suggested by the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in Bonn was that major charitable contributions be handled through recognized national agencies, which in turn would initiate the appropriate publicity. Nevertheless, American-supported charities continued to receive considerable publicity from the local press. During 1957 an estimated \$175,000 was contributed by U.S. military personnel to assist their less fortunate German neighbors. Charities receiving such support included hospitals, orphanages, refugee camps, religious and civic organizations, and homes for the aged.<sup>32</sup>

(6) Clubs. American personnel were also encouraged to participate in German or German-American clubs and hobby groups. One of the most active groups, and at the same time the oldest, was the Federation of German-American Clubs. Established in 1947, a year that witnessed a decisive turning point in the policy of the United States toward Germany, the federation was designed to promote German-American friendship and understanding. The 36 member clubs of the federation, totaling approximately 5,000 dues-paying members and many thousands more as participants, fell generally into four categories: the German-American Men's, Women's, Young Adults', and the International Clubs. Income of the federation came solely from dues, supplemented by a USIS grant-in-aid; there were no paid employees. One of the projects sponsored by the federation was to provide free vacations for West German children of lower income families. This activity helped to counter the effort of the East Zone Communist regime to indoctrinate children by offering them free holidays in the so-called German Democratic Republic. The federation also sponsored two American students for a year's study at a German university during the academic year 1957-58, and conducted a summer camp and seminar for young German and American adults. In addition to publishing a monthly magazine devoted to the subject of German-American relations, the federation sponsored many other activities, including charities, cultural events, language instruction, and excursions. The high point of the federation's annual program occurred in May, when German-American Friendship Week was observed throughout the Federal Republic.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup>(1) See note above. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, 26 Nov 57. CONF. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957).

<sup>32</sup>(1) Rept, 23d Mtg, cited above. CONF. (2) PR Brochure. UNCLAS.

<sup>33</sup>(1) PR Brochure. UNCLAS. (2) Repts, 22d & 23d Mtgs, cited above. CONF.

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(7) Rod and Gun Clubs. For several years the USAREUR Rod and Gun Clubs have contributed to closer German-American relations by bringing U.S. Army sportsmen into contact with Germans whom they normally would not meet, for in Europe hunting is generally limited to the upper classes of society. In January 1958 representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry and the fishing associations of Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg were invited to USAREUR headquarters to discuss partial affiliation of the American fishing clubs with the German associations. In June 1958 the American hunting clubs were invited to join the German Hunting Association (Deutscher Jagd Verband); that month the American clubs sent a delegation to the association's annual conference in Hamburg, where for the first time they were given representation on the executive council.<sup>34</sup>

(8) Cultural Events. The Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra continued to play the leading role in USAREUR's cultural activities program, playing 98 concerts to audiences estimated at 84,800 Europeans. The U.S. Army Field Band toured several European countries, where it delighted thousands in frequent concerts presented in parks and music halls, on parade grounds, and at playing fields. Informal cultural relations, including American participation in amateur theatrical groups, local orchestras, and singing clubs, were encouraged with excellent results.<sup>35</sup>

(9) Sports Events. In Europe the game of soccer has the greatest following of any sport. In an effort to establish friendly contacts with the local communities on the sporting fields, USAREUR encouraged military personnel to form soccer teams for local competition. The beginning was difficult, but the American teams steadily gained proficiency in this unfamiliar sport. Moreover, the teams made many friends among the Germans and demonstrated the value of good sportsmanship in community relations. Local competition was also encouraged in such sports as basketball, boxing, track and field, fencing, and ice hockey.<sup>36</sup>

## c. German Programs.

(1) The Atlantik Bruecke. From the German side came effective help in establishing and maintaining a friendly atmosphere between the local population and the American personnel on duty in Germany. Prominent among the groups assisting in this effort was a privately endowed organization of German industrialists and educators known as the Atlantik Bruecke (the Atlantic Bridge). Trips by U.S. servicemen to points of interest in Germany, including a visit to Hamburg where 75 soldiers were guests of German families for 3 days, were sponsored by this organization. In addition, the Atlantik Bruecke published at its own expense a high-quality, English-language monthly magazine, The Bridge. This publication

<sup>34</sup>(1) CA Div Jnl, Jul 57. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Miss L. E. Miethke, CA Div Hunting & Fishing Br, 13 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>35</sup>PR Brochure. UNCLAS.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

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provided the American soldier with well-written, informative reading about Germany, its history, and its traditions. The Information Division reviewed and screened the magazine; in the fall of 1957 it was distributed on a trial basis as a supplement to an area command newspaper and to troop information centers and dependents' schools to determine whether reader interest warranted the expense of command-wide distribution. Commanders were urged to give the project their special attention to insure that the paper was fairly evaluated. By June 1958 reader reaction indicated that The Bridge was a desirable and useful troop information medium. Distribution of the magazine was therefore increased from 4,000 to 22,000 copies in NACOM, with a comparable circulation planned for the other area commands, including Berlin.<sup>37</sup>

(2) The International Club in Bamberg. On the initiative of Mr. Emil Kemmer, a member of the Bundestag, a club house supported by private donations and open to both Germans and Americans was established in Bamberg. The purpose of the club was to provide German and American young people with a meeting place that had a wholesome atmosphere. In February 1958 the club boasted a membership of 1,500 members. After the club's founding, German-American relations in Bamberg improved steadily over the low point in 1956, when, following a series of incidents, there was strong agitation for the withdrawal of the troops from the community.<sup>38</sup> Late in June a second international club with its own clubhouse was established in Aschaffenburg. The official opening was scheduled for 5 July 1958.<sup>39</sup>

d. Community Advisory Councils. Meeting more frequently than in the past, German-American Community Advisory Councils, developed largely through the initiative of the Germans themselves, continued to play a key role in maintaining harmonious relations between the local communities and the American forces. In the USAREUR area of responsibility there were 52 community advisory councils, three state councils, and one federal council located at Bonn. Prominent personalities from local communities met with representatives of the U.S. garrisons to discuss such troop-community issues as maneuver damage, public health, and traffic safety. Since the number of personnel waiting for dependent housing who were meanwhile seeking quarters on the economy was steadily increasing, the councils formed rent-control committees to check abuses by both landlords and tenants.<sup>40</sup> Many councils took steps to fix flat rates for taxi fares between town and casern to reduce the number of misunderstandings and incidents between servicemen and taxi drivers. In addition, the councils organized joint social, sport, cultural, and religious events. The

<sup>37</sup>Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Mr. S. B. Whipple, Info Div Trp Info Br, 13 Aug 58. UNCLAS.

<sup>38</sup>PR Brochure. UNCLAS.

<sup>39</sup>Ltr, Mr. E. Kemmer to Gen Hodes, 26 Jun 58. UNCLAS. In SGS C/R.

<sup>40</sup>USAREUR housing rental agencies were also established throughout the command to assist U.S. personnel in obtaining suitable quarters on the local economy. UNCLAS.

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three principles governing American participation in the councils were that the local community leaders provide the main impetus and direction, that representatives of all NATO forces stationed in the community participate in the council, and that USIS personnel share in the planning and implementation of programs.<sup>41</sup>

115. Public Information Policy on Nike Sites

Since opposition from local German communities to the establishment of permanent Nike sites was an obstacle to the implementation of current air defense plans, steps were taken to overcome this antagonistic attitude by an appropriate public-relations program designed to create and maintain an atmosphere of public acceptance of the Nike installations in the USAREUR area of responsibility in Germany. In May 1958 the Information Division provided all commanders with guidance concerning the release of information on Nike guided missiles and installations. Guided tours of Nike installations were arranged for local and state government and press representatives, while news releases, including pictorial coverage, were prepared for dissemination to the wire services. Primary objectives of this campaign were to encourage public appreciation of the importance and effectiveness of the Nike weapons in defending the local communities from hostile air attack, to convince public opinion that adequate precautions had been taken to protect the communities from any danger resulting from accidents occurring to the equipment at the installations, and to foster good troop-community relations through a public awareness of the social and economic impact of the installations upon the local community as well as the generally high caliber of military personnel selected to man the installations.<sup>42</sup>

Section II: Développements in the U.S. Area  
of Responsibility in France

116. Line of Communication Negotiations

a. General. In 1955 the French Government had denounced the original line of communication agreement of 1950 on the grounds that it was out of date and therefore no longer adequate. Their professed aim was to codify the basic principles developed through experience since 1950.

<sup>41</sup>Repts of 22d & 23d Mtgs, cited above. CONF.

<sup>42</sup>(1) USAREUR ltr, 7 May 58, subj: Public Information Guidance for Release of Information on Nike Guided Missiles and Installations in USAREUR. AEAIN-P 260/H5.1 IN. OFLUSE. (2) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Capt H. A. Wiatt, C/Info Div Community Rel Sec, 23 Sep 58. UNCLAS.

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USAREUR played only an indirect role in the negotiations, which were conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Paris. However, the outcome of these negotiations was of the utmost importance to the U.S. Army, Europe, since the Line of Communications Agreement with France was the legal foundation for its vast logistical system, stretching from the Atlantic to the Rhine. Although in late 1957 the French made a concession in accepting the U.S. position on residual value,<sup>43</sup> thereby removing a major obstacle to eventual agreement, three years of negotiations had produced no settlement. Meanwhile, the 1950 agreement had been renewed periodically by a series of 3-month extensions, which, however, provided an unstable foundation for the line of communication across France. If a government ill-disposed toward either NATO or the United States came to power in France, the existing arrangement might cause the U.S. forces serious difficulties. By 30 June 1958 the situation remained unchanged.<sup>44</sup>

b. Access Roads. Negotiations on this troublesome issue continued throughout FY 1958 with no agreement in sight. Meanwhile, minimum essential maintenance of access roads was accomplished as in the past, with the French furnishing the materials and the installation commanders arranging for, or supplying, the labor and equipment.<sup>45</sup>

#### 117. Establishment of American Forces Network Facilities

Following the signing of the Franco-American agreement of 1957, permitting the establishment of American radio facilities<sup>46</sup> in France, a network with three studios located at Verdun, Orleans, and Poitiers, was organized. The first broadcast from the studio in Orleans took place on 23 May 1958 and was aired over the five AFN transmitters at Orleans, Verdun, Poitiers, Camp des Loges, and Chateauroux. The French representatives attending the initial broadcast appeared pleased with the program and encouraged American officials in their plan for ultimate expansion to 30 transmitters covering all Army and Air Force installations in France.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Residual value is the sum credited to the U.S. Government for dollar-financed improvements whenever a facility is vacated by the U.S. forces. UNCLAS.

<sup>44</sup>(1) Cable 16, Am Emb Paris to State Dept, 27 Nov 57. (2) Fgn Svc Dispatch 1745, same to same, 2 Apr 58. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 France (1957). (3) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col D. T. Parrish, USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 27 Aug 58. CONF.

<sup>45</sup>(1) Cable EC-9-380, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 23 Jan 58. CONF. (2) 2d Ind, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Dec 57, subj: Access Road at St. Andre Aerial Quartermaster Depot. ECJD-C 610, Hq EUCOM. UNCLAS.

<sup>46</sup>CINCUSAREUR was responsible for the American Forces Network in Germany, France, and Italy. (USEUCOM Dir 15-3, 1 Sep 58. UNCLAS.)

<sup>47</sup>(1) Rept, 23d Mtg, cited above. CONF. (2) DF, C/Info Div to CofS, 26 May 58, subj: Armed Forces Network in France. AEAIN. UNCLAS.

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118. Official Contacts

a. Coordination Between U.S. Agencies. During FY 1958 closer contact was established between USACOMZEUR headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Paris. Arrangements were made for the USACOMZEUR commanding general, or his deputy, to attend the biweekly Embassy military staff meetings chaired by the Ambassador. Also, a representative of the Embassy's Military Affairs Section attended the bimonthly commander's conference at USACOMZEUR headquarters and presented a summary of the current political situation. Embassy personnel also attended command briefings and other high-level conferences.

The Office of the Special Assistant for International Affairs, a special staff section at USACOMZEUR headquarters, handled all military-political questions not requiring top-level attention. These included matters arising from the interpretation or implementation of existing agreements with the French Government, the development of Army positions on issues under negotiation, and routine problems arising from the presence of the American forces in France.

b. The French Central Liaison Mission. The Special Assistant for International Affairs and the Embassy Military Affairs Section, worked together closely to assure full coordination of U.S. views on all issues before approaching the French Central Liaison Mission.<sup>48</sup> The unstable political situation in France during FY 1958 did not affect the excellent relationship between the French mission and the U.S. forces. This was due largely to the well-trained French civil servants assigned to the mission, who provided continuity and made every effort to eliminate possible areas of conflict between military and civilian authorities.<sup>49</sup>

c. Legal Contacts. The USACOMZEUR staff judge advocate, the U.S. Embassy's legal section, and the French Ministry of Justice maintained close contact in implementing the criminal-jurisdiction clause of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, whereby waiver of criminal jurisdiction had to be worked out in detail. Before approaching the French, judge advocate personnel coordinated positions with the Embassy's legal section in the course of weekly visits. This procedure proved quite effective, since the French representatives waived jurisdiction in a high percentage of cases. Cases in which French court decisions might set precedents adversely affecting the interests of the U.S. forces in France were reviewed by judge advocate personnel, who then conferred with the Embassy's legal staff and French Ministry of Justice officials to determine whether an appeal should be made. This system worked well with the full cooperation

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<sup>48</sup> Established in 1950 as a central point of contact with the American military representatives for the implementation of U.S. military policy in France. UNCLAS.

<sup>49</sup> Memo, Mr. D. A. Flinn, USAREUR Polit Ad, to Maj Gen J. M. Willems, CofS, 6 May 58, subj: COMZ-American Embassy, Paris, Relationships. CONF. In Polit Ad files.

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of the French officials concerned.<sup>50</sup>

119. Community Relations

Only 15 percent of the American troops in Europe were stationed in France, as compared with 69 percent in Germany. The community-relations problem in France therefore had different aspects than in Germany. The self-sufficient "Little Americas," so characteristic of the U.S. Army community in Germany, were rare in France, where the bulk of the American personnel lived in rented quarters scattered throughout the local community. Nevertheless, USACOMZEUR conducted a widespread and effective community-relations program. In the first quarter of FY 1958 USACOMZEUR sponsored 44 official events in which French nationals participated, 98 civic-social events in cooperation with the local community, 34 sporting events, and band concerts attended by an estimated 30,000 French spectators. The annual Franco-American picnic at Verdun and the famed Mirabelle festival at Nancy were among the outstanding Franco-American social events. An American square-dance group from the Nancy Ordnance Depot made effective contributions to the program through numerous public appearances.<sup>51</sup>

USACOMZEUR also employed French nationals as community-relations advisers; these personnel were selected by the Army, subject to approval by the French Central Liaison Mission. Since these advisers were found to be highly effective in implementing a successful community-relations program, their employment was to be expanded within fund availabilities.<sup>52</sup>

Internal community-relations committees, established at Army installations in France and initially composed only of military personnel, were created to study and discuss all issues pertaining to community relations. Where appropriate, local citizens were subsequently encouraged to participate in the work of the committees. It was expected that these innovations in the sphere of community relations would provide an important bridge for Franco-American understanding.<sup>53</sup>

Section III: Relations with Italian Authorities

120. Liaison Arrangements

USASETAF continued to act as the U.S. Army headquarters in Italy responsible for liaison between USAREUR on the one hand and the USCINCEUR

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. CONF.

<sup>51</sup> Rept, 22d Mtg, cited above. CONF.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. CONF.

<sup>53</sup> Rept, 23d Mtg, cited above. CONF.

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representative, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. Sending State Office in Rome on the other. Of particular interest were problems requiring negotiations with Italian authorities and having a potential impact upon USASETAF's combat readiness, training programs, and morale, or involving major political considerations.<sup>54</sup>

USASETAF headquarters used two points of contact in its relationships with the U.S. Embassy and the Italian Government. The first--the USCINCEUR liaison office, established 1 April 1955 in Rome by USCINCEUR and MAAG, Italy--was designated as the single point of contact for all USEUCOM activities or agencies dealing with either the U.S. Embassy or the Italian Government. The U.S. Sending State Office, established in Rome on 21 January 1956--the effective date of the status of forces agreement with Italy--was the single point of contact on all matters concerning the agreement. Since this division of authority was not always clear, USASETAF recommended to USAREUR that USCINCEUR designate the Sending State Office as the single point of contact for all matters between USASETAF, the U.S. Embassy, and the Italian Government. No action on this recommendation was taken before 30 June 1958.<sup>55</sup>

121. Negotiations for a Customs Agreement

An executive agreement signed in 1954 had established that Italian customs authorities were permitted to impose a series of complicated and involved customs procedures on U.S. forces shipments moving into, out of, or within Italy. Under this agreement each military installation in Italy was, in effect, treated as a bonded area for customs purposes. The Italian customs requirements, involving the use of eight different forms, were the most complicated of any country within the USAREUR area of responsibility. In sharp contrast to these requirements was the simple AE Form 302, accepted as adequate documentation in France, Germany, and the Benelux countries. USASETAF representatives had been negotiating since January 1956 to obtain a more simplified customs procedure and, if possible, to make the Italians accept AE Form 302. When no agreement was in sight toward the end of FY 1958, USAREUR suggested that, in the event the negotiations reached an impasse, USASETAF request the U.S. Embassy for assistance in obtaining a modification of the 1954 agreement.<sup>56</sup>

122. Community Relations

Relations between the relatively small American military force and the civilian community in Italy remained generally harmonious. While the

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<sup>54</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 17 Mar 58. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In Hist Div Docu Sec.

<sup>55</sup>Ltr, Gen Fischer to Gen Willems, 19 Jun 58. AESE-CG. UNCLAS.

<sup>56</sup>(1) Cmt 2, Trans Div to SGS, 5 May 58, no subj. In SGS 255/H5 (Taxes). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG SETAF, 6 May 58, subj: Customs Problems in Italy. AEATC 255/H5. Both UNCLAS. (3) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 7 May 58. AEAGX 250/54. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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USASETAF traffic accident rate was low as compared with other USAREUR areas, accidents continued to be the major community-relations problem. The Italian press, however, was quite lenient, often placing blame upon poor road conditions and other local factors rather than on the U.S. military driver involved. The local press also commented favorably on the articles of cultural interest included in the USASETAF newspaper. Analysis of the Italian press indicated that public opinion throughout northern Italy continued to be highly favorable toward USASETAF, NATO, and the United States. Community relations were highlighted by the appearance in Verona of the U.S. Army Field Band on its European tour. Better mutual understanding was promoted through a series of incentive awards to Italian nationals for outstanding efforts to promote good Italo-American relations.<sup>57</sup>

#### Section IV: Contacts with Soviet Armed Forces

##### 123. Top Level Contacts

a. Official Visit. In January 1958 a Russian officer inquired through the U.S. Military Liaison Mission as to when General Hodes would be prepared to receive a courtesy visit from his Soviet counterpart, General M. V. Zakharov. After coordination with USCINCEUR and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, CINCUSAREUR suggested several open dates when the call could be made. Eventually 22 May 1958 was selected for the visit, and final arrangements were made through the Civil Affairs Division and the Soviet Military Liaison Mission in Frankfurt.

When General Zakharov arrived at USAREUR headquarters for the courtesy call, he was accompanied by his deputy chief of staff, the chief of staff of the Soviet Air Force units in Germany, the chiefs of the Military Liaison Mission and the External Relations Branch, several staff officers, an aide, and three interpreters. Following a military honors ceremony and a demonstration by a U.S. Army drill team, the two commanders in chief discussed problems pertaining to U.S. access to Berlin. Later in the day the Russian visitors were taken on a tour of Heidelberg, the 130th Station Hospital, and other Army facilities, including the dependent housing area in Patrick Henry Village. In the evening General Hodes entertained the entire party at a reception and dinner. Despite the continual difficulties with the Soviet forces, an atmosphere of cordiality prevailed throughout the visit. The press release was limited to a simple statement that the Russian commander, accompanied by members of his staff, had paid a

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<sup>57</sup> Rept, 22d Mtg, cited above. CONF.

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courtesy call on General Hodes on 22 May 1958.<sup>58</sup>

b. Russian Receptions. When the Soviet Military Liaison Mission in Frankfurt sent out invitations to attend the reception in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, USAREUR headquarters adhered to its policy established at the time of the Russian intervention in Hungary, namely, that general officers should decline, while others might accept or decline as they desired. An exception to this policy was made, however, when the mission invited U.S. Army officials and other personnel for the Soviet Armed Forces reception on 22 February 1958. The USAREUR chief of staff represented the commander in chief, and other personnel were allowed to attend if they wished.<sup>59</sup>

c. Observer Exchange Proposals. During the Armed Forces Day reception at the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Russian representatives renewed the proposal to exchange observers for maneuvers and exercises they had first made in June 1956.<sup>60</sup> Since no decision had been made concerning the earlier proposal, policy guidance was requested from USCINCEUR. In reply, USAREUR was instructed that, as an interim measure, no observer exchange would take place and that it should make no corresponding commitment.<sup>61</sup>

#### 124. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam

a. Tailings of Mission Vehicles. After 27 October 1957 East German agents followed closely all U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) vehicles that left the mission compound in Potsdam. On several occasions deliberate efforts were made to wreck the mission vehicles, and on one occasion a member of the U.S. mission was threatened with physical violence. On 14 November the chief of the USMLM protested to the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB) in East Germany concerning the tailing action. When the protests produced no results, USAREUR decided to take retaliatory action against the Russian Military Liaison Mission in Frankfurt during the period 2 to 6 December. The task of tailing the Soviet vehicles was given to the 66th CIC Group, supported by NACOM military police personnel and equipment. Two days after this tailing action began, East German tailings of U.S. mission vehicles ceased abruptly, whereupon the retaliatory action was halted immediately. When East German tailing was resumed the following

<sup>58</sup>(1) Incl, to cmt 2, CA Div to Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, to DF, Hist Div to CA Div, 14 Oct 58, subj: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). AEAHI 250/8. CONF. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act. Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 3 Apr, 21 May 58. AEAGX 250/54. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>59</sup>CA Div Jnls, Nov 57, Feb 58. CONF.

<sup>60</sup>For further details, see USAREUR Annual Hist Rept, FY 57, p. 300. SECRET (info used CONF).

<sup>61</sup>Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of Cofs, 24 Mar 58; CONF; 9 Apr 58, SECRET. AEAGX 250/54.

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day, the U.S. personnel resumed their activities. Nevertheless, after coordination with the chief of the USMLM, the U.S. tailing of the Soviet mission vehicles was suspended on 6 December, as originally planned.<sup>62</sup>

b. Restricted Areas. On 12 February 1958 the chief of SERB suggested that American and Russian authorities remove all permanent area restrictions in their respective zones of responsibility. This would leave as restricted areas only military installations, as defined in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, and maneuver areas, which might be under temporary restriction. Although CINCUSAREUR was unwilling to be committed in this matter until the Soviet proposal had been studied in detail, both the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 and G-3, were directed to develop a map, indicating the minimum U.S. restricted areas to be retained as well as other restricted areas in priority of importance, to be used to counter residual Soviet restrictions in the event an agreement was reached in the future. No further action was taken on this proposal by the end of the reporting period.<sup>63</sup>

c. Russian Troop Withdrawals. Early in February 1958 the Soviet military headquarters in East Germany announced that they would withdraw 41,000 troops, including 2 mechanized divisions, 1 antiaircraft artillery division, and 3 artillery brigades, from their zone of Germany. Western observers were invited to attend eight of the withdrawal ceremonies, beginning 27 February 1958. Without exception, the ceremonies that the western observers were permitted to witness were shams. The largest number of troops observed boarding trains was approximately 700 at Cottbus on 26 March. Only obsolete equipment, apparently collected from numerous installations throughout the zone, was observed departing the scene of the announced withdrawals. Western observers were not invited to the other withdrawal ceremonies that were held; in fact, they were denied access to the respective areas.<sup>64</sup>

#### 125. East Zone Efforts to Achieve Recognition

a. Border Control. The period under review was marked by a gradual tightening of Communist controls both on the sector border dividing East Berlin from the western half of the city and on the zonal frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR). On the morning of 13 October 1957 the GDR radio announced that a zone-wide currency reform would take place between 1200 and 2000 hours. The Communist authorities immediately applied strict controls at all border

<sup>62</sup>(1) DF, CA Div to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., subj: Summary of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 27 Nov-6 Dec 57. In SGS 322.01 SD (1957). (2) CA Div Jnl, Nov, Dec 57. Both CONF.

<sup>63</sup>(1) CA Div Jnl, Feb 58. CONF. (2) Wkly Summary of Maj Act Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Ofc of CofS, 12 Mar 58. SECRET (info used CONF). AEAGX 250/54. (3) Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col J. L. Low, Dep C/CA Div, 27 Aug 58. SECRET.

<sup>64</sup>USAREUR CinC's Wkly Stf Conf, Nr 3, 1 Apr 58. SECRET.

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crossing points, halting outbound German traffic from West Berlin. Allied traffic, however, was permitted to continue on the interzonal Autobahn and between the eastern and western sectors of the city, except for three vehicles. The Allied commandants protested unsuccessfully that these restrictions were contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreement of 1949. During the following weeks, however, it became evident that the increased controls on sector and zonal boundaries were not isolated incidents, but part of a new Communist scheme to stem the flow of refugees toward the west. On 28 December 1957 the Consular Affairs Division of the GDR Foreign Ministry informed the U.S. Political Adviser in Berlin that, as of 1 January 1958, U.S. citizens in possession of diplomatic and special passports would have to obtain GDR visas for all travel into and through the German Democratic Republic except for troop personnel and guards of the U.S. military garrison stationed in West Berlin traveling between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. This communication was followed on 30 December by a letter addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, in which the Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin stated that in 1958 the Soviet consular offices would no longer issue transit visas through East Germany to U.S. personnel holding diplomatic or special passports. Exempted were the personnel of the Allied garrisons in West Berlin, who would continue to deal with Soviet officials.<sup>65</sup>

b. Unjustified Detention. On 17 January 1958 the wife of the Commanding General, Berlin Command, and a group of her guests were detained by East German police at the east-west sector boundary. The Russian reply to the U.S. protest concerning this incident stated that, since the German Democratic Republic was free to decide its own policies in and around Berlin, only strict observance of the regulations established within its own borders would prevent the recurrence of such incidents.<sup>66</sup>

c. Potsdam Tours. As of 21 March 1958 authorization for the weekly special-service bus tour to Potsdam had to be obtained from the German Democratic Republic rather than from the Soviet military authorities, as in the past. When the U.S. Berlin commandant expressed to General Zakharov his displeasure over the abrupt termination of the Soviet documentation for the Potsdam tours, the Russian general replied that he was implementing orders from higher headquarters.<sup>67</sup> No further Potsdam tours were conducted during FY 1958.

d. The Helicopter Incident. On 7 June 1958, while en route from Hanau to Grafenwoehr, an H-19 helicopter assigned to the 3d Armored Division landed on East German territory in the vicinity of Zwickau. The personnel aboard the aircraft, 6 officers and a crew of 3, were taken into custody by Soviet military personnel and then turned over to East

<sup>65</sup>(1) Incl, to cmt 2, CA Div to Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, cited above.  
(2) Cable 166, US Min Berlin sgd Hillenbrand to Am Emb Bonn, 30 Dec 57.  
Both CONF.

<sup>66</sup>CA Div Jnl, Feb 58. CONF.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., Mar 58. CONF.

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German civil authorities. The following day General Hodes dispatched a note through the USMLM, Potsdam, requesting General Zakharov to return the American personnel and equipment to USAREUR control. Instead of replying directly, the Russian headquarters released a statement that the aircraft and personnel were in the hands of the East German authorities and that all inquiries should be directed to the latter. On 10 June CINCUSAREUR summoned General Suvorov, chief of the Soviet mission in Frankfurt, to Heidelberg in another effort to secure return of the aircraft and personnel. Meanwhile, a note from the GDR Foreign Ministry, transmitted through the Czechoslovakian Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy in Prague, stated that the German Democratic Republic was prepared to negotiate with U.S. representatives concerning this matter.<sup>68</sup>

During a press conference on 10 June Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that the United States was prepared to negotiate the release of the personnel and aircraft with GDR authorities only with the understanding that such action did not imply recognition of the Communist regime. On the same day a somewhat tardy reply was received from General Zakharov, who stated that he was unable to comply with General Hodes' request since the matter was not within his competence. Nevertheless, USAREUR continued its efforts through the USMLM to obtain Soviet cooperation in dealing with the GDR authorities. The Russian headquarters did agree to send an escort officer to accompany the chief of the USMLM to a conference with GDR Foreign Ministry officials. However, the Soviet officer served only as a guide and did not attend the conference. Since the credentials carried by the U.S. Army representative were considered unsatisfactory by the GDR Foreign Ministry, and a protocol proposed by the German Democratic Republic was rejected by the U.S. representative, the conference proved to be fruitless. On 19 June General Hodes forwarded a second note to General Zakharov, reasserting that under existing agreements the Russians were responsible for returning the personnel and aircraft. In Washington, D.C., on the following day the Soviet Charge d'Affaires was summoned to the State Department and requested that his country's military authorities in Germany be instructed to return the U.S. personnel and equipment held in the Soviet Zone of Occupation.

General Zakharov's reply to General Hodes, dated 23 June, indicated that the Soviet position remained unchanged. USAREUR therefore recommended to the Department of the Army that, inasmuch as efforts to secure release of the personnel and aircraft through the USMLM had been unsuccessful, an attempt should be made to deliver mail and clothing to the detained personnel through the Red Cross or some other international organization. Contact through the International Red Cross was quickly established, and on 25 June the president of the East German Red Cross responded to a request by his American counterpart by agreeing to deliver personal mail and comfort packages to the detained personnel. At the end

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<sup>68</sup>DF, ACoS G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jun 58, subj: H-19 Helicopter in East Germany. AEAGC. UNCLAS. The remaining material in this section is based on CA Div Jnl, Jun 58. CONF.

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of June USAREUR suggested that the military be relieved of further negotiations.<sup>69</sup>

126. Access to Berlin

Since November 1956 there had been almost continuous Russian harassment of U.S. military trains and convoys to and from West Berlin. The issue turned on the question of whether the American or Russian military commander in chief and diplomatic representative had the right to determine the composition of military trains and convoys and what personnel were entitled to be transported by these means. General Hodes' firm position was that he alone had this right insofar as it pertained to U.S. military personnel and their means of transport. This issue was, he pointed out to his Russian counterpart in the Soviet Zone, a purely military matter that should be settled only by the military.<sup>70</sup>

127. Berlin Rail Transportation Problems

a. The Freight Car Issue. Early in August 1957 Soviet checkpoint officials at Marienborn began protesting the presence of freight cars attached to the U.S. military passenger trains. The Russians also insisted that all freight cars be marked, and that the train commander carry the freight warrants in case the checkpoint officials should request them. In the past train commanders had no documentation other than the "train consist" document, listing the number and types of cars composing the train.<sup>71</sup>

The Russian position seemed to be that, according to existing quadripartite agreements, the Allied Berlin garrisons were authorized a definite number of passenger and freight trains. Instead of using their full quota of freight trains, the U.S. authorities adopted the practice of attaching freight cars to military passenger trains. While the Russians did not question the right to do so, they insisted that the same documentation be carried for these cars as for regular freight trains.<sup>72</sup>

Documentation for freight cars attached to U.S. military passenger trains usually remained in the custody of the train commander and was not shown to the Soviet officers at the checkpoints. The Russians' insistence on a change in procedure was probably motivated by their wish to interfere

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<sup>69</sup>The nine military personnel were released to U.S. control on 19 July 1958 as the result of an agreement signed by representatives of the American and East German Red Cross organizations. UNCLAS.

<sup>70</sup>Cable SX-5455, CINCUSAREUR from Hodes to USMLM Potsdam for Bellonby, 28 Aug 57. CONF.

<sup>71</sup>CA Div Jnl, Aug 57. CONF.

<sup>72</sup>Cable 45, US Msn Berlin sgd Gufler to Am Emb Bonn, 21 Sep 57. CONF.

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with shipments of HICOG-12 and ICEM<sup>73</sup> items as well as with shipments of technical radio equipment manufactured by a West Berlin firm on Civil Aeronautics Authority contracts. These shipments were not sent by regular freight but were moved in baggage and freight cars attached to the U.S. passenger trains.<sup>74</sup>

On 18 September 1957 the Bundesbahn (West German Federal Railways) administration in Frankfurt received a telegram from the East German Transport Ministry stating that in the future no freight car could be attached to Allied military passenger trains to and from Berlin unless approval was obtained 10 days in advance from the Russian military headquarters in East Germany. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn requested the Foreign Ministry to instruct the Bundesbahn to reply that the matter was exclusively a Four-Power responsibility and therefore not within the competence of either the Bundesbahn or the East German Reichsbahn. This was in line with USAREUR's position that the issue was strictly a military matter that should be settled on the military rather than the political level. Furthermore, USAREUR contended that the Four-Power agreements lifting the Berlin blockade provided for the restoration of preblockade practices, which included the hauling of German mail cars, empty reefers, and freight and baggage cars on the U.S. military passenger trains. The Russians, however, insisted that freight cars not be attached to passenger trains, threatening to detach such cars and send them through on regular freight trains.<sup>75</sup>

According to the U.S. Embassy, pertinent quadripartite agreements did not seem to provide clear grounds for including freight cars on passenger trains. Moreover, this was not normal German railroad practice. Furthermore, little support could be expected from the French or British, who declared that they normally shipped all their freight on regular military freight trains, although the French admitted that they "occasionally" attached freight cars to passenger trains. The British and French took the position that Soviet insistence upon regular documentation for freight cars attached to passenger trains was in accordance with normal international railroad procedure. USAREUR, on the other

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<sup>73</sup>HICOG-12 shipments consisted of printed material and films carried on a prepaid, space-available basis. They were not to exceed 12 tons--thence their designation--per day, 10 tons of which were to be printed matter and the remaining 2 tons, films. The ICEM--Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration--of which the U.S. was a member, was authorized to ship baggage and personal effects of emigrants to the West--not including the Federal Republic--by military trains on a space-available basis. CONF.

<sup>74</sup>Cable 54, US Msn Berlin sgd Gufler to Am Emb Bonn, 28 Sep 57. CONF.

<sup>75</sup>(1) Cable SX-5542, USAREUR to DA, USCINCEUR, 31 Aug 57. (2) Cable SX-5543, USAREUR to USCOB, 31 Aug 57. (3) Cable 151, Am Emb Bonn sgd Bruce to US Msn Berlin, CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 57. (4) CA Div Jnl, Jun 58. All CONF.

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hand, claimed that over several years the U.S. Berlin garrison's daily requirements of about four tons of fresh dairy products had been carried by freight cars attached to the daily passenger trains and that a precedent had thus been created and accepted by the Russians. Nevertheless, U.S. authorities were unable to obtain tripartite agreement on the freight documentation issue.<sup>76</sup>

b. Removal of U.S. Mail Car. The conflict was sharpened even further when, on the night of 19 September, the Russian officer at the Marienborn checkpoint protested to the U.S. train commander the presence of a freight car being used to carry U.S. mail. The Russian officer declared that he would not clear the train until he had checked with his headquarters. While the Soviet officer supposedly telephoned his headquarters, the U.S. train commander returned to his train to await the decision. After a lapse of time the train moved out of the station, and the train commander assumed that clearance had been granted to proceed. Upon arrival at the West German border, however, it was discovered that the mail car had been detached at the Marienborn checkpoint. Both USAREUR's protest and request for immediate return of the car were rejected by Soviet authorities with the statement that passenger trains containing freight cars would no longer be cleared through the checkpoints.<sup>77</sup>

As an immediate result, freight cars were removed from the next Bremerhaven-Berlin train before it reached the Marienborn checkpoint. This decision, however, was rescinded the following day, and the previous procedure was immediately restored. At the same time USAREUR recommended to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn that a protest be made at Russian headquarters, the incident be publicized, and freight cars continue to be carried on passenger trains. The detached car was to be left where it was until the Soviet authorities permitted that it be attached to another U.S. passenger train and removed to Helmstedt. However, the Russian authorities did not comply with the U.S. request to attach the car to a U.S. military train. The mail car was attached to a German train at Marienborn and thus returned to U.S. jurisdiction.<sup>78</sup>

c. Elimination of HICOG-12 and ICEM Shipments. Berlin Command, USAREUR, and Embassy representatives meeting in Berlin from 25-27 September recommended that, under the circumstances, the shipment of HICOG-12 and

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<sup>76</sup>(1) Cable 155, Am Emb Bonn sgd Bruce to State Dept, CINCUSAREUR, 20 Sep 57. (2) Cable D-57, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR attn G4, 23 Sep 57. (3) Cable 159, Am Emb Bonn sgd Bruce to State Dept, 23 Sep 57. All CONF.

<sup>77</sup>Cable SX-5961, USAREUR from Polit Ad to Am Emb Bonn, 20 Sep 57. CONF.

<sup>78</sup>(1) Cable 43, US Msn Berlin sgd Gufler to Am Emb Bonn, 19 Sep 57. (2) Cable SX-5963, USAREUR to Am Emb Bonn, 20 Sep 57. (3) Cable D-55, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 57. (4) Incl, to cmt 2, CA Div to Hist Div, 29 Oct 58, cited above. All CONF.

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ICEM supplies be halted. This recommendation was approved, and the shipments were stopped beginning 2 October 1957. The Governing Mayor of West Berlin protested this decision, urging the continuation of HICOG-12 shipments, since during the past 5 years 8-10 percent of the total exports of the Berlin graphics industry had consisted of such items exported via the military trains. The protest, however, was in vain, because the decision had been made at governmental level.<sup>79</sup>

d. German Mail Cars Attached to U.S. Trains. On 16 October Russian authorities at the Marienborn checkpoint began to detain Bundespost (Federal Post Office) cars attached to the daily Berlin U.S. parcel-post train and to confiscate parcels containing anti-Communist literature. The acting Soviet commandant in East Berlin protested on 24 October against what he termed the illegal transport of this material. This protest was answered by pointing out that the Paris Agreement of 1949 bound the U.S.S.R. to insure the normal functioning of railroad transport and that delaying West German mail cars was inconsistent with this agreement. Nevertheless, USAREUR unofficially asked West German agencies to ship their propaganda material by other means.

In December the Russian authorities again objected to the Bundespost cars attached to U.S. military passenger trains and threatened that in the future they would remove these cars at the checkpoint. USAREUR countered that German mail cars had been regularly attached to U.S. trains since December 1945, except for the period of the Berlin blockade; the Russian objection was rejected as contrary to international agreement. At the same time, USAREUR and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn agreed to turn the train back rather than permit the Soviet checkpoint officials to detach Bundespost cars.<sup>80</sup> The Russians made no further attempt to detach German mail cars, and the matter was dropped.<sup>81</sup>

e. Instructions to Train Commanders. In view of the ever-present possibility that the Russians might transfer checkpoint control of Allied Berlin rail and motor transportation to East German officials, USAREUR wanted to strengthen the Allied position for such a contingency. Current instructions to U.S. train commanders were to accept GDR clearance under protest. USAREUR recommended that the U.S. Embassy in Bonn secure tripartite agreement to a stronger procedure, according to which trains would return to their point of origin rather than accept East German documentation.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>(1) CA Div Jnl, Oct 57. (2) Cable 73, US Msn Berlin sgd Hillenbrand to Am Emb Bonn, 19 Oct 57. Both CONF.

<sup>80</sup>Cables SX-6941, SX-7644, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Nov, 16 Dec 57. CONF.

<sup>81</sup>Intvw, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col Low, cited above. CONF.

<sup>82</sup>(1) Cable SX-7350, USAREUR to Am Emb Bonn, 29 Nov 57. (2) CA Div Jnl, Nov 57. Both CONF.

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The U.S. Embassy's immediate reaction was to reject the USAREUR recommendation on the grounds that there was little likelihood of East German authorities assuming control of the checkpoints and that any self-imposed blockade, resulting from trains being returned in order not to accept East German clearance, should be avoided.<sup>83</sup>

By the end of December 1957, however, USAREUR succeeded in obtaining Embassy agreement to a modification of the U.S. military train commanders' standing instructions. Train commanders were to reject Russian or East German demands for visas or other documentation for any passenger on the trains. Such demands were to be protested, and the commanders were to insist that the train be allowed to proceed by virtue of its Allied status. If, following the protest, the train was not cleared, the train commander was to demand that the train be returned to its point of origin. Furthermore, the passengers were not to be subjected to customs control or inspection.<sup>84</sup>

f. New Travel Documentation. Lengthy negotiations between the three Allied political advisers and the Soviet diplomatic representative in East Berlin concerning a new travel-order documentation and a change in procedures were brought to a successful conclusion in November 1957. All parties agreed that the new documentation, standardizing Allied travel orders for Berlin, would be introduced on 2 December 1957. At the same time USAREUR recommended to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn that when the new documentation was introduced the military train commanders should also cease the practice, in effect since 25 November 1956, of protesting the showing of U.S. passengers' identity documents to the Russian officers on duty at the checkpoints. On 2 December 1957 the new Allied Berlin travel orders were utilized for the first time, and concurrently the U.S. train commanders were instructed to cease their protests to the Soviet checkpoint authorities. The new documentation was accepted by the Russians, and for a short time no further difficulties were encountered at the checkpoint.<sup>85</sup>

g. Russian Attempts to Modify Procedures. The Soviet authorities changed their procedures during the following month. During the night of 14-15 January 1958 Russian checkpoint personnel attempted to affix stamps to travel orders of Allied train passengers. The Russians rejected Allied protests concerning this procedural change and insisted that all travel orders would have to be stamped beginning 31 January. Allegedly, the Russian authorities wished to assure themselves that the travel orders would be used for only one round trip. Allied representatives pointed out, however, that their instructions specifically limited the travel orders to one round trip and that the Allied military officials would

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<sup>83</sup>Cable 265, Am Emb Bonn sgd Trimble to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Dec 57. CONF.

<sup>84</sup>Cable SX-7859, USAREUR to USATC Frankfurt, USCOB, 30 Dec 57. CONF.

<sup>85</sup>(1) Cable 140, US Msn Berlin sgd Hillenbrand to Am Emb Bonn, 9 Dec 57. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957). (2) Cable SX-7568, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Dec 57. (3) CA Div Jnl, Nov 57. All CONF.

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stamp them as invalid following such a trip. Colonel Kotsiuba, the Soviet deputy military commandant in Potsdam, rejected this suggestion but extended the stamping deadline to 10 February 1958.<sup>86</sup>

On 7 February 1958, at a meeting with the Russian representative, Allied political advisers agreed to accept the Russian stamp on the travel orders, provided the stamping took place on the station platform beside the train and that the trains were not delayed. Train crews would be issued travel orders valid for 30 days. On 10 February the stamping procedure went into effect, with the stamping being accomplished in a glass-enclosed, trainside office instead of on the open platform as initially agreed.<sup>87</sup>

While this issue was being settled, the Russians sought to introduce another administrative control. At a meeting with the three Allied political advisers in Berlin Colonel Kotsiuba requested that the Allies supply lists of train crew members. On the basis of these lists--to be submitted to the Soviets by the 25th of each month--the Soviets would issue the crews' travel orders for the following month. While USAREUR was willing to identify train crew members by a stamp on their travel orders, there were strong objections to the Soviet request both on principle and for administrative reasons. The U.S. authorities contended that only they were qualified to issue orders and determine who should be included in train crews.<sup>88</sup>

h. Broadening the Authorized Categories. As a followup to the removal of all restrictions for Autobahn travel of dependents of U. S. military personnel stationed in Berlin whose nationality was not American, British, or French, USAREUR authorized in November 1957 limited travel via military trains for this category of dependents, who were mostly of German nationality. To test Soviet reaction, a few passengers of this category were to travel on the military train and, if the Russians did not object, the ban would be removed completely. Accordingly, from 8 through 29 November 20 test cases were made by permitting such passengers to travel on permanent-change-of-station movement orders via the U.S. military passenger train between Berlin and Frankfurt. There were no Soviet objections, and steps were taken to lift the ban completely.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Summary Sheet, CA Div, 3 Feb 58, subj: Soviet Demand to Stamp Travel Orders of Military Train Passengers. AEACA 250. CONF.

<sup>87</sup> (1) Cmt 2, CA Div to Dep CINCUSAREUR, 24 Mar 58, subj: Berlin Access. AEACA 250. CONF. (2) Memo for rec, Lt Col S. H. Barrow, CA Div, 8 Apr 58, subj: U.S. Berlin Military Train Commanders Use of Marienborn Station Platform Trainside Office. AEACA 250. CONF.

<sup>88</sup> CA Div Jnl, Feb 57. CONF.

<sup>89</sup> (1) Cable SX-6698, USAREUR to Am Emb Bonn, 28 Oct 57. (2) Cable SX-7568, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Dec 57. Both CONF.

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Further suggestions were made to broaden the categories of personnel authorized Berlin travel clearance and military travel orders. For this purpose, travel privileges were to be extended to all U.S., British, and French civilian employees and dependents of U.S. military personnel possessing an identity and privilege card issued by the military services. This action was to affect a category of personnel at that time excluded from authorized military documentation for travel to Berlin, namely, civilian employees of the forces stationed outside of West Germany and Berlin. This modification would be facilitated by the fact that, after the new travel orders were introduced, the Soviet checkpoint authorities would be unable to differentiate between civilian employees stationed in Germany and those stationed elsewhere.<sup>90</sup>

With the broadening of authorized categories, care was to be exercised not to increase train travel between Frankfurt and Berlin. Steps were therefore taken to reduce the weekend hump in travel to Berlin by reducing the number of sleeper cars on each weekend train from 5 to 4. All advertising of tours to Berlin ceased, and the American Express Company privilege of making block bookings on U.S. military trains was withdrawn.<sup>91</sup>

128. Autobahn Travel to Berlin

a. U.S. Policy. Since a showdown with the Russians over the single matter of travel documentation was to be avoided, USAREUR limited movement of convoys over the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn to the minimum considered essential to military operations. Requests for use of truck convoys through the Soviet Zone had to be approved by USAREUR headquarters. Normally, however, military trucks would pass through the Soviet Zone individually.<sup>92</sup>

b. Harassment of Convoys. Soviet efforts to curb access to Berlin via Autobahn continued throughout the year. There was no relaxation of the customary impositions, and, whenever possible, new ones were added. In the face of Russian harassment, USAREUR maintained that an organized military truck convoy was a military unit and therefore not subject to internal scrutiny by the Russians. Showing the officers' identity cards, a Russian translation of the travel orders, and a manifest listing the number and type of vehicles as well as the number of officers and enlisted men, was the maximum documentation to which the Russian checkpoint officials were entitled. Although the Russians also demanded the presentation of individual identity cards, this was done only under protest, since the procedure was regarded as objectionable and damaging to U.S. military

<sup>90</sup> Cable SX-7005, USAREUR to Am Emb Bonn, 13 Nov 57. CONF.

<sup>91</sup> Annex A, to USAREUR ltr, 20 Aug 58, subj: Persons to be Authorized Movement Orders. CONF.

<sup>92</sup>(1) Cable SX-5371, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 22 Aug 57. (2) Cable SX-6559, USAREUR from TO to CINCUSAFE, Berlin Comd, et al., 22 Oct 57. Both CONF.

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prestige.<sup>93</sup>

On 5 August 1957 the Russians refused clearance to an advance party of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, unless each individual could be checked against the photograph on his identity card. The Soviet demand was rejected, and the convoy returned to West Berlin. The U.S. authorities in Berlin protested that this unprecedented demand was a breach of military courtesy and a restriction on U.S. Army access to the Berlin Autobahn in violation of existing Four-Power agreements. At the same time the Russians were notified that another convoy would soon be dispatched. In reply, the Russians declared that they had imposed no new controls and that the checkpoint personnel had only acted within long-standing regulations. However, a second convoy, dispatched on 7 August, was cleared through the checkpoint without a demand to match the individuals with their identity cards. In addition to the cards--which were, as usually, shown under protest--only the customary documentation was produced. The convoy was allowed to pass and arrived at Helmstedt without incident. USAREUR was determined not to retreat on this issue, since assent to Soviet demands to match identity cards with individuals would set a precedent that the Soviets might extend to military passenger trains. This would permit Russian personnel to board trains to check the passengers against their documentation, a procedure completely unacceptable to USAREUR.<sup>94</sup>

During a courtesy call on General Zakharov on 28 March 1958, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, U.S. Commander, Berlin, discussed the difficulties encountered by U.S. Army truck convoys at the Berlin Autobahn checkpoints. General Hamlett pointed out that the only documentation required for troop movements by train was the "train consist" together with a collective movement order and personnel roster. However, troop movements by road convoys had repeatedly been obstructed by Soviet demands for more detailed inspection and additional documentation. He therefore requested that future road convoys be processed similarly to troop movements by rail. The Russian commander replied that no changes in procedure were intended and promised to look into the matter to see that Russian checkpoint personnel were properly instructed.<sup>95</sup>

c. Allied Measures. Since Soviet harassment of U.S. military convoys continued unabated, General Hodes decided to discuss the cumbersome Russian checkpoint procedures with General Zakharov during the latter's visit to USAREUR headquarters in May 1958. The Russian commander appeared to agree at that time that the documentation required for military convoys and supply transports was unnecessarily complex and stated he would look into the matter. The three Allied political advisers then discussed the problem at a meeting in Berlin with their Soviet counterpart on 18 June.

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<sup>93</sup>Cable SX-5371, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 22 Aug 57. CONF.

<sup>94</sup>(1) Ibid. (2) Cable SX-5118, USAREUR to DA, 10 Aug 57. CONF.

<sup>95</sup>USAREUR CA Div Jnl, Mar 58. CONF.

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The Allied representatives protested that Soviet requirements for a detailed breakdown of military supplies and equipment was contrary to the terms of the Hodes-Zakharov discussion.

Meanwhile, USAREUR decided to send a convoy from Berlin to Helmstedt to probe Soviet intentions. The Russian commandant of Berlin was notified of this plan by letter and was informed that the convoy commander would be in possession of documentation prepared in accordance with the Hodes-Zakharov discussion. In reply, General Zakharov stated that he was unable to fulfill General Hodes' request, since the Allied and Soviet political advisers had not yet reached an agreement on Autobahn control procedures. The Russian checkpoints would therefore continue to abide by their current instructions. On 23 June, when the convoy appeared at the checkpoint with the documentation mentioned in the preceding letter, the Russian checkpoint officer refused to clear the convoy without additional documentation, whereupon the convoy returned to its point of origin. On the same day CINCUSAREUR lodged an official protest concerning this procedure.<sup>96</sup>

On 30 June, at another meeting with Lt. Col. Markushin, the deputy commandant of the Soviet Sector of Berlin, the Allied representatives learned that the Russians interpreted the Hodes-Zakharov discussions quite differently from USAREUR. A tripartite position concerning military truck documentation was presented to Colonel Markushin together with a copy of the approved Allied cargo manifest form. Colonel Markushin noted that adoption of the proposed form would represent a weakening of Soviet "control." He thereupon rejected as inadequate the Allied proposal to list cargo under the headings of military supplies and equipment, suggesting instead a breakdown into armaments, foodstuffs, and other equipment. The listing was also to include the total weight and number of containers. During the discussion Colonel Markushin introduced an entirely new element by asserting that Russian checkpoint personnel reserved the right to look at the contents of the vehicles to insure that the contents complied with the manifest. He insisted, however, that this did not imply an actual customs-type inspection. The Allied representatives replied that this new demand was completely unacceptable and that they would report the Soviet position to higher authority. It was now evident that the Russians, although temporarily thwarted over the issue of military train documentation, were probing for an advantage in the matter of military truck documentation.<sup>97</sup>

#### 129. Air Corridors

On 7 January 1957 a joint Russo-East German declaration issued in Moscow had stated that "existing four-power treaties regarding the use of air corridors between Berlin and West Germany by aircraft of the United States, Great Britain, and France have a temporary and limited character

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., Jun 58. CONF.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

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and do not affect the principle of recognition of air sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic." In October 1957 several articles reiterating the principle of East German air sovereignty appeared in semiofficial Communist publications. Neither the U.S. Embassy in Bonn nor USAREUR headquarters favored making any concessions on this issue, and both recommended that, if necessary, stern measures be adopted to assure uninterrupted Allied air access to Berlin. The U.S. position rested on the three basic premises that there must be no recognition of the East German claims to sovereignty in the Soviet Zone airspace, that there be reciprocity of rights between East and West, and that there be no impingement upon the rights of the Western Allies to unrestricted access to Berlin via the air corridors. Nevertheless, the Russians continued to use the issue as a means of asserting the "sovereignty" of their East German puppet by insisting that flights of Allied aircraft over East Germany be carried out in "strict conformity with the principle of the recognition of the sovereignty of the two German states."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>(1) Cable SX-6941, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Nov 57. (2) CA Div Jnl, Feb 58. (3) Cable USAREUR SMC-IN 8487, US Msn Berlin sgd Gufler to Am Emb Bonn, 20 Mar 58. All CONF.

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Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume except those found in AR 320-50, 29 October 1958.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
AAU	American Athletic Union
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACMS	Army Command Management System
ADPS	automatic data processing system(s)
ADSEC	Advance Section (USACOMZEUR)
ADVON	Advance Operations (USAFE)
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFN	American Forces Network
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AIRCENT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
ALFCE	See LANDCENT
Am	American
amb	ambassador
apt	apartment
ARS	Army Relief Society
ASAE	Army Security Agency in Europe
ASP	atomic support plan
A.S.S.R.	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
ATF	Army task force
BASEC	Base Section (USACOMZEUR)
BND	<u>Rundsnachrichtendienst</u> (West German intelligence agency)
B/P	bulky package
CAG	See CENTAG
CARE	Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere, Inc.
CCFFA	<u>Commandement en Chef des Forces Francaises en Allemagne</u> (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany)
CE JEDP	Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CG	commanding general
CINCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
COM	commander (with NATO designations)

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
COMSTELMAREA	Commanding Officer, Military Sea Transport Service, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area
contrib	contribute (contribution)
cos	cosmic
CP	capabilities plan
CRF	Central Records Facility (Fort Holabird, Md.)
CWS	Continental wage scale
CY	calendar year
CZ JEDP	Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan
CZ JPAW	Central Zone Joint Atomic Fire Plan
D/	See dep
DAC	Department of the Army civilian (employee)
DAD	Department of the Army Detachment
DAFC	Department of the Air Force civilian (employee)
dep	deputy
DM	<u>Deutsche Mark</u> (German monetary unit)
DRC	Defector Reception Center
DUKW	amphibious truck, 2½ ton, cargo
ea.	each
EAM	electric accounting machine(s)
ECP	European Command property (account)
ed.	edit(ion)
EDP	emergency defense plan
EEO	emergency evacuation order
EES	European Exchange System
e.g.	for example
EMPS	European Motion Picture Service
EP	emergency plan
<u>et al.</u>	<u>et alii</u> (and others)
etc.	et cetera
ETSSE	evacuation of technical services supplies and equipment
EUCOM	European Command (to August 1952)
Eur.	Europe(an)
FIA	financial inventory accounting
FOURATAF	Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force
Fr	France, French
FTX	field training exercise

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
GAO	general alert order
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GED	general educational development
Ger	German(y)
GFY	German fiscal year
G.m.b.H.	<u>Gesellschaft mit beschaenakter Haftung</u> (limited liability company)
GTAV	general transport administrative vehicle
HAC	See HACOM
HACOM	Headquarters Area Command
HICOG	U.S. High Commission(er) for Germany
<u>Ibid.</u>	<u>Ibidem</u> (in the same place)
ICCG	Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
JCA	Joint Construction Agency
JCOC	joint command and operations center
JEAP	joint emergency alert plan
jnl	journal
JUSMMAT	Joint U.S. Mission for Military Assistance to Turkey
KT	kiloton
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LCU	landing craft, utility
LOFC	line of communication
LS	labor service
LWR	local wage rate
man	manual
MASS	Modern Army Supply System
min	minister, ministry
MISEV	military service (unit)
mm	millimeter
MOBIDIC	mobile binary digital computer
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MPS	Motion Picture Service
MRS	memo routing slip
MS(s)	manuscript(s)
mtg	meeting
mthly	monthly

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
NACOM	Northern Area Command
NAVCENT	Allied Naval Forces Central Europe
n.d.	no date
NELM	U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NEO	noncombatant evacuation order
NODEX	new offshore discharge exercise
NORAD	North American Air Defense System
NORTAF	Northern Task Force
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
NUSIC	nuclear strike information center
CAC	Orleans Area Command
O&MA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OCA	Office of the Coordinator and Special Advisor
CRA	order for reinforced alert
ORD	Operations and Research Detachment
CRO	Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University)
OSA	order for simple alert
OSP	offshore procurement
p. (pp.)	page(s)
<u>passim</u>	here and there
PLF	parachute landing fall
recap	recapitulate, recapitulation
REG	Returnee Exploitation Group
RORO	roll-on, roll-off
RRPAT	Rhine River Patrol
S.	Senate bill
SACOM	Southern Area Command
Sen.	Senate, Senator
SERB	Soviet External Relations Branch
sess.	session
SETAF	See USASETAF
SID	Strategic Intelligence Detachment
SMC	staff message control
S.N.C.F.	<u>Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer</u> (French National Railways)
sq.	square

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
term	terminal
thru	through
TFI	technical proficiency inspection
TR	theater reserve
TWOATAF	Second Allied Tactical Air Force
USACAF	U.S. Army Construction Agency, France
USACAG	U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany
USACOMZEUR	U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe
USADEG	U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAGD	U.S. Army General Depot
USAPEB	U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven
USASETAF	U.S. Army Southern European Task Force
USATC	U.S. Army Transportation Center (Frankfurt)
USCOB	U.S. Commander, Berlin
USEP	U.S. Escapee Program
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command (after August 1952)
USIS	U.S. Information Service
USMLM	U.S. Military Liaison Mission (to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany)
USNAVGER	U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
USO	United Service Organization
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator
vol.	volume
vs.	versus
VTG	<u>Vereinigte Tanklager und Kesselwagen, G.m.b.H.</u> (United /German/ Tank Car Co., Inc.)
WAC	See WACOM
WACOM	Western Area Command
WBK	<u>Wehrbereichskommando</u> (Military Regions)
wkly	weekly
yds.	yards

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[illegible]

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler (1987). The total chlorophyll content was determined by the method of Arar and Cook (1980). The carotenoid content was determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Weil (1983). The total phenolic content was determined by the method of Singleton and Rossi (1965). The total flavonoid content was determined by the method of Zhishen et al. (1999). The total protein content was determined by the method of Lowry et al. (1951). The total amino acid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total nucleic acid content was determined by the method of Burton (1956). The total lipid content was determined by the method of Folch et al. (1957). The total carbohydrate content was determined by the method of Dubois and Gilles (1950). The total mineral content was determined by the method of Ashby et al. (1984). The total organic acid content was determined by the method of Saito et al. (1987). The total alkaloid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total saponin content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total tannin content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total terpenoid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total steroid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total glycoside content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total alkaloid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total saponin content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total tannin content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total terpenoid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total steroid content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982). The total glycoside content was determined by the method of Kohn and Wootton (1982).

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Chronology

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
	<u>1957</u>	
<u>Jul</u>		
1	Wage increase for German LWR retail-trade employees becomes effective.	23c(3)
	First reserve officers are integrated into the Regular Army under PL 737, 84th Congress.	19a
	Rhine Ammunition Depot, Rhine Ordnance Barracks (Central), U.S. Army Quartermaster Market Center, Signal and Ordnance Procurement Centers, and Ordnance Finance and Accounting Office are transferred from USAREUR to USACOMZEUR.	77a
	Department of the Army limits the use of stock and consumer funds as part of a world-wide austerity program for the first half of FY 1958.	78a
	U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, is relieved from assignment to the U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, and placed under the operational control of the Engineer Division.	61
	All technical service commands are discontinued, except for the U.S. Army Signal Command.	5h
	U.S. 10th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions are reorganized under the pentomic concept.	61b
	40th Missile Group, Heavy, is reorganized at Redstone Arsenal.	62c
	LANDCENT assigns the German II Corps headquarters and 2d and 4th Infantry Divisions to CENTAG.	58b
2	CINCENT sets forth policy for the operation of joint command and operations centers.	56
5	USEUCOM and USAREUR conferees meet to discuss the SHAPE barrier air defense concept.	64a
8	Maj. Gen. H. G. Maddox is appointed USAREUR Deputy Commander in Chief.	
	Maj. Gen. C. D. Dasher replaces Maj. Gen. H. G. Maddox as USAREUR Chief of Staff.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
	Col. W. W. Harris replaces Maj. Gen. E. D. Post as USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff.	
15	DA-directed reduction in force of approximately 13 percent of USAREUR DAC spaces begins.	23a(1)
	Agreement on 5½ percent wage increase for German LWR workers, effective since 1 April 1956, is finally signed.	23c(2)
18	Operation SAFEHAVEN, in support of the Hungarian refugee movement, is terminated.	109
20	CENTAG EP 1-57 is published.	54b
<u>Aug</u>	USAREUR abandons plans for construction of underground general depots and substitutes cut-and-cover construction.	87b
1	The 45-hour workweek becomes effective for the bulk of German LWR employees.	23c(5)
	Department of the Army imposes obligation ceilings for the first quarter and first half of the fiscal year.	8a
	U.S. 8th Infantry Division is reorganized under the pentomic concept.	61b
	German III Corps assumes responsibility for the former sector of the French II Corps.	58b
	Joint Construction Agency is disestablished and the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France, is designated as its successor organization.	6m
8	USAREUR Theater Army SOP is completed.	75b
10	French Government announces currency devaluation from 350 to 420 francs to the dollar.	11a
15	USAREUR Staff Units are organized.	6a
	USAREUR EP 312 (NEO) becomes effective.	60d
19	USAREUR plan for the receipt and movement of special weapons is completed.	80a

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
19-24	Exercise AIRMED ALPHA is conducted.	72e(1)
26	USAREUR ETSSE 1-55 is rescinded.	75d(1)
28	Col. C. T. Schmidt replaces Col. C. N. Smith as Chief, Civil Affairs Division.	
30	Stockpile is established in USAREUR for Theater Reserve Number 3A.	89e
31	USAREUR BOQ construction program is completed.	100b(2)
<u>Sep</u>		
1	U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, is assigned responsibility for Air Force construction in Germany.	100a
6	Joint action by Departments of the Army and Air Force cancels Section 15 of Theater Reserve Number 1.	89c
13	USAREUR is informed that expenditure ceilings have been imposed upon Department of the Army.	8b
15	U.S. Army Military District, Europe, is organized, and the six existing U.S. Army Reserve military districts are discontinued.	6i
	Col. C. P. Babcock is appointed Chief, U.S. Army Military District, Europe, and Deputy Area Commander for Reserve Affairs, Europe.	
17-22	Exercise COUNTER-PUNCH is conducted.	72a(2)
19	Soviets remove U.S. mail car from U.S. Army Berlin duty train at Marienborn checkpoint.	127b
19-28	Exercise BROWN JUG is conducted.	72e(2)
25	Lt. Col. W. F. Ashenfelder replaces Col. C. H. Miles as USAREUR Finance and Accounting Officer.	
27	Trilateral agreement with France and Germany approves integration of the NATO and USAREUR POL pipeline systems in Europe.	90b
30	Defense support <u>Deutsche Mark</u> funds are exhausted.	7b
<u>Oct</u>		
	USAREUR is directed to reuse obligated but unexpended <u>Deutsche Marks</u> to meet payrolls.	8b

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
	COMFOURATAF forwards to CENTAG a study of relocating the operational elements of CENTAG and FOURATAF headquarters.	56
	Electronic computer is delivered and installed for use in Seventh Army MASS.	14c
	DA training team makes annual staff visit to USAREUR.	74b
1	U.S. Army Hospital Center, Germany, becomes operative.	5g
	U.S. 3rd Armored Division is reorganized under the pentomic concept.	61b
	Consolidated Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service, Europe (AAFMPSE-E), is established.	32b
	Drastic reduction of German LWR employee strength, caused by elimination of <u>Deutsche Mark</u> defense support payments, begins.	23c(1)
	Command-wide use of Army Command Management System begins on trial basis.	10
1-18	NODEX 17 is conducted by USACOMZEUR as a large-scale logistic training exercise.	96b(2)
2	HICOG-12 and ICEM shipments on Berlin duty train are eliminated.	127c
7	Accountability for USAREUR command stocks is transferred to USACOMZEUR technical service supply-control agencies.	93
8	First Nike battalion is organized in Europe.	61b
9	CINCUSAREUR approves revision of Concept C planning.	76a
10	USAREUR directs that major tonnages be diverted from French ports to Bremerhaven and Rotterdam in interest of economy.	76a(1)
	Seventh Army proposes changes to NORTHAG-CENTAG boundary.	58c
13	German Democratic Republic (East Zone) announces currency reform.	125
27	Intensive East German tailing of USMLM tour vehicles begins.	124

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
31	COMCENTAG submits plans for integrating Allied personnel into his wartime headquarters staff.	55a
	ORO European Field Office is instructed to prepare a study on the USAREUR supply system in order to simplify supply procedures in the command.	88d(1)
<u>Nov</u>	USAREUR G1 assumes direct responsibility for welfare construction program; issuance of certificates of fund availability ceases.	9a
	First Provisional Artillery Task Force is redesignated Northern Task Force (NORTAF).	63b(1)
6	USAREUR publishes new administrative instructions for a revised Concept C.	76a(2)
8	German III Corps assumes responsibility for eastern border security.	58a
14	C/USMLM protests to SERB over East German tailing actions.	124
18	Pilot Law Officer Program is established in USAREUR, to become effective 1 January 1958.	36a
30	USAREUR POL pipeline through France is considered complete.	101h
<u>Dec</u>	USAREUR establishes G2-G3 war-room group to operate until CENTAG forward command post becomes operational.	60e
	SACEUR presents to the NATO Standing Group his proposals for integration of air defense.	64b
1	Program for discharge of substandard enlisted personnel begins.	20b
	CENTAG/USAREUR EP 321 becomes effective for planning purposes.	60c
	U.S. Army Ordnance School is discontinued, and its activities are consolidated with those of the U.S. Army Engineer School.	6j

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
2	New Allied travel documentation is introduced.	127f
6	U.S. tailing action of SMLM is suspended.	124
12	USAREUR plan for the receipt and movement of special weapons is implemented on a command-wide basis.	80a
17	CINCUSAREUR requests of USCINCEUR that Redstone missiles be made available to his command.	62a
21	COMCENTAG approves agreement on barrier and denial planning.	59b
24	COMCENTAG forwards plans for establishing integrated peacetime staffs for CENTAG headquarters.	55b

1958

Jan

1	U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF) is transferred from the jurisdiction of USEUCOM to that of USAREUR.	4c
	USAREUR assumes intelligence collecting responsibility for Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.	39
	German Democratic Republic announces that U.S. citizens in possession of diplomatic and special passports will be required to have visas for travel into and through East Germany.	125
	Pay increases of 10 percent become effective for civil-service employees.	23a(4)
	Pay increases of 8 percent become effective for French LWR employees.	23d(2)
6	Seventh Army Support Command is activated.	4a
7	Gyroscope rotation by battle groups and smaller units replaces rotation by divisions.	18c
10	Centralization of stock control and accountability for all technical services is completed.	93
11	Col. H. H. Shaller is appointed Acting Chief, Special Activities Division, replacing Maj. Gen. D. M. Daniel.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
15	Out-patient hospital and clinic fee for DAC employees and their dependents is reduced from \$1:75 to \$1.00 per visit.	31b
16	USAREUR realigns responsibility for air defense.	65a
18	Maj. Gen. C. L. Dasher replaces Maj. Gen. H. G. Maddox as USAREUR Deputy Commander in Chief.  Maj. Gen. J. M. Willems replaces Maj. Gen. C. L. Dasher as USAREUR Chief of Staff.  Col. C. E. Johnson is appointed Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing temporarily Maj. Gen. J. M. Willems.	
20-24	Exercise WHIP SAW II is conducted.	72e(3)
21	Department of the Army directs USAREUR to make maximum peacetime use of the French line of communications and ports.	76a(4)
28	Operation Double Switch, relocating the 8th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions, is completed.	103b(1)
30	USAREUR JEAP 1-56 is rescinded.	60c
31	USAREUR rescinds orders diverting cargo from the French ports.  USAREUR dependent housing program supported by <u>Deutsche Marks</u> is completed.	76a(5)  100b(3)
<u>Feb</u>	Electronic computer is moved from its temporary site in Stuttgart to Zweibruecken.  USAREUR develops procedure to reestablish obligated <u>Deutsche Mark</u> balances with dollars.  Conference on refugee and civil-control planning, with representatives from LANDCENT, AFCENT, CENTAG, U.S. Seventh Army, French First Army, USACOMZEUR, and U.S. V and VII Corps, is held.	11c  8b  66
1	Rhine River Patrol turns over the patrolling function to the German 791st Engineer River Company.	61d

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
5	USNS Comet, a newly designed RORO vessel, arrives in St. Nazaire, completing its first voyage to USAREUR.	96a(5)
10	Soviet stamping of Allied travel orders is initiated.	127g
10-14	Exercise COLD WAVE is conducted.	72e(3)
10-20	Exercise SABRE HAWK is conducted.	72d
14	CENTAG authorizes U.S. Seventh Army and French First Army to begin planning with German military regions.	59b
15	U.S. Army Signal School is discontinued and its functions are consolidated with those of the U.S. Army Quartermaster School.	6k
	U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, Europe; U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, France; U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, Germany; and U.S. Army Element, Stars and Stripes, are assigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, and placed under the operational control of the Information Division.	6q-t
17	Location of cut-and-cover depot in ADSEC is determined.	87b(1)
	ORO presents recommendations for simplifying USAREUR supply procedures.	88d(1)
	USAREUR publishes Change 1 to Vol. II (Logistics), USAREUR CP 1-56 (BASIC).	75a
18	CINCUSAREUR approves major revision of EP 201.	60b
20	CINCUSAREUR is designated as USCINCEUR representative for establishing, maintaining, and publishing a consolidated list of off-shore suppliers upon whom restrictions have been imposed by U.S. commands and agencies.	86
21	USAREUR publishes its Support Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Unilateral) (C).	75d(3)
26	Maj. Gen. R. M. Osborne is appointed USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
28	USAREUR forwards to NORTHAG combined agreement for employment of NORTAF.	63b(1)
<u>Mar</u>	USAREUR Mobile Chest X-Ray Service is placed in operation.	31c
3	First dollar payment is made to German Finance Ministry to repay "borrowed" unexpended <u>Deutsche Marks</u> .	8b
6	Department of the Army inaugurates van-sea-van method of transporting household goods overseas.	96a(4)
12	USAREUR Training Area Survey and Negotiations Board is established.	110a
	CINCUSAREUR directs conversion of maids' quarters, playrooms, and excess BOQ spaces to temporary family quarters.	100i
14	Col. H. H. Shaller is appointed Chief, Special Activities Division.	
15	Col. A. W. Widmer replaces Lt. Col. W. F. Ashenfelder as Finance and Accounting Officer.	
	The Office of the Secretary of the General Staff is discontinued, and the Office of the Commander in Chief is reorganized.	3b
17-22	Exercise LION BLEU is conducted.	72b
20	CINCUSAREUR presents his recommendations for air defense to Department of the Army.	64f
21	USACOMZEUR publishes its plan for evacuation and demolition of technical service depots in Germany.	75d(1)
	Special Service tours to Potsdam are suspended.	125c
25-27	Exercise GREEN COBRA is conducted.	72e(3)
28	Raising German flag with U.S. flag over major USAREUR installations begins.	113

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
<u>Apr</u>	USAREUR championship marksmanship matches are held.	69f
	France agrees to use of dollar currency in that nation.	11b
1	First joint U.S.-German interrogation center begins operations at Stuttgart.	40a(1)
	Program for realigning logistical functions and technical service commands between USAREUR and USACOMZEUR is completed.	77a
	Theater logistical functions are transferred from USAREUR to USACOMZEUR.	77c
	U.S. Army Transportation Depot, Sandhofen, is transferred from USAREUR control to USACOMZEUR.	77a
	Northern Area Command (NACOM) and Headquarters Area Command (HACOM) are consolidated, with NACOM assuming responsibility for what had been HACOM.	4e(1)
	1st Mountain Division, 1 combat group of the 1st Airborne Division, 2 armored infantry battalions and 1 combat command of the 5th Armored Division, and a signal battalion of the II Corps, all German units, are assigned to CENTAG.	58b
2	USAREUR Supply and Maintenance Board is established.	88d(3)
3	Maj. Gen. H. Hewett is relieved as Air Defense Coordinator and appointed USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Advanced Weapons and Guided Missiles.	
	Col. W. W. Harris is appointed USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and Logistics.	
10	Last housing unit in the Neu-Isenburg area is released.	111a
	COMCENTAG forwards revised plans for establishing integrated peacetime CENTAG headquarters.	55b
17	New logistical mission is defined for USACOMZEUR.	77e
21	Maj. Gen. T. L. Sherburne, Jr., replaces Maj. Gen. R. C. Cooper as Assistant Chief of Staff, G3.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
24	USAREUR publishes the new USEUCOM list of debarred and suspended suppliers and contractors.	86
29	CENTAG EP 1-57 is redesignated CENTAG EP 1-58 by publication of Corrigendum Number 1.	54b
	State Department approves Ambassador's recommendation to accept German Status of Forces Agreement proposals in principle.	110
<u>May</u>	DA team begins survey of USAREUR reporting system.	15b
1	Berlin Command, Northern Area Command, Western Area Command, Southern Area Command, and U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven, are redesignated as major commands.	2b
	Wage increases of approximately 9 percent become effective for German LWR hotel and mess personnel.	23c(4)
6	USAREUR Chief of Staff approves recommendations for employment of the first Redstone group.	62b
9	USAREUR-USAFE-FOURATAF conferees on air defense procedures meet.	65d
	Last four war criminals are paroled from Landsberg Prison facility.	112
13	USAREUR Class IV Special Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-1-58 is established in support of USAREUR EP 201.	75d(4)
15	Air Defense Division is discontinued.	3c
22	Soviet Marshal M. V. Zakharov makes official courtesy call on Gen. H. I. Hodes.	123
23	Italy agrees to use of dollar currency in that nation.	11b
	First broadcast over newly acquired AFN facilities in France is made.	117
26	Col. K. E. Lay replaces Col. E. B. James as Chief, Historical Division.	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
27	Dollar currency replaces military payment certificates in France, Germany, and Italy.	11b
	USAREUR withdraws Air Defense Liaison Group from Twelfth Air Force headquarters.	65b
28	USAREUR logistical support plan for advanced weapons in non-U.S. NATO countries is completed.	79
30	CINCENT publishes atomic strike plan.	63a
<u>Jun</u>	USAREUR establishes the U.S. Army Surveillance Unit, Europe.	61e
	FOURATAF headquarters moves to Ramstein Airbase.	56
1	USAREUR submits plan for the safeguarding and supplying of nuclear warheads to non-U.S. NATO delivery units.	64b(3)
	Military pay increases of 10 percent become effective.	19c
	Pay increase of $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 percent become effective for Italian LWR employees.	23e
1-5	Exercise FULL PLAY is conducted.	72c
4	New enlisted grade structure is established.	19d
	Planning is inaugurated for emergency alternate line of communications.	94c
6	Maj. Gen. P. A. Gavan replaces Maj. Gen. G. E. Martin as Assistant Chief of Staff, G1.	
7	U.S. helicopter makes forced landing in East Germany; crew is seized.	125d
11	CINCUSAREUR remits unserved portions of sentences of remaining war criminal parolees.	112
13	LANDCENT conference on air defense meets.	64g
18	Department of the Army announces that negotiations with the Italian Government are being initiated to obtain entry rights for 10th Special Forces Group.	61c

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Date

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30

German 791st Engineer River Company assumes responsibility for the lift mission of the Rhine River Patrol.

61d

Use of dependent housing is withdrawn from technical representatives in the USAREUR area.

105b(2)

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